POLITICAL THEORY AND
POLITICAL HISTORY:
UNDER THREAT OF VIOLENT ERASURE

A PUBLICATION OF
THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF BLACK POLITICAL SCIENTISTS
POLITICAL THEORY AND
POLITICAL HISTORY:
UNDER THREAT OF VIOLENT ERASURE

A PUBLICATION OF
THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF BLACK POLITICAL SCIENTISTS
# Contents

| Editors’ Note | vii |
| Research Articles | 1 |
| China’s public diplomacy in Kenya: History, Power and Politics | 2 |
| *Anita Plummer* |
| Wrestling with the whiteness of South African philosophy: Ndumiso Dladla’s Here is a Table | 20 |
| *Thabang Dladla* |
| Du Boisian Multi-structuralism | 39 |
| *Reem Abou-samra* |
| “Fair” Minority Representation and the California Voting Rights Act | 55 |
| *Olivier Richomme* |
| Humanitarian Intervention: Powerless in a Globalizing World? | 76 |
| *Harold Young* |
| The Moses Complex and the Crisis of African American Leadership | 95 |
| *Dale Tatum* |
| Turning the Wheels: Striving and Black American Social Identity in the 21st Century | 129 |
| *Ronald E. Brown, Davin Phoenix, and James Jackson* |
| Symposium: Teaching, Learning, and Theorizing Under the Threat of Violence and Erasure | 149 |
| Embraced: Reflecting on the Massacre of Muslim People in New Zealand Through My Research Findings | 150 |
| *April Jackson* |
| “Theories of Time and Space”: Natasha Trethewey’s Black Feminist Pedagogy and the Political Philosophy of a Poet Laureate | 153 |
| *Audra Eagle Yun* |
| Decolonizing South African Education: Lessons from the Pre-Colonial Era | 156 |
| *Betty Mamotlokoa Serame* |
| For the Love of Nipsey Hussle | 163 |
| *Shauntece Laurant* |
| Filmmaking as Scholarship: Filmmaking, Knowledge Production, and Embodied Theorizing | 167 |
| *H.L.T. Quan* |
Book Reviews

Huma Mohibullah review of *Making Moderate Islam: Sufism, Service, and the “Ground Zero Mosque”* Controversy by Rosemary R. Corbett

Meredith Cecilia Lee review of *Race and Sexuality* by Salvador Vidal-Ortiz, Brandon Andrew Robinson, and Cristina Khan

Jennifer Jones review of *Partners or Rivals? Power and Latino, Black, and White Relations in the 21st Century* by Betina Cutaia Wilkinson

Michael Burch review of *The World of Protracted Conflicts* by Michael Brecher

Justin Koch review of *Checkbook Elections?: Political Finance in Comparative Perspective* by Pippa Norris and Andrea Abel van Es

Jessica Beyer review of *Risk and Hyperconnectivity: Media and Memories of Neoliberalism* by Andrew Hoskins and John Tulloch

Jennifer Richter review of *The Politics of Innovation: Why Some Countries Are Better Than Others at Science and Technology* by Mark Zachary Taylor


Craig Bruce Smith review of *The American Revolution Reborn* by Patrick Spero and Michael Zuckerman

Amber Gordon review of *Treasure | My Black Rupture* by Anna Martine Whitehead and *Surveillance* by Ashaki Jackson

Note on Passing: Byrdie Larkin

Invitation to the Scholarly Community
Editor’s Note

The Research Articles begin with Anita Plummer’s contention that “Chinese diplomats have branded their country as a non-hegemonic global partner that had the common experience of Europe’s imperial expansion along with the other formerly colonized nations… with the resulting effect that “Chinese diplomats have replaced a Eurocentric narrative with a Sino-centric one.” This research brings a four-century span of political history into conversation with contemporary research on diplomatic narratives. Philosopher Thabang Dladla introduces the threads which link political integration projects in South Africa to the role played by advocates of colonialism in the field of political philosophy. Reem Abou-samra explores “contradictory advocacy” in W.E.B. Du Bois’s writings and in scholarship about him and recommends multi-structuralism as an alternative methodology for scholarship on his work. In this critical period after the June 2019 Supreme Court Rucho v. Common Cause decision Olivier Richomme’s research on the California Voting Rights Act explains how significant state level decision making on increasing minorities’ representation, especially Latinos, will continue to be. Harold Young’s research on Sudan Myanmar, Congo, Yemen, and Venezuela raises wide-ranging questions about the challenges facing people of color as they face referrals to the International Criminal Court. Dale Tatum’s critique of elite leadership practices is sited at the busy intersection between political psychology, studies of leadership, and religion and politics. This sweeping research article draws on a variety of sources including speeches from the 1865 Colored People’s Convention, the 1865 West Indian Day Emancipation Day, the 1963 March on Washington, as well as proverbs and spirituals. “Using the Black American subsample of the 2001-03 National Survey of American Life (NSAL-SAQ),” Ronald Brown, Davin Phoenix, and James Jackson suggest that “striving effectively affirms black individuals’ positive social identification in light of their experiences with racial inequity, while surfacing potential cleavages within the black political coalition.” Taken together this issue features several scholars reflecting on pre-colonial African societies as knowledge reservoirs for the present as well as enduring cognitive and psychological strategies for group and individual survival. This issue is based on rigorous experimental research on more than a half dozen countries and robust study of race in an international and global context. Quantitative research on political psychology, political behavior, and voting rights offers insightful and productive findings about the nature of political repression.

The Symposium features reflections on teaching and learning and how the experiences that we have in our research cultivate empathy, tolerance, and egalitarian views. April Jackson draws on her research findings and learning experiences about the hyper-pathologization of Black Muslim and African Methodist Episcopal youth and their communities to connect to the people massacred in Islamophobic violence in New Zealand. Audra Eagle Yun, Head of Special Collections & Archives at the University, of California, Irvine and the principal investigator for “Transforming Knowledge/Transforming Libraries,” a three-year IMLS Laura Bush 21st Century Librarian Program research grant project to explore the gap between ethnic studies theory and community archives practice, reflects on being taught by US Poet Laureate Natasha Trethewey and how that experience shaped her work in defense of community based archives. Betty Mamotlokoa Serame examines the South African high school and university student protests (2014-present) through an analysis of Pan Africanist approaches to education that often take pre-colonial education seriously. As decolonization has become the key language in South Africa to talk about how to challenge the legacies of white supremacy, bias, and
contemporary discrimination in higher education Serame reminds us to turn toward the classic writings of Jomo Kenyatta’s *Facing Mount Kenya* (1938) and Kwame Nkrumah’s *Flower of Learning* (1962) and Steve Biko’s *I Write What I Like* (1978) and their political philosophies about the role of education in political life. Shauntece Laurant writes in the aftermath of the murder of Nipsey Hussle, a Southern California based musician, about the process of unlearning pathologizing norms about being from a racialized and devalued inner city space. H.L.T. Quan describes the political project of QUAD Productions as making “social theoretical perspectives in an accessible language for students and the general public, and to produce impactful insight for policy consideration.” Jackson and Laurant, both NCOBPS GAP Award Winners, represent interdisciplinary approaches to political science and the impact of our successful pipeline project from Atlanta to South Central Los Angeles to the mighty and truly inspired intellectual space that NCOBPS continues to be for so many of our young scholars.

Our refereed Book Reviews take up issues of assimilation and Americanization as they shape how Muslims living in the United States come to terms with the mutually articulating forms of institutionalized discrimination they face; how race and sexuality can be rendered more fruitfully as imbricated and tangled processes that must turn toward queer of color critique—and beyond intersectionality—to be able to address trans women of color as well as other social and political identities. Picking up on NCOBPS long contributions to the founding and expansion of Race and Ethnic Politics and Latino Politics our Book Reviews continue to evidence a long-standing and sincere intellectual curiosity about developments in these cutting edge and independent areas of inquiry toward evaluating the possibilities and constraints on political coalition building. Scholars explore “protracted conflicts” and their multi-issue roots in 33 cases with the distinctive contribution of a centuries long view of political history as well as an interdisciplinary cross national study of the nature of post WW II innovation. State-level demographic changes and their impact on presidential elections and political finance regulation and the lack thereof remain as critical features of citizen perceptions of access to substantive democracy. As a wave of right wing political parties sweeps across Europe and the Americas big capital—financial, corporate, communications, transportation, new technologies, land and natural resources, and pharmaceutical and biomedical— has increasing leverage to influence electoral outcomes and perceptions about the quality of elections and the stability of democratic governance. The book reviews feature research on grassroots collective action and newspapers as still-relevant a force for cultural influence in the face of “organized forgetting” about neoliberalism as an enduring key term of significance for the present. Offering a refreshing approach to the study of politics and culture, reviews explore the paradox between a cinematic revival of studies of the American Revolution in an era when scholars have largely become silent on the subject and consider two exemplars in the burgeoning field of creative writing about Blackness as a subject for robust theoretical consideration. Documenting the newest Renaissance in Black Arts, authors around the world put police brutality, spectacularization, and temporality under the microscope of research in pursuit of total and unequivocal Black liberation.

This issue is dedicated to the memory of the creative genius and generosity of Peter Hudson (1951-2019), Byrdie Larkin (1952-2019), Binyavanga Wainaina (1971-2019), Leonard McNeil (1945-2019), and Nipsey Hussle (1985-2019). We also mourn with our members Ismail White and Shenita Brazelton and to those others who have lost friends and loved ones. We send our sincere condolences to the families and friends of Marion Overton White and Robert Brazelton.

Tiffany Willoughby-Herard
University of California, Irvine
China’s public diplomacy in Kenya: History, Power and Politics

Anita Plummer*
Howard University

Abstract
Since 2006, bilateral trade and investment between Kenya and China has increased along with the presence of state and non-state actors from China. With China’s reemergence on the African continent comes a need to earn a positive reputation and image of the Chinese actors in Africa. Historically, China’s relationship with poor countries has played an important role in its grand strategy. The Sino-Kenyan diplomatic arena is a medium by which China and East Africa’s historical contact has been carefully crafted and conveyed to both Kenyan and Chinese publics. History has been adapted to fit the ideals and vision of Chinese diplomats in order to protect and advance their own political and economic interests in Kenya. By examining cases temporally tied to the 14th century Zheng He voyages to Kenya’s coast, Afro-Asian solidarity movements, and Cold War relations between Kenya and China, this study explores the core values that are articulated in the interest-bound and culturally-bound information distributed by Chinese diplomats in Africa.

Keywords: Kenya, China, public diplomacy, soft power, Cold War, Africa

The pre-modern history of the contact between East African and Chinese civilizations, until recently, had been marginalized from Western, Chinese and African historical narratives. It has been well documented in historiographies that Eurocentric world histories mark the early modern age with the European discovery and conquest from the years 1400 to 1600; for centuries various phases of Chinese history have been suppressed by political authorities in efforts to establish legitimacy; and for Africa, according to scholars like Friedrich Hegel and Hugh Trevor Roper, only recently entered history through its colonization by Europe and slavery. Chinese diplomats have created, cultivated, and delivered a historical narrative in Africa that has emphasized the pre-modern ties between city-states on the coast of East Africa and China, while de-emphasizing its historical ties with African nations during the colonial and immediate post-colonial periods. This narrative frame has the potential to present an alternative reading of Africa’s place in history; one that emphasizes pre-colonial African societies as agents in the international system that engaged in both trade and diplomacy with China. Conceptually, this narrative moves beyond the popular pronouncements of south-south solidarity, common struggles against colonialism, win-win partnerships and mutuality. Chinese diplomats have branded their country as a non-hegemonic global partner that had the common experience of Europe’s imperial expansion along with the other formerly colonized nations. However, in Africa, the narrative has been revised backward to include a glorious history that predated European conquest and colonization with China at the center. Rhetorically, Chinese diplomats have replaced a Eurocentric narrative with a Sino-centric one. This narrative has been adapted to fit the vision of political elites who want to justify China’s increased economic and political

* Direct correspondence to anita.plummer@howard.edu
engagement with African nations and along with it culturally bound messages that connect China to Africa’s past, present and future.

The first part of the study uses cases temporally tied to the 14th century Zheng He voyages to Kenya’s coast and the second part focuses on Afro-Asian solidarity movements and Cold War relations between Kenya and China. The cases are followed by an inquiry into the core values that are articulated in the interest-bound and culturally-bound information distributed by Chinese diplomats and other high-ranking officials. The researcher conducted a document analysis of speeches, publically available government documents, news articles and op-eds in Kenyan-based media and some Chinese-based media between 2005 and 2012. This time period corresponds with China’s re-engagement with Kenya which included a series of events such as the opening of the first Confucius Institute in Africa at the University of Nairobi, the 600-year anniversary of the Zheng He voyages, and the launch of two Chinese-funded archeological projects in Kenya. The researcher also conducted interviews and observational research in Lamu and Malindi in 2010.

**Interest-bound information**

The present phase of Africa and China’s engagement was launched at the 2006 Beijing Summit convened by the Forum on Cooperation on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC). High-level representatives from 48 African nations met with senior level Chinese officials under the maxim ‘friendship, peace, cooperation, and development.’ Since then, bilateral trade and investment have increased along with the presence of state and non-state actors from China in Africa. With China’s reemergence on the African continent comes a need to earn a positive reputation and image of the Chinese actors in Africa. China’s economic and political ties with nations in the Global South have helped secure its position as a world power. Africa is important to China’s interests because it is a source of raw materials, a destination of Chinese-made manufactured goods, and a support-base in international multilateral institutions. There has been a lively debate in African policy circles, the African press and academia about the short and long-term impact of China’s presence in Africa in what Seifudein Adem (2012) categorized as Sino-optimism, Sino-pragmatism and Sino-pessimism. Optimists argue that China’s presence in Africa has and will usher in much-needed economic development on the continent. The pragmatists state that the escalation of China’s business interests are an inevitable part of interconnected global markets. Consequently, they argue, China’s behavior in Africa is similar to other major actors from Europe and the United States. The pessimists, on the other hand, maintain that China’s role in Africa will further its underdevelopment because it reinforces Africa’s role on the periphery of the international system (Adem 2012). In light of the debates, diplomats from China have built a narrative with the intent to frame contemporary Sino-African relations in response to perceived or real image problems.

A government uses public diplomacy to engage foreign audiences and to protect and advance their own political, economic and strategic interests (Fitzpatrick 2009). Nye (2004; 2011) states that soft power yields desired outcomes, credibility, and legitimacy. China’s soft-power strategy is firmly rooted in its imperative to access resources and markets and African elites’ ability to use China’s engagement to boost their political clout and power in international negotiations (Kopiński, Polus, and Taylor 2011). China’s public diplomacy tools in Africa include people-to-people exchanges, disaster relief, humanitarian assistance, cultural exchanges and Confucius Institutes. China Central Television and China Radio International, both of which are based in Nairobi, are intended to reach broader African publics. China’s public relations use
narrative frames that are intended to help influence the political environment not only in Kenya, but also in other developing countries.

Public diplomacy and public relations are two related concepts; public diplomacy applies public relations models that are not mutually exclusive in practice and outcome (Grunig 1992; Signitzer and Coombs 1992; Wang 2006; Yun 2006). A nation must have a positive reputation to build credibility and to some extent persuasion factors in China’s public diplomacy in Africa. Michael Kunczik (1997) defines public-relations between nations as “the planned and continuous distribution of interest-bound information by a state aimed (mostly) at improving a country’s image abroad” (13). International public relations are designed to introduce, integrate and legitimize institutions of communication (Curtin and Gaither 2007). In the literature on international public relations, the term is often interchangeable with propaganda (Ibid.; Kunczik 1997; Zhang and Cameron 2003). Communications experts initially applied intercultural public relations and the ethnocentric model to multinational corporations (Botan 1992), but it may also be used to consider the assumptions of semi-periphery nations engaging those in the periphery. According to Kinzer and Bohn (1985), one of the underlying problems in the ethnocentric model is that the information may be inappropriate for foreign audiences because it reflects political conditions of the home nation and not the host.

The international dimensions of China’s public relations, especially in developing nations, are based on the assumption that the Chinese model of public relations and the values that they project are universal. For example, China’s emphasis on a history of empire is deeply embedded in Chinese culture, and the opening ceremony of the 2008 Beijing Olympics was a “coming out” for China, reintroducing itself to the world on a grand scale. The opening ceremony emphasized China’s pre-modern history as a central part of its culture and thus the foundation of contemporary China’s rise. This is also reflected in the literature on China’s global strategy which states that China’s five thousand years of continuous recorded history has primed it to be a world power (Ye 2011). This is the impetus for the history of contact between Africa and China being a central part of China’s narrative in Africa. This raises the obvious question, how effective are the historical narratives that political agents argue bind African nations together with China to determine their mutual destinies?

**Pre-modern contact**

Trade along the Silk Road maritime and overland routes facilitated the exchange of goods between East Africa’s coast and China for five centuries before Zheng He’s fleet arrived. Chinese products were circulating not only along East Africa’s coast but also inland in Ancient Zimbabwe and the city of Mapungubwe in present day South Africa (Snow 1989). By the eighth century, as Islam expanded, settlements on Kenya’s coast became bustling centers for merchants. By the tenth and eleventh centuries, significant amounts of African goods such as ivory, frankincense, rhinoceros horn, tortoiseshell, and ambergris were reaching China. The Kenyan coastal cities of Mombasa, Malindi, Lamu Island and Pate Island were a part of the international Indian Ocean trade network led by Muslim merchants who ferried silk, pottery, bronze utensils and coins to the Kenyan coastal communities.

Zheng He led the first formal visit by a state official from China to Africa under the third emperor of the Ming Dynasty. His 1417-1419 voyage, which followed the trade routes as mentioned above, was specifically planned for Africa. The fleet traveled from Taicang along the same path it took for the previous four voyages to Iran and later Oman and Yemen. His first Africa trip went along the coast to Mogadishu, Baraaawe, Pate Island, Lamu Island and Malindi.
Zheng He’s sixth voyage from 1421 to 1422 and final voyage from 1431 to 1433 also visited the Swahili coast as far south as Mombasa. The tours represented a magnificent display of cross-cultural contact that was the culmination of centuries of trade over thousands of miles. Chinese diplomats have resurrected the history of the Zheng He voyages alongside the better-known history of Third World solidarity against European colonialism. There are three aspects of the Zheng He story that diplomats in Africa emphasize in speeches and newspaper op-eds: the giraffe of Malindi, the story of Chinese descendants living on Kenya’s coast, and the excavation of a Chinese ship and other artifacts.

Giraffe diplomacy

The presentation of a giraffe to the Ming emperor, Zhu Di, in Peking in 1415 by envoys from the city-state of Malindi has been a familiar story told by present-day diplomats in Africa. In a 2010 letter to The Daily Nation (Kenya), one of the most widely-read newspapers in the region, Ambassador Liu Guangyuan wrote:

Back in the early 15th Century, the biggest ship in the world visited the Kenyan coast. The ship’s commander, Zheng He, was one of the greatest navigators during China’s Ming Dynasty (1368-1644 AD). He can be compared to Marco Polo, Vasco da Gama, Ferdinand Magellan, and Christopher Columbus. During one of his seven voyages to the western sea, Zheng brought Chinese porcelain and friendship to Kenya. In return, the residents of Malindi gave him a giraffe. Zheng proudly took the animal back to China. The giraffe was kept in the imperial court. This gesture prompted what was to be referred to as “giraffe diplomacy.” Afterward, many countries vied with one another to present giraffes to the Ming Dynasty in exchange for silk, porcelain, and tea. Later, the King of Malindi himself traveled to China in Zheng’s fleet where he lived for the rest of his life. It would be appropriate, therefore, to claim that friendship between China and Kenya started almost 600 years ago with a beautiful and elegant giraffe (Liu 2010).

The giraffe came from the East African kingdom of Malindi, located in present day Kenya. In China at the time, the giraffe was interpreted as a mythical unicorn that in turn represented divine favor of the emperor and proof of his virtue. In other words, the giraffe was a symbol used to legitimize Zhu Di’s rule. Poets and scholars recorded hymns of praise because the giraffe signified the Confucian ideal of perfect virtue, perfect government, and perfect harmony in the empire and universe (Duyvendak 1949). The gift of the giraffe from a far-off kingdom provided an opportunity for the emperor to capitalize on the symbolism and justify his fleet of ships traveling to cities along well-established trade routes (Shen 1995). All of which reaffirmed his position as ruler and China’s presence as a powerful country.

Diplomats began referencing the idea of giraffe diplomacy in speeches in the 1960s, and they have continued to refer to it as an affirmation of Chinese foreign policy in Africa as being rooted in a particular moment in history. The symbol of the giraffe is also a minor representation of Kenya’s eternal ties to China and the continuation of an unbroken relationship that began centuries earlier. Diplomats evoke this story as China and Africa’s historical progression from pre-modern to the present. The image of the giraffe and Zheng He remains a popular figure that represents China’s contact with the world prior to the age of European exploration and conquest.
There was some historical revisionism at play here as diplomats stated that the giraffe was fruit from a Zheng He voyage when most accounts indicate that it was part of a previous trip of an East African merchant to China.

The revised history fits into China’s grand historical narrative—it has become a usable history. Liu’s version of the history sends the message that Zheng He initiated the contact when it was envoys from Malindi that presented the giraffe that led to Zheng He’s visit to Africa. This detail, if presented accurately, would have indeed put an African kingdom at the center of this story. However, this does not fit the narrative framework maintained by Chinese diplomats. The symbol of the giraffe, which Liu refers to as “giraffe diplomacy,” is a reference to tributes made to China at the height of Sino-centrism. This suggests that the civilizations on Africa’s east coast were tribute bearers and reactants to this history. By comparing Zheng He to European explorers that arrived in Africa nearly a century later, reinforces China’s grand history as not only predating Europe’s discovery of Africa but also producing different outcomes. For example, under orders from King Henry, Portuguese conqueror Dom Francisco de Almeida brought with him twenty-three ships and 1,500 soldiers to invade coastal cities in Kenya. Conversely, Zheng He came with his fleet and left—peacefully.

An origin story

According to folklore, a ship capsized between 1415 and 1418 and the Chinese survivors swam to shore and later became integrated into the coastal community along the Lamu Archipelago which includes the islands Lamu, Pate, and Manda. The sailors had to prove themselves to Malindi residents by killing two pythons that had been tormenting the village. After defeating the snake, the sailors were allowed to stay and marry local women. This resulted in a group of African-Chinese descendants living on Kenya’s coast that over time migrated between the islands. According to local sources, there are multiple families living on Pate and Lamu that trace their lineage to the Chinese sailors. This history had been widely known locally and orally passed down for generations in this close knit Muslim, Swahili-speaking community. This diverse community had been forged by centuries of trade and contact via the Indian Ocean trade as illustrated by the Zheng He voyages.¹

Mwamaka Sharif Lali, a Kenyan woman from Pate Island, was said to be one of the descendants of a shipwrecked Chinese sailor from the 15th century. Labeled by the Kenyan and Chinese press as the “Chinese Girl,” Sharif’s identities were distorted to fit the imagination of Chinese diplomats. For example, her name was altered from Sharif to ‘Sharifu’ in the Chinese press. A veritable origin story of Sino-African ties had been crafted with the intent to shape the attitudes of both Kenyan and Chinese publics. This case draws into question the core values embedded in these narratives and whether or not publics are accepting them.

In 2002 a team from China visited Sharif’s family in Siyu village on Pate Island with the intent to verify accounts that Chinese descendants were living on the island. From that encounter, the daughter of a small town fisherman was hoisted into the Sino-African diplomatic arena. The Chinese team that investigated Sharif stated that they used DNA testing to confirm her Chinese heritage. They also said that her maternal lineage could be traced back to one Chinese ancestor and that she, her mother, two sisters and two brothers were the only surviving descendants on the island of 7,500. A report from the Chinese embassy in Nairobi stated that Sharif “has rightfully been nicknamed ‘Chinese Girl,’ her complexion and [facial] features tell a story” (Embassy of PRC 2005). In 2005, embassy officials in Nairobi said that they granted her request to study in China. That same year she traveled to China on a media tour and participated
in celebrations marking the 600th year anniversary of Zheng He’s expeditions in Taicang (China Daily 2005). The Chinese Ministry of Culture produced a documentary film about Sharif’s story called “The China Girl.” The film was screened to guests at the embassy in Kenya and the Africa pavilion at the 2010 Shanghai Expo. A 2005 statement released by the PRC Embassy in Kenya stated:

She was born on a remote island along the Kenyan coast. In her childhood, she learned her forefathers were among some Chinese sailors who escaped from a wrecked ship hundreds of years ago. Her fate is totally changed after groups of Chinese visited her village to study the cultural relics left by an ancient Chinese fleet. And suddenly she steals the limelight as she is invited to visit China as a special guest and is offered a scholarship to pursue further studies in a Chinese college later this year. “I want to see the place where my ancestors live,” said Sharif, adding that she is going to explain to her hosts why there are Chinese descendants living along the coast of East Africa (Embassy of PRC 2005).

The Chinese press identified her as “Chinese” and in some interviews Sharif Lali referred to herself as Chinese. Sharif Lali hails from a coastal culture that is uniquely tied to African, West Asian/Arab, and Muslim histories along the Swahili coast. For China, Sharif represented the culmination of Kenya and China’s historical contact being not only diplomatic in nature but also genealogical. The researcher did not find a single published news article or speech from a Kenyan official on this case in the period under study. This demonstrates that Sharif Lali’s identity as a Kenyan woman of African and Chinese descent and the origin story of Sino-African relations, which was robustly promoted in the press in China and by Chinese officials in Kenya, was not either an image or a message that Kenyan leaders chose to publically mention. The closest reference to it was the 2010 joint statement by the archeological team quoted earlier. During this period, Kenyan leaders primarily focused their public relations messages on the potential benefits of Sino-Kenyan economic engagements particularly in trade and infrastructure. The interest-bound messages of Kenyan and Chinese leaders were different and nuanced. Kenyan leaders understandably focused their speeches on policy accomplishments and ensuring that Kenyans would have more opportunities for employment. For example, in 2010 China funded both small and large scale projects ranging from exploratory natural gas drilling in Isiolo, which was unsuccessful, to loans to construct the Thika highway. Information on these types of projects was the subject of sound bites and news articles that featured Kenyan leaders. The takeaway here is that the Kenyan officials emphasized narratives that resonated with domestic audiences and Chinese officials did the same. The origin story of Sino-Kenyan relations is an ethnocentric one that Kenyan leaders implicitly did not subscribe to in their engagements with Kenyan publics.

For Chinese officials on the other hand, in line with its global strategy to gain international legitimacy and become a world leader, history is a central part of their narrative. For example, an exhibit at the Yunnan Nationalities Museum in Kunming, China had a 2008 exhibition titled “Zheng He: The Great Navigator, Diplomat, and Envoy” that featured photographs of Pate Island with captions that stated that there was a settlement of Chinese and African descendants living there. This corresponds with China’s interest in conveying to domestic audiences China’s place in Africa’s history.

In sum, political agents have activated an origin story of Sino-African engagement
that is based on locally derived knowledge. In *Memory, History and Forgetting*, Paul Ricoeur discusses the difference between the origin and the beginning. He argues that for historians “the beginning” is comprised of dated, verifiable events that mark the start of history (Ricoeur 2004). However, its foundation is in knowledge and that may undiscoverable, thus there may be a gap between the origin and the beginning. One issue that arises, and this is the case with all oral histories, is not documenting the story, but verifying it. The next case examines how Chinese government sponsored archaeological digs on Kenya’s coast between 2010 and 2012 were undertaken to confirm premodern trade contact and the story behind Sharif’s ancestry. Excavation of at least four sites near Mambrui village and the Khatib Mosque that were part of the 12th-century kingdom of Malindi served as a key point along Indian Ocean trade routes. Archaeologists from the National Museums of Kenya and their counterparts from the National Museums of China and Peking University’s School of Archeology and Museology also excavated a Chinese vessel that sank 600 years ago near Lamu Island. Believed to be one of the ships of Zheng He’s fleet, perhaps the one that carried the shipwrecked sailors, the Chinese Ministry of Commerce funded the three-year project, which included the training of Kenyan archaeologists in underwater excavation (Ndurya 2010). A 2010 joint statement by Qin Dashu and Herman Kiriaima, the heads of the joint Chinese and Kenyan archaeological team that worked on excavating a shipwreck in Mambrui stated:

Zheng He commanded the Ming Dynasty’s merchant fleet of hundreds of ships to Kenya twice in the 15th Century. Many people believe one of these ships sank around the Lamu Archipelago. The sailors then stayed on the archipelago, married local girls, and taught them farming and fishing...One of the beneficiaries of the close linkages is Mwamaka [Sharif], a young woman who is currently studying Chinese medicine in China on a scholarship from the Chinese government (Nabukewa 2010).

Representatives of the project connected the ship’s excavation to the story of the shipwrecked sailors. Both projects were examples of China’s quest to resurrect and unearth a history that connects the two countries. For China, these co-sponsored activities reinforce a usable history that contributes to China’s history as a benevolent partner in Africa, and this has become a matter of China’s branding. An article in *Daily Nation* (Kenya), stated:

The archaeologists say that the history of the East African coast could be re-written after a three-year excavation on the mainland and Lamu, where a Chinese ship sank some 600 years ago, is concluded. While little is known about Chinese involvement in early trade with East Africa, these excavations could change the perception that Europeans were the first visitors to Africa (Ndurya 2010).

Chinese and Kenyan news agencies stated that the archaeological research was necessary to verify the contact between Kenya and China. The media coverage was more aimed at building ties between the two countries, not necessarily unearthing history. As of 2010, the National Museum of Kenya at Lamu had a collection of artifacts from China that was found in ruins along the coast. At best, these items confirm that there was trade between the two regions but not necessarily contact between the civilizations. However, the exhibit also included an anchor that
was salvaged from one of Zheng He’s ships. The recent excavations were met with resistance from Muslim community members who said that the Kenyan and Chinese archaeologists were not adhering to Islamic law regarding the exhumation of human remains. The joint Sino-Kenyan excavation team issued a statement countering the negative media reports (Ndurya 2010). In the declaration, the archaeologists emphasized correcting a perception of East African history, one that focused on re-writing Kenya’s history of “discovery.”

The efforts led by the Chinese government funded projects relates to two issues articulated in Marc Ferro’s *The Use and Abuse of History*. Ferro argues that paradoxically in decolonizing their history, the formerly colonized use the same methodological and perhaps analytical instruments to construct their histories. In this case, another reading of East Africa’s place in the pre-modern world has been reoriented with China at the center. A history has been imposed on Kenya using the master’s tools. Secondly, Ferro writes, “to control the past is to master the present, to legitimize dominion and justify legal claims” (2004, Kindle locations 110-112). The Chinese government has the power to craft history and distribute their findings to domestic and foreign audiences.

The next section examines the next moment in Sino-African history, China’s involvement in supporting African liberation struggles and later the newly formed African states.

**The spirit of the Bandung and Afro-Asian Solidarity**

It was in the spirit of countering the hegemony of the dominant colonial and imperialist powers that African leaders sought Pan-African unity and to create ties and other colonized and formerly colonized nations. On the other side of the Indian Ocean, China was also forging diplomatic relationships with other Asian countries and Africa. The relations between newly independent African nations and their Asian counterparts has a lineage beginning with the 1927 Association of Oppressed Peoples Meeting in Brussels. This meeting served as the forerunner of the Bandung Conference, the first large scale Afro-Asian conference held in Indonesia in 1955. China’s primary aim at this conference was to promote itself as a responsible ally in the international community. The “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence,” Zhou Enlai’s framework for China’s foreign policy, became the model for the seven principles at Bandung:

1. Respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity of nations
2. Abstention from aggression and threats
3. Non-interference in the internal affairs of nations
4. Racial equality and non-discrimination
5. Equality of all nations
6. Respect for the freedom to choose a political and economic system
7. Mutually beneficial relations between nations (Cooley 1965).

Even though Kenyan representatives were not present at Bandung, the principles of solidarity had an impact on Kenyan political consciousness. An article titled “Human Rights: Let’s Make Them Real,” appeared in the June 8, 1956 issue of *Tribune* (London) by Kenyan nationalist Joseph Murumbi, who fled British oppression in Kenya three years earlier and later became a high ranking official in the Kenyan government. He wrote:
British policy over the past fifty years forced the colonial peoples, by resorting to violence, to wrest step by step a measure of human freedom. Ireland, Kenya and now Cyprus are tragic examples, and one often wonders when Britain will learn the folly of repression and denial of human dignity. The Bandung conference brought the peoples of Asia and Africa together for the first time. If perhaps the peoples of Britain are not going to stand with them in the fight for Human Rights, the peoples of these two great continents, representing nearly two thirds of the human race, would have to depend on their own efforts to gain their rights (Ogunsanwo 1974).

Murumbi later helped define Kenya’s foreign policy objectives after independence in his role as the chief diplomat. The principles of respect for territorial integrity of other states, peaceful coexistence, non-interference in the affairs of other states, and non-alignment are currently four of the recognized norms of Kenyan foreign policy. This is the case with most African foreign policies and can be attributed to the influences of Pan-African and Afro-Asian solidarity movements in the 1950s.

By 1957, as political movements in African and Asian colonies escalated their demands for independence, China too took a more militant stance in its foreign policy. China wanted to rally formerly colonized nations under the banner of anti-imperialism and socialism. For China, the nations aspiring for independence would be important revolutionary partners in the socialist mission against imperialism. In 1960, a statement in the *Peking Review* expressed support for the Mau Mau resistance in Kenya (Wondji and Mazrui 1993). Pragmatically, the People’s Republic of China also sought international recognition as the sole, legitimate government of China and not the government in Taiwan. Later, in 1963 during the Sino-Soviet split, China wanted to convey an image of it being a non-hegemonic power unlike the US and USSR.

The December 1958 All Africa People’s Conference held in Accra forged a heightened level of diplomacy between Africa and China because the Chinese saw African countries as emerging powers in the international system (El-Khawas 1973). These newly formed countries were potential allies in China’s (PRC) claim as the sole, legitimate power of China. A number of African-Asian solidarity organizations were established, bringing together journalists, writers, workers, lawyers, youth, and women. Between 1958 and 1959, delegations from twenty-seven African states and territories visited China by invitation from the overseas friendship and cultural organizations organized by the Central Committee of the C.C.P. Kenya sent three delegations during those two years and a total of thirty-two delegations between 1960 and 1965 (Ogunsanwo 1974). There was a decline in visits as a result of China’s Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) and the weakened relations between Kenya and China.

International meetings of nationalist movements and sympathetic governments allowed for radicals, socialist, and socialist leaning political personalities to collaborate and build an international support base. For those groups without sovereignty, the international stage provided a platform where they could act as representatives of their territory even if they had no government control. These spaces also allowed for political groups to exploit Cold War rivalries to procure funds, military training, and arms. For example, All Africa People’s Solidarity Organization (AAPSO) established the Afro-Asian Solidarity Fund to supply material and financial support to organizations and people “participating in the struggle of the Afro-Asian peoples against imperialism, colonialism and racial discrimination and for independence, equality, freedom, the rights of man and genuine democracy” (Amer 1972, 236). It was at the
second AAPSO conference in April 1960 where Oginga Odinga, one of the founders of the Kenyan independence movement, along with other nationalist groups from Africa increased their calls for independence. The organizations that solicited Chinese support at AAPSO lobbied for Chinese financial resources in order to push for a radical agenda within existing independence movements and later in postcolonial governments.

In 1962, the British press accused Odinga of receiving funds from China and other socialist countries. He organized for Kenyan students to receive scholarships to study in the Soviet Union and China. In response to criticisms in Kenya and from abroad, Odinga argued that education for Kenyans was paramount over politics and if the Chinese helped Kenya accomplish its goals, Chinese support would be welcome (Ogunsanwu 1974). Kenyan ties with China were unpopular among most Kenyans and negative press made people even more skeptical of China’s intentions. This would play a critical role in the soured relations between the two countries four years later.

When Kenya gained independence on December 12, 1963, Odinga and his supporters were successful in having the new nation recognize the Peoples Republic of China and not Taiwan (Yu 1988). The People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of China (Taiwan) were both courting the newly independent African nations. In 1963, the year of Kenya’s independence, African nations made up 30 percent of the United Nations membership. In 1963 Taiwan was recognized by 19 African states and China only had 13 states in its corner. At the annual vote on Chinese representation as the sole legitimate government of China that year, 17 African states voted for Taiwan and 14 for China. As African nations became independent the tide turned in favor of the PRC and in 1971 the General Assembly passed resolution 2758 that transferred the seat from the ROC to the PRC. This critical moment cemented China’s role on the international stage and it was with the assistance of newly independent African countries that China gained recognition in the United Nations.

The Chinese press reported on the independence celebrations in Kenya. Chinese Foreign Minister Chen Yi attended the independence celebrations and official relations between Kenya and China were established two days later. China was eager to show its support for Kenya, which was facilitated by Odinga who served as Minister of Home Affairs and then as Kenya’s first Vice President. China aided Odinga’s efforts to sway Kenyan politics toward nationalizing industries, the redistribution of land owned by white settlers to landless Africans and reparations for Mau Mau fighters. These policies were considered radical by more conservative forces in Kenya that favored promoting capitalist interests.

The spirit of Bandung and China’s support for African independence has been vaguely evoked in the contemporary narrative framework. For example, in a speech to the Annual Inter Region Economic Network Training Program in March 2011, Chinese ambassador to Kenya, Liu Guangyuan stated:

There are many reasons that China and Africa must be friends, brothers, and partners. One; our longstanding friendship has a profound historical trace. As early as two centuries B.C., the Chinese Han Dynasty began exchanges with African countries…. Two; the common historical fate and experience in fighting colonialism and striving for national independence has brought us together. We are both deeply aware of the truth that backwardness and poverty leave one vulnerable to attack. That’s why we have been sticking together and helping each other. We know well that China-Africa friendship was jointly developed
by Chairman Mao Zedong, Premier Zhou Enlai and the older generation of African statesmen. It is an invaluable political asset and tradition for both of us and it gives us a unique strategic advantage. We have every reason to cherish it, uphold it and let it grow even stronger. China shall never forget that it was our African brothers who carried us into the UN in 1971 and have been extending to us generous support ever since on every international and multilateral front. Without your support, we would by no means [have] become the very China [we are] today. We do feel we owe you a lot, thus we shall keep on offering the same generosity and sincerity (Embassy of PRC).

This statement illustrates the parts of history that are emphasized by diplomats. What follows is an account of China and Kenya’s relations during the Cold War and then the decline in those relations which is a part of history that does not fit the narrative frame of China’s public relations in Kenya.

**Kenya-China and the Cold War**

Zhou Enlai’s seven-week Africa tour to ten countries in 1963 and 1964 was aimed at solidifying the ties between China and Africa. Zhou’s scheduled visit to Kenya in January 1964 was cancelled because of military mutinies in Kenya, Uganda, and Tanganyika, and the revolution in Zanzibar. Zhou’s mission was to promote the concept of a “third force” that united countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America (Taylor 2007). In his speeches, Zhou compared the liberation struggles in Africa to those of the Chinese revolution. An article in a 1963 issue of the *Beijing Review* stated:

The national liberation movements in Asia and Africa have become an indestructible, powerful revolutionary force of the present-day world. They are forging ahead with momentum that shakes the world. The Afro-Asian people’s struggle against imperialism and old and new colonialism is making increasingly greater contributions to the defense of world peace and to the promotion of human progress (Jackson 1995, 393).

China’s support for African movements in countries such as Egypt, Algeria, Somalia, Ghana, and Congo-Brazzaville was minor in terms of finances, but effective. By 1960, China had positioned itself as an ally to many liberation movements. China supported groups that used military means to fight colonization and not groups that supported negotiations with Europeans (Snow 1989). This was a shift in its role in the era of Afro-Asian solidarity in the mid 1950s when China supplemented the activities of the Soviet Union (Ismael 1971). Some of the newly independent African countries housed Chinese embassies that assigned staff members to help groups fight for liberation from Europeans (Snow 1989).

In May 1964, Odinga led a delegation that visited Moscow and Peking (Beijing) on official state business (Prybyla 1964). While there he asked China to help in the struggle to end apartheid in South Africa and to offer aid in the remaining African colonies (Chege 2008). In his role as the Minister of Home Affairs Odinga arranged for one hundred Kenyan students to receive military training in Bulgaria and China. These plans were accompanied by Soviet funding for a KANU training center called the Lumumba Institute where students learned about scientific socialism. Kenyan president Jomo Kenyatta was incensed at Odinga and feared that he posed a threat to his presidency. Aware of the dangers posed by external powers meddling in Kenya’s
domestic affairs, Kenyatta wanted to eliminate opposition. The radical wing of his party, led by Odinga, with the support of the USSR, Eastern European countries and China, had the resources to overthrow Kenyatta and the moderates. With his power base threatened, Kenyatta secured his control over the military and police force. He officially requested that the US, USSR, and China stop assistance to Kenya unless it went through official government channels (Attwood 1967). The Kenyan Special Police was assigned to monitor Odinga’s activities. Two weeks after Odinga’s overseas visit, Kenyatta repudiated Odinga and appointed Joseph Murumbi as Prime Minister. Kenyatta and his moderate, pro-Western supporters, whittled down Odinga’s power in the government by drafting a new constitution that would prevent him from assuming power and making Kenya a de facto one party state. After the government reshuffle, Odinga was no longer the second in charge. He was later given the title of vice president, a position that was powerless under the constitution.

The decline in relations

The events in Kenya were a part of a wider trend in Africa and Chinese officials were not responsive to the changing political environment. In June 1965, while visiting Tanzania, Zhou proclaimed that ‘Africa was ripe for revolution.’ This statement disturbed Kenyatta and moderates in KANU. The military coups in Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda and the revolution in Zanzibar the previous year further threatened Kenyatta’s rule and Kenya’s stability. Between 1964 and 1965, Chinese support in Africa was weakened when the state was accused of providing arms and training to rebel movements in Congo-Brazzaville, Niger, and Burundi (El-Khawas 1973; Ismael 1971). The accusations in the Western press were likely an extension of Cold War rhetoric. Chinese officials denied their involvement, but nevertheless China’s reputation in Africa suffered as a result of the suspicion that China backed existing governments and the revolutionary groups aimed at overthrowing them (El-Khawas 1973). Kenyatta interpreted Zhou’s statement as undermining the power of recently elected African elites who chose a capitalist or mixed economy. In response to Zhou’s statement and similar proclamations by Odinga on the promise of communism being able to deliver food to the people, Kenyatta stated:

It is naïve to think there is no danger of imperialism from the East. In world power politics the East has as much designs upon us as the West and would like us to serve their own interests. This is why we reject Communism. It is in fact the reason why we have chosen for ourselves the policy of non-alignment and African Socialism. To us Communism is as bad as imperialism (Attwood 1967, 251-252).

This strong condemnation of China’s role in Africa marked a turn in Sino-Kenyan relations. On July 22nd, six weeks after Kenyatta delivered this statement warning that his government would not tolerate external interference from the ‘East’, a Chinese correspondent for the New China News Agency, also known as Xinhua, was expelled from Kenya. The Chinese government responded that they were not aware of his activities. An investigation into his activities, likely carried out by the Special Branch of the Kenyan Police assigned to monitor Odinga, found that the correspondent was connected to Odinga. Diplomatic relations were maintained but China was put on alert that Kenyatta was closely monitoring their activities. This behavior was to be expected considering Kenyatta was struggling to maintain unity within his government and any subversive elements, not to mention external interference, had to be contained.
Kenyatta’s observations of political trends across Africa also served as an impetus for him to severely limit his country’s ties with China. For example, between 1965 and 1966, six coups were staged within four months in Congo-Leopoldville, Dahomey, the Central African Republic, Upper Volta, Nigeria, and Ghana (El Khawas 1973; Ogunsanwu 1974). The Chinese government stated that the coups were a result of counter-revolutionary military forces, imperialist agents in the West, and dissatisfied masses (Ogunsanwu 1974). The new military regimes in these countries were critical of Chinese intervention in Africa. Dahomey and the Central African Republic severed relations with China. In February 1966, Kwame Nkrumah, one of China’s closest allies in Africa, was overthrown while travelling to Hanoi. Nkrumah received the news of his deposition while in transit through China. This was a major setback for Sino-African relations as the Ghanaian National Liberation Council led by General Lieutenant J.A. Ankrah scaled back Chinese activities in the country and closed a Chinese run guerilla training camp that worried many African heads of state (El Khawas 1973; Ogunsanwu 1974; Nkrumah 1968).

In response to the developments across Africa and the internal power struggle within the Kenyan government, Kenyatta sought to further limit Chinese influence. Odinga split from the Kenyan African National Union (KANU), the political party in power, to form the Kenyan Peoples Union (KPU), which maintained ties to China. China likely continued its involvement with Odinga because they anticipated the he would be Kenyatta’s successor, which was a sound decision considering Odinga was second in command in 1963. However, after the expulsion of the Xinhua journalist and the events in other African countries, Odinga’s political foes took advantage of the anti-Chinese sentiment.

On March 10, 1966, four envoys and two journalists from communist countries were expelled from Kenya for undercover activities associated with Odinga. A member of the Chinese Embassy was deported in this sweep. A few days later a motion was introduced to the Kenyan parliament calling for the government to sever its relations with China. The motion stated that since Zhou Enlai’s ‘ripe for revolution’ speech in 1964, a number of coups and assassinations had taken place in Africa. The parliament approved the motion condemning China for its involvement in Africa. On March 17th the Chinese Embassy in Nairobi sent a note to the Kenyan Government protesting the motion. In it, the embassy stated that the motion “arbitrarily linked up Premier Zhou Enlai’s remarks about the excellent revolutionary situation in Africa with the recent series of reactionary coups d’état, assassinations and other incidents engineered by imperialism in Africa. This can only be deemed a premeditated scheme to poison the normal relations between the two countries” (Summary of World Broadcasts Part III 1966).

Relations were not officially severed, but over the next year they remained chilly due to reports in the Kenyan media criticizing the Cultural Revolution and claims that African diplomats in China were being trained to carry out cultural revolutions in their host countries (Larkin 1973). On June 29, 1967, the Kenyan Government declared the Chinese charge d'affaires, Li Chien, persona non grata and gave him forty-eight hours to leave the country. China responded by expelling the Kenyan charge d'affaires in Peking. Kenyatta successfully contained both Odinga and the perceived Chinese threat to Kenya. The Cultural Revolution shifted China’s policy focus to address domestic issues. China and Kenya’s relations would be put on hold until Kenya’s second president Daniel Arap Moi assumed power. The criticism that China was interfering in Kenya’s affairs and the subsequent chilling of relations has been left out of the narrative framing by Chinese diplomats. This is unsurprising as China’s support for political movements in Africa largely dried up after a number of policy blunders in Africa.
and in this case, Kenya. Despite this, in 1971 Kenya voted in favor of United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758 that recognized the People’s Republic of China as the sole legitimate representative of China in the UN. China’s commitment to Third World solidarity culminated in this vote. This is also a significant moment in Sino-African relations that is frequently mentioned by Chinese diplomats as a victory for south-south cooperation.

Conversely, Kenya’s neighbor, Tanzania, had a different relationship with China because their ideological outlooks were similar. The most prominent example of Chinese diplomatic assistance to Africa was the ambitious undertaking of the Tanzania-Zambia railway in 1970. The Tazara Railway was the largest foreign aid venture of the Chinese government up to that date, at $420 million (Mutukwa 1977). This undertaking was significant because it allowed two African countries, one landlocked, to develop a transport network that circumvented trade routes controlled by the Rhodesian and South African regimes. The railway helped realize a Pan-African reality; it facilitated political and economic independence from Rhodesia and South Africa. This demonstrates the differences and nuances independent African nations made—African agency in determining their foreign policies.

A survey of speeches and press releases by Chinese diplomats between the ministerial conferences of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation in 2006 to 2011 showed that Kenya’s history of soured relations was largely ignored. It is an inconvenient history. However, a written overview of the bilateral relations between China and Kenya on the PRC’s Kenyan embassy website stated:

China established diplomatic relations with the Republic of Kenya on December 14, 1963. In the initial days of the establishment of the relations between the two countries it saw a fair development. After 1965, the relation of the two countries was lowered to be at the chargé d’affaires level and towards the beginning of the 1970s it gradually returned to normal (Embassy of the PRC in the Republic of Kenya).

The incident with the chargé d’affaires was the height of the conflict between Kenya and China in the 1960s. This incident has since been ignored in speeches because it does not fit well in the vision or re-visioning of Sino-Kenyan history. While the vestiges of China’s failed Cold War policy in Africa taint China’s historical narrative, Kenya’s foreign policy during this period was soundly grounded in rational decision making given the political and economic constraints and ambitions that newly elected leaders faced at the time. The Kenyatta administration viewed China’s presence in neighboring African nations as a threat to power. More pointedly, Kenyatta wanted to ensure that his opposition did not gain legitimacy or resources from China. It is also worth noting that the Kenyan press provided robust and critical coverage of China’s domestic policies and China’s policies in Africa.

Chinese officials assume that their historical connections with Africa will persuade or convince African publics to accept its interests and presence in the region. The Chinese government consistently stays on message with its pronouncements of ‘win-win’ cooperation and the not so subtle juxtaposition with the West as a benign, non-hegemonic partner who has been ideologically and economically aligned with countries in the Global South. As Kenneth King observes, the Chinese government avoids using paternalistic language that echoes the donor-client relationships of African nations with the West (2013). In most cases, political decision-makers in China consciously use the language of mutuality, which frames the relationship as
equal and non-hegemonic (Ibid.). Along these lines, the vivid descriptions of China and Africa’s pre-modern contact provide a historical foundation for the contemporary relations. Diplomats perform history in order to forge a common identity and destiny through a shared experience of economic engagement and a common struggle against colonialism.

Moreover, these images and the accompanying narratives occupy a space along with the conspicuous economic and political transactions between African and Chinese officials, firms and individuals in Africa. Historicizing Sino-African relations assumes that African publics are “motivated by the same needs and desires and are persuaded by the same arguments” (Banks 1995, 110) as in China.

The history between Africa and China is not as evident in the consciousness of Africans who are more familiar with Western involvement on the continent, and diplomats attempt to stake a claim to Africa’s history. China and Kenya’s current policy behavior is rhetorically based on the principles of promoting mutual understanding. Therefore, they hope to develop a favorable reputation among the Kenyan public to dampen potential negative perceptions of China’s growing presence in the economy.

In conclusion, elements of history have been mobilized to present an alternative reading of China’s engagement in world politics—one that counters the legacy of European imperialism and undermines significant moments of African agency. As such, China presents itself as a non-hegemonic actor in the African foreign policy theater and the conclusion they draw from these historical connections is that this history will help shape how Kenyan’s perceive China’s present political and economic interests in the region. Some parts of Kenya and China’s history have been excavated and used primarily by Chinese diplomats with the aim to strengthen their economic and political ties with African nations, while other parts of history have been buried. China does not have the obvious historical and linguistic ties of Kenya’s former colonial metropole, Britain and the challenge for Kenyan and Chinese leaders is framing contemporary economic relations within a historical context that appear uncontrived. For Chinese leaders especially, the facts of the history are not as important as the vision—a viable, unbroken heritage and glorious past that flourished in the absence of Europeans.

This study looked at the function of history in framing contemporary relations between China and Kenya. China’s interest-bound public relations promote the idea that as two formerly colonized territories, Kenya and China have similar histories, struggles, and futures. This strategy of using history to justify contemporary relations is only relevant in the diplomatic arena. So, why does China need to justify its historical connections to Africa? China’s vision for itself as a world power is driven by its desire to gain legitimacy and then shape international norms and institutions. Even though the Chinese government says that it is an equal partner with African countries, it is evident to most that the power relationship is asymmetrical. China has the power to assign value to a historical narrative that de-emphasizes the autonomy and agency of Kenyan premodern and modern states and their engagement with the world. It also has the power to disseminate its historical outlook in Africa and beyond by using its tools of public diplomacy. The imperative for Chinese diplomats is to bridge the contemporary economic and political ties with an unbroken line of pre-modern to contemporary contact between the two nations. This corresponds with an ethnocentric narrative that is more appropriate for Chinese audiences. The values not of historians but of leaders activate this history. In this case, history is mobilized in an attempt to shape perceptions of contemporary Sino-African relations.
Notes
1. The author conducted three key informant interviews in Lamu, Kenya June 11-12, 2019.
2. Museums in Gedi and Lamu have Chinese coins and dated pottery on display (Author’s observation, June 2010, Gedi and Lamu, Kenya).
3. This statement was also made on Zhou’s ten-nation African tour December 1963-February 1964.
4. In Congo (Brazzaville) in 1964 China was accused of providing arms and military training to members of the National Liberation Committee. The leader Pierre Mulele was reportedly trained in guerilla tactics in China. In Burundi China was said to have provided material support to Gaston Soumialot’s group. In Niger between 1964 and 1965 Sawaba opposition forces carried out nine attacks. The Sawaba forces later admitted that they had been trained in guerilla warfare in China and wanted to overthrow the government. China was accused of being involved in the assassination of Burundi’s Prime Minister Pierre Ngendandumwe in 1965.

References


Liu, Guangyuan. 2010. “From giraffe the diplomat to ‘peace ark’” The Daily Nation, Opinion Section.


Nabukewa, Joy. 2010. “No bodies exhumed by Chinese in Malindi excavation project.” Coast Week.


Wrestling with the whiteness of South African philosophy: Ndumiso Dladla’s *Here is a Table*

Thabang Dladla*
*University of Fort Hare

Abstract
This paper seeks to engage with the reality of South Africa, from the position of being black in South Africa. It is impossible to have any meaningful engagement about South Africa without an understanding of the history that brings it about. This is a history of conquest and colonisation, which we shall argue has not been undone albeit the post 1994 settlement. Philosophy in South Africa is tied to such a history like a child is tied to mother through an umbilical cord. This is to say Philosophy in South Africa is a form of colonialism which finds expression through the negation of the black/colonized experience in the construction of its enterprise. Philosophy is a product of experience, and in South Africa it is the white experience of the world that is constitutive of philosophy as such. This paper seeks to articulate the black experience of the world through a perspective that is opposed to the violent existence of South Africa to date, and this shall be done through a critical exposition of Ndumiso Dladla’s *Here is a Table: A Philosophical Essay on the History of Race in South Africa* (Bantu Logic Publishing, 2018), a timely intervention which makes such a reflection possible. This is the Azanian critical philosophy that is opposed to the conquest and colonisation of the indigenous people in the unjust wars of colonization that Dladla (2018) elucidates.

Keywords: South Africa, African Philosophy, Azanian tradition, Ndumiso Dladla, Black experience, history of South African philosophical education

* Direct correspondence to dladlathabang@yahoo.com

---

If by integration you understand a breakthrough into white society by blacks, an assimilation and acceptance into an already established set of norms and code of behavior set up and maintained by whites, then YES I am against it. I am against the superior-inferior white-black stratification that makes the white a perpetual teacher and the black a perpetual pupil (and a poor one at that). I am against the intellectual arrogance of white people that makes them believe that white leadership is a sine qua non in this country and that whites are divinely appointed pace-setters in progress. I am against the fact that a settler minority should impose a system of values on an indigenous people.

-Steve Bantubonke Biko (2004:26)

---

Introduction
The colonial character of South African philosophical practice, which we aim to discuss in this paper, is a by-product and expression of the European colonial enterprise which found its articulation with the arrival of the first Dutch settlers of 1652 and the British 1820 settlers. Both settler populations were unified against the indigenous conquered population after the resulting
wars between themselves, over our land and its resources (including our labor), which have been identified as the wars for South Africa.¹ South Africa then comes to be a republic after the unification of the two Boer republics (the Transvaal and the Orange Free State) and Natal and the Cape of Good Hope which were in the possession of the British. South Africa comes to exist as a reconciliatory pact between the two oppressor groups who have become one in a union that is South Africa.² This establishes South Africa as a product of a colonial imagination, and thereby deeply troubling and problematic in the imagination of the indigenous populations as the poet Ingoapele Madingoane (1978) enunciates:

They came from the west sailing to the East// with hatred and disease flowing from their flesh// and a burden to harden our lives// they claimed to be friends// when they found us friendly/ and when foreigner met foreigner they fought for the reign.

Indeed the material living conditions of the indigenous conquered peoples speak volumes in this regard: landlessness, informal settlements, low life expectancy, poor health etc. This is the burdensome life of the native/colonised that Frantz Fanon (1963) identified as opposed to that of the settler³ which can be distinguished as the zone of life and the zone of death respectively. Moreover, the colonised situation, or the black condition, is what Afro pessimists, followers of Frantz Fanon, have termed social death, following Orlando Paterson’s *Slavery and Social death*, which is a fatal being alive.⁴ Being a Black⁵ student of philosophy what was always of concern to me was how philosophy shunned reality, or perhaps my reality, and how this robbed us of philosophy proper, a concern with the real, non-philosophical or everyday, instead of uncritically mimicking what is being done in the North: continental Europe, England and north America. This paper will explore the history of philosophy in South Africa, which is linked with the history of the coming to being of South Africa itself, and the resulting north-boundedness of philosophical practice that establishes it as purely colonial. We shall not exhaust the entire history of the discipline but shall limit our discussion to the overarching themes: mimesis and Eurocentrism.⁶ Moreover, this paper will also explore the existential challenges of such an undertaking on the part of the colonised, to show how such a colonially inspired practice has readily at hand the questioning of the existence of an African philosophy which is inextricably tied to the denial of equal human status to the colonised. In the following section we shall provide a short history of institutionalized philosophy in South Africa following Mabogo More (2004) and Ndumiso Dladla (2018) who have discussed the coming to being of it elaborately, and whose ideological predisposition and orientation we fully share (precisely their incredulity to pronouncements about the present which would render it as a radical rupture from an old ‘apartheid’ as has been the Azanian school’s tendency). Our purpose will be to outline the overarching themes in such a historical unfolding: mimesis and Eurocentrism,⁶ which as we shall argue remain undisturbed albeit the supposed transition to a “post” apartheid. Consistent with our argument it shall be revealed that this ‘post’ in post-apartheid should not be understood as the unraveling of the fundamental contradiction in South Africa since apartheid,⁷ beginning in 1948 was the “strengthening and perfecting an already existing system of racial discrimination and domination” (Dladla, 2016:34). Rather it is our argument that the focus on apartheid as a fundamental contradiction serves to obfuscate the real problem that is conquest⁸ which continues to express itself through the marginality of African philosophy, which is rather anomalous in an African country as Biko (2004:26) well noted:
[For] one cannot escape the fact that the culture shared by the majority group in any given society must ultimately determine the broad direction taken by the joint culture of that society. This need not cramp the style of those who feel differently but on the whole, a country in Africa, in which the majority of the people are African must inevitably exhibit African values and be truly African in style (my emphasis).

It is thereby imperative for this paper to begin with a brief examination of the history of institutionalized philosophy in South Africa to illustrate the continuities in the present with the supposed colonial past and to provide the justification for a liberatory practice of philosophy.

**Some notes on the relationship between Philosophy and History**

On *Black negativity or the affirmation of nothing*, Jared Sexton’s 2017 interview with Daniel Colucciello Barber for *Society+ Space* is critical to my understanding of the relationship between philosophy and history and the continuities that animate their reconstruction. Sexton writes:

> How do those whose ground is taken from them, who are taken from their ground, who are taken away from themselves as ground—how do they embrace that groundlessness as possibility when it is likewise marked by the scandal of an unaddressed crime?

Perhaps before we can continue with our discussion concerning the history of institutionalized philosophy in South Africa it is important to outline our understanding of what is meant by history and how it relates to our understanding of what is philosophy. Because history itself is not the past, but an account of it or an attempted reconstruction of it, it is inadvertently impossible to imagine unanimity on any such account or its objectivity so to speak. Precisely because there exists no such a place outside of society, and our position within it, from where we can examine it or have any meaningful account of it. This predicament prohibits any such account’s ability to achieve the status of objectivity, and to outline every such attempt as socially located. Furthermore, it is our aim and project to understand those pretenses and attempts as articulating a socially dominant position in society, which in our case inescapably is the position which advances the interests of white elites and their predominantly white allies. Not surprising considering the overt exclusion and marginalization of Africans to date, not to speak of the attachment to Europe, as would a colony to its mother, that South African education, including philosophical education, has proven a mimicry of European and American education and norms as the exclusive sites for any philosophical justifiability. Because in the colonial psyche there exists no such possibility in a supposedly dark continent, void of any history and possibility of knowledge (*a la* Hegel), they have come to enlighten.

Ndumiso Dladla (2017) has identified racism, following Steve Biko before him, in *Against an analytic(liberal) conception of race/ism* with its attendant aversion to history, as rooted not only in feelings of superiority by whites to their racial others, but more importantly their *power* over them, what Dladla (2017) has designated as *historical power*: precisely “the historical establishment and systematization of political and existential synonymy between whiteness and humanity (and its correspondent rights)”. According to Dladla (2017) “white supremacy has meant that, beyond the Eurocentrism which has imposed European cultural and
social standards as the human standard, the very life chances and life expectancies of white people are better and higher in the world,” what Frantz Fanon has theorized as the Manichean reality/\textit{materiality} of the colonial situation; more acutely the zone of the settler and that of the native.\textsuperscript{10}

Furthermore, following Bernard Makhosezwe Magubane (2007:252) it would certainly be a cliché to state that such an oppressively racist and colonial state as South Africa needs a racist historiography. Indeed this is another dimension of historical power as identified by Dladla (2017) because white supremacy, as a form of historical power, “is established on the one hand through the enjoyment and exercise of social, economic and political power collectively, that is as a group, over a significant period of time” while on the other hand, and more importantly for our project “it includes the enjoyment of power over the very enterprise and discipline of historical writing and representation itself” which includes: “the power to create institutions of historical production, as well as representative academics, cultural producers and public figures who authorize one’s version of the account of the past” (Dladla, 2017 emphasis mine). As Magubane (2007:252) laments; “to be an African, in particular in South Africa, meant and still means to suffer privation, on a daily basis. But among South African historians, it seems not to have been a very important issue.” There are many reasons that can be given to account for such a situation including the peculiar form of ignorance associated with being white, following Charles Mills’ conceptualization. However, for our purpose in this section it is important to highlight the existential plight of the African, who becomes black through conquest by the white, which renders her \textit{invisible} to history.

Precisely because conquest of the indigenous Africans, in the unjust wars of colonization, was predicated on the unethical doubt concerning their humanity, which justified their brutalization through enslavement and seizure of territory precisely because they were deemed not human beings in the first instance, are forever imperceptible to the plight of human possibility. That such a doubt was harbored and nurtured, in Western philosophy, by such luminaries of the Western philosophical project as far back as Aristotle, not to mention moderns like Kant, has been the work of Black/African philosophy as a critical negative project which has broadened and enhanced our understanding both of the West and philosophy itself. Furthermore, this has meant a re-evaluation of Western philosophy from the perspective of her non-European others who have suffered alienation from it, and a re-examination of its methods and starting points; many of which who were inordinate for understanding our reality.

A study of the history of South African philosophy, which cannot be untied with that of South Africa writ large, presents to us an opportunity to ponder on the reality that is South African philosophy to date without the pretense of not being positioned in this unfolding as its negative as part of the \textit{Wretched of the earth}, to use Fanon’s pertinent phrase. As Magubane (2007:252) reminds us:

\begin{quote}
Forces that emerged victorious in the struggles between the colonizer and the colonized created South African history, as written by recognized historians. If one looks at the history of higher education in South Africa, there is no question that the forces that endowed its institutions were the major beneficiaries of African helotry.
\end{quote}

This should cast doubt on the objective status of such accounts, as those by liberals and neo Marxist revisionists that Magubane identifies, precisely because, as Magubane (2007:253) adds: “the subjects we choose to study, the questions we ask, the concepts and theories we use,
are not neutral, or motivated by purely academic concerns. What we study has a lot to do with relations of power,” which in our case is the lack of any power or subordination. Mills (2007) has theorized white ignorance as an epistemic deficiency resulting from the privileged position whites occupy in society, which leads them to be incredulous about many aspects of reality that the subordinated, the Blacks, cannot afford to be. This then leads to the subordinate position as the productive site for knowledge about the world and reality as Mills (1998: 17) attests:

Insofar as this is a philosophy that develops out of the resistance to oppression, it is a practical and politically oriented philosophy that, long before Marx was born, sought to interpret the world correctly so as better to change it… philosophy is here called upon to evaluate and counter the dehumanization to which people and ideas of African descent have been subjected through the history of colonialism and of European racism. In a broad sense, virtually all African-American philosophy is “political,” insofar as the insistence on one’s black humanity in a racist world is itself a political act.

It is therefore from such a position, that of being Black in South Africa with much similarities with being African-American, that the history of institutionalized philosophy shall be narrated for the reason of understanding our present as not having changed much from the past. Real change in this regard would be to undo the Eurocentric character of the practice and its northboundness. Following Mills (1998) we agree that Black philosophy is inherently political in that it aspires to make an impact to the world and reality as a matter of urgency, and cannot afford to leave everything as is. Such an impact, in our case, cannot be made without understanding our object historically as a philosophical enactment of conquest and its undisturbed continuity to the present.

**Philosophy in South Africa: a short history**

Precisely because post-apartheid is not post conquest, which is to say that there is a continuity between apartheid and its afterlife “post” apartheid which leaves the problem of conquest undisturbed as Mahmood Mamdani has so poignantly pointed out, this section then outlines the history of institutionalized philosophical practice in South Africa from the position of the conquered whose epistemic position, indeed positioning, has received less elucidation in the learned public let alone in philosophical discourse. To problematize conquest, instead of focusing on the illusory apartheid, as has been the focus of the so called ‘liberation movement’, necessarily also calls into question the naming of this territory as ‘South Africa’: because it is not from the volition of the indigenous conquered people, which then properly establishes it as a purely colonial invention. Precisely, as Valentin Mudimbe (1988:1) informs us:

Colonialism and colonisation basically mean organisation, arrangement. The two words derive from the Latin word *colère*, meaning to cultivate or design. Indeed the historical colonial experience does not and obviously cannot reflect the peaceful connotations of these words. But it can be admitted that colonists (those settling in a region) as well as colonialists (those exploiting a territory by dominating a local majority) have tended to organise and transform non-European areas into fundamentally European constructs.

Indeed the coming to being of South Africa is made possible by violent incursions by the colonisers against the colonised and the seizure of territory that accompanies it which, by some
accounts, began in the mid seventeenth century with the arrival of the Dutch (Terreblanche, 2002). However, such violence found justification because the African was in the lack in terms of properly human qualities: rationality, which the coloniser had in abundance, as demonstrated by Western philosophy’s denial of African humanity among others since Aristotle at least (Ramose, 1999; 5).

Furthermore, the founding of the universities by the European settler ultimately solidifies the image of the African as a lesser human, incapable of creating knowledge, which saw the settler recreate Europe in Africa as Dladla (2018:28) attests:

Initially the school was to serve the settler’s immediate personal interest fulfilling the wish to remain intimately connected to ‘the metropolis’ or “source” (of civilization and culture). Thus the curriculum and approach to teaching were as consistent with the trends in the original home of the settler as possible. The initial objective was to ensure that the graduate of the university in the colony received an education comparable in character and quality to that of her counterpart at home.

Even the architecture of the seating in lecture rooms was consistent with those in the metropole notwithstanding the teaching and examining procedures, which speaks of a deliberate ignorance of the space and experiences which the place they exist in affords (Dladla, 2016:29). Apart from the settlers personal interests in recreating the university in the image of true civilization and culture, that the mother country ceaselessly has in abundance, the school and the university alike were to serve an altruistic function for the colonized: “to civilize (humanize) the as yet “sub-human African” by introducing her to the culture, language, religion, values, and knowledge of her supposedly superior conqueror” (ibid). Notwithstanding 1994 supposedly marking a transition to a more just society predicated on the values of non-racialism, as pronounced in the constitution, the outlined situation has continued undisturbed.13

To be sure, South Africa has two contending traditions of colonialism: the Dutch (who arrived in 1652) and the English (who arrived in the 1820s). The former albeit its self-proclaimed re-identification as Afrikaner and its language Afrikaans has continually relied on Continental Europe for cultural, religious, and intellectual inspiration, while the latter looked upon Britain and America for its cultural inspiration. These two traditions reproduced themselves respectively in the realms of institutionalized philosophy and respective university orientation: the Afrikaner with European Continental philosophy and the English with analytic philosophy (More, 2004). It is interesting to note that both traditions that would constitute institutionalized philosophy in South Africa began in the nineteenth century (Dladla, 2016. More, 2004). We shall begin with a brief exposition of the Afrikaner tradition then followed by the Anglo-Saxon.

The Afrikaans institutionalized philosophical tradition owes its beginnings to the theological school in Stellenbosch where there were course offerings in the history of philosophy (More, 2004:151). According to More (2004:151):

After Stellenbosch, several Afrikaans-medium universities emerged in the Orange Free State and around Johannesburg and Pretoria. From the cultural and religious traditions of the Afrikaner people a certain distinct Calvinist and neo-Fichtean philosophy developed, especially at Potchefstroom University. Most of its advocates came from or studied in Europe under philosophers such as Schelling, Herder, or Fichte and were
also under the influence of Kant, Kierkegaard, Husserl, Abraham Kuyper, etc. – mostly German and Dutch philosophers. From the outset, the dominant tradition in most Afrikaans universities has been Kuyperian neo-Calvinism combined with neo-Fichtean nationalism, both of which provided the bases for the apartheid system. One of the characteristic tenets of Calvinism is “the election by predestination of the few through grace to glorify God...and the damnation of the rest of mankind, also to the glory of God.”

Indeed Dladla (2018:36) relying on Peter Duvenhage points out the blend in continental philosophy and protestant theology in the development of institutionalized philosophy at Afrikaans universities duly attributable to the powerful Dutch Reformed Church. According to Dladla (2018:36):

From the doctrines of divine election and predestination in Calvinism were the justification for the social ideology of a chosen people which justified racial conquest and domination. From Fichte the concept of nature was invoked to justify the maintenance of separation between groups of different languages as well as his view of the individual sub-ordinate aspect of the Absolute Spirit which reveals itself historically in the life of the community. Much of this thinking was to provide a philosophical basis to apartheid under the leadership of the Afrikaner Nationalist party. Once apartheid had commenced (after 1948) most Afrikaans university philosophers explicitly defended it. A variety of approaches were employed towards this end including Rawls’s Theory of Justice.

Moreover, Husserlian and Heideggerian phenomenology were also of greater use and were the chief architects of the apartheid state’s philosophy of education which was steered by the Afrikaans University of Potchefstroom for Christian Higher Education (Dladla 2018, More 2004). What’s more is that the relationship between the university and political power reveals more than a relationship of intellectual support but a tangible and historical agenda of maintaining white supremacy. To demonstrate this point Dladla (2018:37) relies on political journalists Ivor Wilkins and Hans Strydom’s writing on the Afrikaner secret society known as the Broederbond which had members from the top echelons of all Afrikaans speaking Universities:

Amongst those who would come to light are several philosophers who at one point in time taught at some of these universities. Prof Nico Diederichs was by far the most famous broeder philosopher, going on to become the first vice-chancellor of the Rand Afrikaans Universiteit (later the University of Johannesburg) and Finance Minister before becoming State President of South Africa in 1975. Before his rise to academic administration and politics, Nico Diederichs had been chair of political philosophy at the University of the Orange Free State and had studied in both Holland and Germany, had made many politically relevant contributions in his academic career. He had, for example, theorized a social metaphysics opposed to human equality in his Nasionalisme as Lewesbeskouing en sy Verhouding tot Internationalisme (Nationalism as a Weltenshaaung and Its Relation to Internationalism) (Dladla 2018:38).

However, it is important to note as Dladla (2018:39) does that Diederichs was not the only active Afrikaner academic who was politically minded and that such relationships
most likely affected teaching and learning at Afrikaans speaking universities. The University of South Africa occupied a unique position of offering tuition both in English and Afrikaans, however according to More (2004:150) it was ideologically aligned with Afrikaans speaking universities. Indeed Dladla (2018:39) points to an interesting case of the UNISA chair of philosophy from 1951 to 1965 Herman de Vleeschauwer who was a Kant specialist invited by Nico Diederichs who was at the time a member of parliament. According to Dladla (2018:39) de Vleeschauwer was an escaped convict for Nazi war crimes committed during the German occupation of Belgium during the Second World War and immigrated to South Africa facilitated by Diederichs, Dladla continues:

The Diederichs-de Vleeschauwer amity represents a natural relationship between apartheid and institutional philosophy in South Africa. To all appearances, the successors of de Vleeschauwer as Heads of the Department of Philosophy, including other academic staff, were likely to have been sympathetic to apartheid either as members of the Broederbond or the National Party. It is unlikely that at the time, Professor Samuel Pauw, himself a member of the Broederbond and Vice-Chancellor of the University of South Africa, would have sanctioned the appointment of academic, even administrative staff who posed a substantial and serious challenge to apartheid.

The relationship between institutionalized philosophy and the solidification of conquest as represented by its legal codification in apartheid is not limited to the Afrikaans-continental tradition which was explicit in its racist pursuits but also extends to the Anglo-Saxon tradition to which we now turn.

To be sure academic philosophy in South Africa has always been the terrain of whites, particularly white males (it would have been interesting to say more about the exclusion of females from the practice, although it would have been exclusively about white females, however such a discussion is beyond the scope of this paper). Moreover, albeit the perceived differences between the English and the Dutch descendants both were united in making sure that South Africa is a white man’s land as More (2004:152) demonstrates quoting from the then minister of Bantu affairs M. C. de Wet Nel who asserted:

The philosophy of life of the settled white population in South Africa, both English speaking and Afrikaans-speaking in regard to the color or racial problem...rests on three basic principles.... The first is that God has given a divine task and calling for every People in the world, which dare not be destroyed or denied by anyone. The second is that every People in the world, of whatever race or color, has an inherent right to live. In the third place, it is our deep conviction that the personal and national ideals of every individual and every ethnic group can best be developed within its own national community. Only then will the other groups feel that they are not being endangered. This is the philosophic basis of the policy of apartheid.... To our People this is not a mere abstraction, which hangs in the air. It is a divine task, which has to be implemented and fulfilled.

Indeed such unanimity between the Afrikaner and the British is predicated on the western form of life as qualitatively superior to all other forms, this is Eurocentrism par excellence. However, the Anglo-Saxon academic philosophical tradition began at the University of the
Cape of Good Hope which was established in 1873 (More 2004 and Dladla 2016). According to More and Dladla from the onset the English speaking universities preoccupied themselves with the British philosophical traditions such as empiricism and with such figures as Locke, Hume, Mill, Russell etc. The ideological orientation of such a preoccupation was undoubtedly liberal as Dladla (2018) has so aptly demonstrated. Indeed one of the first notables of the English tradition at the South African College (later the University of Cape Town) was R. F. A. Hoernlé who became one of the major figures in the intellectual formulation of South African liberalism. Hoernlé’s inaugural address as professor of philosophy in 1923 at another English university, the University of the Witwatersrand (Wits) “stressed the significance of liberalism in a multiracial society such as South Africa. A text he authored in 1939 with the title South African Native Policy and the Liberal spirit argued for racial separation as opposed to assimilation or parallelism” (Dladla, 2018:41 and More, 2004:153). An interesting note by both More and Dladla is that apartheid was an articulation of such a ‘liberal’ view. With the advent of apartheid officially in 1948 the English-speaking universities became more associated with supposedly apolitical analytical philosophy, itself an expression of Englishness/Britishness (Dladla, 2018). According to More (2004:154):

Philosophy at most English-speaking universities, while still embracing the liberal spirit, increasingly became associated with analytical philosophy. It is in this group that we find most neutralists, those who believe that “philosophy ought to be pursued for its own sake” without intervention in social and political issues of the day. Since philosophy, according to the neutralists, is a second-order activity concerned mainly with the logical analysis of concepts, the task of the philosopher is therefore the clarification of the logic of concepts and their meanings. Social and political issues are not, accordingly, the responsibility of the philosopher qua philosopher but qua active citizen. These are philosophers who Ronald Aronson characterized as “professionally indifferent to what goes on in South Africa today. Whatever their personal commitments, professionally they have no difficulty staying out of politics.”

In a review essay of Ronald Aronson’s *Stay out of Politics* More (1996) laments the indifference of the liberal philosophers to apartheid and their abstract thinking, which for him is not real thinking as it is thought without a thinker. However, such indifference though perceives itself as not politically involved is an expression of a political sentiment: “In politics indifferent means satisfied….. in bourgeois society, the label ‘non-partisan’ is merely a veiled, hypothetical way of saying that the person in question belongs to the party of exploiters. In philosophy, too, indifferent cannot mean anything but satisfied…. This is the real significance of abstention” (Paul Nizan, as quoted by More 1996). It is similar to claiming to be a non-smoker in a place polluted by all forms of smoke (More 1996). However, Dladla (2018:42) contends that the cherished a-political disposition of the English-speaking philosophers need not be overemphasized at the expense of examining some of the political activities that took place within those departments. Dladla (2018:42) makes use of an article by historian Teresa Barnes on how the English speaking universities have, as with most individual politicians and activists, been over celebrated for their “struggle” and “resistance” against apartheid. According to Dladla (2018:42) the English philosophers’ proclaimed quest for academic freedom demonstrable through students they produced who became antiapartheid activists were also complicit in the sustenance and support for apartheid in South Africa. Barnes (2015:21) dealing in particular with the case of UCT’s
Professor Murray was also brought in as a state witness in the Treason Trial where his task was to identify the accused’s writings as “communist” to which the defense also made him read his own work which he also identified as communist, [he] “also worked for the Publications Appeal Board (the main South African censorship body from the 1960s until the 1980s)”. According to Barnes (2015:23) “Murray was the head of the political committee of the Board and wrote many opinions that were central in the Board’s decisions to ban books and silence authors of critical political materials… in some instances recommended authors be investigated by military intelligence. Barnes goes on to show that he was not the only professor at UCT who worked for the apartheid regime but that there were countless, spies and agents at the so-called open universities who did such work.”

Such a history of the discipline is very informative and also helpful in understanding our present, for those of us who did not witness it and who have been kept in the dark about it (I was born two years before the birth of the “rainbow nation” in 1994). It is evidence of our collective discomfort with the university as it currently exists in South Africa, which is continuous with this history, which found articulation in 2015 with the #RhodesMustFall movement and currently with the #decolonisingthecurriculum movement which in the philosophy circles expressed itself as the formation of the Azanian Philosophical Society, which I am a founding member. The history of institutionalized philosophy outlined above illustrates the colonial character of discipline and its overreliance on Euro-American classifications which continues to undermine the particularities of the African experience. This necessitates the liberation of the practice from its North boundedness and aversion to reality. We shall turn to a reflection of an experience of philosophy in the post 1994 era South Africa from a student perspective to show the marginality of African philosophy, and the neglect of reality, that is inherent in South African philosophy.

‘Teacher don’t teach me nonsense’:
The unchallenged hegemony of white philosophy in South Africa

For not only are Whites “prosthetic Gods,” the embodiment of “full presence,” that is, “when a white is absent something is absent,” there is “a lacuna in being,” as one would assume given the status of Blackness but Whiteness is also “the standpoint from which others are seen”; which is to say Whiteness is both full Presence and absolute perspectivity –Frank. B. Wilderson III (2008:98).

The apparent whiteness of South African Philosophy is not something which was readily visible to me before I acquainted myself with the peculiar history of how the present came to be. This is to say it never appealed to me as a concrete subject for philosophic reflection and this is attributable to my uncritical rainbow consciousness. I was one of the many believers in the project of the “new South Africa.” I was taught to see no color. This was strange because the idea of the rainbow implies a particular color consciousness, but this was to be a passive awareness of it because the gist was color-blindness, since repeating the mistakes of “the past” was not part of the ideal of what is to be “the new” or “post-apartheid” South Africa. But color revealed itself to be seen, in more ways than one, until I had to take a direct look and really observe exactly what for so long I have been taught not to see. Philosophy proper had begun, since philosophy concerns itself with the non-philosophical; the reality or everyday if you like.
And it was the everydayness of my blackness and that of many others who had to stand with me on the long bus queue, going back home from a long day at school to study Immanuel Kant, whose philosophy could not explain this reality to me, perhaps because to him I’m just a nigger, that the whiteness of the philosophy I was being taught began to reveal itself to me. Not even the debate between John Rawls and Robert Nozick came close to explaining that reality to me. The reality of being a Black student from Soweto, one of a few that makes it to University with aid from a National Student Financial Aid Scheme (NSFAS) loan that one has to queue the whole day for and the humiliating affidavits required; where one needs to explain the abject conditions of one’s poverty in order to qualify. The reality of being the first suspect whenever anything goes missing.

The whiteness of my instructors and of those few students who readily understood the work was clearly observable to me, even the examples that were supposed to aid my understanding of the work were mostly foreign to me and other blacks. We had to go out of our world to make sense of what was conveyed. It was this time that I began to search for the literature that could explain that reality to me and I came across Frantz Fanon’s *Black Skins White Masks* and *The Wretched of the Earth*. I read about the Manichean reality in the colonies, the zone of life and the zone of death, the divide between the settlers and the natives, the abstracted expression of what I knew concretely as Sandton and Alexandra. From then onwards those private conversations with other Blacks came to be understood in their proper existential terms. Reflections on the existence of Black South African philosophers had been giving me sleepless nights. This is because my white instructor had told me I could be the first since there existed none. This should be testament of the far reaching consequences of white ignorance, indeed at seminars and colloquia one is not surprised by the utter ignorance of the existence of African philosophy. Leading philosophers raise the question “Is there an African philosophy?” which is an expression of a deliberate refusal to acknowledge or apprehend the existence of African philosophy and African philosophers. Such ignorance we argue is indicative of a privileged social position that comes with being white; which is the intentional cultivation and protection of ignorance; not a lack of knowledge but a practice of conditioned and intentioned not-knowing and, in the case of this country, over-reliance on the presupposed superiority of European and or Anglo-Saxon models and their reproduction and maintenance.

To this day this continues to be the reality of those students who are engaged in philosophical study in South African universities. The names of scholars like Mogobe Ramose, Chabani Manganyi, Joe Tefo, and Mabogo More are still together with their philosophical work on the reality that is South Africa and Africa silenced, erased and ignored. Together with the ignorance of these academics is the work of philosophical importance produced by the experience of a multi-century struggle for liberation and the intellectuals and intellectual work (some philosophical) which it has produced. Notable among these include: the University of South Africa (UNISA) trained philosopher Mziwakhe Lembede’s Africanism; the African studies scholar, linguist and political philosopher Mangaliso Sobukwe’s Pan-Africanism; and the existentialist prophet-theoretician of Black Consciousness philosophy Bantubonke Biko. Philosophy in South Africa continues to shy away from the reality of present day South Africa where blacks have got fewer life chances and shorter life expectancies than whites. It continues to shy away from those who have to wait in long queues to receive R350 social grants to feed their families for a month, the visible blackness of those who have to clean after them, do their garden and ensure that they are kept safe from ‘criminals’ (read blacks). The philosophy establishment is blinded from reality by its northbound gaze, and is preoccupied with mimicking
what the “real” philosophers are doing in continental Europe or England and America. Uncritical followers of a philosophical world that doesn’t even know of their existence, that doesn’t cite them, invite them or write about them even as they continue to idolize, worship and copy. As Enrique Dussel (1985:12) so aptly observed about colonial philosophy:

[T]he colonial philosophers of the periphery gaze at a vision foreign to them, one that is not their own. From the center they see themselves as nonbeing, nothingness; and they teach their pupils, who are something (although illiterate in the alphabets imposed on them), that really they are nothing, that they are like nothings walking through history. When they have finished their studies they, like their colonial teachers, disappear from the map geopolitically and philosophically, they do not exist. This pathetic ideology given the name of philosophy is the one still taught in the majority of philosophy schools of the periphery by the majority of its professors.

As we have demonstrated with the history of philosophy in South Africa above the situation remains unchanged as Dladla (2018:47) reports:

Around September 2013 an incident took place which caused a bit of a disturbance in the world of philosophy in South Africa. Louise Mabille, a young lecturer in philosophy at the University of Pretoria made national news after she wrote a controversial article in the Afrikaans cultural blog PRAAG, run by Afrikaner intellectual and cultural activist Dan Roodt. In her article she wrote that black South African males rape babies as a “cultural phenomenon.” In order to support her claim she averred that they [Africans] had not even invented the word rape (and were impliedly unfamiliar with the concept) until their “meeting” with their enlightened civilizers from Europe” (Dladla 2016:47).

Following Dladla (2018) it is indeed difficult to imagine that Mabille was a recent convert to racism. However, it is highly likely that she has held her views throughout her studies, teaching and social life and with enough confidence to publish them on the internet in her own name with no expectation of consequences. On the other hand the people, including the Philosophy Society of South Africa (PSSA), who populate the institutions that distanced themselves from her during this embarrassing incident were also likely former teachers, mentors, students, and colleagues. Indeed if we consider the history of philosophy in South Africa as well as its character today it emerges that there is high probability that far from being exceptional, Mabille is, in fact, the rule. Her exceptionality is that she was caught out as Dladla (2018:48) attests:

She is the double-victim of both a poor education which was in part responsible for her perspective and a scape-goat paraded as a convenient exception; a gangrened limb amputated to save a diseased body of which she was an ordinary and consistent part before wounding herself by exposure. Her expulsion was a wasted opportunity for thorough reflection which might get to the root cause of the problem her incident brought to light. It also prevented the philosophical community from moving a step closer to the necessary fundamental change which can liberate philosophy in South Africa. This was, however, no mistake. The body was merely preserving itself.
However, the marginal status of African philosophy and that of Africans in philosophy in South Africa today speak of outstanding liberation, the negotiated settlement, and the post-apartheid South Africa that follows which has upheld the philosophical doubt that the African is not a rational being, or not of equal human status with the white. Liberation for us requires not simply the development and practice of a philosophy of liberation but also the liberation of philosophy itself. Philosophy in South Africa itself needs to be liberated because it is a philosophy of oppression and a philosophy of oppressors which continues to justify the unacceptable conditions that the majority of South Africans live in today precisely because, as Kimberlé Crenshaw (as cited by Mills 1998:102) attests: “a society once expressly organized around white supremacist principles does not cease to be a white supremacist society simply by formally rejecting those principles. The society remains white supremacist in its maintenance of the actual distribution of goods and resources, status, and prestige”, which is what new South Africa truly represents, substantially continuous with a supposedly old apartheid South Africa. This section through personal reflection of the alienating experience of being a black student of philosophy in South Africa was an attempt at demonstrating the northbound gaze of the practice, mimicry, and the commitment to ignorance of the philosophical establishment which is in need of rectification.

Conclusion

This paper has discussed the history of philosophy in South Africa as comprising of two contending traditions coinciding with the two traditions of colonialism in this country: the Dutch and the English. The mimetic nature of the practice of philosophy in South Africa was also discussed as expressive of a northbound gaze which we have identified as Eurocentrism. Although separate the two traditions of both the Afrikaner and the English speaking were united in the conquest of the indigenous people in the unjust wars of colonialism, this is expressed with the formation of the union of South Africa after the two Anglo-Boer wars where the white identity was solidified as expressed in the first use of non-racialism. It has been argued that albeit the transition to a post-apartheid, which is not post conquest, there is much continuity with the supposed past than a break with it expressed through the commitment to Euro-American models of philosophical justifiability and aversion to our immediate reality. A personal reflection as a student of philosophy in this post-apartheid era was also offered to demonstrate the unchallenged hegemony of white philosophy in this country which has with it the readily questioning of the existence of African philosophy. This paper, through a historical exposition of the institutionalized practice of philosophy and the necessarily reconstructionist foundations of such an undertaking, was an attempt at showing the Eurocentric and colonial character of South African philosophy to display the need of liberating philosophy from the pervasive condition of the northbound gaze.

Notes

1. According to Mogobe Ramose (2005:9) “the Anglo-Boer War was waged on the assumption that the British and the Afrikaners had the right to claim title to South African territory. By the time the war actually broke out, both belligerents had contending claims to acquired rights over South African territory. Conspicuously missing in these claims was the question whether or not the indigenous conquered people of South Africa had a prior right to title over South Africa. This omission is consistent with western discourse on conquest. An essential feature of this discourse is that morality, law and
justice applied only to the “civilized” people like the British and the Afrikaners. According to this reasoning, it was correct to hold that South Africa belongs only to the British and the Afrikaners.”

2. Ndumiso Dladla (2016:162) relying on Jon Soske shows how non-racialism developed so as to bridge the gap between the Afrikaner and the English, Dladla (2016:162) elaborates: “Soske has argued that despite the popular tendency assuming that the concept of the “non-racial” originated from within the ranks of the liberal tradition, specifically around the qualified franchise in the Cape, it is, in fact, surprisingly the case that “non-racial” was used first in South Africa in the beginning of the 20th century to describe “inter-group” relations between the English and Afrikaner people without regard to ethnicity. This early use originated from the Afrikaner Bond. In its early use, it came to indicate pro-imperial white unity in South Africa. It did not as such from its beginnings in South African discourse emerge in the supposed opposition to racism but rather marked an explicit evolution of racism; of better cooperation by the conqueror in pursuit of the subjugation of the indigenous conquered people.”

3. “The ‘native’ sector is not complementary to the European sector. The two confront each other, but not in the service of a higher unity. Governed by a purely Aristotelian logic, they follow the dictates of mutual exclusion… The colonists sector is a sector built to last, all stone and steel. It’s a sector of lights and paved roads, where the trash cans constantly overflow with strange and wonderful garbage, undreamed of leftovers… the colonized sector, or at least the “native” quarters, the shanty town, the Medina, the reservation, is a disreputable place inhibited by disreputable people… the colonized sector is a famished sector, hungry for bread, meat, shoes, coal and light” (Fanon, 1963:4).

4. Following Lewis Gordon’s schematization of Frantz Fanon’s arguments in Black Skin White Masks Frank Wilderson (2008:98) points out; “The world cannot accommodate a black(ened) relation at the level of bodies—subjectivity. Thus, Black “presence is a form of absence” for to see a Black is to see the Black, an ontological frieze that waits for a gaze, rather than a living ontology moving with agency in the field of vision…. there is ‘something’ absent whenever blacks are present. The more present a black is, the more absent is this ‘something.’ And the more absent a black is, the more present is this something.” Blackness, then, is the destruction of presence, for Blacks “seem to suck presence into themselves as a black hole, pretty much like the astrophysical phenomenon that bears that name.”

5. A descendent of the indigenous people conquered in the unjust wars of colonisation is what ‘blackness’ refers to in this regard as an inherent category of conquest: the triumph of the colonizers ‘whiteness’ which creates its other as ‘black’ i.e. without white there is no sense or meaning of black. For a detailed elaboration of this position see Frank B. Wilderson, III (2008) ‘Biko and the problematic of presence’ in Biko Lives edited by Andile Mngxitama et.al

6. Following Tsenay Serequebehan (2002:64) we define Eurocentrism as “a pervasive bias located in modernity’s self-consciousness of itself. It is grounded at its core in the metaphysical belief or idea (idee) that European existence is qualitatively superior to other forms of human life.”
7. According to Gail Gerhart (1978:4) “Apartheid, or the doctrine of racial segregation, is the philosophy of the National party which has ruled South Africa since 1948. The earliest roots of race discrimination can be found in the seventeenth century when whites first colonized the Cape of Good Hope, but apartheid as a full-fledged political ideology developed much later, following the transition to an industrial economy in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Pressed both by white employers and white workers, who shared an interest in the tight control of black labor, successive governments enacted a structure of laws and regulations designed to guarantee the superior economic status of whites and to perpetuate a master-servant relationship between the races in all spheres. Gradually gaining ground against the entrenched vestiges of integrationism built into the political system inherited from Britain at the time of Union in 1910, segregationists achieved a major breakthrough in 1936 with the removal of the last Africans from the common voters’ roll of the Cape Province—a political turning point to which we shall refer again in due course. The present ascendance of apartheid as an ideology began with the 1948 election victory of Daniel F. Malan and the National party, which at that time drew its support almost entirely from rural and working-class Afrikaners.”

8. According to Ramose (2007, 320), “[t]he proliferation of ‘anti-apartheid’ organisations, especially in Western Europe, certainly made a positive contribution towards freedom in South Africa. However, they had the infelicitous effect of misleading the gullible into the belief that apartheid in South Africa was the fundamental problem. Abolish apartheid, so the reasoning went, then all shall be fine. In this way, the question of freedom in South Africa was reduced to the problem of the constitutional recognition of the ‘civil rights’ of the conquered peoples of South Africa. Thus an all-inclusive constitution, recognizing the ‘civil rights’ of all the peoples of South Africa, was deemed to be the solution to the apartheid problem. On this reasoning, it was unnecessary to question the morality and political legitimacy of the ‘right of conquest’ because South Africa belonged to all who lived in it.” Ramose’s diagnosis of the fundamental problem in South Africa is consistent with the reasoning of the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania concerning the African’s sovereign title to territory which the Europeans through their questionable rights to conquest consistently denied. Izwe Lethu! The PAC slogan went, reacting to the Kliptown Charter of 1955, which was officially adopted in 1958, where the Africanists staged their exit from the African National Congress (ANC). The charter famously asserts that “South Africa belongs to all who live in it; black and white”, which therefore nullifies the sovereignty of the African over the lost territory due to the unjust wars of colonization against the indigenous people by equating their claim to that of their conqueror (whites). This then was to be the ideological impetus which inspired the ANC-led struggle for inclusion, which received its success through the negotiated settlement that brought about what was to be the “new” South Africa. To this Ramose (2007, 320) laments: “The defenders of the compromise that has resulted in the ‘new’ South Africa argue, among other things, that the compromise was the best option at the time since it averted an impending ‘civil war’. Suffice it to state that, since colonization, South Africa has been practically in a state of war. A hypothetical ‘civil war’ in the 1990s could not justify the sacrifice at the altar of compromise of the moral and political imperative to bring about a just and peaceful end to the ensuing colonial war.

10. Precisely the difference between the abundant life of the colonizer and the living death of the colonized.

11. In his inaugural lecture at the University of Cape Town suggestively titled “When Do Settlers become Natives?” Ugandan intellectual Mahmood Mamdani provides illuminative remarks concerning conquest and its particular significance as exemplified by the South African situation; “Settlers are made by conquest, not just by immigration. Settlers are kept settlers by a form of the state that makes a distinction—particularly juridical—between conquerors and conquered, settlers and natives, and makes it the basis of other distinctions that tend to buttress the conquerors and isolate the conquered, politically. However fictitious these distinctions may appear historically, they become real political facts for they are embodied in real political institutions… The South African transition has a double significance from a continental point of view. For the first time in the history of African decolonization, a settler minority has relinquished exclusive political power without an outright political defeat. I am not arguing that this minority has given up its interests, only that it has consented to exploring ways of defending these interests other than a monopoly over political power and the rights of citizenship. In doing so, I believe it has established—in the native eyes—a political and moral claim to citizenship in a post-apartheid order … the South African transition means that nowhere on this continent has a settler minority succeeded in declaring and sustaining the independence of a settler colony.”

12. This was the contention of the Africanist school in liberation struggle history which revolutionised the congress movement in the 1940’s, giving it a mass character instead of being merely a petitionist movement as it was from its inception, with the birth of the ANC youth league championed by the Africanists such as Anton Lembede and Peter Mda. However, such revolutionary sentiments were to find independent expression and articulation in 1958 when the Africanists exited the congress movement, after its infiltration by white communists who wrote the freedom charter for them which contained that “South Africa belongs to all who live in it Black and white,” and founded the Pan Africanist Movement of Azania in 1959. It is interesting to note that the Black Consciousness Movement that would be born about a decade later also refused to be identified as South African and also opted for Azania which is a contention against the questionable right of conquest that gave the conquerors the right to name this territory as ‘South Africa.’ For a history of the PAC of Azania and struggle history see Gail Gerhart (1978) *Black Power in South Africa*. And Thomas and Karris Carter *From Protest to Challenge* vol 3 1953-1964.

13. Dladla (2016:31) attests to the fact that “[m]uch of the curriculum in South African universities is still obdurately chauvinistic and not even, as might arguably be the case with other parts of the world, a locally-derived cultural chauvinism but the most classical and unapologetic Eurocentrism. It has a bias against and condescension towards “non-European” thought and even more especially against African thought and experience. The scholars, theories, methods, and experiences favored are usually exclusively Western.”
In the case of “African philosophy for example after previewing a typical South African curriculum and teaching program one could be forgiven for assuming that “African Philosophy did not exist.” Indeed my personal experience as a philosophy student in a post-apartheid South Africa is testimony to this, I remember asking one of my educators whether Africans had any contribution to philosophy and was told that there was none and that perhaps I could be the first (I offer my personal reflection in the following section).

14. According to Dladla (2018:39) “There were many more senior Broederbond members who had senior positions at universities….Amongst senior Broeders who were Vice Chancellors or Rectors of universities, for example were, Dr Hilgaard Muller (former Minister of Foreign Affairs) at the University of Pretoria, Prof Samuel Pauw, University of South Africa. Professor WL Mouton the University of the Orange Free State, Professor EJ Marais at the University of Port Elizabeth(now Nelson Mandela Metropolitan university), Professor Tjaart van der Walt at the University of Potchefstroom. One need only wonder whether or not there is a family relationship between these paragons of apartheid and some of the academics either still active in universities or just recently retired. If there are indeed family relationships then it is pertinent to ask how far – to translate an Afrikaans idiom – has the apple fallen from the tree.”

15. According to Dladla (2018:129) “Despite analytic philosophy’s famous apolitical reputation, an examination of the lives of the philosophers themselves and the history of their opinions suggests that analytic philosophy enjoys a close relationship with liberalism. This is hardly surprising when one considers firstly, the relations between analytic philosophy and empiricism and, secondly, that the great British empiricists such as Locke, Berkeley, Hume and Mill could broadly be characterized as liberals.” However, it is important to note that this was a later development in the English speaking Universities when they were assuming a more “neutralist” approach and detached themselves from explicit political expression.

16. Laying out a definition of liberalism in South Africa as a political ideology Gail Gerhart (1978:7) likens it with Trusteeship in that they “feel that the black wards of the white man deserve a free and fair chance to “grow up” and become the white man’s equal. Whites, in fact, according to the usual liberal view, have a duty to promote the black man’s assimilation, through education and through the extension of political rights appropriate to his level of acculturation. Unlike apartheid, which calls for blacks to “develop along their own lines” and in pursuit of their own separate variants of culture, liberalism has always recognized one common human standard of measurement: the adoption of “civilized” or modern, western ways. Until 1936, the qualified but nonracial Cape franchise with its premise of gradual democratization was an embodiment of the liberal ideal. “Equal rights for all civilized men,” ran the classic liberal credo, echoed at the time of the founding of the Liberal party in 1953, “and equal opportunity for all men to become civilized.”

17. It is interesting because in the political scene that will follow the liberals were “opposed” to apartheid, which was the policy of Afrikaner nationalists in the form of the national party, and were for “integration.” It is such liberal sentiments that Steve Biko and the Black consciousness movement were duly opposed and developed the philoso-
phy of black consciousness antithetical to such sedimentations.

18. Dladla (2016:42) relying on Barnes points out that “Professor Andrew Howson Murray, who held the chair of UCT’s department of philosophy and ethics from 1937-1970 was a well-known and widely employed collaborator and agent of the apartheid regime. In the course of his academic work Murray, for instance, contributed papers to volumes published in honor of two conservative South African philosophers the Belgian ex-Nazi fugitive Herman de Vleeschauwer of UNISA and Stoker of the University of Potchefstroom. Barnes writes “As a philosopher and educator, Murray’s perspective was that the concept of pluralism was the only answer to the challenges of life in a multi-racial society. Although in other settings pluralism can be a reasonable call for democratic decentralization, in Murray’s hands it was deformed into an apology for apartheid.”

19. The following is a revised version of my presentation at the annual meeting of the Philosophy Society of South Africa in January 2017 held at Rhodes University in a plenary panel titled “liberating philosophy from racism”. We staged our exit from the racist body to form the Azanian Philosophical Society which was launched in Pretoria at the Black August Festival this year.

20. Dladla’s (2016, 2018) intervention, which is an elucidation of the Azanian critical tradition, has made it possible to reflect on the history of South Africa and of philosophy more meaningful particularly as he grounds African philosophy as a basis for doing philosophy and also his attack of liberalism expressed as analytic philosophy and its attendant aversion to history. This is part of the greater struggle and mission of the Azanian philosophical society.

21. Dussel (1985:11) enunciates; “I call colonial philosophy that which was exported to Latin America, Africa, and Asia beginning with the sixteenth century (the universities of Mexico and Lima were founded in 1552 with the same academic ranking as those of Alcalá and Salamanca) and especially the spirit of pure imitation or repetition in the periphery of the philosophy prevailing in the imperialist [center].”

References
Dladla, Ndumiso. 2016. Against an Analytic Conception of Race/ism. MA thesis. UNISA.
———. 2018. Here is a Table: A Philosophical Essay on the History of Race in South Africa. Pretoria: Bantu Logic publishing.


Du Boisian Multi-structuralism

Reem Abou-samra*
The Roeper School

Abstract

Scholars have studied W.E.B. Du Bois writings as part and parcel of American political and sociological thought. Often, scholars view his writings through one lens and thereby classify his works as contradictory and inconsistent, such as his writings advocating segregation/integration or liberalism/communism. By analyzing Du Bois’s writings through one lens, the complexity in which he wanted to implement change is lost and is deemed contradictory. In this paper, I analyze the literature on Du Bois’s writings and recommend an alternative approach to understanding Du Boisian writings: multi-structuralism. In order to understand Du Bois’s seemingly contradictory advocacy, I recommend approaching his works based on different levels of analysis to affect change: individual, group, national, and world. By doing so, one can see Du Bois’s policy recommendations as complementary although in tension, rather than contradictory, in order to work towards one overarching goal – equality of people.

Keywords: Du Bois, multi-structuralism, double-consciousness, pan-Africanism, Black-American

Introduction

W.E.B Du Bois was born (1868) into a time of multiple transformations in the United States of America; only a few years after the Emancipation Proclamation (1863); raised during the Reconstruction Era (1865-1877); and living through World War I, the Great Depression, and World War II. In fact, his death came (August 27, 1963) on the eve of the momentous March on Washington (August 28, 1963). Throughout these times, major shifts occurred, economically, politically, and culturally. The United States was urbanizing and industrializing. Du Bois wrote during the black migration from the South (Gilbertlove 1997), during the Progressive Era, where there was a push for voting rights for women and poor immigrants (Kraditor 1967), a regulation of industry, and reorganization and expansion of unions such as the American Federation of Labor, the Niagara Movement and the NAACP (Green 1998). Also, the United States was emerging as a significant power after the Spanish-American War. The aggressive enforcement of the Monroe Doctrine demonstrated that the relatively young nation was getting more and more involved internationally (Jones 1969). The dynamic context in which Du Bois was writing, was one that was changing, growing, and moving, beyond the local (and national) and into the international realm.

In this paper, I argue that in order to effectively understand W.E.B Du Bois’s activism and work, one must approach it with a multi-layered understanding, in which I label Du Boisian Multi-Structuralism. He sought to influence society based on four main structures: The individual, the group, the nation, and the world. These four structures interact with one another causing a sense of tension and reciprocity that may facilitate or withhold change. It is because of this tension, that often Du Bois is seen as a contradiction through his works and writings. For example, he writes in favor of both segregation and integration; for both liberalism and communism; for American Patriotism and African Nationalism. It is important to recognize that Du Bois worked within his agency in order to make to improve social equality. When reading

*Direct correspondence to reem.abou@gmail.com
his works, Du Bois first asserts the self (the first level of analysis), before discussing the other structures of society at the collective level: the group (African Americans), the nation (America) and the world (Pan Africanism and International Systems). In order to understand his writings without contradiction, the reader must view how Du Bois uses this multi-structural approach.

**Literature Review**

Many writers focus on one or two of the layers of society when discussing Du Bois’s political thought. Similarly, they may focus in the question of Du Bois’s inconsistency as an author and activist. Rarely do they look at his work through a multi-structured approach. The way’s Du Bois’s work is understood is in the following ways: 1) As a cosmopolitan ideal and international framework (Sundquist 1993; Frederickson 2001; Moses 1988); 2) Focused on societal groupings, such as the family unit (Reed 1997); 3) Focused on racial groups, the color-line and advent of double consciousness (Lewis 2000, Repplier 1916); 4) The development of the African nationalism and pan-African movement (Pardy 1967; Contee 1972; Kendhammer 2006); 5) The preoccupation on Marxism, socialism, and capitalism (Morrison 2000; Lorini 2007); 6) Du Bois’s individual characteristics (Drake 1986; Walden 1972). This section will elaborate on the varying theories and theorists who study Du Bois’s work.

In his discussion of Du Bois, Sundquist centers on the concept of the soul. He argues that in Souls of Black Folk, Du Bois was able to “reconstruct” African American culture through the black religion (Sundquist 1993, 459). Du Bois dichotomy was not between the American and the black American, but between the African and the American which “that led Du Bois to an amorphous interpretation of the category of race that would have significant implications for his national aesthetic” (Sundquist 1993, 461). For Du Bois, race was not about the color line per se but “a world-spirit or Volkgeist” in which people shared a common idea (Sundquist 1993, 462). Sundquist argues that because of Du Bois’s vagueness and tendency to speak in the ethereal form, there was a fluidity and no stable standard of what definitions of identity or leadership must be (Sundquist 1993, 464). Sundquist says “It is possible, indeed, to locate Du Bois entirely outside of a black nationalist tradition and to place him, for example, in the tradition of American pragmatism” (Sundquist 1993, 464). Sundquist locates Du Bois’s writings within wider American literature and the community of scholars. He wishes to show the contributions of black Americans’ to American culture, and in particular through black spirituals. For Sundquist, Du Bois’s utilization of black culture shows a level of individual and collective agency (the first two levels of analysis in this paper).

Moses explains the manifestation of a black nationalist background as well as the embodiment of a world spirit, or cosmopolitan goals. Moses describes Du Bois’s influences throughout his life, such as the conservative tradition of Crummell, the radical transcendental principles of Douglass, and the communist thrust which was articulated through a black nationalistic ground (Moses 1988, 140). Yet, Moses recognizes Du Bois’s attempt to focus on “cosmopolitan goals” (Moses 1988, 246).

In line with Sundquist’s assertion that Du Bois could also fall into the tradition of pragmatism, Morrison depicts Du Bois’s place in the progressive movement through his work The Philadelphia Negro. Morrison argues that Du Bois “tried to create an intellectual blueprint to reform America.” Du Bois sought to educate “reform-minded whites” about the experiences and “true nature” of black Americans, in light of post-Reconstruction and the increasing erosion of civil rights (Morrison 2000). Similarly, Veroli argues that Du Bois served as a pragmatic predecessor of CLR James, as a critic of materialism, capitalism, and a “superstructure model
of society”. Veroli explained Du Bois understood “the reality of raced subjectivity” and that “reality is socially constructed” (Veroli 2003).

Some authors focus on Du Bois’s individual characteristics and quirks. Horne explains that Du Bois’s political thought was consistently influenced by his individual passion towards “socialism, peace, and equality” and his uniqueness was that he constantly revised his ideas based on the changing contextual realities (Horne 1986, 8). Drake argues that the paradoxes and inconsistencies of Du Bois’s life could be explained by his “continuous probe, touching the sensitive areas along the color-line, and considered it his duty to document the results of the probing as well as his own reaction to the situations” (Drake 1986, 113). Furthermore, Drake explains that Du Bois “considered himself an institution as well as a person—and he was” (Drake 1986, 113).

Du Bois has also been painted as part and parcel of the discourse of Americanism and American exceptionalism. Repplier explains that “Du Bois’s conception of true Americanism would be the abolishment of the color line” (Repplier 1916). Abbott focuses on Du Bois’s entanglement of American exceptionalism with that of the Agrarians. His hope in American exceptionalism was articulated in a belief for “a glorious conclusion to a historical quest” that could be obtained for African Americans. Furthermore, America was exceptional because it was “part African American and part Caucasian” (Abbott 1999, 154). Similarly, Lorini argues that Du Bois (like Ortiz) combatted racism in America, both in ideology and policies. Du Bois adopted the idea of “acculturation”, in which American culture has been largely affected and progressed by African-Americans, from the beginnings of the nation (Lorini 2007).

Du Bois has been understood in terms of cultural phases in society (both in American and internationally). Gregg explains that Du Bois’s writings are marked by phases that he underwent. He breaks up Du Bois’s historical writings into: 1) the social scientific through The Suppression of the African Slave Trade and The Philadelphia Negro; 2) the cultural materialist through Souls of Black Folk, John Brown, and The Negro; and 3) the Marxist through Black Reconstruction in America and Black Folk (Then and Now). These three phases developed in parallel with (but also deviated from) his white counterparts (Gregg 1998, 79). Morse focuses on the role of “double consciousness” and the “second sight” as found in Souls of Black Folk, explaining the hurdles of racism, the question of humanity, and the formation of identity in a white-dominated America (Morse 2008).

Like Gregg and Morse, Reed argues that Du Bois’s whole political theory is centered around contextual realities in which the Negro must ascend the scale of civilization (Reed 1997, 31). He argues that Du Bois was an anti-modernist, influenced by socialism, and by the idea of a cooperative commonwealth. Essentially, “Du Bois’s thought was formed in the great cauldron of collectivist ideas” (Reed 1997, 25). Reed explains that Du Bois “linked inquiry to strategic political action” (Reed 1997, 177). Du Bois’s idea of politics is centered around “the realm of government activity and public policy” (Reed 1997, 178). Because of the focus of local issues, Reed emphasizes Du Bois’s “primacy of state-centered politics in making sense of the black American situation” (Reed 1997, 178). Reed argues that, by concentrating on the element of double-consciousness, theorists “depoliticize and dehistoricize” accounts of the African American experience (Reed 1997, 177). In fact, by recognizing Du Bois’s true foundations of race, one can truly understand Du Bois’s political agenda. Reed locates Du Bois’s writings within political thought in America. He shows the evolution of Du Bois’s thinking. For Reed, double-consciousness and pan-African thought are concepts that are catalysts for political action, not ideals or end points.
One of the major contributions made by Du Bois was his role in shaping the Pan-African movement. Du Bois is often referred to as the ‘father’ of Pan-Africanism. H.G. Pardy explains that it was through Du Bois’s leadership that helped influence the Pan-African movement providing “the loose organization structure… through a series of Congresses” and that it was through his writings that Du Bois “provided the ideas that gave to Pan-Africanism a distinct ideology” (Pardy 1966). Pardy explains that “Much of his writing emphasized the relationship of the Negro to Africa and this was central to his Pan-African ideas”. Contee similarly explains that Du Bois’s contribution to Pan-Africanism was its revival when many of his contemporaries failed to due so (Contee 1972). Kendhammer explains that Du Bois’s narrative of Pan-Africanism is a form of anti-colonial discourse. He points to the contradictions of his liberal and later communist ideals and reconciles these contradictions based on his “positionality within the colonial world” through African Nationalism (Kendhammer 2006).

None of the authors explicitly indicate the need to explore the multiple layers of analysis (or the multi-structuralism) in which Du Bois operates and advocates. However, George M. Frederickson does begin to broach the idea, in his article The Double Life of WEB Du Bois (2001). Fredrickson explains that Du Bois never sought to transcend race, but rather to “reconcile or coordinate his multiple identities, as a descendant of enslaved Africans, an American citizen, and a cultivated and cosmopolitan citizens of the world” (Fredrickson 2001). Furthermore, Du Bois “anticipated the version of modern multiculturalism that stresses permeable boundaries and interaction among different groups” (Frederickson 2001). All these various conceptions of Du Boisian theories are relevant and significant in understanding his contributions; However, they lack a comprehensive outlook on his life, context, and work.

**Multi-structural Approach**

The multi-structural approach recommends analyzing Du Bois’s work through a comprehensive lens: individually and collectively (a group, nationally, and internationally). Theorists who mention Du Bois at a mainly collective level (Moses 1988; Gordon 2003) somewhat disregard the individual level of analysis, in which Du Bois asserts that the self, or the individual as a unit of analysis. The individual is and should be ultimately free and exists within different layers of society. Du Bois states “The soul is still individual if free; the group is social” (Du Bois 1996, 68) which means two things: First, that the soul is an individual, given its state of freedom. Secondly, a group, which is made up of these individuals, is a social entity. Because society is made up of a group of individuals, Du Bois argues that the self needs to be validated before the collective can formulate. He states that there is a need for self examination and reflection (Du Bois 1996, 105), asserting that the individual must be developed. He believes that in order for a future to rise, individually and collectively, depends on an individuals own effort, where they strive alone yet encourage others to strive forward. However, the conditional “if free” is critical; Du Bois recognizes that the soul is not truly “free” due to the racial ordering of society constraining and limiting the ability to strive among individual black souls.

Du Bois writes in the paradigm of American political culture. He is heavily influenced by republican and liberal ideas and traditions. According to Hartz and Sandel, American political culture is monopolized by a hegemonic, monolithic liberal tradition (Hartz 1955; Sandel 1996). Sandel says “central to republican theory is the idea that liberty depends on sharing in self-government”(Sandel 1996, 5). Self-rule requires the citizens’ posses, or come to acquire certain civic virtues of deliberating upon common good to shape “the destiny of the political community” (Sandel 1996, 5). Du Bois’s argument about self-striving and recognition that the
common good may indeed require individual sacrifice is a manifestation of that. However, the presence of the veil means that self-striving is a problem that must be confronted, if a republican theory of liberty is the dominant paradigm.

There exists between the individual and the collective a constant tension. In Du Bois’s case, he believes that the individual self must develop before the collective self, because the collective self is subject to the individual self. Du Bois wrote “To attain a place in the world, He must be himself, not another” (Du Bois 1999, 105). This is a logical conclusion, given the list of ideals that Du Bois has on life: “beauty and health of body, mental clearness and creative genius, spiritual goodness and receptivity, and social adaptability and constructiveness”(Du Bois 1996, 61). The way Du Bois prioritizes his criteria for life indicates that the individual must be developed physically, mentally, and spiritually before socially. In order for a successful collective identity to be thoroughly established, individuals must strive for these three elements as individual persons.

The idea of striving, like republicanism, was part of Du Bois’s religio-cultural context. It was derived partially from Du Bois’s reading, participation and understanding of Puritan writings by clergy such as Jonathan Edwards, Jr. Edwards wrote about striving for perfection on earth so that an individual would obtain their heavenly reward (Edwards 236, 379, 388, 615, 618, 636, 661). For Puritans, reading the Bible, participating in church functions, voting for church leaders, attending school, reading, writing, and community participation moved one toward spiritual and moral perfection. Striving toward moral and spiritual perfection was initially a rebellious action aimed largely at reforming the Church of England. Political terrain is vitally important, as is discipline, a fixed belief system, strong group identification, and rejection of the out-group—non-Puritans. Finally, a willingness to sacrifice one’s well-being for the community is part of what it means to strive toward perfection. Du Bois’s participation in a congregational church in his hometown and attending Harvard may have surely influenced his writings and thinking about self-striving. Self-striving is inherently rebellious and has the goal to reform a political institution. Du Bois may have felt, like Edwards, that self-striving at the individual and collective level could result in the reformation of American democracy. Du Bois may have strongly believed in the republican ideal of self-striving, where the democratic community is open to all peoples. This rebellious action manifests in Du Bois’s political thought as “agitation”. Du Bois explains that agitation differs from aggravation, stating that “agitation is a necessary evil to tell of the ills of the Suffering. Without it many a nation has been lulled to false security and preened itself with virtues it did not posses” (Du Bois 1972; Nov. 1910). Furthermore, not only is this agitation one that is political, social, and physical but “a hard duty but a necessary one— a divine one” (Du Bois 1972; Nov. 1910).

Nevertheless, Du Bois does not neglect collective development in favor of individual development. Du Bois was not solely and uniquely a black nationalist, as some may portray him to be through his work in the Academy (Moses 1988, 135). He believed that individuals must give back to their society, such as through the development of organizations like The Academy and the Negro college. Holt argues that Du Bois’s goal was not “social endogamy or black nationalism but to be ‘a co-worker in the kingdom of culture’” (Holt 1990, 305). Holt explains that biographers tend to criticize Du Bois for his “inconsistency” (he excludes Rampersad, Marable, and Lester) in which he is portrayed “lurching between the antithetical and contradictory goals of black nationalism and racial integration” (Holt 1990, 305). Reicher explains that subordinate groups, in order to empower their members “lead to a complex set of strategies” in order to “challenge the social hierarchy” while “dominant group members seek to
reassert it” (Reicher 2004, 932).

Du Bois’ collective action plan is laid out on three tiers: dispelling ignorance, lessening poverty, and lessening crime (Du Bois 1996, 355). In order for these goals to be met, the individual must thrive. Nevertheless, after the collective has been established and maturates, it also gives back to the development of individual selves (which signifies a cyclical process of development). Within the same section of The Training of Negroes for Social Power, Du Bois states that there is a need for the growth of initiative, spread of independent thought, and expanding consciousness of manhood. Collectively, these needs can be met. Individuals who recognized their self-worth and develop, give to the collective community, but not merely for a collective identity. It is because the collective identity also gives back to the individual’s further development. Self-identity and collective identity have a ‘give and take’ relationship, but are interdependent. Du Bois develops this model through his own life, and that of the representative men, which Lewis calls “the New Negro” (Lewis 2). He often states that elites need to participate and give to the collective identity. It is often the case that the elites have already a well-established level of individualism. Du Bois already recognized his self-worth as an individual, but argued that these matured individuals should help perpetuate growth for the collective. By doing so, not only are they helping the collective grow, but themselves as individuals.

Many theorists assume that W.E.B. Du Bois focused solely on the collective good of African Americans. That as a group, the African American community needed to be empowered, without taking into account other groups of people. His social programs advocate for social change, towards the improvement of the quality of life of African Americans, as well as political equality and enfranchisement, by developing the group, even at the risk of segregating rather integrating. Because of his focus on policy programs that serve “the group”, the concept of individualism is typically overlooked by readers and interpreters of Du Bois. However, in this paper it is argue that Du Bois is actually an advocate for individualism, just as equally as he is an advocate for the social welfare of the group. In fact, the main methodology of group development is an active form of self-development of individuals. In the case for Du Bois, he believes that the individual self must develop before the collective self, because the collective self is subject to the individual self. The individual must be developed physically, mentally, and spiritually before and during positive social development. The collective cannot move forward until individuals advance, in order to give back to the collective. The theory established is based on understanding each level of Du Bois’s mutli-structural approach: the individual, the groups, the national and political system (the American experience), and the world (international system). Each of these levels of analysis must be addressed and engaged, in order to have an effective change in society.

**Level of Analysis: The Individual**

When Du Bois speaks in terms of the individual, he speaks in terms of the American individual, at times addressing white Americans at others addressing black Americans. Du Bois concept of individualism stems from an emphasis on civic virtue and self-rule (see discussion of Sandel). It is in opposition to writings about rugged individualism, which led political leaders such as Theodore Roosevelt to believe that America’s destiny was to rule over the darker races in Asia and the Americas. Due to the systematic racism in American society, Du Bois seeks to re-condition the black American mind to value themselves, not in comparison to anyone else, nor through a racial Veil. Du Bois tells the reader that there is a need to “train ourselves to see
the beauty in black”(Du Bois 1996, 59). This is training is essential because, if successful, it unravels hundreds of years of inferiority complexes that have been pushed through the institution of slavery, as well as segregation and various Jim Crow laws.

The Song of Smoke is a clear attempt to assert this affirmation of black pride, accept and value one’s self. The poem indicates trials and tribulations faced, but there is a constant repetition that affirms the reader by saying “I am the Smoke King. I am black” (Du Bois 1996, 54). Du Bois explains, as previously mentioned, that upward mobility is based upon living a ‘good’ life; where life is “beauty and health of body, mental clearness and creative genius, spiritual goodness and receptivity, and social adaptability and constructiveness”(Du Bois 1996, 61). These qualities are essential to attaining upward mobility and Du Bois wrote, in an effort to reassert pride in black Americans, “I maintain that the black race excels in one, two and four, and is well abreast even in three” (Du Bois 1996, 61). The aforementioned qualities are a recognition of the body (physical), the soul (the spiritual), and the ability to improve (perfectibility), all of which are qualities that are later found in Du Bois’s Representative Men. Du Bois’s writing is filled with examples and chapters dedicated to the self-affirmation of the black American as well as the recognition of self-beauty. Self-beauty is important because it is the ability to view oneself through their own standards, rather than through the Veil, basically, another’s eyes.

Du Bois tells the reader that an internal drive and a sense of self-striving is an important component within the individual. In Souls of Black Folk, Du Bois encourages the audience that they, as individuals, to develop a true self-consciousness, rather than a double consciousness (Du Bois 1996, 102). In order to do so, the individual will have go through a journey of “reflection and self-examination” (Du Bois 1996, 105), through which one can attain “self-consciousness, self-realization, self-respect” (Du Bois 1996, 105). There is a necessary need to “rise above seeing oneself through the veil” (Du Bois 1996, 212). The Veil is linked to self-striving and political reform, this discussion does suggest that reading, writing, and self-reflection are critical if the individual is going to strive beyond the racial veil. He insists that individual effort and ability shall be the test of real American manhood and not differences of race, color or descent (Du Bois 1996, 379); which is an attestation of American individualism. The missing element of the individual that Du Bois attempts to cultivate is self-assertion, which he criticizes by saying: “What we have lost is the courage of independent self-assertion.” (422) Therefore, in order to attain a place in the world, to become a true individual, Du Bois argues that the individual “must be himself and not another” (Du Bois 1996, 105).

Level of Analysis: The Group

To understand the group as a level of analysis for Du Bois’s multi-structural approach, one must understand the various concepts that overlap in this level. Therefore, a discussion of blackness reciprocates a discussion of whiteness, race, double consciousness, and Americanism.

In an attempt to explain the concept of blackness, Du Bois must first define what race is and why it is an issue. Du Bois does not deny the differences of races, nor does he neglect the issues. He clearly defines race as:

It is a vast family of human beings, generally of common blood and language, always of common history, traditions and impulses, who are both voluntarily and involuntarily striving
together for the accomplishment of certain more or less vividly conceived ideals of life (Du Bois 1996, 40).

Du Bois saw race as something that needed to be utilized in order to develop and improve the nation and humanity at large. Races are not and should not be groups of people based upon a hierarchical structure, but rather a horizontal and multilateral structure, that work together to improve humanity (the last level of analysis). Du Bois posed the question “how shall this message be delivered; how shall these various ideals be realized? The answer is plain: by the development of these race groups, not as individuals, but as races (Du Bois 1996, 42). Meaning it is not for the superiority or the inferiority of a group to be distinguished as a race, but to contribute to humanity. Du Bois said “Negroes inspired by one vast ideal, can work out in its fullness the great message we have for humanity” (Du Bois 1996, 42). Similarly he lays out the creed of the Negro ideal as:1) as a race with a unique contribution to humanity 2) to maintain race and ideal of human brotherhood 3) development of whites and blacks side by side 4) advocate for social equilibrium 5) cure social ills 6) impartial selection of ability in economic/intellectual world 7) destiny to strive honorably, rearing race ideal to glorify God and uplifting the people (Du Bois 1996, 46-47). This shows that racial groups, if empowered, serve to empower all people in a multilaterally. In the group, one can articulate the idea of self-striving through fixed racial categories and rebelling against such fixed categorization (Reicher 2004) . The idea of the Veil significantly influences Du Bois’s writing about how, first, the individual black American should conceptualize race; second, how to identify with a specific racial category; and third, reject categorization of the race by the dominate group. By doing so, it would allow the individual to define themselves, to identify strongly with their race (black nationalism / pan-Africanism), and to work towards reforming and eventually eliminating the negative categorization of blacks by white racists.

Du Bois’ definition of blackness is never strictly defined in his works. He is reluctant to use the term “black/ness” as an identifier because it comes with a connotation that eliminates many people from its scope (including himself). However, before replacing the term with a more comprehensive and encompassing one, Du Bois explains that blackness is based on being a referent; one comes to the realization of being different. Therefore, for Du Bois, blackness is not necessarily the quality of being black, but the condition of living within the veil (Du Bois 1996, 102). Du Bois wrote, exemplifying this “leaving, then, the world of the white man, I have stepped within the Veil” (Du Bois 1996, 100). Repeatedly, Du Bois talks about the problem of the color-line (Du Bois 1996, 100), in terms of the Veil. This problem of the color-line, the Veil, is an indication of being the “other” or a subaltern group, in which one is being contrasted to a standard that is imposed upon them. Du Bois talks about his own experience by saying:

They pointed out that I was not a ‘Negro,’ but a mulatto; that I was not a Southerner but a Northerner, and my object was to be an American and not a Negro; that race distinctions must go. I agreed with this in part and as an idea, but I saw it leading to inner racial distinction in the colored group. I resented the defensive mechanism of avoiding too dark companions in order to escape notice and discrimination in public. As a sheer matter of taste I wanted the color of my group to be visible. (Du Bois 1996, 79)
Du Bois explains the concept of the Veil with two components: First, difficulty in achieving metaphysical self-consciousness, the sense of double-consciousness of seeing oneself through another’s eyes; Second, the difficulty in attaining physical and material manifestations of opportunity. Du Bois explains this by saying:

I have called my tiny community a world, and so its isolation made it; and yet there was among us but a half-awakened common consciousness, sprung from common joy and grief, at burial, birth, or wedding; from a common hardship in poverty, poor land, and low wages; and, above all, from the sight of the Veil that hung between us and Opportunity. (Du Bois 1996, 135)

Accompanying this understanding of blackness is the “veil”, “second sight”, or the concept of “double-consciousness”. This multi-faceted understanding of blackness shows that blackness is not just a term that defines one’s skin color, but rather a socio-political reality (Du Bois 1996, 72). Du Bois describes the condition of second-sight or double consciousness by relaying that “The Negro is sort of a seventh son, born within a veil, and gifted second sight in the American world- a world which yields him no true self-consciousness, but only lets him see himself through the revelation of the other world” (Du Bois 1999, 10). The concept of blackness is a socio-political reality in America as government denied equal rights because “in the past the Negro was below average social position and unrecognized till developed” (Du Bois 1996, 72).

Whiteness, according to Du Bois, does not hold the same underpinnings as blackness does. Du Bois dedicates a whole essay called The Souls of White Folk, as a discussion of the systemization of white superiority and imperialism in the world, especially in terms of America. Du Bois mocks whiteness by saying that American racism is much like “a great religion, a world war-cry: Up white, down black to your tents, O white folk, and world war with black and parti-colored mongrel beasts” (Du Bois 1971, 500). This is a severe criticism of white imperialism. Du Bois questions the adoption of “new white people” (Du Bois 1971, 500) into the democracy, but neglects the black Americans. This neglect, according to Du Bois, is self-deprecating and therefore the white American will “hang bound by his own binding” (Du Bois 1971, 501), if they do not seek to right the wrongs done. Therefore, as a group white Americans must seek to help enfranchise black Americans, not because of a sense of superiority, but it is their duty as Americans and as human beings to improve humanity, just as all racial groups should seek to do. Hence, Du Bois specifies a set of duties for white Americans. Those duties are: 1) to stop discrimination for jobs and encourage radical change in public opinion along the color line; 2) to recognize the existence of the better class of Negroes and gain their active aid and cooperation by generous and polite conduct, social sympathy, recognition of problems, and not patronizing them; 3) to recognize the unconscious prejudice and half conscious actions of men and women; and 4) having a polite and sympathetic attitude, generous granting of opportunity, a seconding of their efforts, and a desire to reward success (Du Bois 1996, 352). By fulfilling these duties, white Americans can recognize propaganda against the Negro race for what it is, “lies” (Du Bois 1996, 67).

Du Bois, in order to drop the baggage associated with the term “black”, adopts the utility of the word “Negro”. Due to the socio-political history of black Americans through systematic forms of discrimination such as slavery and segregation, the term black or blackness has a
negative connotation. Therefore, in order to break free of the Veil and to break free of sociopolitical constraints a new identity must be formed, that is positive, but essential to the race and that is the “Negro”. This is explained when Du Bois discusses the N.A.A.C.P. and the word choice of utilizing the term “Negro”, as being more logical, holding no negative connotation, and having a two tiered purpose. Du Bois wrote “Let the world know what there I affine and genuine about the Negro race; to see that there is nothing about the race that is worth of contempt.” (Du Bois 1996, 70-71) With the recreation of the “Negro identity” is accompaniment of new social obligations.

Level of Analysis: The Nation

In the discussion of Americanism, it is found that, part of being an American is to work towards American liberal ideals (See discussion of Hartz and Sandel). Du Bois attempts to do so through addressing this issue of systematic racism found in America. Lorini explains that “For Du Bois, Negroes were Americans ‘not only by birth and citizenship’ but also by their political ideals, language, and religion” (Lorini 2007, 35). Therefore, by understanding the individual and their role, and by understanding the groups and their roles as well, then one can build an understanding of what the American must by and work towards. Du Bois’s drafts a very basic collective action policy plan based on three tiers: dispelling ignorance, decreasing poverty, and decreasing crime (Du Bois 1996, 355). But there is a history of internalized racism that needs to be eradicated. In order to address the issue of systematic racism, Du Bois tells the audience what real American Manhood is, or rather what it is not, racial. As mentioned earlier, Repplier explains that true Americanism would be articulated through the abolishment of the color line (Repplier 1916).

In order to help make a real land of the free, certain steps need to be taken including: Stop lynching and mob violence. Stop disenfranchisement for race and sex. Abolish Jim Crow cars. Resist the attempt to establish an American ghetto. Stop race discrimination in Trade Unions, Civil Service, places of public accommodation, and public schools. Secure justice for all men in the courts. Insist that individual desert and ability shall be the test of real American Manhood and not differences of race, color, or descent. (Du Bois 1996, 379) In this case, to dispense of internalized racism, the structural racism must be eradicated. Any form of de jure racism must be removed, in order to remove de facto racism. But Du Bois does not just focus on removing forms of discrimination, but to enfranchise the black American, by having them recognize that they are American first. Du Bois wrote “we claim for ourselves every single right that belongs to a freeborn American, political, civil and social; and until we get these rights we will never cease to protest and assail the ears of America” (Du Bois 1996, 374). Accompanying this statement is a set of demands: The right to vote, freedom, manhood, the honesty of wives, the chastity of daughters, the right to work, the chance to rise. Ceasing discrimination in public accommodation. The right of free men to walk, talk and be without whoever they want. The laws enforced on everyone, rich, poor, capitalist, laborer, black & white. The fourth and fifth Amendment be carried out and enforced; and children truly educated. (Du Bois 1996, 373-6). Du Bois argues that “any attempt to deny this equality by law or custom is a blow at humanity, religion and democracy” (Du Bois 1996, 382). Meaning, by not meeting the needs of all Americans, then American democracy is a farce and therefore “we must strive for the declaration of independence to hold true” (Du Bois 1996, 131).

The question of being American was never disputed for Du Bois. Essentially, regardless of race, one was an American, but it is important for other racial groups (mainly whites) to
accept that. Even at times where Du Bois was most critical about America and its actions, he never denounced his American identity. Du Bois does recognize the dichotomy between being American and being black, however, they are of an intertwined nature, rather than separated identities. Often, the American identity would be modified with another identity, however it does not supersede it. Examples of this are: “dark Americans” (Du Bois 1996, 86), “second sight in the American” (Du Bois 1996, 101), “white Americanism” (Du Bois 1996, 102), “both a Negro and an American” (Du Bois 1996, 102). Americanism is based upon the culture, ideals, and values found in the United States of America. For most American political theorists, Americanism is based upon the notion of unanimous conviction of liberalism (Hartz, Sandel), and more specifically, as attached to the notion of individualism. The problem being raised is the notion that Americanism is solely based on individual freedoms, and not group freedoms. The reality is group identity should be part of the individualistic framework, which each group must be fully enfranchised, just as an individual should be. Du Bois’s notion of Americanism is based upon individualism, yet simultaneously, it is linked to group freedom as well, where the group is not merely a combination of individuals, but an referent identity. The group works to gain individual freedoms as well as group enfranchisement from structural marginalization.

The fear or point of contention that arises is whether Du Bois pushed for a black separatist mentality, by advocating for black rights in the United States. Does black identity supersede the American one for Du Bois? Blackness is a physically clear marker of identity, he stands by a transcendental identity, and that is the American identity. His policy proposals serve to emancipate the black American, speaking within the American social context. Therefore, Du Bois has faith in the promise of democracy, which also serves as a catalyst that moves Lincoln, John Brown, Nat Turner, Charles Young, and activists in the Niagara Movement and the NAACP. This promise of democracy, this American exceptionalism, gives hope to these individuals to fight and eliminate racial discrimination. He believes that we can truly become the land of the free, as long as certain steps be taken, and full citizenship is extended regardless of race (Du Bois 1996, 379). Du Bois puts faith in the hope that American democracy will bring justice, people just have to be organized in order to do so. Therefore, the individual identity plays reciprocally with the group identity, both contained within the greater American context. Du Bois declares a fight against homogeneity because of the assumption that “americanization is the making of this country one great homogeneous whole” (Du Bois 1996, 384), where as, in fact the majority of Americans do not believe in the homogenizing process and argue that “America shall be a land for development and that into that development shall grow many different roots” (Du Bois 1996, 384).

Du Bois Americanism stems from that hope that democratic principles of liberalism will succeed in attain rights for all Americans. Du Bois’, no matter how frustrated he is with his contemporary political system, does not deny his American identity. He wrote “I know the United States. It is my country and the land of my fathers. “ (Du Bois 1977, 419). Therefore, being American is two fold: The cultural experience, as well as political and social enfranchisement. If one is part of the cultural experience, then they will always be partially American, but to become truly American, one must achieve political and social enfranchisement through group action, and be true to the common values of our early forefathers and the concept of liberalism.

Throughout Du Bois’ life, there was an attempt to reconcile the “warring identities” of Negro and American. However, Du Bois never fully reconciled the identities. Throughout his works Du Bois attempted to bridge the gap between his identities, however he was forced, in the end, to readopt the notion of double-consciousness. Although he continued to address himself as
being an American and a Negro, he said in his speech in Peking at 91 years old “One thing alone I own and that is my own soul. Ownership of that I have even while in my own country for near a century I have been nothing but a ‘nigger’” (Du Bois 1977, 405). His statement makes it clear that regardless of his efforts, he will continue being black, stuck within the veil. The uplifting narrative of the American Negro he worked towards is forced into the referent and demeaned within the American context.

Level of Analysis: The World

Not only does Du Bois ascribe certain duties and roles for the individual, the group, and the American, but he ascribes certain duties at a system level of analysis. Du Bois essentially offers a comprehensive outlook regarding the international world and the interactions that may occur at that level. In this world view, Du Bois’s writings about self-striving of an individual, a Negro, and an American, help to explain his enduring belief that democracy is good for the darker races of the world. However, Du Bois’s stance on international relations is often questioned because of it’s paradoxical nature. On the one hand, during World War I, he was an advocate for the participation of black Americans in the war. One the other hand, later on in his life, Du Bois’s disappointment with the events following World War I influenced his thinking about separatism and socialism. He became a proponent of socialism, due to the exploitation of the people, and especially the exploitation of various colored people around the world.

Although Du Bois believes in American liberalism, he was a proponent of socialism. He saw the exploitation of the people at the hands of capitalism, imperialism, and greed, especially along the color-line. He wrote in Socialism and the Negro:

I maintain that English working classes are exploiting India; that English, French and Belgian laborers are raping Africa; that the working classes of America are subjugating Santo Domingo and Haiti. They may not be as conscious of all they are doing as their more educated masters, called nationalists and imperialists, but they are consciously submitting themselves to the leadership of these men (Du Bois 1972, 376).

Inaction, according to Du Bois, is a conscious submission of will. Therefore, there must be some sort of effort in order to attain political agency. This problem of exploitation is a transnational problem, and it manifests in the United states, where he wrote “The class struggle of exploiter and exploited is a reality” (Du Bois 1972, 401). Furthermore, like other countries that have been exploited along the color-line, the United States follows through, “it is manifest that the mass of Negroses in the United States belong distinctly to the working proletariat” (Du Bois 1972, 403-4). But unlike other nations, there are laborers of various different races in the United States, some of which are white. These white laborers can sometimes regard black laborers as the sacrificial goats (Du Bois 1972, 391), where there is “a wild and ruthless scramble of labor groups over each other in order to climb to wealth on the backs of black labor” (Du Bois 1972, 405). Because of the divisive nature of the laboring class, there is no united front among black and white laborers and therefore the Marxist revolution exists nowhere on the American horizon no where on the American horizon. (Du Bois 1972, 408). Socialism however, for Du Bois is a transnational system that could influence and inform American values.

Du Bois was questioned by his contemporaries about his interventionist policy during
World War I, and the fact that he advocated for black soldiers to enlist in the war. In the Crisis Writings, Du Bois dedicates a whole chapter called World War and the Color Line (November 1914). Initially, Du Bois is extremely critical of the war. He explains that the war is merely one based upon race and the disenfranchisement of other races. He wrote “The present war in Europe is one of the great disasters due to race and color prejudice and it but foreshadows greater disasters in the future” (Du Bois 1972, 238). Later, in another article name Awake American (September 1917) Du Bois began by questioning American involvement in a war fighting for democracy, when it was not a proper democracy at home (Du Bois 1972, 256). Du Bois then begins to encourage America’s involvement in the War in Close Ranks (July 1918), disregarding temporarily the aforementioned criticisms and wrote “Let us, while this war lasts, forget our special grievances and close our ranks shoulder to shoulder with our own white fellow-citizens and the allied that are fighting for democracy” (Du Bois 1972, 257-8). Du Bois then went further in his next article, A Philosophy in Time of War (August 1918) telling the people that regardless of race, the American identity was the top priority and therefore he wrote “Our country is at war. The war is critical, dangerous and world-wide. If this is our country, then this is our war. We must fight it with every ounce of blood and treasure. Second. Our country is not perfect.” (Du Bois 1972, 258). After pushing for this policy of intervention, Du Bois discusses the atmosphere of returning soldiers of being noncontributing to democracy at home in Returning Soldiers (May 1919). Although the soldiers came home to face more systematic discrimination in the forms of lynching, ignorance, insults, stolen rights, land and labor, Du Bois still advocated that given the call to duty again, they would respond, saying “Under similar circumstances, we would fight again” (Du Bois 1972, 261). But Du Bois’s agitation approach manifests itself in the following article on Race Pride (January 1920) where he poses the question of whether the international system should adopt a segregation policy versus integration policy (Du Bois 1972, 263).

Du Bois, until the end of his life, seemed to advocate positively for the participation of black Americans in the war, because it was necessary. Nevertheless, because of the condition of groups within the American context, he hesitated and heavily criticized America’s involvement. This hesitation was not a complete disillusionment of American exceptionalism, rather an awakening of the current conditions and realities of racism and discriminatory policies. Du Bois believed in the liberal American ideals, saw that at any level of analysis, whether it was the individual, the group, the nation, or at the world-wide level, if working towards those liberal ideals, one can reciprocate change and development towards those ideals at all the other levels.

Another example of his world level of is through his work on Pan-African identity and activism. Du Bois defined Pan-Africanism as “an effort to bring together leaders of the various groups of Negroes in Africa and in America for consolidation and planning for the Future.” (Du Bois 1955). This connects both the racial group in America (and across the world) with the continent. Du Bois links the potential of the group while building confidence. He explains in his writings, that even though the NAACP did not directly adopt the programs of the Pan African Congresses, he still worked heavily. In his article, Pan Africanism, Du Bois details of the different conferences as well as the surrounding sentiment. He explains that American propaganda regarding the word African and Negro “resulted in a widespread distaste among American Negroes for being regarded as Africans” (Du Bois 1955). By advocating for Pan-Africanism, Du Bois attempted to reconcile his liberal ideals of race in America with his later communist ones (Kendhammer 2006). The goal of Pan-Africanism, was not solely for the benefit of the African community, but to ensure “To the World: The absolute equality of races, physical, political and social is the founding stone of the world and human advancement” (Du
National Political Science Review | 52

Bois 1955). His work with Pan Africanism, his involvement in the World War and his ideas on socialism all reflect his multi-structural approach, in which the individual works within their group to help human advancement in the world.

Conclusion

In sum, this paper suggests the necessity for a new theoretical framework on Du Bois’s political thought, in which self striving is interactive at the individual, the racial group and national group levels in order to improve society at all these levels of analysis. There are inherent tensions and reciprocal loops that allow us to better change society. The contribution to the literature is a multi-layered and multi-structured approach to Du Bois’s writings which takes into account republican theory and social identity theory, where self and group identities are flexible, mutable, and dynamic. Much like early Puritans, Du Bois strongly believed that while political learning takes place within a political system, such a system must not constrain individual development, if it does, one has a right and obligation to rebel, to resist, to attempt to mobilize others to change the system and those that rule it; which is largely consistent with the Declaration of Independence. Therefore, a critical aspect of Du Bois’s thought was that of the development of the individual soul, which is inherently free.

Du Bois draws up a political theory that is multi-structured and multilateral. He approaches societal change in a way that is cyclical. If at any given point, society progresses whether at the individual level, the group, the nation, or the world, all other layers of society would progress and therefore, reinforce one another. These four structures interact with one another causing a sense of tension and reciprocity. The are moments when the individual or the group lags behind, although the nation works towards egalitarianism and democratization, vis-à-vis World War I. Similarly, there are moments when individuals progress forward, such as Abraham Lincoln, John Brown, and Charles Young as Representative Men. Because of his definition of race as being groups of people working towards a common ideal, there is a notion of progressivism, where race and groups are not used to be divisive, but to work together. Similarly, transnational movements or political ideologies can help shape and inform the world, such as socialism and Marxists concepts. All of these varying levels of analysis interact with one another in order to move and progress toward a certain American idealism, that even at his most cynical points in life, Du Bois never dismisses.

Notes

1. Acknowledgements: I would like to express my sincere thanks for Dr. Ronald E. Brown and Dr. Phillip Abbott who encouraged my curiosity in reading the writings of WEB Du Bois and Black Political Thought as a graduate student. I would like to also express appreciation for the feedback given from reviewers.

References


Contee, Clarence G. 1972. “Du Bois, the NAACP, and the Pan-African Congress of
Accessed June 24, 2019


“Fair” Minority Representation and the California Voting Rights Act

Olivier Richomme*
University of Lyon, France

Abstract
The California Voting Rights Act is slowly eliminating at-large elections in the Golden State and it had a positive outcome for minorities’ representation, especially Latinos. It helped ethno-racial minorities elect more candidates of their choice at the local level and created a pool of talent that could be tapped into for higher office. Yet, switching to districts has its limits, in particular when cities are well integrated. And by itself, it may not guarantee that minorities can reach descriptive representation close to their electoral weight. The CVRA does not limit remedies to district systems. Alternative voting systems, such as cumulative voting, as they have become more popular lately, can represent a supplement to single member plurality districts when majority-minority districts are not easily drawn. Besides, California is the only state that managed to pass such a law. When state legislation does not encourage the elimination of at-large systems, alternative voting systems might be the next logical step in electoral reform attempts.

Keywords: California Voting Rights Act, minority representation, racial polarization, at-large elections, single-member districts, proportional voting

Introduction
Over the past 20 years the state of California passed two major electoral reforms that had a tremendous impact on minority descriptive representation: the Independent Redistricting Commissions that eliminated the legislature conflict of interest and took redistricting out of the hands of lawmakers and the California Voting Right Act that forces switching to single-member districts.¹ This article focuses on the latter to evaluate its impact and explore the next phase in electoral reforms aimed at increasing minority representation.

Since 2003, across the state of California, at-large elections have been disappearing.² The main reason of this evolution is the passage of California Voting Rights Act (CVRA) in 2002. This Act addresses the problem of at-large elections within the context of racially-polarized voting (RPV) and it applies to most levels of governments: cities, school districts, special election districts.³ It stems from civil rights lawyer Joaquin Avila’s frustration of trying to bring Section 2 claims at the local level especially in rural communities. In essence it is an improved version of the federal Voting Rights Act for the local level. Ethnically diverse cities that hold at-large elections and have few minority officeholders are now vulnerable to lawsuits under the CVRA. All a plaintiff has to do is demonstrate that racially polarized voting, or racial bloc voting, exists, that is that voters belonging to an ethno-racial group consistently vote “as a bloc” for candidates of that same group.⁴ As some jurisdictions in California are switching to district elections, either voluntarily or through litigation,⁵ one may wonder if the CVRA has lived up to expectations. The answer to this question depends on what one anticipated from the

* Direct correspondence to Olivier.Richomme@univ-lyon2.fr
If the goal of the CVRA was to produce more opportunities for minorities to elect their candidate of choice, the law is an undeniable success. Indeed, in a context of racial polarization voting, district elections do make the election of minority candidates more likely. However, if one estimates that the goal of this electoral reform was to produce a level of descriptive representation for minority voters that is close to their electoral weight, one may feel that the CVRA came up short or hasn’t produced those results yet. Indeed, without local community empowerment and mobilization, switching to districts in the context of racial polarization may not result in spectacular levels of descriptive representation susceptible to satisfy minority groups or activists. The paradox of the CVRA is that its main goal is the creation of single member plurality districts in order to approximate levels of descriptive representation that would be proportional to minorities’ electoral weight.

Yet, switching to district elections has its limits. When cities are well integrated, drawing majority-minority districts may not be feasible. At least one settlement in a CVRA case, in Mission Viejo, has imposed a non-district system, a cumulative voting system, in which voters can cast as many as five votes for a single candidate (Robinson 2018). The language of the CVRA does not limit remedies to district systems, but merely lists district systems as one example of “appropriate remedies.” Moreover, California is the only state that has passed such a law (Stang 2016). If forcing the end of at-large elections in other states is too difficult, other alternative voting systems may also have the potential to help increase minority representation.

Alternative voting systems seem to be more popular in the US nowadays. In 2018, the state of Maine became the first state in the Union to use cumulative voting for its federal elections. The New York Times editorial board endorsed in 2018 ranked choice voting for congressional elections (Editorial Board 2018). The organization Fair Vote has been receiving a lot of press coverage in its advocating for PR voting systems. Even in the state of California the state’s legislature passed a bill in 2016 that would have allowed all cities to switch to ranked-choice voting even though the bill was vetoed by Governor Brown without much explanation (Egelko 2016). The relative popularity of alternative voting system in 2018 is linked to many issues but one of them is the election of minority candidates.

The contention of this article is that districts are not the only option and that alternative electoral systems are a reasonable alternative either when geographical district are too complicated to create under the CVRA or, in the rest of the Union, where state legislation ending at-large systems has not been implemented.

A-Joaquin Avila’s Legacy

The California Voting Rights Act has had a tremendous impact on local politics in California, and like most influential pieces of legislation it almost never came about. If it wasn’t for the tenacity of one voting rights attorney, the situation of minorities voting rights in California would be quite different.

Joaquin Avila worked for MALDEF from 1974 to 1985, first as a staff attorney, then as a regional associate counsel and from 1982 to 1985 as President and General Counsel. In 1985, he opened a private practice solely dedicated to voting rights cases, the only one of its kind at the time. At MALDEF he had acquired great experience fighting voting rights cases under equal protection standard and when the Supreme Court rendered its decision in Mobile v. Bolden, 446 US 55 (1980), Avila testified before Congress in 1981 to reauthorize and amend the Voting Rights Act. His testimony focused on the state of Texas and put the emphasis on local
jurisdiction and especially the problem that at-large schemes represented for Latinos (Avila 1981). While the new amended Section 2 voted by Congress was a great victory for voting rights advocates because Congress established that is was not necessary to prove intent as part of the evidentiary process to establish discrimination, the new interpretation of Section 2 in Gingles introduced “geographical compactness” as a precondition. Indeed, federal voting rights cases under Section 2 require that a successful plaintiff show that (1) the minority group be sufficiently large and geographically compact to form a majority of the eligible voters in a single-member district, (2) there is racially-polarized voting, and (3) there is white bloc voting sufficient usually to prevent minority voters from electing candidates of their choice. Only if all three of these “preconditions” are proven, the court then proceeds to consider whether, under the “totality of circumstances” the votes of minority voters are diluted.

An ethnic or racial minority had to be geographically compact enough to create a majority-minority district in which the said minority could amount to 50% of eligible voters. Much to the chagrin of Avila, many preliminary studies done before challenges showed that this threshold was too high in many cases. While potential clients came to his office he had to turn them down and explain to them that he could not file the case in spite of a high racial polarized voting and a history of no minority electoral success. So as early as 1984, Joaquin Avila recognized that a state law eliminating the geographical compactness criteria would help fight voting rights cases. From 1989 to 1992, he worked with Assemblyman Peter Chacon to try and pass bills eliminating at-large elections only to see those bills vetoed by Republican governors once they were accepted by the legislature. He tried to work with MALDEF on this issue but the Latino organization made a strategic decision of not focusing on the local level.

Avila especially worked on passing a bill after the seminal Section 2 case in California Gomez v. Watsonville that was successful in 1988 on appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The Gomez decision helped to renew efforts at the community level to eliminate discriminatory at-large elections and therefore challenges were filed in other parts of California. The Gomez case was a legal success that reverberated throughout the state and the switch to districts in Watsonville led to the election of Latino Oscar Rios in 1989, the community’s preferred candidate, who was then elected mayor (Stein 1989). However, the period of successful Section 2 enforcement in California did not last following the case Romero v. City of Pomona, 883 F.2d 1418 (9th Cir. 1989). This was part of a national trend observed by Cain and Miller when Section 2 violations were harder to prove for “other minorities,” meaning other than African-Americans. According to Joaquin Avila two major unsuccessful at-large election challenges discouraged any further litigation by private parties.

Since the private bar had been thus far largely responsible for enforcement of minority voting rights, Avila was convinced that this activity needed to be incentivized. Any new state law should accomplish two goals: remove the compactness factor and help private lawyers with their cost.

For several years Avila doubled his effort to have a bill passed in the legislature with no success. It wasn’t until 2000 when NALEO invited Avila to do a presentation on redistricting before the legislative caucus of minority officials that Avila mentioned to them that while legislative redistricting was important, local at-large districts were the single most important hurdle to minorities’ elections. At the time most city and school districts in California elected their governing boards using at-large election systems. The exceptions (those that elected by district) tended to be the very large cities and school districts. Getting people elected at the local level was crucial to have a pool of experienced candidates that could, then, be viable candidates for
the legislature.17 This argument probably struck a chord with Richard Polanco who was at the time the Senate Majority Leader because he approached Avila about sponsoring a bill that became SB 976. His chief of staff Saeed Ali took Avila’s proposal to the legislative council which came back with a document that Avila disapproved of. He therefore decided to write his own bill, with advice from Robert Rubin, former legal director for the Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights (LCCR) of the San Francisco Bay Area, convinced that it would not become law. But Richard Polanco really believed in Avila’s bill and his position as Majority Leader meant he was owed many favors in the legislature. The bill died once in the Senate but Polanco resuscitated it. It worked its way to the Assembly which tweaked it marginally and was back in the Senate for concurrence. It was adopted in the Senate by a vote of 24 to 10 and in the Assembly by a vote of 47 to 25. In July 2002, Governor Gray Davis pondered vetoing the bill. When Davis representatives contacted Avila, he immediately called Senator Polanco who apparently found the words to convince the governor to sign the bill into law. The California Voting Rights Act of 2001 became law in 2002, with an effective start date of January 1st 2003, “with little fanfare, indeed practically unnoticed by the public or the media” (Adams 2005, 177).

However this was only the first part of the battle, because a law is only as useful as the extent to which it is enforced. It took Avila and Robert Rubin more than two years to prepare to take on their first case with. They filed their first suit in 2003 against the Hanford Unified School District18 and it was immediately settled and the attorney’s fees to the plaintiffs were part of the settlement.19 So the case was a success however the law wasn’t really tested.

The real test for the new law came in 2004 when the city of Modesto was sued and fought back. Avila and Rubin approached George H. Brown since they needed a major law firm (Heller Ehrman) for such a big case. The team filed a suit under the CVRA on behalf of some Latino residents of the city of Modesto. The plaintiffs claimed that racially polarized voting was preventing Latinos from being elected. Moreover, the city had only elected one Latino council member since 1911, even though the city Latino population exceeded 25%, therefore demonstrating an absence of electoral success on the part of the Latino community to elect the candidate of its choice. They initially lost the case in 2005 when the Stanislaus County Superior Court Judge, Roger M. Beauchesne, sided with Modesto and declared the law unconstitutional. Judge Beauchesne argued that the law showed preference to minorities without requiring them to demonstrate need and also ruled that the requirement for the city to pay attorney’s fees was an unconstitutional gift of public funds. Judge Beauchesne focused on the CVRA’s effort to get around rulings that the VRA required plaintiffs to meet the Gingles test. But they appealed and the constitutionality of the CVRA was confirmed by the 5th district Court of Appeal in December 2006.20 When the California Supreme Court refused to review the case in 2007, Avila breathed a sigh of relief. His vision had come to fruition.21 Sanchez v. Modesto ended in settlement after the city voted on a ballot measure to use district voting by 2009. But the city still had to pay $3 million in fees for the defendants’ lawyers. In the middle of the Great Recession every city hall and school board in California paid close attention to such a big settlement. And many lawyers did too as voting rights litigation appeared more appealing. Avila had told lawmakers when he testified for the bill in 2002 that he expected other attorneys would take on cases because of favorable incentives written into the measure (Blood 2009). Some might argue that it was self-serving for lawyers to write a law that helps them get paid (Lucas 2011). Yet it is precisely the cost that is the real deterrent for municipalities and makes it so risky to legally fight back. The cost of switching to district elections is very minimal in comparison and that is why so many cities are nowadays doing it voluntarily. The CVRA is such a deterrent that in many cases it is
not even used. In essence it has become, for the local level, what the VRA was in the 1990’s for legislative districts.

B-The California Voting Rights Act: A Quiet Revolution?

The California Voting Rights Act addresses the problem of at-large elections within the context of racially polarized voting. At-large districts were a product of the Progressive movement in the early twentieth century to try and weaken neighborhood parochialism and machine politics and to implement a jurisdiction-wide perspective. During the Progressive Era the lack of competition in local elections was also perceived as a big issue. Progressives therefore pushed for nonpartisan elections as a solution to the problem of one-party rule in the cities. Their idea was to promote more business-like administration of cities. They were successful in the sense that nonpartisan elections are a feature of most American cities. Even though in nonpartisan elections the party name does not appear on the ballot and parties do not play a formal role it does not mean that, as a matter of constitutional law, parties are barred from participating in the election. So national parties are weakened by nonpartisan elections but when they get involved in local elections they do bring organizational power. Besides, academic work has shown that voter rely on party affiliation even in non-partisan elections. A study of down-ballot, nonpartisan statewide elections in California showed that voters had difficulty choosing whom to support in the absence of partisan identification. Moreover, a large percentage of voters changed their candidate preference when they discovered their party affiliations (Schaffner and Streb 2002). And yet electoral competition at the local level is almost non-existent. Voter turnout is substantially lower, incumbents are safer and scholars have found no indication that candidates engage in any substantial policy competition (Schaffner, Streb & Wright 2001). This is particularly problematic for under-resourced minority challengers of local political machines. But if at-large elections have such a bad reputation in the US it is especially because many “progressives” used them in order to exclude ethnic and racial minorities from serving on local governmental bodies (McCrary 2011).

The California Voting Rights Act applies to all levels of governments: cities, school districts, and special election districts. It applies only to at-large and from-district electoral systems, or combination systems. Indeed, there are more than two possible redistricting systems. At one extreme are single-member districts and at the other is at-large elections of all members of a city council or other legislators in a given jurisdiction. At-large systems are those in which all the voters in the jurisdiction elect each member of the governing board. In between single-member and at-large systems there are different alternative systems. “From-district” elections (sometimes called “at-large by residency”) require each member of the governing board to live within a particular district however elections are still by all the voters in the jurisdiction, rather than being limited to the voters within a district. The from-district system was intended to offer larger geographic representation on the city council than traditional at-large elections while still making sure that council members be accountable to the entire electorate. However, like traditional at-large voting, it can still allow a bare majority of the electorate to win every seat, in effect blocking out minority representation.

There are also combination systems in which, for example, a primary election may be conducted “by-district”, but the general election is conducted “from” those same districts: the top-two vote winners in the primary election in each district run for election “at-large” in the general election. All these variations can be challenged if the minority plaintiffs can show that racially-polarized voting (RPV) limits their ability to elect or influence the election of minority-
preferred candidates. Two cities also use at-large by seat voting that differs from the at-large from-district system because the seats do not represent a geographic area. A candidate may run for any seat up for election. Theoretically, this system encourages more political accountability than a traditional at-large election because candidates may target specific incumbents to challenge.

Unlike with the federal VRA there is no requirement of proving geographic compactness, and no necessity to create a hypothetical single-member district consisting of over 50% Latino eligible voter population. In a way, the CVRA, even though it was anterior to this case, provides a solution to the loophole in Bartlett which allows for crossover districts to be drawn in the redistricting process, but does not allow valid crossover claims under Section 2. The CVRA reads:

An at-large method of election may not be imposed or applied in a manner that impairs the ability of a protected class to elect candidates of its choice or its ability to influence the outcome of an election, as a result of the dilution or the abridgment of the rights of voters who are members of a protected class.

The major requirement is that plaintiffs must prove racially polarized voting prevents the ability of a protected class to elect candidates of their choice or to influence the outcome of an election. The term “protected class,” as used in the CVRA, has been recognized as race-neutral in identifying those plaintiffs who have standing to bring a claim and seek remedial action under the statute. A protected class is defined by the CVRA as “a class of voters who are members of a race, color or language minority group, as this class is referenced and defined in the federal Voting Rights Act.” Subdivision (b) of California Election Code Section 1402 also lays out the framework for the plaintiffs’ burden of proof, borrowing from some VRA case law such as LULAC v. Clements, where racially polarized voting may be determined through an examination of election results in which at least one candidate is a member of a protected class, elections involving ballot measures, or any other electoral choices that impact the rights and privileges of members of a protected class.

In addition, there is no need to prove the other Senate Report factors as required under the Federal Voting Rights Act. These Senate Report factors are probative and can be introduced, but they are not necessary. What the federal and CVRA have in common is that there is no requirement to prove an intent to discriminate against minority voting strength. Once a court finds that the elements previously mentioned have been met and a violation of the CVRA has taken place, the court must implement appropriate remedies, including district-based elections tailored to remedy the violation.

And as mentioned before, maybe the most important innovation of the CVRA is that it mandates the award of costs, attorney fees, and expert expenses to prevailing plaintiffs. On the other hand, prevailing party defendants are not entitled to costs unless the court finds the action to be “frivolous, unreasonable or without foundation,” a very high standard. Or as Morgan Kousser summarized it:

Unlike in federal litigation, plaintiffs may be held to be “prevailing parties” (and thus collect fees and costs) if there is a “causal connection” between their lawsuit and a change in the defendants’ behavior – for example, if a defendant jurisdiction switches from at-large to district elections once a lawsuit is announced, even if only
minimal legal paperwork is ever filed. This last provision encourages lawyers to file numerous lawsuits without the fear of having to carry them through complicated hearings, depositions, and trials, and it encourages local jurisdictions to settle well before they begin to run up large bills. (Kousser 2015).

So the CVRA has been very successful in responding to one of the main gaps in Section 2 of the VRA that is the difficulty in bringing Section 2 claims at the local level and in rural communities. However, some issues remain as Paige Epstein noted in 2014:

Thus, while coalition, crossover, and influence districts clearly seem to be allowed under the CVRA, it remains unclear to what extent such districts are desired, required, or implemented, and what shape such districts are required to take. Relatedly, the CVRA does not appear to allow for vote dilution claims to be brought against jurisdictions with district-based election systems.

**C-The slow death of at-large elections through litigation**

The question raised by at-large elections in the context of the minority rights revolution is not new. In 1968 Paul A. Freund wrote that “while the major outlines of the reapportionment doctrine may be settled, there remain a host of questions still unresolved: its application to local government, the legal status of gerrymandering, the limits on multimember districts, the use of weighted or fractional voting in the legislature” (Freund 1968, 6). In 1982 Malcolm E. Jewell was still wondering: “As we enter the period of post-1980 reapportionment, one of the questions that remain is whether the trend toward single-member districts in state legislatures and city councils will continue” (Jewell 1982, 129). In California, in 2019, the process is underway through litigation. First came Modesto, then Compton, Anaheim, Escondido, Whittier, Palmdale and others. Ethnically diverse cities that hold at-large elections and have few minority officeholders have proved vulnerable to lawsuits under the California Voting Rights Act. All a plaintiff has to do is demonstrate that racially polarized voting exists and sometimes that can be done with election results that reveal contrasting outcomes between predominantly minority precincts and Anglo ones. Roughly three quarters of California school boards use at-large voting (245 out of 944), as do many city councils and other local boards. Many jurisdictions fearing a lawsuit have switched to single-member district elections, usually after receiving the “demand letter” from lawyers. No local government has won a state voting rights lawsuit, and jurisdictions that can’t demonstrate fair treatment of minorities in at-large election systems must pay plaintiffs’ legal fees. So across California, many community college and school districts are eliminating at-large elections (Landsberg 2009). Cities have been more reluctant, leading to a series of legal actions.41

We can also observe that most lawsuits resulted in a ballot measure to adopt districts. That is because the general rule in California was that cities could only switch from one system to another by majority vote of that city’s electorate. However, as of 2017 cities with fewer than 100,000 residents could transition from at-large or from district elections to by-district elections with a city council-passed ordinance, if that change was done to address concerns of racial minority vote dilution. And beginning in 2017, new legislation allowed any-sized city to transition to by-district elections without a confirming vote of the electorate.43
Figure 1 – California cities that have switched to districts elections since the passage of the CVRA (as of January 2019)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>population</th>
<th>Latino CVAP</th>
<th>Election cycles</th>
<th>Latinos pre-change</th>
<th>Latinos in 2019</th>
<th>Other Non Anglo</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Modesto</td>
<td>201,165</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sanger</td>
<td>24,270</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4 (1 mayor)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tulare</td>
<td>59,278</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2 (1 mayor)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madera</td>
<td>61,416</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5 (1 mayor)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chula Vista</td>
<td>243,916</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3 (1 mayor)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compton</td>
<td>96,455</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4 (mayor)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Escondido</td>
<td>143,911</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Santa Barbara</td>
<td>88,410</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3 (1 mayor)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>King City</td>
<td>12,874</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Los Banos</td>
<td>35,952</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chino</td>
<td>77,983</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palmdale</td>
<td>152,750</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patterson</td>
<td>20,413</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Riverbank</td>
<td>22,678</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visalia</td>
<td>124,442</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Merced</td>
<td>78,958</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highland</td>
<td>53,104</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastvale</td>
<td>53,683</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anaheim</td>
<td>336,265</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1 (1 mayor)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woodland</td>
<td>55,468</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3 (1 mayor)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City</td>
<td>Population</td>
<td>Latino Population</td>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Others</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buena Park</td>
<td>80,530</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wildomar</td>
<td>32,176</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turlock</td>
<td>68,549</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hemet</td>
<td>78,657</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dixon</td>
<td>18,351</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banning</td>
<td>29,603</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Garden Grove</td>
<td>170,883</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yucaipa</td>
<td>51,367</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Juan Capistrano</td>
<td>34,593</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visalia</td>
<td>122,442</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bellflower</td>
<td>76,616</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2018</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fullerton</td>
<td>135,161</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corona</td>
<td>152,374</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Mesa</td>
<td>109,960</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Cajon</td>
<td>99,478</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eureka</td>
<td>27,191</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Placentia</td>
<td>50,533</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rancho Cucamonga</td>
<td>165,269</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upland</td>
<td>73,732</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chino hills</td>
<td>80,374</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cathedral City</td>
<td>51,200</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temecula</td>
<td>111,024</td>
<td>24.7%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indio</td>
<td>76,036</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Redlands</td>
<td>68,747</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Murrieta</td>
<td>103,466</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Menifee</td>
<td>77,519</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jurupa Valley</td>
<td>106,028</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
It needs to be noted that municipalities that have only gone through one election cycle (cities that have switched since 2016) may not have had elections in districts that were susceptible to elect a minority candidate. In time, they may present more minority elected officials. What we observe, though, is an increase in the switching to districts throughout the state leading to an increase in minority elected officials, especially Latinos and an overall increase in the sheer number of Latino candidates being elected on city councils throughout the state.

D-The limits of Geographical Districting and Winner-take-all

1-The CVRA mitigated results

As demonstrated above, most cities in California that have switched to district elections saw, over time, an increase in the number of Latino elected officials. However, not every case was a success. There are examples showing that switching to single member districts in itself is no guarantee of electoral success. It is to be noted that the bulk of the election changes occurred in school districts which resulted in many more minorities being elected locally. In that sense, the CVRA is a real success and its impact goes beyond municipal elections. But city council races are more visible and are the real prizes of local politics. The increase of Latino elected officials thanks to the CVRA is has been steady although not spectacular. Some activists may wish that the revolution happened faster.

To understand why switching to districts is often not enough, many local factors need to be taken into consideration such as the presence of other communities of color, the way the districts are drawn, the quality of the candidates, the absence or presence of several minority candidates, the willingness of the city council to appoint minority candidates in a case of vacancy and, of course, turnout. Most local elections have notoriously low turnout rates. The examples of cities not electing Latino officials after a switch to districts don’t undermine the great success that the CVRA has been. They simply show that there is more to electing Latino candidates than the mere switch to districts. Without strong candidates, higher turnout or registration, district elections, while being an improvement, do not necessarily guarantee minority descriptive representation in proportion to the community’s electoral weight.

It is often contended during voting rights lawsuits that a switch to district elections would increase minority turnout, because minority voters will realize that they have a much better chance to elect candidates of their choice. While there has long been evidence in support of such a contention (Barreto and Segura 2004), turnout rates for Latinos or Asians can hardly be considered satisfactory as they lag nationally behind Anglos and African-Americans. In many CVRA cases, switching to districts was even combined with other electoral changes to try and boost turnout, most notably to change municipal election dates to coincide with other major state elections, as well as federal elections, such as presidential or congressional, in the month of November. This article suggests that other electoral changes should also be experimented with when majority-minority districts are not doable. In some cities, such as Hesperia for instance, the population is so integrated that it is difficult to create majority-minority districts that would not be struck down by the courts. For that reason MALDEF only sues cities when lawyers can prove majority-minority districts can be created. Moreover, in the rest of the Union, switching to districts is not mandated by state law. If the CVRA model cannot be exported, should alternative voting systems be encouraged?
2-The limits of SMDs

The main problem eliminating at-large election through litigation is that once litigation is over the bulk of the work in terms of community empowerment, outreach and get-out-the-vote operation remains to be made. Right after a lawsuit and the publicity it generates, public interest is often high but this tends to recede afterward. If activists limit their tasks to hiring lawyers to change the election system but don’t follow through with on-the-ground political outreach during the following election cycles, then the CVRA can’t live up to its expectation.

And the expectation can be quite high if the goal is to achieve levels of representation in proportion to the political weight of a given community. Even though minority organization leaders usually deny that proportional representation would be their goal, their position might actually be more ambiguous. Katherine Tate’s does an interesting experiment in the 1996 National Black Election Study that finds that black respondents prefer proportional outcomes but do not necessarily see proportional representation as “fair,” suggesting considerable confusion in the general public about the connection between voting schemes and electoral success (Tate 2003, 156). Besides, the way statistics are presented always suggests that the absence of proportional representation is suspicious. For instance, the Leadership California Institute California Latino Legislative Caucus and NALEO present figures in a way that is very explicit: according to the census Latinos represented in 2014 38.6% of the California population but 19.6% of voter registration on average between 2002 and 2012. During the same period Latino represented, on average, only 16.5% of the California electorate. These figures are directly compared with Latinos descriptive representation at different levels of responsibility. In 2015 they represented 12.5% of state Senators, 23.8% Assembly members, 9.8% of County Supervisors and 14.6% of city council members (NALEO 2015). Pointing out the discrepancy in this manner implies that the ultimate goal is some sort of proportional representation. The paradox of the CVRA is that its main goal is the creation of single member plurality districts in order to approximate levels of descriptive representation, for Latinos especially, that would be closer to their electoral weight. The question can therefore be asked if in California as a complement to districts, other voting systems may not be adopted to help produce better results. The question of alternative voting system is especially salient in the rest of the Union where state legislation such as the California Voting Rights Act was not adopted.

3-Alternative voting system

The CVRA as it raised the issue of what represents “fair” minority representation begs the question of alternative electoral system. The genesis of the CVRA shows that Avila, a civil rights attorney, operated only in the framework provided by the federal VRA and was only looking for a practical way to tweak it to make litigation more efficient at the local level. The impetus behind his effort was not to come up with a comprehensive reform to look at elections and minority representation. At-large elections have a bad reputation among minority groups because they have been used in the context of a “winner-take-all” system designed to frustrate minority groups. This is a paradoxical trend because most activists seem to advocate for single-member plurality districts while at the same time wishing that elections would yield proportional results. Arend Lijphart presents it as a fundamental choice: “if one’s highest priority is to achieve proportionality one has to opt for proportional representation; conversely, if one is unwilling to abandon plurality and geographical districting, one can try to minimize extreme disproportionalities […] but one has to reconcile oneself to not getting proportional or near proportional results” (Lijphart 1982, 105). And yet in such a diverse political environment as the United States both systems can coexist.
The problem with geographic representation is that it advantages geographically concentrated groups. Some formal redistricting criteria are better for certain groups than others. A classic example it that of women for whom majority-minority districts cannot be created. Moreover, even geographically defined communities raise theoretical problems. It can be said that the district process imposes an identity on a given community instead of letting people chose for themselves. With districts there is no escaping the selection bias problem. Just because people are ascribed census attributes does not mean they share a sense of political unity. Political priorities can change between elections or over time. In one election economic issues can be more salient, in another social issues can be perceived as more important. Census data are not collected to estimate policy concerns. Inferring political weight to demographic data can be misleading. PR does not try to predetermine which minorities should be represented.

The problem with districting is far from being new as Robert Dixon already observed in 1968: “A mathematically equal vote which is politically worthless because of gerrymandering or winner-take-all districting is as deceiving as “emperor’s clothes” (Dixon 1968, 22). Samuel Isacharroff (1993, 228-229) also remarked that districts are a poor mechanism to reflect the preferences of groups defined through the act of voting:

it is inconceivable that districted elections better could satisfy these objectives than many of the proportional and semiproportional systems employed elsewhere that assure proportionate results by reproducing voter preferences without state-sanctioned manipulation of the outcomes.

Arguing for alternative voting systems Lani Guinier (1993, 1637) came to the conclusion that:

Despite judicial reluctance to adopt alternative remedies, the principle of one-vote, one-value satisfies the representational needs of voters in two ways that districting does not. First, it extracts the unfairness of wasted votes from winner-take-all solutions. Votes that would have been wasted in a winner-take-all system are redistributed to voluntary constituencies consistent with the actual level of their political support. Second, it allows voters to choose their representational identity. Rather than imposing a group identity on a given geographic constituency, this system gives voters the opportunity to associate with the identity that fits their own view of psychological, cultural, and historical reality. Thus, racial and other politically cohesive groups could be represented in proportion to their actual strength in the electorate rather than in proportion to their geographic concentration.

However, it is possible to imagine a form of proportional representation (PR) adapted to geographical districts. There is a middle-ground between European style at-large PR systems and American SMD rules that is called semi-PR system championed by scholars such as Engstrom (1998, 2001, 2010) or Amy (2002). The semi-PR systems consist in concentrating multiple votes on one candidate (cumulative voting or CV) or limiting votes to a number less than the number of elected offices (limited voting or LV) or expressing a number of preferences to make surplus votes count (preference voting sometimes called single-transferable voting) (Weaver 1984). These systems have the advantage of lowering the threshold for representation for minority groups and can be adapted to geographical districts (Guigner 1994, 147). Minority voters don’t need to constitute majorities within districts in order to have the opportunity to elect
the candidate of their choice so there is no need for district boundaries to selectively include or exclude members. As Michael Kang put it: “The key consideration is that both cumulative voting and limited voting enable the minority to act directly on an affirmative preference for a candidate, but make it more complicated for the majority to fill all available seats and block the election of the minority’s candidate” (Kang 2010, 1274).

Another advantage of changing the electoral system can help move away from the fight over statistical data. The criteria that the Supreme Court has identified as “traditional race-neutral districting principles” such as contiguity, compactness, and respect of other government boundaries are more likely to be respected. And geographical “communities of interest” are less likely to be cut by district lines. Also and this has been the case in California especially, when districts are drawn to provide electoral opportunities to a Latino minority, another problem of districting plans is the large disparity that can occur across districts in Voting Age Population or Citizen Voting Age Population.

PR and Semi-PR system have been fairly criticized. When STV has been adopted in California it has mostly been in districts. Where STV has been proposed for at-large systems, such as in Santa Monica in 1992 or Santa Clara in 2018, it’s been rejected as much too confusing. While changing electoral systems can be confusing, any community (even the ones least proficient in English) can be educated and can learn to take advantage of new electoral opportunities if accompanied by the right public services.

Another criticism addressed to PR is that it is not adopted to non partisan elections as it is the case in California at the local level. But this is only true of the list system when parties indeed decide who appears on the list and in what order. Yet, the appeal of PR and semi-PR is precisely that they can contribute to move beyond the two-party system that many reformers see today as a constraint on true marketplace-like competition.

The fundamental differences between majoritarian and proportional representation have been debated for a very long time. The stakes are clear. All decisions about political rules are trade-offs. Each system has its advantages and drawbacks. And it is true that changing from one system to another might mean exchanging a set of problems for another. Majoritarian systems supposedly help form a governing majority while proportional systems might offer a more fair representation of minority groups. The question of proportional representation is at the heart of the minority voting rights revolution and can be found in the 1965 Voting Rights Act if one can read between the lines. This is what Bruce Cain calls the “specter of proportionality”: “The language of the Voting Rights Act deftly dances around the issue, guaranteeing only that protected classes of individuals who have suffered discrimination have the right to “elect a representative of their own choice.” But this vaguely defined formal right evolved over time into an informal goal of roughly proportional descriptive representation, eventually developing critics on both the right and the left” (Cain 2001, 12). The contention of his article is that districts and semi-PR systems are not necessarily antagonistic and can be complementary. Both should be encouraged depending on the demographic and legal context in order to help minorities reach the most “fair” political representation. Local politics seems to be a particularly fertile ground for such experimentation.
Conclusion

The California Voting Rights Act is a tremendously important piece of legislation that is very consequential for the state of California as it led to the disappearance of at-large elections through litigation. It therefore has the potential to help ethno-racial minorities elect more candidates of their choice at the local level and create a pool of talent that can be tapped into for higher office. However, if the work of voting rights attorneys is not supplemented by grassroots efforts and community mobilization the results may be more modest than previously anticipated. That is because district elections are not the panacea of minority representation. In a winner-take-all system geographical districting is a very imperfect tool to reach what activists would consider as “fair representation” that is a level of descriptive representation that is commensurate with the minority electoral weight.

Proportional voting systems seem to have gotten more traction in the US as of late and may appear as the next logical step in electoral reform attempts. While the promises of the federal Voting Rights Act and courts intervention in the regulation of elections left many minority groups and activist frustrated about the modest results in increased descriptive representation, the state of California experimented with electoral reforms such as the California Voting Right Act. This measure has had a positive outcome for minorities, especially Latinos. Yet, by itself, it may not guarantee that minorities can reach descriptive representation close to their electoral weight. Alternative voting systems such as cumulative voting, as they have become more popular, can represent an alternative or a supplement to SMDs when majority-minority districts are not easily drawn or when state legislation does not encourage the elimination of at-large systems.

Notes

1. The only two exceptions are San Francisco in 2002 and Oakland in 2006 adopted “instant runoff” voting (IRV) also called “ranked choice” voting, but the measures were implemented mainly to ensure majority rule and increase turnout.

2. The bulk of the changes occurs in school districts but there is a clear trend in municipalities. It was estimated that in 2002 21 cities in California used district elections (Hajnal et al. 2002). In 2016, that number was multiplied by three as 59 cities had a district system and 16 more cities had adopted districts effective in 2017 or 2018 (Heidorn 2016).

3. As of 2018 at least 88 cities have made the change to by-district elections and two more, the City of Goleta and the City of Carpinteria, agreed to make the change for 2022. Approximately eighteen other cities are in some form of legal dispute but have not yet decided to make the change to by-district elections. Thirty two community college districts, over 165 school districts, and at least 12 other special districts have made the change to by-district elections. The only county that had been voting at-large was San Mateo and has switched to districts (Youstina et al., 2018).

4. This is true even if minorities are the numerical majority in the city. In cities with racially-polarized voting but where minority voter turnout is lower than Anglo turnout, at-large voting can produce all-Anglo city councils in majority non-Anglo cities.

5. As of 2016, a report by Common Cause estimated that 83% (413 out of 483) of California cities still used at-large election systems.

6. See https://www.fairvote.org/
7. *Gingles* didn’t specify what the index of a “majority” was – population, voting-age population, citizen voting-age population, registered voters, or the possibility of drawing an “effective minority district” by combining minorities and sympathetic white “cross-over” voters. Indeed, Justice Brennan’s language in *Gingles* suggests that he believed in the last definition. It wasn’t until the 2009 decision in *Bartlett v. Strickland* that the Supreme Court clearly ruled that the proper index was not population or an “effective district,” though the 9th Circuit had made such a ruling in *Romero v. City of Pomona*, 883 F.2d 1418 (9th Cir. 1989).


10. *Gomez v. City of Watsonville*, 863 F.2d 1407 (9th Cir. 1988). In 1960 the city of Watsonville had a population of 11,572 including 1,000 Latinos. By 1980, the city’s population reached 25,543 with 11,509 Latinos. Latinos residents made up 40% of the city’s voting age population, yet only 37% of the city’s citizens. Although the District court found evidence of racially polarized voting it concluded that the Latino population was not sufficiently cohesive politically and geographically compact to satisfy Section 2 requirements. The District court recognized that 95% of Latinos had voted for the same candidate but focused on low voter registration and turnout among Latinos as the main reason. The Circuit court disagreed with this assessment, considering instead that “low voter registration evidences the lingering socioeconomic effects of past discrimination.” *Ibid.*, at 1416, footnote 4.

11. The first direct consequence that the neighboring city of Salinas settled right after *Gomez* to avoid such an expensive trial. It switched to districts for city council but maintained at-large election for mayor. Simon Salinas became the city’s first Latino councilman and was elected in a district in which turnout was higher than in Anglo districts. (Adams 2000, chapter 3).

12. Another candidate, Anthony Campos was elected in 1987 but he was perceived by local Latino activists as too close to Anglo interests. (Takash and Avila, 1989).

13. “Even before the retrenchment of *Shaw* and its progeny, “other minority” plaintiffs lost more often than they won. The failure to meet one or more of the *Gingles* criteria could often be traced to the problems of group heterogeneity and multiracial context. The circumstances of Asians and Latinos differ from those of African-Americans in important ways, a situation we have called group heterogeneity.” Bruce Cain and Kenneth Miller, *op. cit.*, 1998, p. 161.

14. The cases were the cities of El Centro and Santa Maria. (Avila and al., 2007).

15. So much so that in 1999 it’s the U.S. Justice Department that threatened to sue the city Santa Paula if it did not switch to a district system, not Latino activists. The city of Santa Paula had a population of 59% Latino but only had one Latino city council member.

16. At the time, there were a total of 478 municipalities: 108 chartered cities and 370 general law cities. Only twenty-seven cities (or 5.6% of the total number of cities) conducted elections by districts. Based upon a 1995 survey, it was estimated that 65% of public school districts conducted at-large elections, 20% had candidate residency districts and at-large voting and 15% had district elections.

17. This strategy was echoed by state Senator Gil Cedillo when he declared: “Ten years from now, the benefits of generating local electoral opportunities for Asians, Latinos, and African Americans under the CVRA should swamp the 10 new legislative and con-
gressional seats created by the Citizen’s Commission. In fact, the 10 new seats will have limited meaning without a pipeline of qualified, experienced, and empowered locally elected officials that can rise to those offices.” (Cedillo, 2011).

18. **Gomez v. Hanford Joint Union School District.** There had not been any Latino on the district board of trustees in 20 years, despite a population that was 38 percent Latino.

19. It wasn’t the first time that Hanford (population of 33,000 in 1990) made the news because of at-large elections. In 1993, the at-large City Council election was switched to district after the Department of Justice found that, in the context of racially-polarized voting this method diluted minority votes. Hanford is the largest city in Kings County, a jurisdiction that is covered by Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act. The DOJ refused pre-clearance because the city’s annexations diluted Latino populations and at-large election systems had prevented Latino voters to elect a candidate of their choice (Adams, 2000, chapter 5).


21. It should also be noted that Modesto appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. Avila didn’t relax until the U.S. Supreme Court denied cert. in the case.


23. For a study as to why this is the case see Schleicher, 2007.


26. Suspect features under the CVRA include a history of electoral losses by minority candidates or a history of unresolved issues disproportionately impacting the minority community (affordable housing, street and sidewalk maintenance, juvenile crime, etc.), while the said minority represents an important part of the general population.

27. Before 1979, Pasadena had a system in which candidates ran in primaries in districts, but if they received 60% of the votes, there was no jurisdiction-wide runoff. This was repealed in a referendum that was held because of a Section 2 case, a case that was abandoned after the referendum.

28. Only two charter cities, Santa Clara and Sunnyvale use “at-large by seat” elections because California state law does not expressly allow general law cities to use this method. Until recently, Chula Vista and Modesto also used this system but both cities switched to by-district elections.

29. **Bartlett v. Strickland,** 556 U.S. 1(2009), Justice Kennedy’s opinion: “States that wish to draw crossover districts are free to do so where no other prohibition exists. Majority-minority districts are only required if all three Gingles factors are met and if §2 applies based on a totality of the circumstances. In areas with substantial crossover voting it is unlikely that the plaintiffs would be able to establish the third Gingles precondition—bloc voting by majority voters.” For a larger discussion on potential claims by coalition plaintiffs under the CVRA see Cuevas Ingram, 2012.


denied, 552 U.S. 974 (2007), holding that CVRA is race-neutral, that the city failed to show that CVRA was facially invalid and that all persons, regardless of race, have standing under CVRA to sue for race-based vote dilution, such that CVRA is not subject to strict scrutiny under equal protection jurisprudence.


35. *League of United Latin Am. Citizens, Council No. 4434 v. Clements*, 999 F.2d 831, 865, 876 (5th Cir. 1993) (en banc) (LULAC II) (“Section 2 and the Senate Report instruct us to consider the number of minority candidates elected to office.” One of the Senate Report factors for a Section 2 claim that goes towards the totality of circumstances analysis of vote dilution is “the willingness of the racial or ethnic majority—in this case, white voters—to give their votes to minority candidates”).

36. *League of United Latin Am. Citizens, Council No. 4434 v. Clements*, 999 F.2d 831, 865, 876 (5th Cir. 1993) (en banc) (LULAC II) (“Section 2 and the Senate Report instruct us to consider the number of minority candidates elected to office.” One of the Senate Report factors for a Section 2 claim that goes towards the totality of circumstances analysis of vote dilution is “the willingness of the racial or ethnic majority—in this case, white voters—to give their votes to minority candidates”).


38. See id. § 14030. Moreover, the state court is authorized to grant upward adjustment or a fees multiplier.


42. Cal. Gov. Code Sec. 34886 (“the legislative body of a city with a population of fewer than 100,000 people may adopt an ordinance that requires the members of the legislative body to be elected by district or by district with an elective mayor … without being required to submit the ordinance to the voters for approval”).

43. AB 2220 (Cooper) (Ch. 751, Statutes of 2016) (amending Cal. Gov. Code Sec. 34886).

44. Citizen Voting Age population estimates were provided by Levitt and Johnson, 2016.

45. City council member Jill Galvez (District 2) is not a Latina but her husband is from Mexico.


47. Paul Rodriguez was first appointed, he then won reelection in 2018 in District 1.
48. Councilmember Juan Garza was appointed before being elected in 2017 in his new District 5.
49. In 2004 some bay area cities (Berkeley, Oakland, San Francisco and San Leandro) also adopted Instant Run Off Voting (also called Ranked Choice Voting) in order to cut cost and increase turnout. But only charter cities are allowed to adopt this voting method. In 2016 a bill allowing general law cities to adopt IRV was vetoed by the Governor (Senate Bill 1288 (Leno 2016)).
50. “Neither cumulative nor limited voting guarantee any particular election outcome, but they can, depending on the setting and the implementation, provide minority voters with reasonable opportunities to elect representatives of their choice.” (Engstrom 2010, p. 107).
51. Today 321 jurisdictions in the US use a form one of these forms of voting. For a website tracking them see https://www.sightline.org/2017/11/08/over-300-places-in-the-united-states-have-used-fair-voting-methods/
52. Guinier argues that that cumulative voting systems permit “recognition of both the existence and intensity of minority voter preference” (Guinier, 1991, 1461-65).
53. In June 2018, Measure A was rejected by the Santa Clara voters by a margin of 846 votes. The city (with Asian population of 40.4% and Latino population of 17.5%) was finally split in 6 districts.
54. “Cumulative voting turns out not to be without cultural and political costs, which we identify as precisely as we can. But those costs do not appear substantial” (Pildes and Donoghue, 1995, 243).

References


Humanitarian Intervention: Powerless in a Globalizing World?

Harold Young
Austin Peay State University

Abstract
Increasing intrastate conflicts demand a review of the international efforts to punish perpetrators of humanitarian crises stemming from these clashes. This article explores changes in state sovereignty, the role of the United Nations Security Council (U.N.S.C.) and the International Criminal Court (I.C.C.) in humanitarian interventions protecting peoples of color, finding that the geopolitical interests of the five permanent members of the U.N.S.C. have significant bearing on which individuals are referred to the I.C.C., and that this a constrained tribunal for people of color seeking relief.

Keywords: global studies; intra-state conflict; inter-state conflict; power; natural resources; Security Council; sovereignty; intervention; human rights; international community; Sudan; Myanmar: Congo; Yemen; Venezuela

Intrastate Conflicts: The Powerless in a Globalizing World?

Introduction
The ongoing and complicated intra-state conflicts around the world fester in the shadow of tragedies in Cambodia, Rwanda, and Kosovo. The burden and devastation is disproportionately borne by people in the developing world; while many Americans of color may view these conflicts as distant and not relevant to their own lives, they are not. In addition to the suffering experiences by their relatives and friends in these troubled areas, many of the products and status symbols first world consumers take for granted use raw materials and labor extracted from these locations. Think of “blood diamonds” coming out of Sierra Leone (Brown 2005) and “conflict minerals” from the Democratic Republic of Congo (D.R.C.) (Schure 2010) as prime examples. The extraction of these materials fuels intra-state conflicts in many parts of the globe.

The establishment of the International Criminal Court (I.C.C.) in 1998 was a major step in creating a regime to adjudicate individual leaders responsible for atrocities committed against their own citizens. As an affiliated institution of the United Nations (U.N.), the I.C.C. can accept referrals of heads of states for alleged human rights violations from the U.N. Security Council (U.N.S.C.). Any referral, however, can be blocked by a permanent member of the U.N.S.C. using its veto power. Permanent Members of the U.N.S.C. such as China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States of America routinely do this to protect their interest and their allies. Some members of the U.N.S.C. and several other states, however, are not signatories to the Rome Treaty which established the I.C.C. These include the United States of America, China, India, Iraq, Libya, Yemen, Qatar and Israel (Morgan 2013).

This article argues that the interests of the permanent members of the U.N.S.C. are more likely to override referral to the I.C.C. to the detriment of peoples of color in

* Direct correspondence to youngh@apsu.edu
times of crisis. In fact, if the state is geopolitically important to a permanent member, the case will not even be considered. This research finds that while all individuals referred to the I.C.C. are people of color, their states are of limited geopolitical interest to the permanent members of the U.N.S.C., suggesting bias, and opening the door for the permanent members to target some states while protecting others. This reality brings into question long standing international norms, state sovereignty, human rights laws and the responsibility, or legal right, to intervene (and protect or R2P) since the protection of rights and lives of these people is totally dependent on the interests of the permanent members.

The debate around the issue of protecting human rights juxtaposes interventions in support of universal human rights against the premium of national sovereignty (Booth 2007). It also brings into question the use of international regimes to pick “winners” and “losers” based on the interests of the five permanent members of the U.N.S.C. This study will briefly review the responses to crises in member states by regional regimes and responses of the U.N.S.C., examining the international regimes and political will to intervene to alleviate human suffering resulting from intra-state wars. The surge in intrastate conflict make this crucial to the viability of the I.C.C. The next section is an overview of the decrease in interstate conflict with the comparative increase in intrastate conflicts and the comparative numbers of casualties as a result. These comparisons highlight the importance of the I.C.C. and the power the U.N.S.C. wields when it comes to the ability of the I.C.C. to hold world leaders accountable.

The Rise of Intrastate Conflicts

The designation “armed conflict” is grounded in three key characteristics: (1) it is a political conflict; (2) it involves armed combat by the armed forces of a state, or the forces of one or more armed factions seeking a political end; and (3) at least 1,000 people have been killed directly by the fighting during the conflict and there are at least 25 combat deaths annually (Project Ploughshare n.d). Figure 1 illustrates the continuous decline of inter-state conflicts and death after World War II. Even with a brief decline in the mid-1990s, however, the growing trend in intrastate conflict is especially significant at the end of the Cold War (Human Security Report Project 2013).

There has also been an increase in the number of non-state armed conflicts resulting in significant casualties. These conflicts may involve groups in armed conflict outside the control of the government, conflicts between groups and governments actions against groups or individuals. Figure 2 displays comparative data on the number of intra-state conflicts and battle deaths (Human Security Report Project 2013).
Understanding State Sovereignty
The foundation of the modern state is traced to the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia that ended the Thirty-Years War (1618-1648). The Westphalia system is based on political authority over
a well-defined geographic space and autonomy to the exclusion of external actors (Krasner 1995). Five pivotal norms support the Westphalia system: (1) the actors are sovereign states (2) although they possess different capabilities, states are equal (3) the sovereign (ruler) has no right to intervene in another state (4) while self-defense is allowed, non-aggression is the norm but states can act collectively to thwart another state’s dominance (5) international rules govern diplomacy and treaty making, and rules are binding (Brown 2002). This absolute sovereignty does not contemplate any superior authority (Charvet 1997). For the purpose of this research, the third provision addressing the sovereign ruler (head of state) is directly applicable to the power of the U.N.S.C. to make referrals to the I.C.C.

Realist theorists equate power with sovereign state interests (Morgenthau 1973) and survival as the ultimate and single state preference (Waltz 1979). In effect, a state does not have to abide by any rules or agreements, as the claim of self-preservation is the ultimate state preference superseding all others. Similarly, the model is central to neo-liberal thought in which states maximize their utility in a similar anarchic though interdependent international environment (Krasner 1995). Finally, this model also holds for constructivists, minus the assumptions of the realist and the liberal schools and understood to be “a behavioral regularity based on shared understandings” (Krasner 1995, 122). States not only pursue self-preservation, they learn and interact in complex interdependent relationships.

When considering the dynamics of state sovereignty and the need to hold leaders responsible for their actions, important assumptions are recognized. It is assumed that a member of the international community accepts three key elements (a) it is prepared to accept that it may be forcing its ideas on parties who may not agree with them (b) they have accepted the notion of using violence to stop violence and (c) it accepts the task (time, treasury, and life) of domestic rehabilitation after the intervention (Parekh 1997). The next sections discuss the new era of international relations post-World War II.

After World War II, the functional approach emerged in the work of David Mitrany (1948) who recognized that as the need for state cooperation changes, so must international interactions. Under the functional approach, states cooperate in areas of mutual interest and benefit without impinging on state sovereignty. Mitrany suggests that states will develop numerous international organizations that cooperate in different areas and at different levels with far reaching effects. This benefits the citizens of those states and “if organizations are successful and their numbers grow, world government will gradually evolve through their performance” (Mitrany 1948, 358). The emergence of the United Nations (U.N.) and affiliated institutions are key developments of this approach on the international stage.

The U.N. Charter plays a seminal role in defining important issues on the world stage, conflict management, and developments in international law (Scott 2010). Article 2, paragraph 4 of the U.N. Charter reinforces the sovereignty of member states by prohibiting members from threatening or using force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations. Some argue that the state has lost some of its potency as a political actor and has elevated the role of non-state actors (Keck and Sikkink 1998). On the other hand, the realists assert that states are truly the only important actors in world politics. The state-centric realist theory finds the state primarily focused on the security dilemma and a continuous propensity for conflict among states (Morgenthau 1973). A disaggregation of the state as a unitary actor and the consideration of the actions of leaders in relation to the welfare of the citizens are important developments which contribute to our analysis of how states determine whether to act unilaterally or collectively to
intervene in another state.

The international laws, institutions and the supranational firms ushered in by globalization have shifted some power away from the states. Whether accountable to international regimes including the U.N., the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Trade Organization (WTO), or the International Copyright Agreement or the Paris Climate Accord, governments are responsible not only to the governed, they also have a shared responsibility to entities outside the state. Even countries such as Iran, North Korea and Myanmar (Burma), which are particularly guarded in their interactions with international institutions and other countries, respond to some extent to pressure from the international community. For example, while it may not have stopped the intervention, the U.S.A. did seek the U.N.S.C.’s approval before removing Iraq from Kuwait. At the other end of the spectrum, powerful and internationally engaged countries control the U.N.S.C. via their veto power of any action.

Susan Strange championed the connection between economics and international politics and saw globalization driving the change in the state, in terms of where the power really rested (Cox 1997). Strange (1995) describes states as “becoming hollow, or defective institutions” (57). She views globalization as having three major effects on state function. First, it makes national defense less important since accessing other markets is far less dependent on acquiring territory (Strange 1997) leaving security forces in most countries to focus on internal security matters. Second, states have less control of financial affairs including currency, banks, credit and the flow of capital; this in turn makes states less able to make decisions in the interests of their own populace. The economic crisis that started in 2007, nevertheless, demonstrates the vulnerability of the global economic system. This vulnerability is asymmetrical, with the developed state better able to cope than developing states, populated predominately by people of color. Furthermore, human rights violations leading to interventions are more likely in the many weaker states in which the permanent members of the I.C.C have little geopolitical interest leaving many at the mercy of just a few powerful states.

The third element is social well-being. Multi-national corporations negotiate and sign agreements directly with governments which expect these agreements to improve the lives of their people. While there may be benefits, the goal of most firms is to turn a profit, not protect or advance any national interest. From these three elements, Cox concludes that among nations the result will be a “collective colonialism administered through international organizations” (1997, 369). Again, this phenomenon keeps developing states in a dependent position in which the welfare of the people seems secondary to corporate success. To reiterate, this predominantly affects peoples of color in developing states.

While there is growing interstate cooperation in the vision of functionalist thought, the post-World War II era was also one of polarizing focus on state political and economic ideology that cast the state within fixed geographic borders. Under the guise of state sovereignty, the subjection of one ethnic, cultural or racial group over another, or internal imperialism, survived. This led to many human rights violations and genocide, as seen in Ethiopia and East Timor, without attracting any substantive international response (Barkin and Cronin 1994). This approach declined after the Cold War and a more robust international response to human rights violations.

Currently, the debate about national sovereignty and accountability of leaders has a new lease on life in international law, and it takes on more importance. It is observed in relations among states and domestically; as the role of the state changes and its authority over its territory loosens, this does suggest something about the state’s ability to meet the economic and security
needs of its people or exercise its sovereign authority over the population to the exclusion of other states. It must be noted, however, that people of color in developing states are still more vulnerable and less likely to be defended by the international community under the current international regime.

**Method: Addressing the Question**

To determine the basis of the use of veto power by permanent member of the UN Security Council in situations where the responsibility to protect human rights is evoked in the domestic affairs of sovereign states, this study uses the Congruence Method to test the theory in cases since 1998 (when the treaty creating the I.C.C. was signed).

The Congruence Method is appropriate for a small number of cases and provides flexibility and adaptability is testing the theory. The approach allows specific cases to be probed to assess the theory and refine, if appropriate. The Congruence Method will be employed in the form of plausibility probes (George and Bennett 2005) which requires less detail than case studies, allowing more examples to be examined. Examples were selected based on their “likeness” to the dominant theory (Blatter and Blume, 336) which proposes that cases of gross human rights violations and genocide can be referred to the I.C.C. when the home country is unwilling or unable to bring those responsible to justice. The cases selected are as follows: Sudan, Myanmar (Burma), Yemen, Democratic Republic of the Congo and Venezuela.

In this small-N-study \(N=5\), the unit of analysis is the state. The dependent variable is whether the case involving human rights abuses by a state leader has been referred to the I.C.C. by the U.N.S.C. The first independent variable is whether each state is of geopolitical interest to a permanent member of the U.N.S.C. This variable has two parts (a) the geographical location of the state and (b) is its physical features-- which for the purpose of this research is identified as presence of and access to natural resources. Second is the ethno-racial majority in each state. The drawing of causal inferences is guided by Blatter and Blume (2008):

First, other factors which could have influenced the outcomes must be “controlled for”. Since in small-N-studies this cannot be done by statistical means, researchers generally select “comparable cases” (Liphart 1975) or try to find “most similar systems” (Przeworski and Teune 1970). Second, the co-variational relationship between two variables must be given a “meaning” by connecting the empirical observations to theory (320).

Concrete observations are provided which relate these to the theory. To draw inferences about the relevance of the theory, deductive reasoning is used to predict outcomes ex-ante, giving a view of what would happen if the author’s theory applies compared to the general theory (Blatter and Blume 2008). In this research, the general theory is the premise that the purpose of the I.C.C. is to adjudicate gross human rights violations and genocide when the home country is unwilling or unable to bring those responsible to justice.

**Intervention**

The recognition of a need to intervene in a state is not a new concept. Wheeler (2000) identifies the historical origins of the work by seventeenth-century Dutch jurist and international law pioneer Hugo Grotius who wrote that “if a tyrant [...] practices atrocities towards his
subjects, which no just man can approve, the right of human social connection is not cut off in such a case [...] it would not follow that others may not take up arms for them” (45). Today, humanitarian intervention can be defined as the threat or use of force by a state, a group of states, or international organizations with the primarily goal of protecting the nationals of the target state from widespread deprivations of internationally recognized human rights (Murphy 1996). A narrower definition curtails the intent to being solely humanitarian, and that protecting the welfare and freedom of people in another state must be the sole, or at least the primary, goal of the intervention to the exclusion of some benefit to the intervening state (Tesón 1992). While these definitions are very helpful, in this article, “humanitarian intervention” includes those state interventions whose declared goal is to stop or prevent humanitarian suffering though the intervention state may have unrelated underlying motives for intervening (Voon 2002).

The international pressures to intervene are identified four-fold. First, there is increasing importance given to implementing fundamental international human rights standards. Second, globalization is driving some erosion of traditional state sovereignty as the foundation for interstate relations. Third, the effects of media coverage are raising the salience of human suffering around the world (Falk 2012; Parekh 1997). Finally, people feel personally connected to the plight of the victims as a result in a heightened sense of human interdependence and collective need to address the problem in a “physically and morally shrinking world” (Parekh 1997, 5).

The literature characterizes the U.N. Charter as a primary international law prescribing the goals of the international community and constraining the actions of sovereign states. Article I of the Charter states that the primary purpose of the United Nations is “to maintain international peace and security” where a breach of the peace using force by one state against another will be a violation of the purposes of the U.N. Military intervention. Interventions, therefore, are legitimate under international law in three situations only (1) action taken or authorized by U.N. under Articles 39-41 (2) individual or collective self-defense under Article 51 (3) action of organizations authorized by the Security Council under Article 53 of the U.N. Charter. This delineation of the use of force mirrors the general principle of state sovereignty and Article 2(1) that states the principle of non-intervention (Voon 2002).

Finnemore’s (2003) assertion that post-Cold War intervention in sovereign states is legitimized when based on humanitarian grounds, not only changes the purpose for which interventions are used, it possibly rearranges the concept of sovereignty in a way not yet fully explored. This may be grounded by the fact that the U.N. Security Council does have wide leeway in determining what constitutes a threat to or breach of the peace, or an act of aggression by a state. Further, while not directly violating the Charter, intra-state conflicts can incite domestic unrest in neighboring states, spawning refugee crises and regional instability. Human rights violations previously considered to be internal matters are now likely to be considered threats to peace (Stromseth 1993). In many cases, however, the Security Council has not been able to muster the required political power, with proposed actions being thwarted by the self-interest of a permanent member(s) of the U.N. Security Council. Consequently, the status quo is that only the powerful nations can legitimize an intervention in international law.

Helen Thompson (2006) characterizes the focus on human rights as “…a new kind of international politics that begins from a universal ethical commitment to the moral value and autonomy of individuals” (251). This seems to put the individual on the world stage as an actor, so reconciling these two concepts is troublesome. The reality is that both are being pursued by nations at the same time.
Finnemore (2003) identifies this as a change in the purpose of intervention where a sovereign state acts against another sovereign state, not for its gain but ostensibly for the benefit of the citizens. This constructivist approach towards sovereignty moves between theory and reality using the “abductive” method which Finnemore (2003) borrows from Kratochwill and Ruggie (1986). Finnemore investigates “how” nations are moving to a position of acceptance that humanitarian reasons are a legitimate basis for impinging on the sovereignty of another state. Finnemore (2003) states that “Humanitarian activities in the 1990s suggest that certain claims, particularly human rights claims, now trump sovereignty and legitimatize interventions in ways not previously accepted” (21). She asserts that these interventions are ordered according to the general principle of international responsibility and that the use of force is a method now acceptable to the U.N., means sovereignty appears more nebulous than before. As interventions may be “legitimized” by the appeals to human rights, the flag of sovereignty may stand on shifting sands.

Even within a league of powerful nations, there is a norm. Taken to its logical (or maybe illogical) conclusion, Germany should be able to call for multinational action to intervene in the United States on behalf of all those on death row following actions in 2005, when President George W. Bush withdrew the U.S. from the Vienna Convention Death Penalty Protocol that it sponsored and ratified in 1963. Between 1976 and 2018, 1,488 with a high point of 98 in 1999 (Death Penalty Information Center 2018). However, any public comment by a foreign leader criticizing the use of the death penalty as violating international conventions is met with hostility from the U.S. and classified as “meddling” in the internal affairs of the United States. On the other hand, one could argue that executing a few dozen people per year does not rise to a level requiring humanitarian intervention. Nevertheless, this point is not lost on Thompson (2006),

Meanwhile, most recent defenses of sovereignty have come from American lawyers and conservatives, who appear to defend the concept of sovereignty for the American state on constitutional grounds while justifying American disregard for the claim of other states to the same authority (252).

The willingness of the U.N. to authorize an intervention reflects the development of human rights within a broader understanding of interventions that targets the violators themselves and focuses less on the international effects of the crisis, for which the U.N. Charter confers legitimacy (Voon 2002) on other sovereign states. After the Cold War, probably the most important doctrinal development in this area was the U.N.’s authorization of intervention in Somalia in 1992 (Charron 2006). While the outcome there was less than desirable, there are subsequent examples. The rationale may include preserving a state’s reputation (the U.S. as a champion of human rights), loyalty or history (the colonial power and the former colony, as seen when the U.K. intervened in Sierra Leone starting in 2000), or in order to protect some specific national interest (the U.S. intervention in Kuwait in 1990). It is, however, a singular development for a head of state to be referred to a legal tribunal, the I.C.C.

How the International Community Decides

The matter of just how much protection a claim of sovereignty gives nation if its government exercises certain authority or acquiesces to actions to the detriment of its own people, is not well defined. Intervening in order to hold a head of state accountable to the I.C.C.
has proven difficult for the international community and for the U.N.S.C. because doing that may undermine the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention, which forms the basis of the ban in Article 2(7) of the U.N. Charter. If such a broad interpretation of self-defense were used to justify intervention by states, the constraints on the use of force would be decimated (Murphy 1996). Nevertheless, the clash between state sovereignty, the geopolitical interests of major powers and the issue of interventions which hold those accountable for widespread suffering (or genocide) plays out in real time around the world.

The author turns now to the five cases of this study: The Republic of Sudan, The Republic of the Union Myanmar (Burma), Democratic Republic of the Congo (D.R.C. formally Zaire), The Republic of Yemen and The Bolivian Republic of Venezuela.

The Republic of Sudan

Developing countries have repeatedly complained about the asymmetry of power in the U.N. Security Council (U.N.S.C), claiming it influences its referrals to the I.C.C. (Strydom 2015). With a single veto by a permanent member derailing any referral to the I.C.C., so far only Africans have been indicted, although there have been few convictions (Londoño and Simons 2018). The U.N.S.C has referred three cases: Darfur, Sudan, and Libya (International Criminal Court 2015c). It should be noted that although Sudan is not a signatory, many other African states participated in negotiating the Rome Statute and have generally supported the I.C.C.

The 2005 case which has attracted the most criticism involves the sitting Sudanese President, Omar Hassan al-Bashir, who was accused of war crimes and genocide in Darfur. The use of the Janjaweed militia group led to the destruction of 400 villages, widespread gang rape of women and children, and the execution of men and boys who were all mainly Black Muslim Sudanese. The U.N. estimates that at least 400,000 people were killed and many hundreds of thousands more were displaced (The Borgen Project 2016; International Criminal Court 2005).

Sudan is a poor and vast country of two million square miles with unexplored mineral reserves of petroleum, natural gas, gold, silver, chrome, asbestos, manganese, gypsum, mica, zinc, iron, lead, uranium, copper, kaolin, cobalt, granite, nickel and tin. The industry is in its infancy currently with the must success by a French-Sudanese partnership mining gold. In 2014 the value of gold exports reached $2.5 Billion or 70% of the exports (Tubiana May 1, 2014). None of the permanent members of the U.N.S.C. have significant geopolitical interests in Sudan or more specifically, the Darfur region.

The Republic of the Union Myanmar (Burma)

Despite the investigation and damning report by the Special Rapporteur working on behalf of the U.N. Human Rights Council, we have the non-referral of the internationally recognized case of genocide in Myanmar (IUN Human Rights Council, 2016). In addition, a U.N. report cites the government ‘crackdown” on the Rohingya Muslim minority. In the last 12 months alone, 750,000 people have fled Myanmar, mostly to already struggling Bangladesh, 392 villages were razed or partially destroyed; while the death toll is unknown, an estimate of 10,000 is considered conservative. The reports directly implicate military Commander-in-Chief Min Aung Hlaing, Brigadier-General Aung, Vice Senior-General Soe Win, Lieutenant-General Aung Kyaw Zaw, Major-General Maung Soe, and Brigadier-General Than Oo (Parvaz August 27, 2018). Finally, the U.N. report also recommends to the U.N.S.C. that leaders by tried by a tribunal and referred to the I.C.C. To date this has not been done (Tisdall 2018). Surprisingly, there are even serious accusations of complicity by the Nobel Peace Prize winner
and pro-democracy advocate, Aung San Suu Kyi considered the *de facto* civilian leader (Nang and Paddock 2018; Kirby 2017). The seriousness of her alleged complicity resulted in both Amnesty International and the U.S. Holocaust Museum revoking her awards in 2018 (Amnesty International 2018).

International action on this crisis in Myanmar has been absent, despite rhetoric condemning the actions of the government and military by domestic civic organizations, international organizations including the U.N., and some states such as Australia, U.S., Great Britain and France. The U.S. has characterized the actions against the Rohingya Muslim minority as “ethnic cleansing” (Doherty 2018; Mohammed and Brunnstrom 2017). On the other hand, China and India both have investments in the Rakhine state (home of the Rohingya Muslim minority) and back the government (Bhaumik 2017). As China is a permanent member of the U.N.S.C., it is expected to block any real coordinated actions that will affect its geopolitical interest in Myanmar. Further, oil production levels (20,000 barrels per day in 2013) do not even meet local consumption (index mundi 2018a) and there is negligible mineral production.

**Democratic Republic of the Congo (D.R.C. formally Zaire)**

Political unrest and civil conflicts plague the nation with 4.5 million people displaced, one in five (20%) of children dead before age five and 13 million people needing humanitarian assistance. The D.R.C. is one of the ‘poorest rich countries’ in the world. Its natural resources – gold, diamonds, coltan, tin, uranium, and oil – just to name a few - flow to developed countries. Congo is Africa’s biggest copper producer and the world’s largest source of cobalt, important to the surge in electric car production. The BBC reports that “The east of DR Congo is still plagued by army and militia violence despite the end of the country’s five-year war in 2003 in which more than five million people lost their lives - the deadliest conflict since World War II.” (BBC News 2010). In February 2018 alone, Human Rights Watch received reports of massacres, rapes and decapitations that in one village left 15 dead, including three children (Sawyer 2018; ALJAZEERA 2018).

The presence of 19,000 U.N. peace keepers has not stemmed the violence internally and there is continued bickering with neighboring Uganda and Rwanda, who supply the U.N.’s peace keeping troops. President Kabila clings to power and suppresses internal dissent and opposition activity (Global Conflict Tracker 2018). I.C.C. investigators have been in the D.R.C since 2002, yet to date there have been two convictions of lower level actors (The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo and The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga), one acquittal (The Prosecutor v. Ngudojolo Chui) and one ongoing case involving Mr. Ntaganda (International Criminal Court 2018).

In the meantime, the natural resources flow out to international markets and the international community ignores the carnage. As the KPMG Global Mining Institute reports,

> Despite these challenges, the D.R.C.’s mining sector is expected to grow substantially on the back of the growing interest from mining companies from China, Australia, Canada, the UK and the US, among others, due to the large untapped mineral reserves and perceived low mining costs (2).

At least three (China, U.K. and U.S) of the five permanent members of the U.N.S.C. have a geopolitical stake in pushing for intervention to stop the conflict and save lives of those caught up in the conflict directly or indirectly. This indicates that these states are moved to action based solely on human rights violations.
The Republic of Yemen

Yemen has been torn apart by conflict over the past three years as a Saudi (supported by the U.S.) backed coalition fights the Houthi rebel movement (Ansar Allah or Partisans of God). President Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi is backed by Saudi Arabia and U.S.A. This is a proxy war between regional powers, Saudi Arabia (predominately Sunni) and Iran (who back the Houthi movement that is predominantly Shi’ite like Iran). It is also in the shadow of U.S. interests in their support of Saudi Arabia and opposition to Iran in the region. The outcome has geopolitical implications for the balance of power in the region and other conflicts such as Hezbollah in Syria (Saul, Hafezi and Georgy March 21, 2017).

It is now at the point of a humanitarian catastrophe with 14 million people facing famine and at least 87,000 children under the age of five dead already (BBC November 21, 2018). While the conflict rages in the important port city of Hudaydah, humanitarian aid cannot reach people on the ground. The only other permanent member of the U.N.S.C., directly and publicly involved is the U.K. which has tried to broker a truce to allow humanitarian aid to the suffering population. On November 14, the U.K. presented a draft resolution to the U.N. but there has been no progress to date. David Miliband, the former British foreign secretary and current president of the International Rescue Committee commented, “Yemen’s current crisis is man-made…. This is not a case where humanitarian suffering is the price of winning a war. No one is winning, except the extremist groups who thrive on chaos.” (Kristof 2018)

Why is this conflict festering with no intervention by the international community? There are numerous intertwining factors. First, as discussed earlier, there is a regional power struggle between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Second, the U.S. is allied with Saudi Arabia which has significant oil reserves. Third, Yemen is poor with peak oil production of 400,000 barrels of oil per day 2002 (125,000 barrels in 2013; index mundi 2018b) compared to 10,000,000 barrels per day in Saudi Arabia in 2013 (index mundi 2018c). Other natural resources in production in Yemen are limited to gypsum, hydraulic cement and salt (index mundi 2018d). Despite being in a generally volatile region, Yemen is of little geopolitical significance to the permanent member of the U.N.S.C. While the U.S. believes it is securing its interest via support for Saudi Arabia and, while the U.K. takes limited initiatives in the U.N., the people of Yemen face famine, death and destruction. In the foreseeable future, no state will intervene, and no one will be held accountable in the I.C.C. or any other international forum.

The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela

Unlike the Middle East, South America is not considered a high-tension tinderbox (despite numerous intra and interstate conflicts) or a major geopolitically important continent. However, with huge oil and mineral reserves, Venezuela is worthy of attention in the context of this research. There are ongoing political and economic crises in Venezuela. The government of President Nicolás Maduro remains unbending in its policies that underpin acute food shortages and the exodus of 1.6 million citizens in the last three years to neighboring republics including as Columbia, Peru and Trinidad & Tobago, each facing their own problems. In an unprecedented move, Canada, Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Paraguay and Peru (members of the Organization of American States/O.A.S.) have asked the I.C.C. to consider prosecuting senior officials of the Maduro government for arbitrary detentions, extrajudicial killings, torture and sexual crimes used to suppress protest (Londoño and Simmons 2018). From a major oil exporter (98% of
exports value controlled by a nationalized company), Venezuela has seen its production drop from 2.9 million barrels per day in 2013 to 1.45 barrels per day in 2018 (Slav 2018). It is yet to be seen what public actions, if any, the permanent members of the U.N.S.C. can agree to take that may galvanize action by the international community.

In summary, the five states in the sample show the need for the congruence of interests of the permanent members of the U.N.S.C. and the significance of natural resources to these states in particularly geographic areas. Table 1 presents each state, reflecting the geographical location, oil and mineral wealth and whether individuals allegedly responsible for human rights violations are referred to the I.C.C.

Table 1. Sample States by location, mineral resources, head of states and referral status with I.C.C.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Mineral Resources</th>
<th>Heads of States during conflict</th>
<th>U.N.S.C Ally</th>
<th>Referral to I.C.C.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>North Africa</td>
<td>Not significant</td>
<td>President Omar Hassan al-Bashir</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Yes. U.N.S.C. Resolution 1593 (2005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>South East Asia</td>
<td>Not significant</td>
<td>Presidents U Htin Kyaw &amp; Win Myint</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D.R.C.</td>
<td>Central Africa</td>
<td>Significant</td>
<td>President Kabila</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>Not significant</td>
<td>President Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi (by extension Saudi Arabia, U.S.A. and Iran)</td>
<td>U.S.A.</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>South America</td>
<td>Significant</td>
<td>President Nicolás Maduro</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Findings and Conclusions

The cases examined here show that the permanent members of the U.N.S.C. are involved with the states in conflicts but are protective of their own interests to the exclusion of actions that could protect or benefit the people in those crises. First, all the states in this sample are in either Africa, Asia or South American with majority non-white populations. States in which permanent member have significant interests in their natural resources are less likely to be referred to the I.C.C. Of the five heads of state, only one has been referred - President Omar Hassan al-Bashir of Sudan. Sudan is not even a signatory to the Rome Treaty, nor is not a major producer of oil and minerals and none of the permanent members of the U.N.S.C. is a geopolitical ally. Although Myanmar is less isolated, in recent years the Rohingya crisis has drawn the condemnation of international organization and a few countries (e.g., Turkey, Malaysia, Pakistan, and Iran). Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif stated, “Global silence on continuing violence against #Rohingya Muslims. Int’l action crucial to prevent further ethnic cleansing - UN must rally” (ALJAZEERA 2017). However, China’s interest in Myanmar and its ambitions in Asia are likely to block any potential action by the U.N.S.C.

The D.R.C. under the rule of President Joseph Kabila (having succeeded his father,
Laurent-desire Kabila, assassinated in 2001), continues to be stable enough for large scale commercial mining to continue with limited interruptions. The plight of the local people is not a concern of the multinational corporations including Glencore, Randgold, Ivanhoe, China Molybdenum and Zijin (Ross March 15, 2018). The ongoing human disaster in Yemen is not only an intrastate conflict promulgated by other states (primarily Saudi Arabia, U.S.A, and Iran) but takes place in a volatile region. It therefore will probably have implications for the geopolitical interest of the permanent members of the U.N.S.C. and other conflicts in the region (e.g., Israel-Palestinian, Hezbollah in Lebanon and Qatar which is now blockaded by Saudi Arabia). Based on this conflicting and entrenched geopolitical interest, it is unlikely that the U.N.S.C. will refer any head of state to the I.C.C. Finally, Venezuela is a unique case in that while it is oil and mineral rich, it is not generally considered geopolitically significant. However, the policies of the Maduro administration are adversely impacting Venezuelans via scarcities of basic food and resources (BBC 2018) and direct human rights violations – jailing, extra-judicial killings, excessive force by authorities (United Nations Human Rights 2018). Additionally, there is a refugee crisis in neighboring countries (BBC 2018). Despite the formal request by members of the O.A.S., it is unlikely that any action will be taken by the U.N.S.C against the Maduro administration.

Probably one of the bluntest criticisms of this inaction, support for the international status quo, and the permanent members of the U.N.S.C. themselves is made by Nicholas Kristof (2018) who writes:

Russia is up to its elbows in crimes against humanity in Syria, China is detaining perhaps one million Uighurs while also shielding Myanmar from accountability for probable genocide, and the United States and Britain are helping Saudi Arabia commit war crimes in Yemen.
That’s pathetic: Four of the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council are complicit in crimes against humanity. (para. 17 & 18)

Meanwhile, intra-state wars and economic crises smolder and rage in the hot spots around the world precipitating death, destruction of vital infrastructure, internal population displacement, refugee crises and economic pressure on neighboring states. With only a single leader indicted, people of color are disproportionately affected and unprotected in the developing countries in Africa, Asia and the Americas.

The lack of action by the U.N.S.C. has sparked regional reactions, and the finding also reflect the response of African states. In October 2015, South Africa withdrew from the I.C.C., asserting bias on the part of the United Nation’s Security Council in referring only cases originating in Africa to the I.C.C. (Duggard 2013; Strydom 2015). An announcement by Obeded Bapela, head of South Africa’s governing African National Congress (ANC) international relations commission, followed a vote on the matter (Laing 2015). Bapela stated, “The principles that led us to be members remain valid and relevant. However, the I.C.C. has lost its direction unfortunately and is no longer pursuing that principle of an instrument that is fair for everybody” (Laing 2015, para. 4). Led by South Africa, the African criticisms of the I.C.C. charge that the I.C.C. has “lost its direction” (Strydom 2015, para. 1) pointing to the fact that the Security Council has referred cases from Sudan and Libya while situations such as those in Myanmar (Burma), Syria, and Yemen have not been referred. The suggestion is that there is a distinct bias by the U.N.S.C. against Africa (Duggard 2013), borne out by the I.C.C’s own
track record; since the establishment of the I.C.C., only black Africans, particularly high-level officials and politicians, have been charged (du Plessis, Maluwa, and O’Reilly 2013).

At the regional level, in 2009 the African Union (A.U.) expanded the jurisdiction of the African Court on Human and People’s Rights (ACHPR) to include international crimes of genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and several transnational crimes including terrorism, piracy, and corruption. Of the 53 members of the African Union, 26 states have ratified the new protocol (African Court on Human and People’s Rights n.d.a). To date, the ACHPR has adjudicated 24 cases with 30 cases pending (African Court on Human and People’s Rights n.d. b). Some observers suggest that this new protocol was a step toward undermining the I.C.C. (du Plessis, Maluwa, and O’Reilly 2013). The Protocol (Article 5) and the Rules (Rule 33) of the new court, gives African states more control over the extraterritorial court in general and over the cases that are referred to it for adjudication (African Union n.d). This is an interesting development because there is not a complete disavowal of extraterritorial courts, but the replacing of one extraterritorial court by another. It may indicate that states are not generally opposed to extraterritorial courts but are sensitive to the perceived bias of the courts and how their own policies are constrained by the court.

The most recent county to withdraw is the Philippines in May of 2018 after a complaint was launch against President Duterte over extrajudicial killings of suspected drug user and dealers (Mogato and Petty 2018; Cruz 2018). Other states of interest are Saudi Arabia for domestic human rights violation and their involvement in Yemen (Human Rights Watch 2017) and Russian Federation involvement in the Crimea (United Nations Human Rights 2017). With the U.S.A. backing Saudi Arabia and the Russian Federation involved in the Crimea, it is virtually impossible that the U.N.S.C. will be able to act against President Putin of Russia. Finally, it is worth noting the muted international response to the Tamil genocide by the Sri Lankan government which killed between 80,000 and 100,000 people between 1983 and 2009 (Boyle 2010).

Without clear international leadership, a seemingly paralyzed global community struggles with sporadic attempts at cease-fires, humanitarian aid, diplomacy and limited military intervention. The focus of international law research justifiably focuses on R2P in terms of armed interventions Jus ad bellum (or just war) and the nexus between R2P and international criminal tribunals Jus post bellum (or justice after war) while the lacunae that should be filled by discovering a jus non-be/lo or “law instead of war” (Hall 2010). Ultimately, the primary goal should be preventing crises in the first place thereby retaining the integrity of the individual, the state, the United Nations and international legal system.

References
Tamil Rights under International Law.” Atlanta: Clarity Press.


Saul, Jonathon, Parisa Hafezi and Michael Georgy. 2017. “Exclusive: Iran steps up support for


The Moses Complex and the Crisis of African American Leadership

Dale C. Tatum*
California State University, Long Beach

Abstract
The author uses discourse analysis to demonstrate continuities in the Black political agenda from the post-Emancipation period to the present day. Drawing on speeches and mission statements from the 1865 Colored People’s Convention and the 1865 West Indian Day Emancipation Day, and the 1963 March on Washington, as well as proverbs and spirituals, the paper points to the Moses Complex as the critical flaw in Black political organizing. In a compelling historiography and chronicle of Vincent Harding’s Deep River, the paper reconsiders mainstream Black political organizations and well-known leaders through the window of leadership style and argumentation. It argues that a mass-based movement viewed as in-group is a more effective means for African American liberation.

Keywords: Moses Complex, leadership style, Black leaders, Black organizations, civil rights.

Introduction
Moses was a leader who emerged among the oppressed Hebrews to free his people from oppression. He left an enduring legacy which has influenced Western, Judeo-Christian, and African American cultures. Moses is seen as an archetype whose strong personal leadership led the masses to the promised land of “milk and honey” and whose leadership style yields results. This style of leadership has had an excessive influence on African American culture. It has led many to believe that they do not have to be actively involved in the struggle for Black liberation, and that a leader will emerge who will fight on their behalf for racial equality (the Moses Complex). The Moses Complex has limited the effectiveness of Black leaders and Black organizations.

Moses style leadership has yielded limited results. Deuteronomy 32: 51-52 informs us that Moses was not allowed to cross over to promised land because of dereliction of duty. Moses became alienated from his constituents who had become over-reliant on him to provide them with the substance of life. In the African American community, Moses style leadership has brought similar results. African American leaders have not been as effective as they could have been because of their alienation from the masses and their inability to mobilize them effectively. This bifurcation has occasionally led to the cooptation of elements of the African American middle class who often hold lower class African Americans in contempt and work against their interest (Frazier 1962; Dyson 2005). Due to the Moses Complex, African American leaders have been hampered in dealing effectively with many of the chronic problems that the African American community has faced such as freedom from racial oppression, employment, justice, access to the ballot, and education.

During the Civil Rights Movement, when Moses style leadership was abandoned and grassroots/ mass empowerment leadership was employed, the African American community was more effective at achieving its goals (Carson 1994).

*Direct correspondence to Dale.Tatum@csulb.edu
Today, there is an overdependence on elite leaders and a limited role for the masses. This follow the leader style of leadership has become outmoded. It is not suitable to combat 21st century color-blind racism, which is subtle, institutional, and attitudinal. Because African American leaders have continued to use a Moses style of leadership, they have seen many of their civil rights gains eroded, the rise of the carceral state, and have had been able to deal effectively with other problems which have arisen in the community as well.

It is apparent that a new style of leadership based on collective action that empowers the masses is needed to create greater unity within the African American community. This will enable African Americans to have a more effective voice and to obtain the resources they need to adequately deal with the problems that face their community. Moreover, there is a substantial body of social science data which could help the African American community to influence public policy in its favor which has been ignored (Crano 2012). Furthermore, this top down style of leadership has proven to be inflexible and has prevented the African American community from capitalizing on changes which have occurred in the political environment.

**Operational Definition of the Moses Complex**

The Moses Complex is defined here as an elite form of leadership in which an individual or group leads or attempts to lead a mass of people in a particular direction. This does not mean or imply that the leaders define what a community’s problems are. A consensus often exists within a community as to what its long-standing problems are when they reoccur on a consistent basis. In this style of leadership virtually all proposals, innovations, and plans of action aimed at solving a community’s problems are initiated by the leader or an elite group of leaders (top down).

On the other hand, the masses look to a leader or an elite group for direction. They often expect the leader or leadership group to act as their spokesman with the existing power structure and to provide guidance so they can obtain the substance of life: food, shelter, and protection. They also look to the leadership to help them obtain their other crucial wants and the change they desire, which may vary by situation and time. Essentially, the masses expect the leader or leadership group to contend with and solve the most vexing problems which arise in the community. They look towards this Moses for deliverance. In its modern iteration, the Moses Complex is secular. Moses is not viewed as being heaven sent. Nevertheless, many still hope that he/she will arise to alleviate their troubled circumstances.

In the long run, there are systemic problems with this style of leadership. Over time, a gap may develop between the leaders and led as the leaders focus more keenly on their own class interest and less on the interest of the masses. Another problem with this type of leadership is that there is the possibility that a group could be weakened if its leader (Moses) dies or is somehow compromised or discredited.

**The Entrenchment of the Moses Complex in the African American Community**

Moses is a notable figure in the Bible. He confronted Pharaoh (believed to be Ramses II) who enslaved the Hebrews and he demanded that Pharaoh “let my people go.” Through persistence and divine intervention Pharaoh finally acquiesced and Moses parted the Red Sea which allowed “his people” to walk away from the land of their oppression.

During the enslavement of Africans in America, this mindset that God would send a messiah to liberate them from their oppression was prevalent. It was reflected in many of the spiritual they sang. The verses to “Let Gods Saints Come In” states:
Canaan is the land for me,  
And let God’s Saints come in.  

There was a wicked man,  
He kept them children in Egypt land.  

God did say to Moses one day,  
Say, Moses go to Egypt land,  

And tell him to let my people go.  
And Pharaoh would not late go  

God did go to Moses’ house,  
And God did tell him who he was,  

God and Moses walked and talked,  
And God did show him who he was (Allen 1951, 76).  

Other more direct references were mentioned in “Come Along Moses.”  

Come along Moses,  
don’t get lost, don’t get lost, don’t get lost,  
Come along Moses,  
We are the people of God.  

We have a just God to plead our cause,  
to plead our cause, to plead our cause.  
We have a just God to plead our cause,  
We are the people of God.  
He sits in Heaven and answers prayers.  
Stretch out your rod and come across (Allen 1951, 104).  

The Moses Complex has also been prevalent in the writings of African Americans. Wilson Jeremiah Moses (1994) informs us that this has been a recurrent theme in the writings of African Americans throughout history. He has noted that,  

The expectation or identification of a personal savior—a messiah, a prophet, or a Mahdi. This has its politico-religious manifestations, appearing in David Walkers Appeal (1829), The Ethiopian Manifesto (1829), and Albert J. Cleage’s The Black Messiah (1969). It also has literary manifestations, as in W.E.B. Du Bois’ novel Dark Princess (1928, 1).  

This same mindset is still prevalent among many segments of the African American community today. They often look to political and social leaders in their community to solve
their problems for them rather than seeking solutions themselves (Watkins 2012; Lloyd 2013). Such expectation creates problems on two levels. First, it disempowers the individual by removing him/her from the political process. There is the expectation that a person does not have to be an active participant in the political process because “the leader” will do what is necessary. Second, this puts “the leader” in an impossible situation because he/she is doomed to fail since he/she cannot possibly meet all the expectation which are demanded all at once. Note the criticism of President Barack Obama by Eric Michael Dyson, who accused him of dodging racial issues and failing to deal with them effectively when they did come up and could not be avoided (Dyson 2016). One man cannot overturn 400 years of America’s racial oppression. Too much emphasis is placed on the leadership of individuals. One person cannot bear the burden and solve the problems for the group nor can one organization. Racism is essentially a group problem which must be solved by the African American community collectively.

Top-down style leadership has often resulted in the alienation of the African American middle class from the African American masses (Dyson 2005). Thereby, weakening or undermining the effectiveness of the community in its pursuits. As a result, the pace of social change is slowed due to the disharmony within the group.

The African American community has relied too heavily on the leadership of a few individuals rather than looking to themselves and being their own Moses. Derrick Bell also noted that various African American movements and organizations were adversely affected when Paul Cuffe and Marcus Garvey, advocates of African immigration, were arrested and jailed by the government (1992, 37-38).

**Goals**

Many of the core goals of the African American community have been consistent. From the days of enslavement and after Emancipation, one of the most cherished goals has been freedom from racial oppression. Other goals were justice, the freedom to participate in the economic system, freedom of access to the ballot, and access to education (Colored People’s Convention, 1865). In 1869, many of these same goals were reiterated succinctly by many of the leaders of the African American community of that time:

We shall appeal to the American people, to their Legislatures, State and National; and we design to press earnestly upon the 40th Congress, the necessity as well as the justice, of passing a constitutional amendment, providing for impartial and uniform suffrage, throughout the entire Union; and we shall endeavor to induce State Legislatures, to ratify the same.

We shall endeavor…to relieve the colored man from every proscription.

We shall endeavor to obtain Congressional action, for throwing open public lands in the southern states…as may enable the freedmen to become possessors (sic) of homesteads…

We shall appeal to the white tradesmen and artisans of this country, to conquer their prejudices…to allow colored men to have fair field for the display of competitive industry and to do away with all pledges and obligations that forbid the taking of colored boys as apprentices to trades of or the employment of
colored journeymen therein.

We shall earnestly strive to promote...educational advancement... (National Convention of the Colored Men of America 1869).

Since Emancipation the full rights of citizenship have been a collective dream of the African American community. This can be noted in the words of William Howard Day when he spoke on West Indian Emancipation Day in 1865. Day said:

I see...States reorganized merely sufficiently so to include every native male 21 years of age of some kind, whether he be black as night or white as the icicle that’s dwindled by the frost from the purest snow that hangs on Diana’s temple. I see this Government made one by black and white hands, yielded up to black men thus, effort after efforts a portion of Government control. I see schools thrown open for the black children as for the white.

I see black and white priest at the altar of religion. I see black men elected to petty and then to higher offices of the State. I see preferment open to the black man, even the Presidential chair. I see everywhere respect for brains and worth moral and material...I see a nation clinging to justice the admiration of the world (Day 1865).

Similar words with the same eloquence would reverberate from Washington, D.C. one hundred years later when Martin Luther King, Jr. told the world about his dream—the African American dream of freedom and justice. As King stood on the steps of the Lincoln Memorial, he noted,

I have a dream. That one day this nation will rise up, live out the true meaning of its creed: “We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal.”

I have a dream that one day on the red hills of Georgia, the sons of former slaves and the sons of former slave owners will be able to sit down together at the table of brotherhood.

I have a dream that one day even the state of Mississippi, a state swelling with the heat of injustice, sweltering with the heat of oppression, will be transformed into an oasis of freedom and justice.

I have a dream that my four little children will one day live in a nation where they will not be judged by the color of their skin but by the content of their character (King 1963).

The dream has been elusive. Today, African Americans still rank the aforementioned goals of freedom from racial oppression, employment, justice, access to the ballot, and education as among their top priorities (PND 2017; Pew 2019).
The Moses Complex in the Post-Emancipation African American Community

There is a crisis within the leadership of the African American community. Most African Americans believe that their leaders have not been effective (Watkins 2012; Lloyd 2013). Many mainstream African American leaders and organizations have abandoned the African American underclass (Robinson 2011; Dyson 2005; Nelson 2003; Smith 1996; Cruse 1987). In 1968, Joanne Grant wrote, “Alienation, from both the mainstream of American life and from the [African American] elite is readily apparent among the masses of poorer [African Americans] … (7-8). This is still true today. One looks at the high levels of unemployment, the poor quality of education, police brutality, and homelessness, which African Americans in urban areas face and it is apparent that for most who live there, things are not getting better but worse (Wilson 1997). There has been a notable decline in the standard of living of most African Americans over the last two decades. Moreover, only 19% of African American fourth graders are proficient in reading (Tabron 2019). The African American underclass is not part of the American mainstream and is unlikely to become part of it in the near future.

Since Emancipation, the chronic problems of freedom from racial oppression, unemployment, justice, access to the ballot, and education have plagued the African American community (Franklin 1994, Colored People’s Convention 1865; Colored Convention 1869; “African Grievances” 1873; Nelson 2003, 6; Pew 2019). Therefore, there is a strong consensus on many of the issues that need to be addressed, but there is disagreement about the means that should be used to solve these problems. Michael Dawson has noted,

On issues of taxes, partisanship, the role of government, fiscal policy, and the like, blacks remain on the left and unified—more unified across class than whites, but on issues of strategy, tactics, and norms of the black quest for social justice, large cleavages can be detected even using the crude instrument of the public opinion survey (Dawson 2001, xii).

Most of the variation in African American thought have occurred in the realm of strategy. These disagreements are based on what will be the most effective means of overcoming racism and gaining the full rights of citizenship.

During their years of enslavement, African Americans resisted physically (Rasmussen 2011). Despite the fact that African Americans were the majority in Louisiana, Mississippi, and South Carolina during the antebellum period, they were not able to achieve liberty in the United States through the force of arms (Aptheker 1966; Egerton 1993; Franklin & Moss 2000, 164-165; Rasmussen 2011; Robinson, 1999). Other subtle forms of non-cooperation were also used during this period (Blassingame 1979; Gutman 1976).

The great mass of African Americans did not become free until they took the initiative and walked off the Plantations (Du Bois 1963). This is the main point being emphasized here. The key to African American liberation lies with the empowerment of the African American masses. During and after Reconstruction there were numerous grassroots organizations that created schools and other civic organizations for “the uplift of the race.”

Nevertheless, former White confederates (Redeemers) initiated a guerilla war in which 20,000 African Americans were killed from 1868 to 1876 (Franklin 1994; Blackett 1989, 129-130). As a result, many of these organizations and institutions were destroyed and their leaders murdered. Despite these notable efforts, remnants of the Moses Complex persist in the African
Below is a synopsis of some the most prevalent strategies and tactics utilized by African Americans since Emancipation to obtain liberation from racial oppression. The leadership style employed by most of the leaders and organizations is top-down. The point here is not that African Americans have not used grass roots tactics successfully to empower themselves. Indeed, African American in various parts of the county have successful used grass roots tactics to empower themselves in their communities (King 2017; Campbell 2012). It has also been noted that African Americans have made their greatest gains when Moses style leadership was abandoned and replaced by grass-roots strategies which empowered the masses (Carson 1994).

**Frederick Douglass and Radical Egalitarianism**

At the time of Emancipation, Frederick Douglass became the acknowledged leader of the African American community. Douglass believed that the road to Black liberation was through political participation (Douglass 1962, 266). He advocated voting, political activism, integration, and industrial education as the most effective means for African Americans to achieve a meaningful place in American society (White 1987, 3-4, 18-21; Dawson 2001, 258). Douglass wrote:

> We deem it a settled point that the destiny of the colored man is bound up with that of the white people of this country...We are here, and we are likely to be. To imagine that we should ever be eradicated is absurd and ridiculous. We can be remodeled, changed, and assimilated, but never extinguished. We repeat...that we are here; and that this is our country; and the question for the philosophers and statesmen of the land ought to be, what principles should dictate the policy of the action toward us? We shall neither die out, nor be driven out; but shall go with this people, either as a testimony against them, or as an evidence in their favor throughout their generations. We are clearly on their hands and must remain there forever (Harding 1983, 154).

Douglass believed that by participating in the political system, the African American community would be politically empowered and therefore would be able to integrate into American society. However, the collapse of Reconstruction was a major impediment to implementing Douglass’ strategy since most African Americans lived in the South and were disenfranchised. Furthermore, this strategy only yielded limited results in the North since the “great migration” had not occurred yet. Therefore, African Americans did not have significant political influence in the North after Reconstruction as well.

**Booker T. Washington and the Politics of Accommodation**

When the door of Frederick Douglass’ life closed, the door of Booker T. Washington’s leadership of the African American community opened. Washington, who had formerly been enslaved, became a renowned and well-respected educator, known the world over as the founder of Tuskegee Institute (now Tuskegee University). Washington was a pragmatist who believed that industrial education, property ownership, entrepreneurship would help the African American masses to achieve economic stability rather than a classical education. Washington’s speech at the Cotton States and International Exposition in Atlanta, Georgia in 1895 (the Atlanta Compromise), catapulted him into the position as the leading spokesmen for the African American community.
American community. In his speech before that gathering, Washington stated,

To those of my race who depend on bettering their condition in a foreign land, or who underestimate the importance of cultivating friendly relations with the Southern white man who is their next-door neighbor, I would say “cast down your buckets where you are…” Cast it down in agriculture, in mechanics, in commerce, in domestic service and in the professions.

In all things that are purely social we can be as separate as the fingers, yet one as the hand in all things essential to mutual progress (Washington 1895).

The period of counter-emancipation in the late 19th century which restored white supremacy was an era of terrorism. From 1889-1918 approximately 3,000 African Americans were lynched (White 1987, p. 53; NAACP 1919, p. 7; Equal Justice Initiative 2015). Washington’s strategy sought to heel the racial animus of the White man so that African Americans could make social advancements without appearing to be a threat to the White man’s political power. It many ways his strategy was a “Trojan Horse” to improve the social standing of the Black community, especially in the South. This was denoted by one of Washington’s southern White critics, Thomas F. Dixon, Jr., the author of *The Clansman: An Historical Romance of the Ku Klux Klan* who wrote,

[Booker T. Washington] is training them all to be masters of men, to be independent, to own and operate their own industries, plant their own fields, buy and sell their own goods, and in every shape and form destroy the last vestige of dependence on the white man for anything (Dixon Jr. 1905, 1-2).

Washington gave priority to economic rights over political rights (Butler 2005, pp. 70-73). This does not mean that Washington did not believe in racial equality or did not seek it as a goal. He believed that racial equality would eventually be granted after African American achieved economic stability and built working relationships with Whites. For Washington also noted in his Atlanta Compromise,

It is important and right that all privileges of the law be ours, but it is vastly more important that we be prepared for the exercise of these privileges. The opportunity to earn a dollar in a factory just now is worth infinitely more than the opportunity to spend a dollar in an opera house (Washington 1895).

Initially, Washington’s approach was viewed as practical and wise by Whites and by many Blacks including W.E.B. Du Bois, who sent a letter of approval to Washington which is reproduced below,
My Dear Mr. Washington,

Let me heartily congratulate you upon your phenomenal success at Atlanta—it was a word fitly spoken.

Sincerely Yours,
W.E.B. Du Bois

Wilbeforce, 24 Sept. ’95

Over time, Du Bois changed his opinion and joined William Monroe Trotter in denouncing Washington’s strategy as a sellout of the civil rights of African Americans.

Because of Washington’s non-threatening approach, many Whites felt comfortable with him and he was able to solicit financial contributions from many of the leading capitalist of his day. Nevertheless, Washington was more like Brer Rabbit than Uncle Tom, for there was also a stealth aspect to his approach. He used the financial contributions from his White benefactors such as John D. Rockefeller and Andrew Carnegie to the build-up Tuskegee Institute. However,
unbeknown to his White benefactors and Black critics, Washington also used this money to back lawsuits against voter discrimination and “… challenge Jim Crow: against railroad segregation, exclusion of blacks from jury pools, and other state discriminatory practices” (Pildes 2000, 304-305). Washington also founded the Negro Business League to allow African American to build and develop social capital (networks of communication) between each other. He believed that segregation presented some advantages to African Americans because it created a captive market (an enclave) they could take advantage of to build economic prosperity.

Washington’s approach was used by African Americans in Durham, North Carolina. As a result, Durham became the most prosperous African American community in the United States and unlike the African American community in Tulsa, Oklahoma it was able to sustain a great deal of that prosperity over time because African Americans in Durham were able to successfully cultivate the goodwill of the White community. However, the African American community in Tulsa was not able to do this and as a result, many of their businesses and homes were burnt to the ground and many of them became refugees (Butler 2005, 175-237).

In the end, Washington’s scheme proved to be unworkable for the African American community at large. His plan of vocational educational was essential training African American for jobs in an agricultural economy at a time the American economy was making a transition from an agricultural economy to an industrial economy (Butler 2005, 70; Hirschman & Mogford 2009, 898).

The NAACP, Du Bois, and Integration

Due to the political impotence of the African American community and the lynching of African American men by southern terrorist, an elite group of African American intellectuals and professionals (the talented tenth) which consisted of W.E.B. Du Bois, Ida Wells Barnett, and other Black and White progressives founded the NAACP in 1909 to protect the civil rights of African Americans. The NAACP appeared to be a direct heir to Frederick Douglass’ legacy. It began as a multi-racial organization determined to achieve its goal, racial equality. During the early 20th century, the NAACP became the preeminent civil rights organization in the United States. It sought to galvanize the African American community in the battle against racism in many ways.

The organization did research and publicized events dealing with race in its magazine, The Crisis, edited by W.E.B. Du Bois (Kellogg 1967, 50-53). Du Bois was a noted Harvard educated scholar who argued that it was necessary for the top ten percent of African Americans receive a higher education so that they could serve as guides to lead the African American masses away from self-destructive behavior. He believed that this essential for the race to achieve its potential. In his study, The Philadelphia Negro A Social Study, “a work of sociology, [he] criticized the city’s blacks for their immorality, criminality, lack of organization for social betterment, neglect of education, and the failure of the [African American] middle class to assert its claim of leadership” (White 1987, 10).

The NAACP also became involved in legal cases dealing with peonage, extradition, police brutality, and racial discrimination (Kellogg 1967, 57-61). From roughly 1910 to the mid-1930s, lobbying was also a dominant form of black politics. During those years, the NAACP developed a campaign of education, propaganda, and lobbying to shape a favorable climate for the advancement of civil rights for African Americans (Kellogg 1967, 57-61). When President Woodrow Wilson reneged on his promise not to discriminate against African Americans by instituting a policy of segregation among government workers in the Bureau of the Census, the
Bureau of Printing and Engraving, the Treasury, the Post Office, and by appointing few African Americans to political offices, the NAACP protested these actions and held mass meetings (Kellogg 1967, 161-170). The organization also hired a lobbyist to promote the interests of African Americans and to act as a lookout against legislation harmful to the community’s interest (Kellogg 1967, 172). The NAACP also lobbied successfully to prohibit Congress from passing anti-intermarriage bills and legislation to prohibit immigrants of African descent from entering the United States (Kellogg 1967, 176). Furthermore, it organized the African American community to protest a wave of segregation ordinances which were enacted in the early 1910s (Kellogg 1967, 184-187). The NAACP successfully fought against these ordinances (Buchanan 1917). In addition, the NAACP utilized clergy and social organizations to inform the African American community about the significance of its court victories (Kellogg 1967, 187).

It should be noted that the NAACP was a major factor in the defeat of John J. Parker’s nomination to the United States Supreme Court. Parker believed that voting should be the prerogative of White people (Franklin and Moss 1988, 344).

The activities mentioned above demonstrate that the NAACP combined coalition building, publicity, mass appeal, protest, litigation, education, and lobbying, to advance the civil rights of African Americans. However, by the 1930s, it narrowed its focus and began to adopt a different approach. The Association obtained a grant from the Garland Fund and commissioned a study that was conducted by Harvard law professor Nathan Margold regarding the most effective method to attack segregation.

In essence, the Margold Plan called for a series of suits that would focus on the inequities of facilities in segregated schools in the South, especially where they were habitually so, and would emphasize, in particular, the absence of statutory requirements in several states that such schools be equal (Johnson 2001, 648). On the surface, it appeared that the goal was to implement the decision in Plessy v. Ferguson. But, in reality, the goal was to break the financial back of Jim Crow by making it expensive and inconvenient to maintain segregated systems of education.

With the onset of the Great Depression, middle class Black leadership sought a new direction. Collective action no longer seemed possible or practical in the midst of starvation. The African American community, like the White community, turned to the government for a solution to their collective suffering (Nelson 2003, 115-140). When Charles Hamilton Houston became Special Counsel for the NAACP, he modified the Margold Plan and launched an attack on segregation in education which also included graduate and professional schools (Johnson 2001).

The use of litigation, especially from the 1930s-the 1960s, became one of the primary tactics utilized by the African American community in the battle for civil rights. A string of victories helped to lay the groundwork for a direct attack on Jim Crow by the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund which culminated in Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka. Brown spawned a progeny of cases dealing with segregation in housing, use of public facilities, and in other areas. Litigation proved to be an effective strategy, notably during the Warren Court era (1953-1969). However, today this approach has limited utility in the face of a Supreme Court that is often openly hostile to the civil rights aspirations of the African American community.
Black Nationalism as Garveyism

Martin Delaney, before the Civil War, and Bishop Henry McNeal Turner, after the Civil War, were leading advocates of Black Nationalism. But it was Marcus Garvey, a Jamaican immigrant, who built a comprehensive plan around this concept that encompassed politics, economics, education, religion, psychology, vocational training, and Pan-Africanism. Booker T. Washington’s politics of accommodation failed to stem the racial violence in the South against African Americans. Therefore, approximately 500,000 African Americans migrated to the North between 1916-1918 to escape racial oppression and to seek new economic opportunities (Franklin 1962, 24; Cronon 1969, 23). When they were confronted yet again with racial oppression in the North during the Red Summer of 1919, many African Americans were ready for a change. Garvey was able to forge his ideas into a plan which appealed to the African American masses and effectively created the first mass movement among African Americans. It is estimated that at its height, the Garvey Movement had at least half a million followers (Bell 1992, 38).

Garvey believed that due to the racism of the Western world, integration was not possible. Therefore, people of African descent should not rely on White people to help them solve their problems. They would have to solve them themselves. Garvey offered solutions for overcoming the restraints of racism placed on their chance of achieving success. He believed that one of the foremost problems was that Black people perceived of themselves as being inferior to Whites. Garvey wanted Black people to have pride in themselves. He believed that the White man had created a sense of inferiority in Black people by denying them knowledge of their history and accomplishments. Garvey concluded that this could be rectified by teaching Black people their history and by getting them to reconnect psychologically with the motherland of their ancestors, Africa.

Garvey also addressed the “whiteness” enshrined in Christianity with its focus on a White God, White Jesus, and White angels. Borrowing heavily from the ideas of Henry McNeal Turner, Garvey founded the African Orthodox Church, which preached that people of African descent were a chosen people who were made in the image of God. Thus, God was worshipped through the spectacles of Ethiopia instead of spectacles of whiteness (White 1987, 81).

Garvey, like Booker T. Washington, advocated vocational education for the masses and believed that it was possible for the Black man to pull himself out of poverty by pooling his resources with others, establishing businesses within Black communities, and buying property.

Ultimately, Garvey wanted to establish a Black nation in Africa under Black leadership. In effect, Garvey was preaching Black Zionism. He wanted to part the sea of racism and lead Black people to their own homeland where they could be free from discrimination and develop their talents. To this end, he established the Universal Negro Improvement Association, which sought unity among people of African descent. Garvey stated,

Each race and each nationality is endeavoring to work out its own destiny, to the exclusion of other races and other nationalities. We hear the cry of “England for the Englishman,” of “France for the Frenchman,” of “Germany for the German,” of “Ireland for the Irish,” of “Palestine for the Jew,” of “Japan for the Japanese,” of “China for the Chinese.” We of the Universal Negro Improvement Association are raising the cry of “Africa for the Africans,” those at home and those abroad. There are 400 million Africans in the world who have Negro blood coursing through their
veins, and we believe that the time has come to unite these 400 million people toward the one common purpose of bettering their condition (1921).

In 1920, at its annual convention the UNIA issued the Declaration of the Negro Peoples of the World. It listed some of the recurring problems African Americans in the United States faced on a recurring basis. Among them,

Article 1. (Black Empowerment)
...we...declare...all...men, women and children of our blood throughout the world free denizens and do claim them as free citizens of Africa, the Motherland of all Negroes.

Article 3. (Justice)
That we believe the Negro, like any other race, should be governed by the ethics of civilization, and therefore should not be deprived of any of those rights or privileges common to other human beings.

Article 4. (Right to Vote)
That we believe the Negro, like any other race should be given the right to elect their own representatives to represent them...

Article 22. (Right to Education)
We protest the system of education in any country where Negroes are denied the same privileges and advantages as other races.

Article 23. (Right to Work)
We declare it inhuman and unfair to boycott Negroes from industrious labor in any part of the world.

Garvey also established the Black Star Steamship line which purchased four ships for commercial purposes. He disseminated his ideas through his own newspaper, The Negro World. In addition, Garvey created the Negro Political Union which he urged African American voters to vote for candidates it endorsed (Cronon 1969, 132). Through his endeavors Garvey was able to raise $10 million dollars from 1919-1921 (Franklin & Moss 1988, 322). Garveyism provided the Black masses with a unifying ideology which inspired them and gave them a sense of purpose like the Jews developed after their captivity in Babylon.

Consequently, J. Edgar Hoover who was then the head of the Bureau of Investigation (forerunner of the FBI) General Intelligence Division, viewed Garvey as a dangerous radical who should be deported. Hoover used four UNIA members as informants and used that information to obtain an indictment against him for mail fraud in connection to the sale of stock for his Black Star Steamship Line (Evanzz 2001, 59).

The crux of the indictment rested upon allegations made by the informants. What few people knew then (or today, for that matter) was that the indictment was the real fraud. A government audit conducted while Garvey was incarcerated revealed gross prosecutor misconduct. The prosecution had suborned perjured testimony,
fabricated incriminating documents, and committed other acts of misfeasance to guarantee conviction (Ibid.)

Garvey’s UNIA agenda was geared toward lower-class Blacks and not the assimilationist/integrationist agenda of the Black middle class. Therefore, Garveyism encountered hostility from this group who viewed themselves as the rightful guardians of the Black masses. They saw their role being undermined by this upstart Black Moses, Garvey. Many middle-class Blacks were appalled by Garvey’s flagrant showmanship and embarrassed by the vulgar image they felt he portrayed to Whites (Grant 2008, 246). Garvey was also engaged in a battle for the leadership of the African American community with W.E.B. Du Bois and A. Philip Randolph. Du Bois believed that Garvey was a demagogue, financially incompetent, and misleading the ignorant poor Black masses. In 1924 Du Bois wrote in *The Crisis*,

Marcus Garvey is without a doubt, the most dangerous enemy of the Negro race in America and the world. He is either a lunatic or a traitor. He is sending all over the country tons of letters and pamphlets appealing to Congressmen, businessmen, philanthropist, and educators to join him on a platform whose half-concealed plank may be interpreted as follows:

That no person of Negro descent can ever hope to become an American citizen.

The forcible separation of the races and the banishment of Negroes to Africa is the only solution of the Negro problem

Randolph was critical of Garvey’s belief in economic separatism and capitalism and his organization, the Friends of Negro Freedom (FNF), called for Garvey’s deportation:

In January 1923 the FNF sent a public letter to the United States Attorney General Harry Daugherty urging his office to prosecute and deport Marcus Garvey. The FNF letter intensified the federal government’s effort to destroy the UNIA. Marcus Garvey was arrested and persecuted for mail fraud later that year and sent to federal prison. In 1927 he was deported from the United States (Blackpast.org, n.a.).

Garvey’s deportation was allegedly due to the activities of the so-called Committee of Eight (Chandler Owen, Harry Pace, Robert S. Abbott, John E. Nail, Dr. Julia P. Coleman, William Pickens, Robert W. Bagnall, and George Harris), all African Americans, five of whom were businessmen (Cruse 1984, 125: Lincoln 1994, 60; Damani 2015; Cronon 1969, 111). Though Garvey’s organization continued to exist after he was deported from the United States in 1927, his movement collapsed as an effective political force in the African American community.

**The Civil Rights Movement: King, Integration and Empowerment**

World War II was a notable event in the history of mankind. Ostensibly, it was fought to liberate mankind from tyranny. The United States portrayed the war as a battle between the ideals of democracy (liberty, justice, and equality) v. the Nazi ideal of a superior Nordic race, which had a birthright to rule other peoples (Tatum 2010, 1-2). On August 10, 1941, President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Sir Winston Churchill, the prime minister of Great Britain, signed
the Atlantic Charter. It was based on the concept that all the people who reside within a country have the right to rule themselves (self-determination) rather than having rule imposed upon them. Moreover, five days after Pearl Harbor was bombed, Attorney General Francis Biddle issued Circular 3591, which was titled “Involuntary Servitude, Slavery, and Peonage,” to all U.S. Attorneys. The purpose of the circular was to stop de facto slavery in the South so the U.S. could portray itself as a democracy at home and abroad and maintain the support of the African American community for the duration of the war. This subtle attempt to uphold some semblance of democracy did not go unnoticed by the African American community.

After World War II, a human rights movement swept the globe. Decolonization and a civil rights movement in the United States commenced. After all, African Americans had fought the Nazis, Fascist, and the Japanese abroad in the name of freedom and racial equality. Now when they returned home and were confronted with racism, they chose to continue to fight for justice given the fact that a victorious war that dispelled the notion of the existence of a master race had just been fought and won with their assistance (Tatum 2010, 5).

During this movement, Martin Luther King, Jr. emerged as a leader of the African American community because of the attention he received as the leader of the Montgomery Bus Boycott. King used direct action. He modeled his campaign after Mahatma Gandhi’s in India. King sought to invalidate segregation laws by violating them so that he could point out the gap between the ideals of democracy: liberty, justice, and equality and the American practice of democracy. King’s successes lead to the enactment of the Civil Rights Acts of 1957, 1960, 1964, 1968, and the Voting Rights Act of 1965.

The mantle of civil rights was also picked up by the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC). This was an organization founded by African American college students who emulated King’s tactics but took them one step further. It sent members such as James Forman and Martha Norman to the South to work on voting rights and voter education campaigns to empower disenfranchised African Americans. In fact, Foreman believed that King’s leadership style was too overbearing. He viewed the Civil Rights Movement as “a people’s movement” (Martin 2005). The assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr. in April 1968 brought this phase of the African American freedom struggle to a close.

**Malcolm X and the Black Power Movement**

Malcolm X was the spiritual heir of the Black Nationalist of the late 19th and early 20th centuries. In many ways their ideas helped to shape his thinking. Malcolm X’s concept of Black Nationalism focused on education, economic development, and the political empowerment of the African American masses (X & Haley 1992).

In the sphere of education, Malcolm X’s ideas ran parallel to those of Carter G. Woodson, who believed that the education system in the United States miseducated African Americans, emphasizing the contributions of White people while excluding those of African Americans (Woodson 1998). As a result, many African Americans viewed the world from a Eurocentric perspective and developed inferiority complexes because of their mistaken beliefs that Whites created everything and that people of African descent have not contributed to the betterment of mankind. Like Garvey, Malcolm X sought to alleviate this condition among African Americans by encouraging them to learn about their heritage and not to be shaped by the dominate European culture (X & Haley 1992; X 2011; Haley 1963).

Given the high rate of unemployment in the African American community, Malcolm X also thought that it was important for African Americans to achieve economic stability, so they
would be provided with the resources they need to have a decent standard of living. He believed that this was possible by African Americans opening businesses in their neighborhoods. This would empower them economically and enable them to determine what types of businesses were established in their communities (X & Haley 1992; Haley 1963).

Malcolm X also believed in political participation. He believed that this would empower the masses and enable African Americans to gain control of political control of their communities. All too often politicians are elected who claim to be working on behalf of the African American community but seemed more interested in advancing their own interest at the expense of the community’s. Mass voter participation and the heightened awareness would result in better representation and achieve better results.

In urban areas where African Americans lived, police brutality had also become a major problem. Malcom X addressed this problem and advocated self-defense. He was critical of the “passive resistance” of Martin Luther King because he believed that it invited brutality against African Americans and failed to serve as a deterrent. Malcom X’s attention to the issues that concerned African American in the North and the fact that he addressed these issues using the language of the common man and woman enabled him to shift the direction of the civil rights movement even after his assassination.

Malcolm’s influence was strong, especially among African American college students (Benson 2015). When Kwame Ture (Stokely Carmichael) became the leader of SNCC, and advocated a program of Black Power, he was espousing the ideas of Malcolm X. Malcolm X’s greatest legacy remains hidden to many. As a result of his advocacy, most major universities in the United States have an African American Studies Department. This has had a profound impact on the consciousness and self-esteem of the African American community.

Barack Obama and the Politics of Stealth

In many ways, the strategy used by President Obama was similar to the strategy used by FDR to move his New Deal agenda forward. Obama like Roosevelt was able to use universal policies to obtain resources for those in need. Under the guise of universalism, Obama was able to obtain health care coverage for approximately 3 million African Americans who previously lacked coverage (Uberoi, Finegold, & Gee 2016). This was a boon to the African American community which suffers disproportionately from health problems such as hypertension, diabetes, heart disease, stroke, and HIV. Health care cost consumes the largest portion of their incomes. African Americans spend $23.6 billion annually on health care (Johnson 2017).

Moreover, Obama’s Keynesian approach to dealing with the “Great Recession” helped to preserve jobs for middle class African Americans. “Blacks are 30 percent more likely than nonblacks to work in the public sector, according to the University of California, Berkeley’s Center for Labor and Research and Education. And roughly 21 percent of black workers are public employees, compared with 16.3 percent of nonblacks” (Dade 2012). African Americans are employed by various government agencies as attorneys, teachers, policemen, firefighters, civil servants, clerical workers, college professors, and city workers. Obama’s policies made funds available during the economic crisis, therefore preventing many of them from being laid off and their jobs eliminated.

Discussion

From the synopses of the various programs above, there appears to be a wide gulf between the approaches the African American community pursued to obtain racial equality. However, there are more similarities to these strategies than differences.
Most of the strategies above used by African American leaders to obtain racial equality were not as effective as they could have been because most used a top down leadership style. In this style of leadership, a social gap often exists between the leaders and followers.

For instance, Frederick Douglass sought to empower the African American community by encouraging African Americans to participate in the electoral process. He once said, “The Republican Party is the ship and all else is the sea around us.” He attempted to act as a Black Moses by steering African American voters to the Republican Party which he believed would protect their rights and interest. Douglass also acted as a role model by demonstrating to African Americans that their newly gained rights gave them the same freedom as Whites (Nelson 2003, 30). However, the Republican Party sold out the African Americans community with the Hayes-Tilden Compromise. It effectively brought Reconstruction to an end. The collapse of Reconstruction was a major impediment to implementing Douglass’ strategy since most African Americans lived in the South and were disenfranchised. Moreover, Douglass was safe in the confines of Rochester, New York when he married a White woman. However, the fear of Black men having sexual relations with White women often roused southern White men to violence.

In 1889, in Aberdeen, Mississippi, Keith Bowen allegedly tried to enter a room where three white women were sitting; though no further allegation was made against him, Mr. Bowen was lynched by the “entire (white) neighborhood” for his “offense.” General Lee, a black man, was lynched by a white mob in 1904 for merely knocking on the door of a white woman’s house in Reevesville, South Carolina; and in 1912, Thomas Miles was lynched for allegedly inviting a white woman to have a cold drink with him (Equal Justice Initiative 2015, 8).

It was impossible for southern Black men to empower themselves by “following their leader.” After the death of Frederick Douglass, Booker T. Washington sought to be the paramount leader of the African American community. Washington attempted to act as a Black Moses through his notorious “Tuskegee Machine.”

The Tuskegee Machine referred to the financial control used over black education, particularly, over black newspaper and periodicals by Booker T. Washington. By 1904, Washington had successfully surrounded himself with what was called the “Tuskegee Machine.” It enabled him to be influential in many political decisions and became viewed as the key national advisor for the African American community. As a result of this media control, readers of black newspapers and magazines rarely encountered materials unfavorable to Washington’s philosophy of accommodation (Jones 2017).

Washington used the Tuskegee Machine to try to crush organizations such as the NAACP and individuals who were opposed to his leadership and plan of accommodation (Harlan 1983, 371).

Moses style leadership is divisive and as a result, it has delayed the social progress of African Americans. It puts groups as well as individual in competition for control of the community. Moreover, because of the divisions that result for competition among the elite for leadership as well as the divisions that occur between the elite and masses, progress take longer since the community lacks unity. For instance, it took more than two decades, from the time the Margold Plan was adopted, for a successful facial challenge to be to the Plessy decision. This
was an elite strategy which excluded participation by the masses.

By contrast, during the Civil Rights Movement, leadership came from both the top and the bottom; the end result was community empowerment (Carson 1994). Local grassroots organizations played a key part in organizing the various communities for political activities. There were numerous marches, protest, and boycotts involving people from various walks of life.

Even though Martin Luther King, Jr. assumed the role of “leader” of the civil rights movement, he did not perceive of himself as Moses. He believed that the leader of a liberation movement should merely serve as a symbol to rally the masses for their own salvation. King wrote that,

> Some one person or some few persons must stand as a symbol for [an] independence movement. As soon as [the] symbol is set up it is not difficult for to get the people to follow, and the more the oppressor seeks to stop and defeat the symbol, the more it solidifies the movement (King 1959).

There were also groups such as SNCC based on cooperation, collaboration, and collective action which sought to empower communities, especially in the South. This combination proved to be effective. This created greater unity with the African American community. Eight years after the Montgomery Bus Boycott ended, a strong civil rights bill was passed, the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Moreover, as a result of the passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, community organizing also produced notable changes in the number of registered voters. Within two years after the passage of the Voting Rights Act, the number of African Americans registered to vote in Dallas County, Alabama (where Selma is located) rose from 10% to 60%. This was because of the direct involvement of the African American community as a whole.

**Consequences: Class Bifurcation and the Moses Complex**

After the Civil Rights Movement accomplished its legislative goals, the unity within the African American community began to breakdown. Many middle-class Blacks felt that the time for protest was now over. However, the struggle often failed to emphasize the concerns of lower-class Blacks who live in urban areas and must deal with poor housing, police brutality, and high levels of unemployment (Smith 1996). As a result, the effectiveness of the community to fight racism was weakened. Therefore, the African American community has not been able to deal effectively with color-blind 21st century racism, which is subtle, institutional, and attitudinal (Bonilla-Silva 2014, 2-3). Thus, African American leaders and organizations have not been able to stop mass incarceration, the assault on affirmative action, as well as the shooting of unarmed Black citizens, and the disenfranchisement of many segments of the Black community.

**Incorporation (Co-optation?)**

After the passage of civil rights legislation some civil rights leaders, such as Roy Wilkins of the NAACP and Whitney Young of the Urban League, felt that civil rights protests had effectively run their course and were no longer needed because the objectives of the movement had been met (Branch 1998, 423-424; Branch 2006, 424, 458, 477-478).

They believed that African Americans now needed to work within the system to empower themselves economically, politically, and socially. It was argued that this could only be done by forming political coalitions with other progressive political forces such as labor
unions to solve the problems that engulfed African American urban communities in poverty. “At issue, after all, is not civil rights, strictly speaking, but social and economic conditions.” (Rustin 1965, 32). Bayard Rustin also stated,

We are challenged now to broaden our social vision, to develop functional programs with concrete objectives. We need to propose alternatives to technological unemployment, urban decay, and the rest. We need to be calling for public works training, for national economic planning, for federal aid to education, for attractive federal housing—all this on a sufficiently massive scale to make a difference (Rustin 1965, 32).

The incorporation of African Americans into the political mechanism of the United States affected the political style and focus of African American leadership. The African American community stopped looking to political activists to be their spokesmen. Instead, they looked toward elected political leader to voice their concerns. In addition, as poverty declined, African Americans moved toward the political center (Tate 2010).

This proposition raises the question as to whether entry into the system has bifurcated the African American community, co-opting those who have acquired a stake in the system while abandoning those who have not. Those who benefit from the system have a reason to defend it because they have become stakeholders and derive benefits from it. On the other hand, those who do not derive benefits from the system have little reason to defend it. This means that many African Americans still remain locked outside of the political system without an effective voice. Currently, “[t]he wealth gap between blacks and whites in 2013 reached its highest point since 1989. The wealth of white households was 13 times the median wealth of black households in 2013, according to a Pew Research Center analysis of the most recently available data from the Federal Reserve’s Survey of Consumer Finances (Drake 2016). Moreover, the Gini coefficient for African American households is 0.478 noting widespread income inequality (Federal Reserve Bank 2015).

An African American middle and upper class have emerged who do not relate to the African American masses and which views the White middle class as their peer group.

The “integration” of [African American] intellectuals into public and private schools and colleges has generally confirmed the faith of these intellectuals in the soundness of the middle-class way of life. “Integration” has thus tended to increase the size and influence of the black bourgeoisie…Although doctors, dentist, and lawyers depend upon the [African American] masses for their living and are therefore not dependent upon white philanthropy, they have generally acquired a conservative middle-class out-look on life. In fact, no group in the black bourgeoisie exhibits its conservative outlook more than the doctors, who are generally opposed to any tendency towards socialism, especially “socialized” medicine, which would benefit the [African American] masses (Franklin 1962, 91).

This point is also illustrated by the tendency of the “Black Bourgeoisie” to physically separate itself from the African American mass and seek residence in predominately White suburban
National Political Science Review | 114

communities rather than to work for changes and improvements in the African American community. “Between 1970 and 1995, 7 million black people moved to the suburbs, a number considerably greater than the 4.5 million blacks who made the great migration from the South to the North between 1940 and 1970” (Cashin 2004, 134).

Many upper-income African Americans have been bamboozled by color blind racism and “blame individual failings—not racial prejudice—for the lack of progress by lower-income African Americans…” (Reynolds 2007). Nevertheless, race still matters. The fact that race still matters is demonstrated by the fact that “about 16% of white children and about 45% of [B]lack children were unable to match their parents’ success and slipped into a lower socioeconomic bracket in adulthood.” (Reynolds 2007). In addition, “Nearly half of children born to middle-class African Americans fall to the bottom quintile [20%] as adults…” (Reynolds, 2007). This does not happen to Whites. Furthermore, the White bourgeoisie has shunned its Black brethren. Whites take off and head for whiter areas when Blacks begin to move into their neighborhoods in significant numbers (Cashin 2004, 15, 167-201; Schelling 1972, 157).

The bifurcation in the African American community is also notable in some of the cases pursued by the NAACP. It obtained a landmark ruling in *Loving v. Virginia*, which struck down laws prohibiting interracial marriages. This ruling undoubtedly helped some middle-class African Americans who came into close proximity with Whites and formed intimate relationships with them, but it did nothing for the African American masses because few of them know Whites on such an intimate basis as to contemplate marriage with them. The separation of the middle-class NAACP leadership from the Black masses was also noted by Derrick Bell, All too little attention has been given to making black schools educationally effective. Furthermore, the disinclination of white parents to send their children to black schools has not been lessened by charges made over a long period of time by civil rights groups that black schools are educationally bankrupt and unconstitutional per se. NAACP policies nevertheless call for maximizing racial balance within the district as an immediate goal while supporting litigation that will eventually require the consolidation of predominantly white surrounding districts (Bell 1976, 470).

Too much emphasis was placed on trying to prove racial equality by obtaining the honor of Black children to sit beside White children in school instead of improving the overall quality of education and schools in the Black community.

The political gains of the African American community since the passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 have been noted. The increase in the number of African American elected official looks impressive in absolute numbers. However, in relative terms the number is shockingly low.

Near the end of the Civil Rights movement when the Voting Rights Act was passed in 1965, there were an estimated 500 black elected officials out of a total of about 500,000. For several years after the Voting Rights Act was passed, the number of black elected officials grew rapidly, but by the end of the century this growth had come to an end. Between 1970 and 1989 the number of blacks holding elected office grew by 657 percent, from 1,469 to 7,226. Since then, the rate of growth has slowed and then essentially stopped. At the end of the 20th century blacks held
approximately 9,000 elected offices, or 1.7 percent of the total compared with their 12 percent of the population (Smith 2003, 125).

The overall percentage of African Americans holding political office is unlikely to increase in the future, given the Supreme Court’s ruling in Reno v. Shaw in 1993 and its purge of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. As Robert C. Smith has pointed out, “institutional political participation is not enough to secure policies that alter or even substantially ameliorate the terrible conditions of the [African] American ‘underclass’” (Smith 1992, 97).

Urban Rebellions

Urban rebellions are the result of a community’s pent up frustration due to the abuse it has suffered. They often occur due to the physical abuse members of a community have experienced and the lack of resources provided to a community. This is the modern incarnation of the mass slave rebellion. Like the slave rebellions of the past, they occur because of long standing racial oppression. These urban rebellions are collective action undertaken by America’s racial have-nots who have been denied adequate housing, education, face job discrimination, and are subjected to police brutality and harassment on a routine basis. The rebellions are expressions of outrage by African Americans because of their treatment in an affluent society and are viewed by participants to call attention to their problems and to end their suffering. There is an assumption by the participants that the rebellion will send a message to political authorities that things need to improve, and they expect them to improve soon. As a result of their actions, urban residents expect to be consulted and included in any changes which are planned for their communities.

Urban rebellions by African Americans have proven to be the least effective method of bringing forth positive social change. They have served as nothing more than a safety-valve which has let political authorities off the hook. The uprisings are a means to express the community’s pent-up frustrations against social injustices: police brutality, poor housing, inadequate education, unemployment, and job discrimination. But, in the end, it has been the ruling elite that has benefitted from these uprisings because the collective anger of the downtrodden has been released en masse. Therefore, there is no longer sustained pressure that must be dealt with.

In 1965, the signature slogan of Los Angeles disc jockey Nathaniel (Magnificent) Montague, “Burn, baby, burn!”, was seized upon by the urban mass of Black Los Angeles and used as their rallying cry during the Watts Rebellion. The Watts Rebellion of 1965 is typical of what happens after an urban uprising. First, a commission is assembled of noteworthy people. The McCone Commission was assembled to investigate why the rebellion occurred. Second, the urban rebels are appeased. Like the McCone Commission, all post-rebellion commissions will note the inferior education system in the African American community and its failure to adequately prepare students for jobs. They will also cite the high level of police brutality in the community, poor housing, and the lack of jobs. But nothing will be done after the commission finishes its report. In the case of the Watts Rebellion, rather than clearing out the burnt out remains, and rebuilding, and empowering the community economically, some of the remnants were left to stand. “Charcoal Alley” on 103rd Street remained that way for a 7-8-year period. Watts would not be like the Phoenix rising anew from the ashes. The burnt-out areas served as a reminder to the residents of the African American community that their actions were futile, to make them feel powerless, and to send a message that another uprising would yield similar
results.

The Watts Rebellion was a game changer for Black Los Angeles. After the rebellion, South-Central Los Angeles was transformed from a community into an urban ghetto. Many middle class and professional African Americans began to leave the area. The area was also hit hard by a loss of jobs due to factory closures such as the Firestone factory in South Gate, an adjoining community. The forthcoming changes to the area have never been enough to restore it to what it was. The outward migration of African American from South-Central Los Angeles was part of a larger national trend which saw an outward migration of African Americans from urban areas to the suburbs. Sheryll Cashin has noted that, “Between 1970 and 1995, 7 million black people moved to the suburbs, a number considerably greater than the 4.5 million blacks who made the great migration from South to North between 1940 and 1970” (2004, p. 134). Watts has become a home to the African American and Latino underclasses, the mass of whom are politically and socially disengaged from each other. This is typical of urban America today.

The futility of urban rebellions points out that one must know how to rebel successfully if one is to succeed. The failure of urban rebellions points out the need for sustained political pressure and the need to focus on the problems at hand. Just because political authorities finally get around to admitting that long-standing problems exist in a community, as was done by the various commission reports after the uprisings of the 1960s, does not mean that the problem is solved. Time is frozen in the ghetto, it stagnates, problems ruminate, and nothing changes. Instead of pondering, “what are they going to do for us?” Residents of America’s ghettos must realize that the only thing that political authorities will do for them is to try to get rid of them or try to contain them. Sustained pressure is necessary rather than letting it boil over which will cause the safety-valve to engage in a quick release of political pressure.

More must be done to rebuild the urban economy. The weakness of Black business is at the heart of the weak economy in the Black community. Black businesses have underperformed and failed to help bring economic stability to the African American community because of the lack of an infrastructure within the Black community to receive Black owned dollars. Therefore, Black dollars do not circulate, multiply, and provide extensive employment opportunities. These dollars leave the community and fail to contribute to the economic uplift of the community. It has been pointed out that,

A dollar circulates:
- 6 hours in the Black community
- 17 days in the White community
- 20 days in the Jewish community
- 30 days in the Asian community (Johnson 2017).

This helps to illustrate how African American leaders have become dependent on a strategy that seeks liberation from racial oppression through political participation rather than also focusing on education and economic development as well. More need to be done to bolster the economy of the African American community.4

Inability to Cope with Modern Racism

After the NAACP achieved its legislative agenda, helping to secure the passage of civil rights bills, it was criticized by Harold Cruse for remaining stuck in the past and not dealing with the problems of the Black masses. He stated,
The bottom line for the next black political manifesto is economic justice, without which there will be no future black survival. *The truth is, however, there exist in black America no such organized black leadership consensus that is either willing or able to replace, oppose, or simply ignore and bypass the organized remains of the old, institutionalized civil rights and social welfare leadership…*(Cruse 1987, 385).

Traditional Black organizations are moribund. They tend to focus on racist individuals, policies, and laws rather than the unjust social structures which have produced injustices, especially those faced by African Americans who reside in urban areas. It has been pointed out that,

…the civil rights organizations such as the NAACP and the National Urban League continue to fight the enemies of the past, like the Ku Klux Klan or their Tea Party cousins, but not the contemporary structures and practices that are primarily responsible for post-civil rights racial inequality. The more these organizations fight “racist,” the more they fail to highlight the new ways in which racial equality is produced and reproduced helping these practices sediment *(Bonilla-Silva, 2014, 62).

Traditional forms of leadership have not worked in the African American community in recent years because they have emanated from the top down rather than empowered the community as a whole. There is an undercurrent of anger in the African American community sparked by the recent events in Ferguson, Missouri, involving Michael Brown, Eric Garner in New York City, and the other deaths of unarmed Black men at the hands of the police. Young African Americans are increasingly becoming aware of the fact that they do not live in a post-racial society. They rightfully want authorities to take note of the fact that BLACK LIVES MATTER. The BLACK LIVES MATTER movement helped to raise the political consciousness of young African Americans and sparked political activism and protest in the community. However, leaders of the movement have not learned from the past how to empower communities as a means of preventing abuse of their citizens. During the 1960s, the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), and other civil rights organizations sent workers to the South to register and educate voters about the electoral process and the importance of political participation. The BLACK LIVES MATTER movement has failed to follow suit by “putting boots on the ground.” As a result, protests and marches occurred in Ferguson, Missouri, as the US Department of Justice issued a report citing massive abuse of African Americans by the Ferguson police department (US Department of Justice, 2015). Nevertheless, in Ferguson, a city that is 67% African American and 29% White, the White mayor was reelected two years after the death of Michael Brown (Eligon 2017). The protestors failed to learn from the legacy of the SNCC. It is not enough to protest for a just cause. For change to take place, it is necessary for a community to be empowered. Boots were not placed on the ground to accommodate voter education and registration.

**New/Old Strategy**

The African American community needs to proceed on a new course. It is obvious that fighting 21st century racism using 20th century tactics has failed. Gone are the demeaning public signs of Jim Crow segregation. However, there remains a New Jim Crow which has taken its place (Alexander 2012). This system based on color-blind racism is often based on laws and po-
licies that have a disparate impact on African Americans such as prosecutorial discretion which has resulted in African Americans receiving harsher penalties and punishments than Whites (Alexander 2012, 115-117). Similarly, felony disenfranchisement laws have a disproportionate impact on African Americans since they account for the largest portion of the prison population (ProCon.org. 2015). Nevertheless, it is possible to confront modern racism by using tactic from the past and by developing new strategies based social science research, and by adapting to changes which occur in the political environment over time.

Old Strategy

During the Civil Rights Movement, African Americans made some of their greatest advancements in achieving full citizenship. More progress was made during this era than any other. African Americans were able to quicken the pace of social advancement because leadership came from the top as well as from the bottom (Carson 1994). This helped to unify the various elements within the community thereby making it a more dynamic political force whose demand could not easily be ignored and had to be reckoned with.

Therefore, it is necessary and desirable to cultivate, educate, and train more people within urban areas so that the African American masses can become more politically involved than they are today.

In addition, many middle-class Blacks need to wake-up to reality that race still matters and that racial unity is necessary to achieve equality. Racial inequality that still exist on a broad scale. The median household income for White families is $71,300 while the median household income for Black families is $43,300 (Pew Research Center 2016). Racial disparities are also present in the rate of unemployment. Whites have an unemployment rate of 3.5%, while African Americans have an unemployment rate of 7.5% (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2018). Further, racial discrepancies are also apparent in the rates of infant mortality and life expectancy for the two groups. The infant mortality rate for African Americans is 2.3 times higher than that of Whites (Department of Health and Human Services 2014). White men also have a life expectancy of 77.8 years, but Black men have a life expectancy of 71.7 years (Kochanek, Murphy, & Xu 2015).

Moreover, many middle-class Blacks have deluded themselves into thinking that race is irrelevant, no longer defines them, and that Whites will “judge them by the content of their character.” And, some have developed negative attitudes toward low-income Blacks similar to those held by Whites. Nevertheless, as stated previously, they face a precarious predicament influenced by race. Half of the children of the Black Bourgeoisie wind up falling into the bottom 20% income bracket (Reynolds 2007). A fate that does not happen to their White counterparts.

New Strategy and Adaptation

Minority influence has been studied by scholars. It has been demonstrated that in asymmetric relationships it is possible for a weaker party to prevail over a stronger one (Moscovici and Zavalloni 1969; Olson 1971; Tatum 2002; Crano 2012).

These findings have important implications for the African American community as it
seeks solutions as to how to overcome 21st century racism. In *The Rules of Influence*, William D. Crano demonstrates conclusively that a well-organized minority can prevail over the majority if it follows seven rules. Crano’s seven rules of minority influence are,

1. Be Accepted as In-group, as a Legitimate Part of the Larger (Majority) Group, as Part of “Us” rather than “Them.”

2. Be Persistent: Don’t Retreat and Don’t Compromise.


4. Be Unanimous: Everyone Must Be On Board.


6. Make the Subjective Objective.

7. Do Not Expect Direct Influence: Be Attuned to Indirect Influence.

The rules for minority influence as have major implications for the African American community and can enhance its influence if they are implemented properly.

For instance, Rule 1 explains why the BLACK LIVES MATTER movement has not gained enough influence to halt the shooting of African American civilians by the police even though it is a grass roots/mass-based organization. Despite its community-based support, BLACK LIVES MATTER in not viewed as a legitimate in-group by most Americans.

Data shows that 83% of African Americans support the movement but 57% of Whites oppose it (Easley, 2017). In addition, 36% of respondents said that they did not understand BLACK LIVES MATTER’s goals (Horowitz & Livingston 2016). Therefore, it is viewed by most Americans as an out-group and lacks legitimacy.

BLACK LIVES MATTER has failed to raise the consciousness of the nation so that it will empathize with the African Americans who have been murdered and the movement that is protesting their deaths. This is something that Martin Luther King, Jr., did effectively. He “wrapped his message in the American flag” to demonstrate that he was upholding American values and that his opponents were in fact the out-group that was denigrating them. When King
spoke about the sit-ins and civil rights protests, he said that these activities were engaged in to uphold democracy as embodied in the Constitution and the Declaration of Independence (King, 1967). This allowed King to seize the moral high ground and to gain the upper hand on his opponents. If one is not perceived as part of the reference group (in-group) one will be perceived as an outsider (Merton 1968).

Failure to pay close attention to public relations has allowed BLACK LIVES MATTER’s opponents to undermine the movement by distorting its goals and objectives. BLACK LIVES MATTER has weakened itself by focusing on the police rather than the broader social issue of White supremacy. This has allowed its opponents to gain some political traction by portraying the movement’s opposition to racial repression as anti-police. Hence the chant among Whites, “all lives matter.”

Moreover, Rule 4 also has significance. It refers to the necessity for unity which was discussed previously. Hence, the need to bridge the gulf between the African American middle class and the underclass.

In addition, Rule 5 is among the most important to the African American community because it has been slow to adopt new tactics as the political landscape has changed. In 2010, the United States Supreme Court made a landmark ruling in *Citizens United v. F.E.C.* that on the surface seemed to be detrimental to the African American community. However, it could be used to help the African American community to gain influence. In this decision the Court held that the First Amendment prohibited the federal government from restricting independent political expenditures. *Citizens United* seemed to be a boon for corporate wealth to flood the political arena with money and gain undue influence but it need not be.

Lobbying is perhaps the most effective way to influence public policy. It is utilized by corporations, associations, and various groups (Greider 1992). To lobby successfully requires access to politicians and financial resources. African Americans have access to politicians. Nevertheless, African Americans have lacked influence in recent years because they have not mustered the financial resources of the community into the formation of Political Action Committees (PACs) and Super PACs. Today it takes large sums of money to get elected and to remain in office. This is what makes office holders and would-be office holders susceptible to the influence of political action committees and other well-financed interest groups. However, the African American community has not adapted to this changing political environment and as a result has lost a great deal of its political clout. This places African Americans at a major disadvantage with respect to other groups since they are not able to make large scale financial contributions to political campaigns. The African American community must adapt to how the game of interest group politics is played in the 21st century.

President Obama provided an excellent playbook to guide the community. Initially, he appeared to lack financial resources to challenge Hillary Clinton for the Democratic presidential nomination. Yet, during the 2008 presidential campaign he was able to raise $780 million from small contributions by using the internet. This model could successfully be emulated by the African American community to raise the economic resources it needs to form PACs and Super PACs.

*Citizens United* allows established African American nonprofit organizations like the NAACP to raise large sums of money and to spend it on behalf of political candidates who will further its interest. This could be an effective strategy in halting the erosion of African American’s civil rights and bring the era of the New Jim Crow to an end.
If the African American community is to be an effective political force in the 21st century, it must be better organized, and a greater sense of solidarity must be forged among lower-income and upper-income African Americans. This would enable them to mobilize greater resources to influence public policy more in their favor.

Conclusion

In 1989, at Prairie View A&M University, in response to a question Harold Cruse stated that there were no Black leaders.

The puzzled student questioner responded by listing the familiar names of the heads of civil rights organizations, members of Congress and big city mayors. Cruse, responding with evident irritation, said that those persons were not leaders because they had no plan, no program of action and no organization to mobilize and lead blacks in a direction that would deal with communal problems (Smith 1996, 278-279).

Cruse was right about the ineffectiveness of modern Black leadership, but wrong about the reasons for their ineffectiveness. African American leaders and organizations have often been ineffective in the post-civil rights era because of their style of leadership not because the lack of plans.

There are plans for the empowerment of the African American community, such as The Covenant with Black America (2007). It is a detailed plan for the empowerment of the African American community that deals with issues such as health care, unequal justice, housing, political empowerment, and employment. Nevertheless, twelve years later this well thought out plan was issued, it now gathers dust because it was written by professional and intellectuals who have not been able to connect sufficiently with the African American masses to implement it.

If progress is to be made and the New Jim Crow defeated, first African Americans need to remember the past and take note of the fact that they have made the most progress when leadership flowed from the top as well as from the bottom. This created synergy which united the community which enable it to accomplish its legislative goals.

Second, new strategies need to be adopted which take into consideration the Rules of Influence. The African American community needs to be cognizant of how it is portrayed in the media. It must make sure that it is perceived as in-group and not as “the other.” Otherwise, it will lack legitimacy and its demands for change will not be viewed as credible.

When Jesse Unruh was the speaker of the California State Assemble, he said that “money is the mother’s milk of politics.” That is still true today. PACs and Super PACs now dominate the political scene and have gained undue influence. However, African Americans have not kept pace. Therefore, they have not been able to lobby effectively as many other groups. The formation of PACs and Super PACs by African Americans would help them to gain political leverage to dismantle the New Jim Crow. It has been noted that,

America, which idealizes the rights of the individual above everything else, is in reality, a nation dominated by the social power of groups, classes, in-groups, and cliques—both ethnic and religious. The individual in America has few rights that are not backed up by the political, economic and social power of one group or another. Hence, the individual [African American] has, proportionately, very few
rights indeed because his ethnic group (whether or not he actually identifies with it) has very little political, economic, or social power (beyond moral grounds) to weld. Thus, it can be seen that those [African Americans], and there are very many of them, who have accepted the full essence of the Great American individualism are in serious trouble trying to function in America (Cruse, 1984, 7-8).

The formation of PACs would help to enhance the group standing of African Americans by enhancing their ability to reward candidates who support their agenda and to punish those who oppose it. There is a story that A. Philip Randolph once had dinner with FDR, and that after dinner they discussed civil rights. FDR agreed with Randolph’s assessment that more needed to be done by the federal government and told Randolph, “Now go out and make me do it” (The Covenant 2007, ix). Randolph responded by organizing a March on Washington. FDR responded to this by signing Executive Order 8802 which banned discrimination in hiring by defense contractors. The formation of PACs and Super PACs could help to put additional pressure on the federal government to do more to protect the civil rights of African Americans.

Notes

1. There was an overall economic decline for African Americans from 2002-2017 as measured by the Gini coefficient. It is a measure of economic inequality with 0 representing no concentration of wealth and complete income equality while 1 represents complete concentration of wealth. The Gini coefficient for African Americans increased from .483 in 2002 to .499 in 2017. This indicates that overall things got worse economically for most African American and that chances for upward mobility had declined notably. See Income Gini Ratio for Households by Race of Householder, Black Alone or in Combination, Economic Research, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/GINIBAOICH. Accessed April 10, 2019.


References


Alexander, Michelle. 2012. The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of
Colored People’s Convention of the State of South Carolina. 1865. Proceedings of the Colored People’s Convention of the State of South Carolina Together with the Declaration of Rights and Wrongs; A Petition of the People: A Petition to the Legislature, and a Memorial to the Congress. November. Charleston: South Carolina Leader Office.
Colored Men’s Convention of America. 1869. Proceedings of the National Colored Men of


**Court Cases**


*Buchanan v. Warley,* 245 U.S., 60 (1917).


*Plessy v. Ferguson,* 163 U.S. 537 (1896).

Turning the Wheels:
Striving and African American Social Identity in the 21st Century

Ronald E. Brown*
Wayne State University

Davin L. Phoenix
University of California, Irvine

James S. Jackson
University of Michigan

Abstract
This paper treats striving as an unobservable yet critical mental process in identity formation and social categorization among African Americans. Striving is a reflective, continuous attempt to develop and maintain a positive sense of the social self and the racial group in the presence of racial discrimination. We contend striving plays an important yet understudied function in the development of black social identity as this process interrupts the otherwise alienating and demobilizing effects of encounters with racial discrimination. Using the Black American subsample of the 2001-03 National Survey of American Life (NSAL-SAQ), we propose a structural model that estimates the direct and indirect influences of personal discrimination, systematic racial discrimination, and black self-categorization on positive aspects of black social identity. We find some support for the model, suggesting that striving effectively affirms black individuals’ positive social identification in light of their experiences with racial inequity, while surfacing potential cleavages within the black political coalition.

Keywords: Striving, social identity, black self-categorization, discrimination, linked fate

Relevant fields: Race and ethnicity; African American politics

Ezekiel saw de Wheel
Way in the middle o’ the air
The big wheel moved by faith
The little wheel moved by the grace o’ God
A wheel in a wheel
Way in the middle o’ the air

Striving toward the kingdom of God, or metaphorically “walking with members of a congregation in a holy way” so that one is not overtaken with “weariness,” was a major theological tenant of the Puritan clergy who settled in New England. Jonathan Edwards’ reading of Luke 13:24—*strive to enter into the straight gait*”—led him to posit that striving requires strong desire, endeavor, and “agony” (Shepard 1999). W.E.B. Du Bois attended Congregational
Sunday School in Barrington, Massachusetts, a community stepped in Puritan tradition, and the idea of striving is embedded in his writings and activism. In an 1897 essay entitled *The Conservation of Races*, Du Bois contends that it is our duty to conserve our physical powers, our intellectual endeavors, our spiritual ideas; as a race we must strive by race organizations, by racial solidarity by racial unity.” And in *The Souls of Black Folk*, [1903], Du Bois articulates the ultimate aim of this effort: “the end of black striving is to be a co-worker in the kingdom of [American] culture, to escape death and isolation (Du Bois 1940).

The concept of striving carries potentially rich utility beyond Sunday morning teachings. We conceptualize striving as a deliberate mental process engaged in by black people in the immediate face of racial discrimination. By striving, we refer to the effort of black individuals to construct and adhere to a prototypical model of black identity. This identity in turn serves two critical functions for individuals, while informing their cognitive and behavioral responses to instances of racial subjugation. One, the act of striving draws a through line that connects the black individual’s personal experiences of racial discrimination to the broader black collective experience of contending with racial injustice. This linkage imbues the individual with the belief that her toils fit within a larger narrative of black struggle. Situating her strife as one of many chapters in the ongoing story of black people’s upward struggle toward self-actualization increases the individual’s motivation to strive to enter into the straight gait.

Two, striving affirms the black individuals’ sense of connectedness to other black people navigating racially injurious terrain. The perception that other members of the racial group—be they conceptualized as family members, friends, or other members of one’s age, religious, or socioeconomic cohort—are also likely to encounter instances of racial discrimination can inhibit the sense of racial alienation that may arise in the face of race-based subjugation (Gurin, Miller and Gurin 1980). The reinforced relational ties to other black people perceived to be soldiering through racial strife fortifies the black individual’s belief that she is but one of many spokes in a wheel being turned toward racial equity.

Indeed, we find the Negro Spiritual “Ezekiel saw de Wheel,” referenced in “The Sorrow Songs” and “Of the Wings of Atalanta,” to be an apt metaphor for black striving. Du Bois writes, “the ferment of his striving toward self-realization is to the strife of the white world like a wheel in a wheel: beyond the Veil are smaller but like problems of ideals, of poverty, of order and subordination, and, through all, the Veil of Race.” In this analogy, the larger wheel represents the institutions and tools of racial oppression employed by rulers of a white hegemonic racial order. From literacy tests, grandfather clauses, convict farms, and lynchings of past eras to mass-incarceration, racial profiling, false imprisonment, and discrimination in housing and employment, which remain a social reality for many black Americans today (Alexander 2012; Hinton 2016; Weaver 2007).

Meanwhile, the wheel within the wheel represents the collective efforts of black people to mount sustained challenges to these ever-evolving instruments of racial strife. Du Bois conceptualized as the spokes of this wheel the members of a nascent black middle class, which despite their sociopolitical, legal and cultural “exclusion from the [white] demos” were nevertheless expected to be “girding herself for the race that must be run.”

We conceptualize striving as both a deliberate and a moral choice, as it reflects an individual’s belief in her obligation to affirm her place in the wheel within the wheel, to join in the collective efforts of African Americans to stand against agents of racial subjugation piloting the outer wheel. Thus, striving is a mechanism motivating political behavior in the face of racial discrimination. This process is illustrated in the life’s work of abolitionist and author Harriet
Jacobs. After escaping from slavery, Jacobs risked re-enslavement by engaging in anti-slavery activism and publishing editorials and her own autobiography, in which she shined a light on the sexual violence often visited upon black enslaved women in North Carolina.

We also detect the concept of striving in President Obama’s remarks at the June 21, 2015 church service at Emanuel Church, South Carolina. In his public eulogy for Pastor Pickney, a state senator among those slain in the racist violence committed at Emanuel Church, Obama evoked Du Bois’ idea that agony will not stop the striving of 21st century black pilgrims: “Mother Emanuel Church and its congregation have risen before, from flames, from an earthquake, from other dark times, to give hope to generations of Charlestonians, and with our prayers and our love and the buoyancy of hope, it will rise again now as a place of peace.”

Within these remarks are the key components of our concept of striving. First, the situating of this tragic instance of racial violence within a broader narrative of black subjugation and overcoming. Second, a positioning of the black congregants as members of a collective with a solemn duty to uplift and affirm one another in the face of an exemplar of the challenges inflicted as part of the prototypical black experience—in essence, spokes with a common responsibility to keep turning the wheel. The case of Emanuel AME provides a particularly vivid recent example of African Americans continuing to turn the wheels of self-preservation and self-affirmation within the larger wheel of a “post-racial” America characterized by pernicious colorblindness and racial violence.

Dawson’s (1994) application of linked fate to black identity—specifically the concept of the black utility heuristic—provides a conceptual window into why striving serves as a wheel within a wheel, thereby connecting the spokes of black social identity. While our concept of striving is informed by this theoretical foundation, there are key differences in how we anticipate linked fate and striving influencing the decisions made by black individuals to advance what they perceive to be the collective interests of the racial group.

Linked fate surmises that black individuals view their circumstances and life chances as inextricably connected to the circumstances and life chances of black people as a collective group (and vice versa). This symbiotic relationship between individual and group is reinforced from a “lived and articulated” understanding of how racial exclusion defines the self (Lubiano 1997, 232; Chong & Rogers 2005). The greater this perceived link between one’s own fate and that of the race, the more salient a role played by an individual’s racial identity on her political decision making (Dawson 1994, 61). Moreover, the intensification of racial hostility increases the propensity of African Americans to base their political choices and behaviors on a calculation of racial group interest. Hence, the more one believes her own life chances are linked to those of the group, the more one will consider racial group interest in evaluating alternative political choices (Dawson 1994, 62).

Whereas a black individual’s sense of linked fate allows her to connect her experiences to other black spokes within the wheel, striving provides her with an interpretative lens that links her personal experiences around race to a prototypical black experience. This lens in turn causes her to look both outward toward other African Americans as a cognitive frame of reference to guide action, and to look upward toward the broader black struggle—historical, contemporary and future-focused—to turn against the outer wheels of racial oppression. This additional mental frame can provide black individuals with a broader range of options to consider when working to counter racism. Simultaneously, this additional frame can surface intragroup divisions, as the individual considers which sets of racial group members are and are not fellow spokes in the inner wheel.
Linked fate casts the black individual as firmly tethered to the group, engendering a sense of responsibility to and kinship with that group (Papish 2015). White, Laird and Allen (2014) highlight a key consequence of this responsibility, demonstrating that conformity to social pressure effectively informs black individual decisions to stake out positions aligned with the collective interests of African Americans, even if those individuals may not personally benefit from those positions. This work indicates that a potential consequence of the racial group ties animated by linked fate is the regulating of black people’s actions. As the authors note, one such manifestation of this regulation is the near uniform support of African Americans for the Democratic Party, despite increasing heterogeneity in the socioeconomic statuses and political beliefs held by members of the group.

Similar to linked fate, striving is also relational—the I in relationship to some other, a we (Elstain 2008, 239; Papish 2015). But in positioning black individuals as pilgrims navigating a racially unjust terrain, striving also gives these individuals the grounds to affirm or contest which members of the group are fellow pilgrims—that is, other spokes in the wheel. It is possible for the mental construction of fellow pilgrims to place at the front and center groups that are typically marginalized within broader black movements. Such was the case of Harriet Jacobs, who conceptualized black enslaved women as fellow spokes in the wheel turning toward abolition.

Alternately, the construction of black pilgrims can effectively exclude black subgroups from the work of turning the wheel. Such exclusion is evident in Cathy Cohen’s (1999) seminal treatise *The Bounds of Blackness*, which chronicles actions by black political and religious leaders to demarcate the specific black sub-constituencies ravaged by the AIDS crisis—gay men, intravenous drug users and formerly incarcerated individuals—as not fit for consideration as fellow spokes of the wheel. The inference to be drawn from these examples is that across different contexts, varying sets of black people more or less adequately conform to the prototypical black identity constructed in the process of striving. One’s perceptions of the fellow spokes in the wheel both shapes the specific sets of black people with whom she feels the strongest identity ties, and informs the behaviors she decides to pursue in response to the racial injury encountered.

This element of striving differentiates it from the concept of linked fate, which implies a universally experienced commonality that ties together the members of the racial group while dampening the effects of variations in class, gender, and other cross-cutting identities. Informed by Laird’s (2017) innovative examination of the conditionality of black identity based on one’s perceptions of her fit within the broader construct of “black interests,” we conceive of striving as a mental process that can increase rather than weaken the salience of intragroup divisions. This process, in turn, determines which specific constellations of black people are integrated within various efforts to turn the wheel against racial oppression, from struggles for abolition to enfranchisement, from desegregation to criminal justice reform.

By providing a lens of interpretation that links one’s personal experiences of discrimination to a larger group narrative chronicling the struggle of black Americans to achieve full personhood, striving provides African Americans with an affirming sense of their valued role in the ongoing black narrative. In turn, this affirmation offsets the depersonalizing or alienating effects of encounters with discriminatory practices and policies (Du Bois 1903).

At the same time, we view striving as a cognitive mechanism animating a contingent type of racial solidarity. By considering which black subgroups are conceptualized as fellow spokes in the wheel across various instances of racial injustice, we can better understand
why and how varying black contingents are integrated within—and excluded from—various strategic efforts to combat racial oppression. Operationalizing the concept of striving should illuminate our knowledge of the specific aims toward which people direct their labor for the purpose of racial group advancement, and the people they conceptualize as fellow sojourners in this struggle.

A model of black social ideology that incorporates striving as a latent construct provides a more comprehensive assessment of the unique socialization and reasoning processes undertaken by African Americans—a process resulting in the affirmation of a prototypical identity of blackness within a societal order that defines the group as lesser. Understanding how black individuals strive continuously to position themselves favorably within a socially rigid racial order gives insight into the causal linkages between perceptions of racial discrimination, black self-categorization, and social identification.

We now present a structural model of black social identity that builds on the foundation laid by prior models exploring contours of black ideological thought (e.g. Allen, Dawson, and Brown 1989; Allen 2001; Sellers 1998 a & b, 2003). This model treats striving as a latent construct. We believe striving will be apparent primarily in the positive associations we find between African Americans’ encounters with discrimination, as well as their broader perceptions of the extent of anti-black discrimination, and two factors. One, how integral their blackness is to their self-identification, and two, how close they feel with other black people. These relationships reflect the mental effort by African Americans to connect their experiences of racial subjugation to a larger prototypical black experience.

Additionally, we can infer from black individuals’ reported senses of closeness to different sets of African Americans the sets of black people they perceive to be reflective (or not) of the prototypical black identity. Thus, we interpret this structural model to glean insight into how striving can augment African Americans’ sense of racial identity as they feel the weight of that identity in a racially stratified world. We also aim to learn how striving can augment or weaken intergroup ties among various black subgroups.

**Hypotheses**

Consistent with our assertion that striving causes one to view her encounters with discrimination as affirming the consistency of her experience with prototypical blackness, we expect that believing one is a victim of personal discrimination will increase the propensity to place blackness at the center of one’s self-categorization (H1a). Likewise, adherence to the belief that African Americans must contend with systemic racial discrimination indicates mental effort to construct a prototypical black experience. Thus, we expect perceptions of systemic racial discrimination will increase the propensity of individuals to place blackness at the center of their self-categorization (H1b). Further, we expect to find a direct causal relationship between black self-categorization and expressions of positive black social identity, as this reflects striving toward affirmation and maintenance of a positive prototypical black identity (H2).

We do not expect a direct causal relationship between personal discrimination and positive aspects of black social identity (H3). In the absence of a politicization of one’s personal encounters with discrimination, such experiences will prove alienating rather than affirming to one’s social self. This in turn will weaken the ties between the black individual and the racial group. Accordingly, we expect to find that the interaction between perceptions of personal discrimination and black self-categorization will have an indirect structural relationship with positive aspects of black social identity (H4).
In contrast, we expect that belief in the existence of systemic racial discrimination will have a direct structural relationship with positive aspects of black social identity (H5). This linkage reflects striving to affirm the value of black people collectively, in the face of structural disadvantage. Studies consistently reveal that systemic racial discrimination is positively associated with black social identity (Gurin, Miller and Gurin, 1980, Gurin, Hatchett and Jackson, 1989; Sellers 1998a & b, 2003). The interaction of systemic racial discrimination and black self-categorization will yield an indirect and strong causal linkage to positive aspects of black social identity (H6).

In sum, the direct and indirect positive relationships will demonstrate empirical support for the metaphorical ‘wheel a-turnin in the hearts’ of respondents who make a causal connection between the salience of their blackness to their identity (operationalized as black self-categorization) and their continual efforts to maintain positive aspects of black social identity. Affirmation of these hypotheses will support our ideal model of black self-categorization and identity. For ease of comprehension, the hypotheses are listed here below:

H1a: Perceptions of personal discrimination are positively correlated with black self-categorization.
H1b: Belief in systemic racial discrimination is positively correlated with black self-categorization.
H2: Black self-categorization is positively correlated with positive social identity.
H3: Personal discrimination is not correlated with positive social identity.
H4: The interaction of personal discrimination and black self-categorization is indirectly correlated with positive social identity.
H5: Systemic racial discrimination is positively correlated with positive social identity.
H6: The interaction of systemic racial discrimination and black self-categorization is indirectly correlated with positive social identity.

The Social and Cultural Context of Black Social Identity

We include socioeconomic status (SES) and religiosity as two control exogenous variables because both have independent effects on various dimensions of black social identity (Demo and Hughes 1989; Ellison 1991; Calhoun-Brown 1996; Tate 1996; Price 2009). SES is especially important, as the emergence of black middle-class enclaves in places such as Chicago, Detroit, Houston and Washington, D.C. can facilitate the tendency of black individuals to construct prototypical identities of blackness that exclude members of the racial group belonging to other socioeconomic classes.

McGowen’s (2017) examination of the political behavior of African Americans in white suburbs indicates that black people in affluent residential sites engage in strenuous efforts to affirm their racial identity through maintaining connections to black churches and civic spaces. Accordingly, whereas we may not expect high SES African Americans to exhibit a weaker centrality of blackness, they may nevertheless project a prototypical image of blackness that is not inclusive of group members with whom high SES black individuals may feel less emotional connections, such as low-income black people.

We expect greater religiosity to augment the effects of striving on the associations between our measures of discrimination, black self-categorization and positive aspects of social identity. As indicated thus far, the disposition of striving as a pilgrimage or upward struggle toward progress bears resemblance to the black Christian ethos of salvation and justified suffering. Thus, we expect striving to be particularly resonant with religious black people, who should
express greater centrality of their blackness, greater closeness to other black people, and more positive elements of black identity.

Data

To conduct our analyses, we use the Black American subsample of the 2001-03 National Survey of American Life (NSAL-SAQ), and the supplemental self-administered mail reinterview of the survey. This complex household probability sample (weighted, clustered, and stratified) contains 3570 black Americans, 1621 blacks of Caribbean descent, and 891 non-Hispanic whites aged 18 and over. The sample weight represents the black American population in the 48 coterminous states. The weights account for disproportionate sampling (unequal probability of household selection), non-response, and post-stratification (adjustment for possible distributional mismatch across socio-demographic characteristics).

Data Analysis

As recommended by Joreskog (1993), we first develop measurement models to test the validity of our hypothesized notion of striving as a latent construct that is measurable with observable variables. We use confirmatory factor analyses to validate the presence of ten proposed constructs: four exogenous and six endogenous. Subsequently, we use structural equation techniques to generate estimates for a proposed structural model. Structural equation modeling (SEM) allows us to block test how observed variables relate to hypothesized constructs, and subsequently how those constructs are linked to one another.

Structural equation modeling also enables us to overcome many of the limitations inherent in other widely used multivariate statistical techniques. It allows us to utilize a large number of variables, which enhances our capacity to develop and test complex theories. SEM provides for direct testing for both direct and indirect effects (i.e. mediation effects) of our predictors on the outcome variables. More importantly, it allows us to directly incorporate and account for measurement level errors in our data analysis, therefore enhancing the precision and efficiency of our coefficients (Lomax and Schumacker 2004).

Variables

Completely exogenous constructs

Table 1 contains information about the relevant exogenous constructs. All variables are coded so that a higher response score indicates more of the phenomenon under consideration. Perceptions of systematic racial discrimination includes three items: 1) perception of whites’ level of respect for black people, 2) perception of whites’ assessment of black contributions to the nation and 3) perceptions of respondents’ beliefs about how other racial minorities evaluate black intelligence. The data in Table 1 reveal that our proposed measures of perceptions of systematic racial discrimination yield an adequate fit ($P<0.01$).

Personal discrimination includes four items asking respondents if they encountered discriminatory treatment in the past year, and if they attribute these actions to their race or skin color. Twenty-six percent of respondents reported at least one form of discriminatory treatment in the past year. The response categories are a) being fired from a job, b) denied a promotion, c) refused a job, and d) treated unfairly by the police. The value of 1 is assigned if the experience of personal discrimination is perceived to be due to race, and 0 otherwise. The data in table 1...
reveals that our measures of personal discrimination yield an adequate fit ($P<0.01$).
We measure socioeconomic status (SES) using two variables: education and household income.
Both variables are categorical variables, the first comprised of four and the second of five categories.

### Table 1. Measurement Model (Completely Exogenous Indicators)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Est.</th>
<th>S.E.</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Religiosity</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>how often read religious books</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>how often watch religious programs</td>
<td>0.86***</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>how often listen religious programs</td>
<td>0.99***</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td>0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>how religious are you</td>
<td>0.39***</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>how often attend religious service</td>
<td>0.57***</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SES</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education (4 Categories)</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.91</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income (5 Categories)</td>
<td>0.55***</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>0.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Systemic Racial Discrimination</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>whites not respect blacks</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>whites not think blacks add to United States</td>
<td>0.96***</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>minorities not think blacks smart</td>
<td>0.79***</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Personal Discrimination (Past Year)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Firing Discrimination</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hiring Discrimination</td>
<td>1.46***</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>0.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promotion Discrimination</td>
<td>0.86***</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>0.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police Discrimination</td>
<td>1.46***</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>0.30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*** P <0.01; ** P <0.05; * P <0.10
The data in Table 1 shows that our SES construct yields an adequate fit ($P<0.01$). As shown by Chong and Kim (2006), while differences in socioeconomic status can potentially surface divisions in black policy preferences, working class and affluent African Americans still largely share fundamental views of the role of racial stratification in determining their lived outcomes. Our model pinpoints how class cleavages can manifest in intragroup divides in the prototypical black identities constructed by upper and working class African Americans, respectively.

Religiosity is a measure of respondents’ personal piousness, religious attendance, and religious involvement. The five items are: a) how religious are you; and how often do you: b) attend religious services; c) listen to religious programs; d) watch religious programs; and e) read religious books. All five indicators are measured on a five-point scale. The confirmatory factor analysis yields an adequate fit ($P<0.01$). As indicated by the aforementioned work by Cohen (1999), religiously adherent African Americans may draw clear dividing lines between the sets of black people viewed as fellow spokes in the wheel, and the sets of black people excluded from the prototypical black identity.

**Endogenous constructs**

Table 2 presents the endogenous constructs. Black self-categorization, labeled *black centrality*, consists of two items; the extent to which: 1) blackness defines the respondent’s identity, and 2) the respondent’s life depends on other black lives. The first item in the measure most closely hews to group identity, whereas the second resembles linked fate.

We also include measures of closeness and group stereotypes. Three measures are utilized to estimate each closeness construct. The first measures individuals’ *perception of closeness to the racial group’s rank and file masses*: we use respondents’ assessments of their closeness to poor, religious, and working-class black people. The second construct measures *closeness to the group’s elites*: we use respondents’ assessments of their closeness to upper class, professional and elective office-holding black individuals. The data in Table 2 reveals that both closeness to masses ($P<0.01$) and closeness to elites ($P<0.01$) provide adequate fits.

We use three sets of indicators to measure positive and negative stereotypes. *Negative stereotypes* measures respondents’ perception of group members’ 1) laziness, 2) inclination to give up easily, and 3) violent nature. *Positive stereotypes* measures perceptions of black people’s 1) intelligence, 2) perseverance, and 3) pride. The data in Table 2 shows that the items selected for negative stereotypes ($P<0.01$) and positive stereotypes ($P<0.01$) are indeed valid measures.

Finally, we include an *autonomy* construct that measures black collectivist sentiments. We measure individuals’ level of approval of the following actions: 1) always voting for black politicians, 2) forming a black political party, and 3) always shopping at black-owned stores. The confirmatory factor analysis reveals that our autonomy construct has sufficient factor loadings, and it provides an adequate fit ($P<0.01$).
Table 2. Measurement Model (Endogenous Indicators)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Est.</th>
<th>S.E.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Black Centrality (Self-Categorization)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>being black is large part of identity</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R’s life depends on other black lives</td>
<td>1.23***</td>
<td>0.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Closeness to masses</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>how close to poor blacks</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>how close to working-class blacks</td>
<td>1.11***</td>
<td>0.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>how close to religious blacks</td>
<td>1.21***</td>
<td>0.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Closeness to elites</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>how close to upper-class blacks</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>how close to elected blacks</td>
<td>1.11***</td>
<td>0.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>how close to black professionals</td>
<td>1.02***</td>
<td>0.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Autonomy</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>blacks should vote for blacks</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>blacks should form political party</td>
<td>1.12***</td>
<td>0.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>blacks should shop black-owned stores</td>
<td>0.93***</td>
<td>0.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Positive Stereotypes</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>how true blacks are intelligent</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>how true blacks are hardworking</td>
<td>1.25***</td>
<td>0.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>how true blacks are proud of selves</td>
<td>0.57***</td>
<td>0.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Negative Stereotypes</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>how true blacks are lazy</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>how true blacks give up easily</td>
<td>0.78***</td>
<td>0.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>how true blacks are violent</td>
<td>0.82***</td>
<td>0.62</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*** P < 0.01; ** P < 0.05; * P < 0.1

Results

Figure 1 shows the statistically significant direct and indirect structural effects for our proposed hypotheses. Table 3 contains the structural model parameters and a summary of the path models that allows us to reject or confirm hypotheses 1a through 3. Both theoretical and statistical criteria provide a baseline to assess the fit of our model. At the statistical level, the hypothesized model presented a good fit to the data. The RMSEA has a value of 0.019, and the CFI and TLI have values of .91 and .92 respectively (higher than the .90 threshold), all indicating acceptable fit. Table 3 also provides a summary of the path model results that allow us to describe the relative influence of control variables on our dependent variables.

Both hypotheses 1a and 1b are confirmed by the data. As expected, both personal discrimination (hypothesis 1a) and systemic racial discrimination (hypotheses 1b) independently
increase black centrality. Our findings indicate that invidious discriminatory treatment shapes identity (Appiah 2005, 68-69), and that black self-categorization is politicized; believing discrimination is systemic increases the significance of blackness to black individuals’ conceptualizations of self.

Hypothesis 2 (a direct causal relationship between black self-categorization and expressions of positive black social identity) is only partially confirmed by the data; black centrality is causally related to support for black political autonomy efforts, but not to positive stereotypes. The linkage between the salience of black identity and support for black autonomy reflects the idea that black self-categorization is, to quote Du Bois ([1919] 1996, 485) “an affirmation of pride in the race, the lineage and the self.” Consequently, it is a politically conscious understanding of the self. Our black autonomy construct may be tapping into this politically conscious conceptualizing of black prototypal identity. Whereas the stereotype questions gauge in-group perceptions, the autonomy construct gauges willingness to engage in group-based ideological strategizing.

Building on Young’s (1998) argument, we speculate that individuals’ high on our black self-categorization measure believe that blacks must deliberate within the group and acquire independent power before working in concert with white political actors. Worth noting here is the positive association between blackness being highly salient to an individual’s identity conception and a propensity to engage in the group-centric strategic thinking.

For us, striving is the inductive cognitive pathway translating salient black identity to politicized black decision making. Positioning oneself within a larger narrative of black collective struggle informs one’s desire to seek means of advancing the collective standing of the group. While this pathway is similar to the effect of linked fate on black political behavior, subsequent findings from the model demonstrate the distinctions between striving and lined fate.

Table 3 reveals two seemingly dissonant positive associations, which are illuminative of the complexity and variability of black identity. The first is the positive association between personal discrimination and closeness to black masses, and the second between personal discrimination and negative stereotypes. Only the second positive association is consistent with our expectation in hypothesis 3—that in the absence of a politicized lens through which to view racial discrimination, personal experiences with discrimination will estrange black individuals from the racial group, rather than affirm their connectedness to the group.
Figure 1. Structural Equation Model Diagram

¥ Only significant effects are represented in the diagram
*Solid lines connote positive statistical relationships; dashed lines connote negative statistical relationships
The first linkage implies that experiences of personal discrimination can indeed increase the likelihood of feeling a sense of sameness with ordinary black people, even if that experience is not viewed through a politicized lens. But concurrently, absent striving to connect the experience of receiving ill-treatment by the police or an employer to the larger narrative of black people crusading against an unjust racial order, black individuals may attribute discriminatory treatment to pathological behaviors or culturally inferior tendencies exhibited by black people relative to whites. This finding seems to be strongest indicator yet that politicization of racial discrimination—conceptualized in our striving process as the effort to link one’s encounters with discrimination to a larger black narrative of soldiering on through injustice—is instrumental to preserving a sense of positive social identity among African Americans.

We also find that systemic racial discrimination is negatively related to closeness to black elites, yet positively related to autonomy. The positive association between systematic discrimination and autonomy provides partial support for H5, which stated that systematic racial discrimination is directly related to positive aspects of black identity. But the distancing from black elites, along with the null relationships between systematic discrimination and both closeness to black masses and adherence to positive black stereotypes, indicate that striving does indeed entail drawing lines of demarcation in the imagining of one’s co-laborers in the pilgrimage toward racial salvation.

That perceptions of systemic racial deprivation are negatively associated with black elites indicates that black people feel greater social distance from those in-group members who have ascended to the professional and political elite classes. Because these black elites may be perceived to be more liberated from the racial constraints prototypical of the black experience, and thus less exemplary of “true” blackness, they appear to be viewed as unsuitable spokes in the wheel turning toward racial equity. The linkage may also reflect individuals’ assessments that descriptive representation has yet to yield substantial benefit to black constituencies. Thus, the negative association may illustrate a hesitancy to view black elites as co-pilgrims in striving, while additionally reflecting a pointed critique of the capacity of such elites to leverage their positions to benefit the group.

The behavioral commitment to black autonomy among those scoring high on systemic racial discrimination is also reflective of the politicization of black prototypical identity. Those who view racial discrimination as systemic rather than episodic are inclined to seek redress through means of in-group empowerment within the social order, as opposed to working in collaboration with other racial groups to advance progress. Again, we posit that striving is the pathway that bridges maintenance of a politicized black identity with adoption of a behavioral stance directed toward racial collective action in the face of racial subjugation.
Table 3. Structural Model Parameters

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Black Centrality</th>
<th>Closeness to Masses</th>
<th>Closeness to Elites</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Est.</td>
<td>S.E.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SES</td>
<td>-0.04*</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Systemic Racial Discrimination</td>
<td>0.45***</td>
<td>0.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Discrimination</td>
<td>0.18***</td>
<td>0.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Centrality</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.09</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ R^2 = 0.42 \] \[ R^2 = 0.18 \] \[ R^2 = 0.06 \]

Table 3. Structural Model Parameters (Ctd)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Autonomy</th>
<th>Positive Stereotypes</th>
<th>Negative Stereotypes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Est.</td>
<td>StdYX Est.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SES</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Systemic Racial Discrimination</td>
<td>0.25***</td>
<td>0.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Discrimination</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Centrality</td>
<td>0.52***</td>
<td>0.31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ R^2 = 0.26 \] \[ R^2 = 0.01 \] \[ R^2 = 0.14 \]

*** P < 0.01; ** P < 0.05; * P < 0.10

\[ \chi^2 = 71.440; \text{df}=23; P= 0.000 \]

CFI=0.91

TLI=0.91

RMSEA=0.019
Table 4 contains the indirect effects. The structural statistical relationships provide partial support for hypotheses 4 and 5. Personal discrimination and black centrality together increase the propensity to support black autonomy (H4); the same is true of the indirect effects of systemic racial discrimination and black centrality (H6). We suspect that African Americans who are personal victims of discrimination desire renewed focus from elites on eradicating the pernicious forms of institutional discrimination still present in various spheres of life. In essence, we surmise they seek to hold their fellow spokes in the wheel accountable for leveraging their positions of influence to strive for the betterment of the group.

Table 4. Indirect Effects

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Effects of Personal Discrimination on Autonomy Through Black Centrality</th>
<th>StdYX</th>
<th>Est.</th>
<th>S.E.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>0.29**</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total indirect</td>
<td>0.09***</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Effects of Systemic Racial Discrimination on Autonomy Through Black Centrality</th>
<th>StdYX</th>
<th>Est.</th>
<th>S.E.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>0.48***</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total indirect</td>
<td>0.23***</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct</td>
<td>0.25***</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Our control variables yield notable, albeit not entirely surprising, results. Religiosity is positively and significantly associated with closeness to black masses and closeness to black elites. It is also positively related to positive black stereotypes. As expected, these findings are in line with results from prior studies (Allen, Dawson & Brown, 1989; Allen, 2001), as well as our theoretical expectations. These findings suggest religious black individuals are indeed inclined to feel greater affinity for black people perceived to be fellow pilgrims working toward racial salvation. Further, perhaps contrary to what would be expected, religiously adherent black individuals appear to conceptualize a broad set of African Americans—both elites and poor and working class individuals—as fellow spokes turning the wheel.

We acknowledge, however, that black respondents in this data set are not asked to register their solidarity with groups that may be stigmatized within the black church community, such as members of the black LGBT community or unchurched African Americans. Our work also stops short of identifying how denominational differences may influence religious black people’s conceptualization of the prototypical black identity. Broadening the set of black sub-constituencies with whom respondents indicate closeness, and accounting for variations across church affiliation, can be fruitful contributions made by future work.

Socioeconomic status is negatively associated with both closeness to masses and with negative stereotypes. The negative association with harmful stereotypes suggests that middle and upper-class black people may view themselves as worthy exemplars of the prototypical black image and experience in America. On the other hand, the negative association with black masses may indicate a perceived disconnect between higher SES black people and groups of
African Americans who they may be perceived to project images of blackness that tarnish or depart from the ideal prototypical image. Once again, we witness in these closeness measures an apparent attempt by particular members of the racial group to parse out which subgroups can make the most (and least) credible claims to projecting the exemplary image of blackness.

While we have argued that striving among black individuals carries the propensity to strengthen within group ties, we also acknowledge the potential for cleavages to arise between racial group members who navigate their experiences around race in heterogeneous manners, due to crosscutting identities such as class and religion (as well as identities that are not explored here but certainly worthy of in-depth examination, such as gender, age, and sexuality). In the concept of striving, we offer a framework for exploring the manifestation of these cleavages, and the distinct manner through which they emerge, highlighting the mutability and complexity of black identity. Our approach to exploring this mutability offers a complementary perspective to Laird’s (2017) aforementioned work, which highlights the dynamism to black identity in the form of the exploration of the subcategories of “moveable blacks.”

To summarize, the structural model reveals associations that provide strong support of hypotheses 1a, 1b, and 2, and partial support of hypotheses 4 and 6. The model also reveals associations that both partially support and lend grounds to reject hypotheses 3 and 5. Perceiving either personal or fraternal deprivation increases the centrality of blackness to African Americans’ self-identification. Absent politicization of their personal encounters with discrimination, black individuals feel greater closeness to other black people—likely due to perceived linked fate—while also adhering more strongly to negative stereotypes about the group. Black individuals who politicize discrimination—reflected in their belief in systemic discrimination—feel no closer to ordinary black people, while feeling more distant from black elites. Yet these individuals are more supportive of black autonomy efforts, indicating a commitment to a particular strategic vision of black uplift. Perceptions of both personal and systemic racism work in tandem with centrality of blackness to increase black people’s support for black autonomy efforts.

We found within this structural model a number of relationships that appear to be particularly indicative of striving at work—for instance, the associations found between the politicization of discrimination and both centrality of blackness to one’s self-categorization and increased support for collective uplift efforts. Striving is a process that affirms rather than disparages the social significance of one’s blackness, while acknowledging the systemic marginalization of black people in society. Such identity affirmation breeds action on behalf of the group, indicated by the support for autonomy efforts. As a preserver of positive self-categorization that interrupts the otherwise demobilizing effects of racial discrimination, striving acts as wheel within the wheel, turning the spokes of black racial identity toward action.

**Conclusion**

Like Ralph Ellison (1953, 1964, 1995), we believe that the black individual’s experiences and interactions around race within both black spaces and wider American culture affects the definition, tenor and significance she gives to her self-categorization, which is causally linked to her social identity as a black American. The act of striving itself is far from a uniform process producing equivalent results across individuals. As indicated by the structural models, striving among poor and working class African Americans who possess structural views of discrimination may manifest in adhering to Black Nationalist ideals of self-improvement and community uplift. Simultaneously, their striving efforts may cause poor and working class
African Americans to reject the utility of seeking racial advancement through mainstream political channels, as well as through black elected officials.

Alternately, striving among more affluent group members may manifest as further widening the social and political distance between them and non-affluent African Americans, who may be perceived to be poor representatives of the prototypical black identity. The process of striving, therefore, can illuminate not only the motivation to take collective action in the face of racially injurious encounters, but can also inform the divergent strategic approaches taken to advance black interests from various factions of the patchwork black community.

The model presented here provides key insights into the role and function of prototypical black identity in connecting black individuals’ categorization and social identity, while raising key questions that should motivate future inquiries. One, what precisely is the relationship between striving among black Americans and political behavior? We have argued that striving may serve as the pathway between politicized black identity and engagement in political activities directed toward black advancement. Our model stops short of examining actual behavior, exploring only preferred courses of action among respondents.

But the next iteration of the study can incorporate measures of political activity ranging from electoral actions such as voting and contacting political elites, to communal actions such as attending local meetings and working with civic organizations, to system-challenging activities such as participating in protests. We believe that pinpointing the sets of black people conceptualized as providing an adequate fit with the individual’s conception of the prototypical black identity paves the way for understanding which political behaviors will be favored or disregarded by the individual when selecting their course of action for racial reprieve. Accordingly, the associations uncovered here between experiences with discrimination, self-categorization and closeness with various black subgroups can serve as the basis for exploring variations in the political actions preferred by people who perceive these respective sets of actors as fellow spokes in the wheel.

Another question to be addressed by future research explores the associations between striving and policy preferences. Given the potential for striving to intensify intragroup cleavages, particularly along lines of socioeconomic status, how might striving lead working class and affluent black people to adopt systematically different positions on the best means to alleviate racial ills? Indeed, surveying the current landscape of black discourse, one finds no shortage of perspectives revealing fundamentally distinct ideas about how the black body politic should distribute its energy and resources to advance the goals of the group. These ideas range from continued pursuit of electoral empowerment through black elective office holding, to calls for black individuals to assume greater moral and social responsibility, labeled as “respectability politics” (Higginbotham 1994; Harris 2014), to calls for a return to the counterinsurgency methods associated with the height of the Black Power movement.

These debates are critically important, as they shape both the archetypal images of blackness, and the strategic paradigms that will be adopted as the primary interpretive lenses through which the emergent black generation will come to view their racial identity and their role in the world. As the outer wheel of American society—comprising the workplace, legal system, media, and electoral system—continue to turn, serving as the filters through which individuals interpret and make sense of learning and socialization (Carmichael & Thewell, 2003), the inner wheel of black community—the colors, smells, sounds, music and memories of participation in formal and informal social groups—will continue to incubate and nurture an always evolving sense of meaning and attachment to black identity. We encourage future
exploration of the diversity of thoughts and behaviors that manifest from the efforts of individual African Americans to strive toward a prototypical black identity through which they can interpret their own experiences.

Notes
2. A computer assisted face-to-face instrument accounts for 86% of the initial NSAL interviews. Computer assisted telephone interviews account for the remaining 14% of the interviews. All interviews were conducted in English with an average length of two hours and twenty minutes. Data collection occurred between February 2001 and June 2003. The response rate for the sample was 70.7%.
3. See https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2015/06/18/latest-president-obama-delivers-statement-shooting-charleston
4. The questions are intended to tap into the longstanding attitudinal dispositions and perspectives that characterize respondents’ racial worldviews. We are confident, therefore, that the responses offered are not simply artifacts of the time of data collection. Due to the coherent and constrained nature of black ideological belief systems, we contend that the responses we explore would exhibit little variation across different contemporary political periods. Accordingly, we affirm the generalizability of these findings when discussing the dispositions of Black Americans in the present context.

References


SYMPOSIUM:
TEACHING, LEARNING, AND
THEORIZING UNDER THE
THREAT OF VIOLENCE AND
ERASURE
I have conducted several years of research on Black Muslim and Black African Methodist Episcopal Youth in Los Angeles; my main research question has been about their shared love of Hip Hop and its role in their religiosity and in developing resilient identities. This participatory action research and ethnographic research with Black Muslim families in South Los Angeles is deeply shaped by the hyper-pathologization of Black youth in the city and by the fact that numerous people in our world stereotype, police, ridicule, belittle, and pathologize Muslims on a daily basis. There is always the haunting accusation faced by young men in both of these communities about the way they move and an insistence on a quality of stillness that they must achieve that far too often defines their existence in the world.

The families that I worked with embraced me, a stranger, and received me as a Black Christian, and allowed me to move into and through their public and private spaces despite this context of vulnerability and threat. Their hospitality, care, and love for me as a human being, scholar, and activist enabled me to develop a more communal research agenda. The members of these Muslim families became co-researchers and co-laborers in the interfaith struggle for justice and peace. Because of the dynamics of this set of experiences, I know how to amplify their marginalized voices, and speak alongside them. The politics and ethics of interfaith struggle as Black people has become a critical site for reflection and study in the aftermath of ongoing terrorist attacks on religious institutions. From the June 17, 2015 Charleston, South Carolina church massacre, to the March 15, 2019 Christchurch mosque massacre we are increasingly witnessing the deployment of racial and religious hatred in ways that reinforce the basic hyper-pathologization of Black life in the world. These are more deadly warnings against the ways that we move together in fellowship and in sacred practice.

I came of age in East Atlanta where my older sister provided the soundtrack to my teenage life, narrated by Hip Hop artists like Dela Soul, Erykah Badu, Ice Cube, Big Daddy Kane, Kilo Ali, Queen Latifah, Talib Kweli, Dilated Peoples, Slum Village, The Roots, Mos Def, Tupac and Naz to name a select few. These artists moved one two and now three generations of young Black people into contemplative practices, self-understanding, and disciplined rejection of hyper-pathologization. As I rapped to the beats, danced to the syncopated rhythms, and internalized the lyrics, in retrospect, it wasn’t until college that I became curious about the inner workings of the religious teachings of Hip Hop music. I desired to study more about cultural icons like Malcolm X and Muhammad Ali whose names were honored in Hip Hop culture and in the rap songs of the culture icons that populated my everyday life. Developing a set of sustained questions about the intersections between religiosity and Hip Hop included reading Su’ad Abdul Khabeer’s *Muslim Cool: Race, Religion, and Hip Hop in the United States* (New York University Press 2016); Monica R. Miller’s *Religion and Hip Hop* (Routledge Research in Religion, Media, an Culture 2013); Daniel White Hodge’s *The Soul of Hip Hop: Rims, Timbs, and a Cultural Theology* (Intervarsity Press Books 2010); and Anthony Pinn’s *Noise and Spirit: The Religious and Spiritual Sensibilities of Rap Music* (New York University Press 2003). Hip Hop music planted this curiosity in me that mirrored the sacred practices that were also the

* Direct correspondence to apriljackson222@hotmail.com
framework for my existence.

By 2013 during my Masters in Theology training, I co-authored an independent graduate course entitled The Contributions of African American Muslims at Claremont School of Theology where I was pursuing my graduate education. My professor, a female Southeast Asian Muslim professor, who teaches interfaith activism, community organizing, and peace and justice work became my doctoral advisor interested in my research agenda and excited about assisting me to construct a liberatory pedagogy for black male religious youth around hip hop. We began defining my research question, which evolved into: How is Hip Hop music utilized as a tool of spiritual resilience for African American male youth in Black religious communities? Building on key research on the politics of culture like Lakeyta Bonnette’s *Pulse of the People: Political Rap Music and Black Politics* (University of Pennsylvania 2015) my research grew hands and feet as my Southeast Asian Muslim professor and I embarked on interfaith and transracial trips to the Black Mosque in Los Angeles. Our crisscrossing the spaces for worshipful sanctuary for these young Black men reflected how the dynamic relationship between mothers and sons in religious institutions operates to create space and to move their children from spaces of harm to spaces of refuge. My professor remarked that for her it was an interracial experience worshiping and praying at a predominately Black mosque with me, her doctoral student, and for me, it was a interfaith experience being a Black female Christian religious educator being embraced by Black Muslim women in a vibrant, culturally diverse city.

As we sat and prayed together, standing shoulder to shoulder, and performing The Fajir prayer, “dawn prayer” which is an obligatory prayer with two rakat or (prescribed movements), one of the five daily prayers offered by practicing Muslims, I though about how the rocking of our bodies were instinctual and in sync. As we adjusted simultaneously, and held our foreheads to the ground, and crossed our arms, we were one body. One Black body. It was in this moment that my research on the hyper-pathologization of Black bodies and how we are made resilient was birthed. It was during the rocking of our bodies in rhythm and in that space and time that the ancestors reminded me that we were on the trans-Atlantic slave trade auction blocks together. Not as Muslim, or Christian, but as Black and brown bodies that were dehumanized and despised. The ancestors reminded me that Hip Hop and the struggle for liberation and social justice is inextricably linked to the history of the African American experience, and Islam’s contributions are apart of the Hip Hop story.

That African American experience has been indelibly shaped by the reactions to Black mobility and movement in space. According to Tim Cresswell “All kinds of mobilities have been mapped onto black bodies in both negative and affirmative ways. Black people, we are told, exhibit “natural rhythm” are “naturally” musical, cannot swim, and are congenitally lazy. Mobility in the United States is marked by race at scales from the body to the country and beyond. Simultaneously, race is marked by mobilities… and the mobilities of black men” which are paradigmatically used against them and against the people who love, nurture, and see futurity and promise in them (2016:12-13). This experience in the mosque coupled with my faculty member’s generosity, mixed with being given the room to create a course, and molded by the teachings of my older sister’s generation of Hip Hop musicians profoundly shifted my questions about Hip Hop in the lives of young Christians. My research agenda transformed toward a whole host of questions about Hip Hop in the lives of young Christians. I learned to “rang[e] in scale [of analysis] from the body to the international, [to] consider mobility as an amalgam of forms of physical movement, the meanings attached to those movements, and movements as experienced and embodied forms of practice…produced by and productive of
power” (Ibid.). These experiences shaped what constitute the ethics of my research and faith practice and honor the cool, religious, soul and noisy spirit of Hip Hop in a more intentional and deliberate fashion.

As a religious educator who builds interfaith community, I honor those who were massacred in the practice of their Christian faith and those massacred in the practice of their Muslim faith. Muslim lives Matter, too! Black mobilities are the key to our freedom from LA to New Zealand. We move together or not at All!!

References
"Theories of Time and Space": Natasha Trethewey’s Black Feminist Pedagogy

Audra Eagle Yun*
University of California, Irvine

In Fall 2005 and Spring 2006, Natasha Trethewey was the Lehman Brady Joint Chair Professor in Documentary Studies and American Studies at Duke University and the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. Coincidentally this was also my senior year as an undergraduate at Duke University, where I enrolled in a course entitled “Documentary Poetry” at the Center for Documentary Studies. The course was cross-listed and met the requirements for my degree in literature and critical theory.

I was excited to join a poetry class that did not require several prerequisite courses from the English literary canon or a lengthy waitlist from which the top English department students were selected. I chose literature at Duke because of its emphasis on interdisciplinary studies and relaxed approach to required courses. Raised among the backcountry limestone roads and trailer parks of north-central Florida, reading literature to echo a professor’s interpretations of Chaucer and Milton was completely foreign to me. On the contrary, literature at Duke included ethnic studies, film and media studies, literature in translation, gender and sexuality studies, and cultural and critical theory. The faculty were diverse, brilliant, and inclusive.

Today, Trethewey’s profoundly personal biography is detailed in several encyclopedic resources, as a few key details are a recurring theme in her work (Kuipper 2012). But in 2005, my classmates and I did not know her background as we entered a small classroom for an upper-level undergraduate poetry seminar. The details of her origins (born to a Mississippi mixed-race couple in the final days of anti-miscegenation) and trauma (her mother was murdered by her stepfather when the poet was 19) are public information, but to hear Trethewey describe her life to her students was to move through a tightly woven tapestry of bereavement and hope. I had never met a professor who put her personal history - her family, her own memories - at the forefront of her work.

We spent a great deal of time reading the work of other poets who centered their work on filling in the missing narratives and erasures in the historical record through “documentary poetry,” including Rita Dove, Andrew Hudgins, Yusef Komunyakaa, and Elizabeth Alexander. We read Bellocq’s Ophelia and Trethewey described her experience of interacting with haunting images from glass plate negatives of sex workers in New Orleans’ Storyville around the year 1912. These images transfixed her attention, both for their depiction of fair-skinned black women, and for all that they did not tell the viewer about the time, place, and personal histories of Storyville’s sex workers. Trethewey imagined the perspective of the subject of the photographs, creating a firsthand narrative for Ophelia and turning the gaze back to the reader. I was compelled by this approach as an effort to imagine history through a combination of ekphrasis and vivid creative narrative.

Trethewey’s success in teaching her students, I now believe, was in her seamless and organic implementation of a black feminist pedagogy. In the words of Barbara Omolade:

* Direct correspondence to audra.yun@uci.edu
A Black feminist pedagogy is not merely concerned with the principle of instruction of Black women by Black women and about Black women; it also sets forth learning strategies informed by Black women’s historical experience with race/gender/class bias and the consequences of marginality and isolation. Black feminist pedagogy aims to develop a mindset of intellectual inclusion and expansion that stands in contradiction to the Western intellectual tradition of exclusivity and chauvinism. *It offers the student, instructor, and institution a methodology for promoting equality and multiple visions and perspectives that parallel Black women’s attempts to be and become recognized as human beings and citizens rather than as objects and victims* (Omolade 1987). [Emphasis added]

In the class, Trethewey naturally moved from reading into the performative aspects of poetry. Her use of multimedia and out-loud readings in class allowed me to hear and see the forms, cadence, and rhythms of poetry. Poetry was *alive*. The value and visibility of the black feminine experience was introduced through the performance -- to consider questions of volume, speed, and emphasis to create texture and emotion. When she shared her multimedia video presentations of “Elegy for the Native Guards,” and “Theories of Time and Space,” poems written for her then-forthcoming book *Native Guard*, I was transported into her historical re-telling and re-imagining of the absences of history.

At the time, I was working part-time as a work-study student in the Duke University Libraries, shelving books and working night shifts at the circulation desk. This experience, along with a summer fellowship at the Library of Congress, helped me decide that librarianship would be my chosen career. I was drawn to librarianship because it prioritized democratic access to knowledge. In the library, all of one’s questions and ideas mattered - not how much money you had, who you knew, or what school you attended. It was Trethewey’s teaching and openness to sharing her documentary poetry that prompted me to reflect on my own interactions with archives and libraries -- and later, to see them as sites of social justice. The core aims of black feminist pedagogy complement and correlate with the noblest aspirations of librarianship.

Another important aspect of Natasha Trethewey’s teaching was the attention paid to the potential for every student to tell their own story through poetry. Trethewey treated her students, in the words of Omolade, as “human beings and citizens” worthy of dignity and an audience. Throughout the course, we workshoped our own writing and tested the constraints of poetic forms. Again, in retrospect: how many undergraduates can say they had the opportunity to ask Natasha Trethewey to read and critique their poetry? The course required students to create a portfolio and perform their own works at a final reading in a small auditorium space. When an announcement was posted for the John Hope Franklin Student Documentary Award program, Trethewey encouraged me to apply. When I took advantage of her office hours, she read a poem I had written about my hometown’s hidden history of anti-black violence. After a moment, she looked at me and said, “you have found your voice.” Those words -- to this very day -- were the most encouraging and empowering I had ever heard.

Whether she believed this meant I was a “real” writer did not matter. It was that the learning strategies set out in her course had taken root within me. My personal experience -- *my* voice -- mattered. I did apply and was awarded the John Hope Franklin prize, using the award to research the history of my hometown, photograph it, and write poetry about it. It was also the research project that gave me my first opportunity to perform archival research, and I experienced first hand the barriers and gatekeeping of traditional archives. When I attended UCLA...
that fall to matriculate in the Master of Library and Information Science program, I was able to enroll in courses on community archives and public library service. The connection between community archives (grassroots efforts for communities to preserve and provide access to their own histories) and documentary poetry (which strives to fill in gaps in history through imagined or enhanced poetic narratives) became clear for me. My final thesis cited literature articulating the symbolic and emotional value of community-based archives, including that “a people cannot truly be masters of their own history and understand their identity unless they have access to their records” (Bastian 1999) I would add the corollary that a people must also be empowered to tell their own stories - as these are themselves records that can supplant the traditional archival record.

I became an archivist in large part due to the proactive, authentic, and empathetic black feminist pedagogy of Natasha Trethewey. In exploring the historical and archival imaginary, my work has always involved local history and community-driven archives. The tangible response of those who interrogate primary sources and prioritize the agency and humanity of marginalized families and communities has been a long-term focus of my professional life. I am currently leading a federally-funded research project to explore the outcomes of undergraduate students applying what they learn in ethnic studies combined with lived experience in contributing to community archives.4 For this project, ethnic studies was chosen for its focus on social cultural theories related to race, ethnicity, identity, and relations of power. We know that, traditionally, archives have served to scaffold power structures that create erasures, absences, and silences in history. I work every day to dismantle that. Trethewey’s work and approach to teaching students to think of their own positionality, value, and voice is what led me to a career in archives -- and for that I am grateful.

Notes

1. See http://www.poetryriver.org/docupoetry.html
2. See https://teachingpals.wordpress.com/tag/natasha-trethewey/
4. See https://ocseaa.lib.uci.edu/imls_grant

References


Decolonizing South African Education:
Lessons from the Pre-Colonial Era

Betty Mamotlokooa Serame*
University of South Africa

Our children may learn about the heroes of the past. Our task is to make ourselves the architects of the future (Gok 2017).

Introduction: No Decolonization No Peace

Despite post-apartheid policy intentions to redress the effects of colonialism in South Africa, inequalities in higher education have remained an endemic problem and continue to have a major influence on student and education (Zembylas and Bozalek 2017). This is because of neoliberal policies which contribute to the reproduction of inequality in society (Gray van Heerden 2018). These inequalities recently featured prominently in student led protests against exorbitantly high fees (#FeesMustFall), which denies the majority of African students access to higher education: The student also demanded the decolonization of current curricular as these reproduce knowledge based on colonial and western history of ideas (#RhodesMustFall). Much of this is also part of the legacy of apartheid that worked to reinforce apartheid ideological apparatuses and the structures of whiteness and white identities that have been deemed valuable in the past historically white universities. African children intentionally rejected colonial pedagogy time and again, recognizing its lessons as harmful and demeaning. By protesting, students devised mechanisms to transgress and reject ‘western values as it was intended to destroy the most cherished of their beliefs’ (Biko 2017, 51) and reigniting attention towards the enormous disparities that still exist in the South African education system (Zembylas and Bozalek 2017). Writing specifically on cultural superiority and the operation of white supremacy, Robert Sobukwe (1959), argues that it is from the myth of race with its attendant claims of cultural superiority that the doctrine of white supremacy stands.

The powerful messages of these protests trickled down to schools. In August 2016 Pretoria Girls High School learners led a protest against the binary of intersectional challenges and cultural domination pertaining to race, gender, class, language and their identities. These high schoolgirls ‘rendered their struggles, voices, labor, and impact visible in our public discourse’ (Dlakavu 2017, 1-7) and launched a whole wave of activism that found its next iteration—resistance reproducing itself—all across universities in South Africa after 2016. The girls confronted issues that challenged their identities and argued that the school constitution which was part of the school curriculum left them with their Blackness condemned. School policies that forced them to straighten their hair and required that ‘all hair must be brushed’ (Nicolson 2016) were not talking to them. Their astute arguments about school rules were steeped in a self-conscious body politics and understanding that as black people and black girls in particular, ‘we are on our own’—embodifying a critical philosophical claim made by Steve Biko decades ago. Their questions provoked everyone to consider whose hair requires a brush when an afro doesn’t require any brush? Their voices, opinions, and forms of resistance represent loud silences in the scholarship on apartheid education. The notion that ‘education is not neutral’ and ‘learners go to school with their cultural expectations and experiences’ (Paolo

* Direct correspondence to serammb@unisa.ac.za and maseratty@gmail.com
Freire 1987,33) helps us understand the schoolhouse as a vital site for contestation over and expression of resistance to apartheid.

Turning towards pre-colonial education as suggested by Pan Africanist philosophy I point to lessons about personal autonomy, producing curriculum that is relevant, peer learning and play, initiation, oral culture and story telling. There is much to be plumbed from within Pan Africanist philosophy’s intentional and deliberate turn toward pre-colonial education for addressing the current calls for decolonizing South African education.

Pre-colonial Education of African Girls

In precolonial societies education for Africans was part of their daily lives. Prior to the arrival of the European settlers in the Cape Colony in 1652, there were formal and informal educational practices through the transmission of indigenous knowledge from adult to child among the Khoi, San, and Bantu speaking people of Southern Africa (Mazonde 2001, Seroto 2011). Anthropologically, this means, African societies did possess a kind of customary education which was embedded within the rich cultures, values and customs of the people (Kasulwe 2014, Kenyatta 1938, Mazonde 2001, Vilakazi 1999) and were different from one community to another.

A similar situation is established that initiation as a ritual carried symbolic meaning that related to the social structure and belief system of a particular cultural group (Seroto 2011, 80-81). This means each community transmitted its own educational content to ensure that the production of knowledge would be relevant to the environmental context. The values, memories, myths and traditions of a community are contained in the initiation ritual.

The parents take the responsibility of educating their children until they reach the stage of tribal education (Kenyatta 1938). The education was intended to instill the clan tradition of the family. Traditional educational institutions trained women to act as central players in their communities. These women would then be responsible for girls’ education ensuring that it entails the ‘scope for physiological, social and moral education’ (Mazonde 2001, 5). On the other hand, girls would exercise their agency through knowledge discussions, sharing of experiences and learning from each other during every different kind of peer learning interaction. Though the category of girlhood has changed significantly over time, pre-colonial education emphasized girls’ capacity to teach and learn from each other. Part of peer learning occurred when they were fetching water, assisting with food preparation, composing songs and lyrics, building and conducting scientific experiments on their environments and during farming activities such as cultivating the land. Naturally the tendency to adopt the habitual behaviour of the age-group grows with the pride of sentiment in belonging to it (Kenyatta 1938). This was one way of ‘instilling ambition and a sense of duty into the hearts of the growing generation’ (ibid.).

This peer learning interaction was normal as they were ‘all commonly sharing their secrets, joys and woes’ (Biko 2017). The work of these girls was bigger than how it is conventionally portrayed within the patriarchal division of roles. African girls existed in largely autonomous and gender distinctive and age-specific households. Gender separations in this context were part of enhancing the significance of their future roles as central players in their community.
The Transmission of Values, Rituals and Knowledge

The importance of play in customary education in Africa has been underlined by many observers (Kenyatta 1938, Mazonde 2001) because it was central to the development of children. Furthermore, play facilitated the child's intellectual and thought development (Piaget 1951). In the pre-colonial era children were free to play as there was plenty of land that was not demarcated and thus enabled them freedom of movement throughout. Such a relationship to land was essential for nurturing autonomy for children as a key part of their socialization rather than parks or recreational centers, which banned African people's presence during apartheid. Leisure was part of the logic of informal education in many different kinds of spaces. A major part of the cultural heritage of African people was transmitted to children and adolescents through informal activities. These kind of informal activities rooted as they were in practice, real world problem-solving, proverbs, linguistic puzzles and storytelling, and every day experimentation produced an 'African sense' (Oyewumi 1997) of a number of social categories and social relations. These pedagogical philosophies and assignments invited young learners to wrestle with ideas about the many ways that a productive and generative life could be lived; they constituted lessons that apartheid education never deemed necessary to African children. Indeed because apartheid education was so firmly steeped in reducing the potential and capacity of the African child and devaluing whatever was good in the African adolescent’s psyche, world, and experiences, its lessons were singularly focused on making docile easy-to-manage racial and gender subordinates. Education during the pre-colonial period was provided through language learning, initiation schools, art education, and music education (Seroto 2011) including story telling.

In addition, the existence of initiation schools as the primary formal education played a crucial role in teaching girls and boys the norms, values and rituals of their societies which were not conveying that of apartheid ideological apparatuses. Initiation schools were ‘a ritual [that] carried symbolic meaning that is related to the social structure and belief system of a particular cultural group’ (Seroto 2011, 80-81). The values, memories, myths and traditions of a community were contained in the initiation ritual and ‘many traditional societies of Africa, formal education most strongly manifested itself in the initiation ceremony which marked the transition from adolescence to adulthood’ (Mazonde 2001, 4, Seroto 2011, 78). These initiation rituals occurred in demarcated special places that were highly esteemed, and often magnificent places for training. This was an indication that they were formal and organized systematically. There were appointed teachers to specifically impart knowledge to initiates. Knowledge constructed for the initiation ritual was fixed and varied from one community to the other. Not only was the pedagogy organized systematically and distinctively but was highly valuable across conveners of initiation processes. An enormous amount of deliberation and intentionality went into the instruction of African children in the pre-colonial period in South Africa.

These initiation schools were formed along gender lines whereby girls and boys were grouped according to age marking puberty (between 13-17 years) and responsibilities carried out within the community. Certainly the organization of schools according to this important social category indicates several complex philosophies about meanings of the making of childhood, adolescence, and types of instruction. Furthermore, initiation schools were conducted for a period of three to six months in camp-like places outside the residential areas as well as being conducted informally in the years of middle childhood immediately prior to participating in formal initiation schools.

During the initiation, girls received instruction in various matters. Although experienced
women in charge of the initiation schools aimed their efforts at instilling indigenous history and values, it seemed that much time was also spent on tutoring initiates regarding the roles of women, including marital duties (Stayt 1968). It is through these initiation schools that adolescent girls were taught sex education which was 'given with a social reference' (Kenyatta 1938, 100). In addition to sex education, natural birth control methods and preparation for childbirth - learning about motherhood and how to endure pain were also taught. The teaching given at initiation does not only concern sex education, but included the theory of respect for elders, manners and working under the system of reciprocity with other people (Kenyatta 1938).

Unfortunately, these initiation schools were infiltrated by 'the impositions of external hegemonic forces' (Emeagwali and Dei 2014, 1). So far, there are no other institutions that have taken over the task of sex education to the same degree of efficacy as initiation schools of the pre-colonial era. Not only sex education was compromised but also the complex and richly debated meanings associated with the many roles that sexuality plays in the life of communities, different households and families. Such instruction was a vital source of ethics training and meaning making for cohorts of learners. This instruction explained a great deal about understanding the body and its changes and how it requires care and consideration over the life course of the individual and of the community including the household and the family. Indeed, the changes and havoc wreaked by colonialism, different wars and European settlement cannot be underestimated in terms of how important it is to have a space for reflection for adolescents on what it means to survive the life course experiencing colonized bodies.

One way in which this failure is seen today is the high rate of pregnancies reported by the South Africa Demographic and Health Survey 2016, that 'the total fertility rate (TFR) for the three years preceding the survey was 2.6 children per woman. The age-specific fertility rate for teenagers was 71 births per 1,000 women aged 15-19, showing little change since 1998' (2017). Pregnancy, per se, is not the problem but rather the conditions under which a lack of sex education, a lack of contraception, the betrayal of rights to legal abortion and rights to the human dignity of persons, and constrained and non-existent and hoarded public health resources operate to stigmatize, isolate, and impoverish families (Mkhwanazi 2014). Sex education in the initiation ceremonies is often misunderstood by colonizers, as if sexual indulgence is encouraged for its own sake; the obscenity of songs and dances and the profligacy associated with many of these ceremonies are held to prove unusual moral depravity (Kenyatta 1938). Overall the politics of reproduction and the lack of reproductive justice that scholars have observed in the contemporary period serve as powerful indicators of the gap that has been created by the loss of pre-colonial forms of education.

**Oral History and Decoloniality**

Although the indigenous knowledge was disseminated through the community, traditions were learned through oracy: songs, poems and ethnic folklore which were passed from generation to generation, most people learned about their culture and traditions through the oral history. One need not romanticize pre-colonial education to be able to assert that pre-colonial education produced vastly different types of subjectivities than colonial education and everything proceeding it did. It is worth situating this brief survey of South African colonial education in the context of the entire continent and its approaches to pre-colonial education. Many universities were established before the arrival of the Colonizers in Africa. In his inauguration speech as the first Chancellor at the University of Ghana, Kwame Nkrumah (1962, 2) indicates:
If University of Sankore had not been destroyed, if Professor Ahmed Baba of forty historical works, had not had his works and his university destroyed, if the University of Sankore as it was in 1591 had survived the ravages of foreign invasions; the academic and cultural history of Africa might have been different from what it is today.

Nkrumah is not calling the ravages and invasions of pre-colonial educational institutions merely unfortunate but insisting that the knowledge produced from these universities was destroyed; challenging the notion that the knowledge had no powerful stamp on the cultural expectations and lives of African people. The demolition of such knowledge was to ensure that the ‘pre-colonial paradigm of knowledge transmission’ (Kane 2016) was untraceable to enable colonizers to justify the dissemination of colonial pedagogy. As Oyewumi (1997) argues, gender was imposed as a social category with a different quality of meaning, the destruction and prohibition against and devaluation of pre-colonial systems of education in South Africa imposed different and very harmful understandings about the value of African adults as teachers and the value of African adolescents as learners. Who South African adolescents are and what their roles as learners in the world are, continue to suffer the injuries caused by the imposition of colonial education which was rooted through apartheid ideological state apparatuses.

**Conclusion**

The notion that ‘decolonization is necessary for a reclamation of our humanity’ (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2013), affirms the largely negative experiences of African students within the historically white universities in South Africa. This is because African students were studying under very difficult circumstances in university campuses. Rejecting colonial education’s mandates of deference and docility, Biko explains: ‘Black man (sic) you are on your own’ (Biko 1978, 91). Biko insisted on African learners reclaiming their own cause for education and liberation. This reiterated the precolonial educational vision of cultivating autonomous learners whose education could not be confined to a system that is perpetually dehumanizing them. African societies did possess customary education which was embedded within the rich cultures of the people (Vilakazi 1999, 202). In this regard, decoloniality is imperative as it is intended to ‘facilitate the unmasking of racism as a global problem as well as demonstrating how knowledge, including science, was used to justify colonialism’ (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2013, 15). It is worthwhile to mention that colonizers have not realized the importance and effects of the precolonial education which successfully has realized its objectives.

**Notes**

1. Jomo Kenyatta’s Facing Mount Kenya (1938) and Kwame Nkrumah’s Flower of Learning (1962) and Steve Biko’s I Write What I Like (1978) left us a rich literature on Pan African education that has been taken up in the work by Ncube Mazonde, Sekondo and Oyeronke Oyewumi, Marianne Bloch, Gloria Emeagwali and George Dei, and Oumar Kane, H.W. Vilakazi among many others. In the current crisis around South African higher education, there has been a great deal of silence about Pan African educational philosophy and ideas. This essay seeks to add to the contemporary debate about South African education and what it must prioritize by inserting this vast and under-explored set of resources for thinking about our approach to education.
References


For the Love of Nipsey Hussle (1985-2019)

Shauntece Launant*
The Hood Scholars

“I like to say something to my city, Los Angeles, we know what he meant to us…we lost a real one. Like Nipsey said, it’s not what is on you but rather what’s in you and what’s in you they can’t take from you. The marathon will continue.”

---Lauren London, Nipsey Hussle’s wife

First and foremost, I send my condolences to Nipsey Hussle’s family who knew him best. As a young National Conference of Black Political Scientists member I would be remiss if I did not draw attention to the loss of a social, political, and economic leader in the community I am from.

This reflection seeks to demystify an often-sensationalized inner-city, particularly representations of gang culture, through the exploration of Nipsey Hussle’s music, activism, and life. It is through my own experience that I relate to his strivings. My goal is to provide a fuller narrative of inner-city Los Angeles and why it is important to listen to those who experience the day-to-day life in the inner-city. Like other communities the one that I share with Nipsey Hussle has conflict and competing interests. Nevertheless, the inner-city Los Angeles that we share is a place of vibrant community traditions, courage, and an extended family.

I think back to Nipsey Hussle’s song, “Question #1,” from the Slauson Boy Album Two (2016) and being asked where I was from as a common greeting while living in Compton. It is the same question I ask people to this day, out of habit, as a way to understand how we can relate. On some occasions, I could say, “Nowhere” and on others, my geographic or generational ties answered for me. These questions were more important than focusing on school as they had a more immediate effect on your well being. The question, “Where are you from?” was always about much more than asking about “a color.” The colors, as popularly rendered in exaggerated movies and stereotypes, reduce gang conflicts to irrational affiliations to clothing colors. But in the same way that “colors” mean much more than can be stereotyped on screen, the question of where you are from has always signified a long history of communal ties, identification with where one’s loyalties reside, designations about what parts of the city one represents, and how these loyalties in geography relate to the questioner’s safety.

You never know when your visibility could make you most vulnerable.

Fortunately, my middle school was in the same neighborhood I lived in, affording me less vulnerability. However, while protection may have not always been an issue, my quality of

* Direct correspondence to thehoodscholars@gmail.com
education was. I took it upon myself to complain about the quality of school supplies, the teacher’s lack of interest in my learning process and what could be done to make my and the other student’s experiences better. I brought my concerns to our school principal.

The response I received was, “What do you expect, this is Compton?” which still makes me cringe to this day.

It was as if the principal had bought into Hollywood’s trivialization of what the inner cities had to offer. What I heard from the principal is that I was getting what I was worth. Knowing that my community faced an extraordinary level of personal insecurity and conflict I had hoped that she would take my complaint more seriously. Without her expressing a genuine interest, I felt that she was buying into the idea that we could not be anything else.

It was not until my junior year in high school that I regained interest in my education. The evolution of Nipsey Hussle’s music gave me language and hope to take interest in myself above any and all negative opinions about me and where I come from. I believed that principal from eighth grade until junior year. I bought into her narrative even though I came from a community that had very high standards and expectations.

In my community, organizations like the Crips, were founded on principles like Constant Resistance in Progress, and Bloods, Brotherly Love Overcoming Oppressive Destruction.

The concepts alone that were part of the founding of those organizations mean something. My principal was unaware of these things.

Nipsey strived to provide counternarratives of inner-city culture in such a way that was palpable and tangible to the community he came from. This uncensored love and vision for his neighborhood earned him respect. In this way, he took us everywhere with him no matter the crowd or opinions of others. He loved his culture and his words, the good, the bad the ugly and in between. His literal existence debunked the misconceptions of his community and showed the world that you can come from the dirt and still own your own business.

You see, being steeped in Los Angeles gang culture; you do not turn down an invitation. For better or worse, we all grew up knowing that you had to embrace all challenges, whether or not you thought you could win. There is a mentality that is required when it came to surviving the streets.

Nipsey Hussle represented hope for people from that community in many different kinds of ways. But one of the ways that was most important was that he never gave up on the idea that he could continue to be associated with and a member of a gang and be a solid citizen contributing value and love to a community. Most people translated the lessons of my principal and other people who viewed us like she did, and thought it was impossible to be a worthy person and to be a member of a gang. Nipsey Hussle, in his later years attempted to organize his life around the original intent of what it meant to be a gang member. Nipsey Hussle was unapologetic about where he and we are from. He offered me a nuanced account through his lyrics and life of how to understand the violence that was a real feature of my community without making that violence who I am or who we are.

He talked about how the violence in our community was very real but we who are en-
acting this violence are not the cause but the effect of the bigger systemic issues. I have been asked why do people join gangs by people who don’t understand the logic of gang membership. I understand the logic of joining a gang, being a member or being affiliated. It is a sense of protection and to be around people who share common values and struggles. I think about the Brotherly love overcoming oppressive destruction but that we perpetuate as well. I am in the past two years coming to understand more about what those words mean.

Coming from homes that didn’t necessarily have parents present and finding those parents within the neighborhood.

Essentially, for me, Nipsey’s music showed his growth from what it meant for someone from the inner-city to strive for more than what was expected of us.

Ermias Ashedom aka Nipsey Hussle was murdered outside of his clothing store, “The Marathon” on March 31, 2019 at the age of 33. The alleged gunman, Eric Holder, is also a member of the Neighborhood Rolling 60’s Crips (RSC). Much speculation has been made since Nipsey’s untimely death related to his outspoken comments about a documentary he was developing about the widely regarded and much beloved, Dr. Sebi, Alfredo Darrington Bowman, a Honduran holistic doctor. Nipsey and many others across the country believe that Dr. Sebi was killed by the government after winning a court case, claiming to have cured AIDS. In a Breakfast Club Power 105.1 FM interview on February 21, 2018 Nipsey shared this story about Dr. Sebi. He believed that by providing Dr. Sebi’s story to the community, listeners would be inspired to mobilize themselves to demand a full inquiry about Dr. Sebi’s murder. Nipsey also explained to listeners that if he was murdered, it would probably be as a government sponsored response due to his activism around the assassination of Dr. Sebi. Nipsey hoped that people would rise up and remember Dr. Sebi but also demand full accountability for that murder.

As mentioned in a 2013 interview with the VLAD TV radio show Nipsey was a member of the prominent Los Angeles group, RSC (Vlad Tv. “VladTV Full Interview with Nipsey Hussle (RIP)”. Filmed [April 2019]. YouTube video, 46:44. Posted [April 2019]. (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hSmjSPAdc40). RSC, like many other gangs in the Los Angeles area originated from a clique co-developed by gang member activist Stanley “Tookie Williams” one of the founders of the Westside Crips. As his music transformed from that of a gang banger to a gang member activist, he foregrounded the struggle against anti-blackness and what it takes to overcome systemic obstacles. His song on the Grammy nominated Victory Lap Album (2018), “Dedication” (ft. Kendrick Lamar) states,

“this aint entertainment, these four niggas on a slave ship. These songs just the spirituals that swam against the waves with. Ended up on shore to their amazement.”

Nipsey took his hustle strategies and love for his neighborhood and transformed it into a vision of hope. This was not only done through his music but also through his “Hussle tactics” which can be understood as entrepreneurship and activism. He also created a business called, Vector 90, a hub for entrepreneurs and creatives alike to have a space for events, workshops and support for startups. His mission as illustrated by business mogul, Jay Z, stated, “gentrify your own hood before these people do it. Claim eminent domain and have your people move it. That’s a small glimpse into what Nipsey was doing.” (Rap Delites. “Jay-Z performing at Webster Hall with Nas, Nipsey Hussle tribute and squashes beef with Cam’Ron”. Filmed [April 2019]. YouTube video, 7:47. Posted [April 2019]. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SRzl64IR9iY.)
Nipsey was investing in the idea of entrepreneurship to keep the tradition of gang culture of “claiming an area” but this time with the purpose of striving to own what we were claiming. As others have stated, “how can we claim something that is not ours, and kill ourselves in the process of trying to hold on to it.” This philosophical question about Black people and space, especially Black people who are said to come from places that nobody should expect anything good from, illustrates so much about why and how Nipsey Hussle’s activism and re-crafting of our worth as members of South-Central Los Angeles communities and neighborhoods matters. Since Nipsey’s passing, many inner-city entrepreneurs and citizens have continued the mantra of, “the marathon continues” by purchasing space within their neighborhoods, supporting each other, meetings amongst rival gangs and attempting to contribute to their overall communities.

After his death, people all over galvanized. His former manager and executive director of Developing Options, a non-profit, Eugene “Big U” Henley organized a unity walk that included members of various gangs in honor of Nipsey Hussle. Gangs in Rialto and New York have called truces. This would be the second time such a national truce event has taken place but the first time in a very long time. We believed him to be the 2 Pac of our generation, a prolific and authoritative spokesperson for Black communities. We saw community leaders, politicians and gang members alike take to the streets in commemoration of his death. Taco Mell hung a picture of long-time supporter and faithful customer, Nipsey Hussle, in his second Taco Mell restaurant. A young entrepreneur from Compton who first started out selling his food in rented out lots.

Trap Kitchen, a local business with locations in Oregon, painted a mural of Nipsey Hussle on his Food Truck. They have also have since Nipsey’s death offered small scholarships to inner city youth dedicated to continuing their education. Keith Garret, owner of “All Flavor No Grease,” a local business owner in South Los Angeles credited Nipsey for helping him move his passion for food from the front of his house in Watts, CA to being nationally acclaimed for the growth of his business. Najee Ali, a youth advocate, who revered Nipsey Hussle as a gentrification fighter, entrepreneur and philanthropy icon created a petition as a call for Councilman Harris-Dawson to rename the intersection of Slauson and Crenshaw, “Nipsey Hussle Square.” Hyde Park Elementary School located at the corner of Crenshaw Boulevard and 60th street has renovated and painted its facilities on behalf of Nipsey Hussle. Revolt TV commentators exclaimed: “The great neighborhood Nip was an activist, an artist, activist, community leader, marketing genius and self taught entrepreneur whose influence is destined to be felt for lifetimes.”

His message has encouraged me to develop my own nonprofit, “The Hood Scholar Mentor Group,” which advocates on behalf of inner-city youth seeking their own path. The mission of Hood Scholar is to acknowledge the existing skills and gifts that young people in South-Central already have and to help them to create healthy alternatives. Our goal is to inspire confidence in them despite the obstacles they are faced with. We are founded on the understanding of intersectionality and offer abolitionist teaching that advocates for more than survival. With the proper investment we can all continue the marathon of our own lives.

His legacy did the work to liberate a community that has been disenfranchised and overlooked.

The Marathon will continue.
Filmmaking as Scholarship: 
Filmmaking, Knowledge Production, and Embodied Theorizing

H.L.T. Quan*
Arizona State University

As a filmmaker and political theorist, I am often asked if I prefer my work to be in print or visual forms. My answer is always both; and indeed, my scholarship embodies and takes advantage of the poetics and analytic of both. Film is simultaneously an art form and a means of communication. Filmmaking is expensive as well as time and labor-intensive, involving a collaborative process that includes conducting basic research, collecting images, analyzing and selecting footage to connect images and sounds in order to communicate ideas, stories and emotions to an audience. Technical knowledge involved in filmmaking can be seen as “geeky” and intimidating. Theoretical knowledge, on the other hand, is often seen as abstract and unapproachable to students and the general public. Yet, both are necessary and equally impactful. In “Historical Voices of Resistance,” Paula N. Kagen (2009), studied the Cassandra Radical Feminist Nurses Network and points out that, “nursing history can be produced as public media to advance progressive ideas about nurses and transformative and emancipatory nursing and healthcare.” Public media, Kagen argues, serves as an important tool for policy design. As Bill Nichols (1992) explains:

We see views of the world and what [documentaries] put before us are social issues and cultural values, current problems and possible solutions, actual situations and specific ways of representing them. The linkage between documentary and the historical world is the most distinctive feature of this tradition. Utilizing the capacities of sound recording and cinematography to reproduce the physical appearance of things, documentary film contributes to the formation of popular memory. It proposes perspectives on and interpretations of historic issues, processes, and events (ix).

My goals, as filmmaker and theorist, have been to animate important social theoretical perspectives in an accessible language for students and the general public, and to produce impactful insight for policy consideration. The essential task of social theorizing, as many have noted, is to lessen miseries and create conditions of possibility for liberation. Through QUAD Productions, and in more than half a dozen short and three feature-length documentaries, (Mountains That Take Wing/Angela Davis & Yuri Kochiyama: A Conversation on Life, Struggles & Liberation; América’s Home; and Bad Form: Queer, Broke & Amazing!), I have interrogated social movements in the United States and Puerto Rico, providing visual narratives about histories, social concerns, and theoretical perspectives from diverse communities and individuals. Through these films, I investigated policy related concerns such as immigration reform, racial segregation, hate crimes, gentrification, displacement, mass incarceration, poverty, and war. For the feature films, I conducted extensive archival and policy research (a process that took more than three years on each) in order to

* Direct correspondence to hltquan@gmail.com
provide the viewing audience with a context for the featured interviews. In both, I employed a similar feminist approach to historiography and interview techniques that I used for my monographs, *Growth Against Democracy: Savage Developmentalism in the Modern World* (Lexington Press, 2012) and *Against Tyranny* (forthcoming). Unlike the dominant approach to documentary filmmaking, QUAD Productions media does not employ an “authoritative” voice-over narration. Despite the fact that by rejecting voice-over, our aesthetic preference makes our films technically more difficult to accomplish, it reflects my training in feminist methodology and its democratic commitment to epistemic justice by pulling slow focus on and amplifying historically marginalized voices and communities.

While film shoots are financially and physically more taxing, and formal distribution outlets for finished films are fewer than for print-based work, “the pleasure and appeal of documentary film lies in its ability to make us see timely issues in need of attention, literally” (Nichols 1992, ix). As a theorist, I find the documentary format liberating: it allows me to be accountable to my subject-participants; and it makes it possible to communicate theoretical insights in everyday language, as social theories are both the reflection and product of everyday-life. Indeed, the influential *Educational Media Reviews Online* notes that *Mountains That Take Wing* (Women Make Movies, 2009) is “an incredible common oral history of social and political activism that can never be found, or duplicated in history books” (Threatt, 2012). The differential impact of visual and textual scholarship is hard to measure; nevertheless, I am proud that my documentary work has been selected to screen around the globe, in large and small venues, in film festivals, national museums and community centers, and in and out of the classroom. The fact that *Mountains That Take Wing*, for instance, has received both national and international film festival awards, attests to the potential and impact of this work, as well as the translatability of visual texts.

Finally, filmmaking is a collaborative process—a challenge not unlike the democratic process itself. Even with experimental short films, films are rarely made successfully by one individual. My long-time collaborator, C. A. Griffith (Associate Professor, Arizona State University Theatre and Film) and I co-founded QUAD Productions, a not-for profit grassroots media organization in 1999, and we have collaborated on numerous projects since 1996. QUAD Productions is committed to communication as a human right, and partners with grassroots organizations to provide media literacy and technical training. Griffith and I also believe that aesthetics and impactful content are not mutually exclusive; as such, we do not believe that we have to sacrifice aesthetics for socially potent content. We share equal credits and perform equitable tasks as co-producer/co-director/co-editor. Moreover, documentary filmmaking also requires a very high degree of collaboration on the part of the film’s subject-participants, which complicates expectations and assessments. *Mountains That Take Wing* took nearly thirteen years to complete not only because we had extremely limited resources but also because the principle participants had demanding schedules. For the completion of all three feature films, Griffith and I are fortunate to have received the support of the Wexner Center for the Arts (Columbus, OH) through its Film/Video Studio Residency program.

This collaborative nature of filmmaking embodies the truism that learning is almost always co-learning. Currently, Griffith and I are putting the final touches on *Bad Form: Queer, Broke & Amazing!*, a feature film on the impact of poverty and economic inequalities
on the lives and struggles of LGBTQ (lesbian/gay/bisexual/transgender/Queer) people and communities in the United States. After spending more than five years working on *Bad Form*, it is difficult to ignore the fact that the more than 200 participants in the film advance a cacophony of theoretical perspectives on economic justice and social transformation that rivals the most potent scholarship in academia and beyond.

**Notes**

1. An average production day lasts twelve hours; with most days running fourteen to sixteen hours long for consecutive days and weeks at a time. A documentary production often extends across several years.

2. In all our joint projects, Griffith is also the director of photography/camera operator; and I am the sound person, music supervisor and archivist.

**References**


BOOK REVIEWS
In *Making Moderate Islam*, Rosemary R. Corbett argues that demands on American Muslims to moderate their faith follows a history of religious minorities being expected to follow the nation’s dominant, Protestant ethic. Using a case study approach, she analyzes the activism efforts of New York City imam Feisal Abdul Rauf and his wife Daisy Khan, who were critical figures in the “translation [of] Islam into American idioms” (1). Corbett follows a line of scholars, such as Mahmood Mamdani (2004) and Saba Mahmood (2009), who critically dissect projects related to Muslim moderation—in fact, she serves as an interlocutor for Mahmood (38-39). Additionally, anthropologist Lila Abu-Lughod has written about Daisy Khan and WISE (2013), questioning how urban elites use culturally secular models to speak for non-elite Muslims and to present Islam to the West. Corbett enhances Abu-Lughod’s discussion by providing background about the rhetoric of Muslim moderation within which such women’s advocacy groups exist. In positing her own theory of how American Muslims emulate American values, Corbett uniquely explores how American Muslims’ religious subjectivities are shaped according to the neoliberal values of labor, deservedness and upward mobility.

Corbett begins by detailing Imam Rauf’s rise in Muslim leadership as well as influences shaping his religiopolitical philosophies. As an immigrant who spent his adulthood in the U.S., he first took a prominent role in the 1980s as the imam of Masjid al-Farah, a Sufi mosque in Manhattan. There, he emphasized Sufi psychology, which focuses on personal spiritual development and service from military to volunteer soup kitchens. Corbett argues that Rauf’s promotion of Sufism and community service within a neoliberal market economy is what defines moderate Islam for him. She notes that his vision of moderation “will be the province of more affluent Muslims”, and is fused with an economic philosophy that “ignores ongoing issues of racially differential treatment in this country” (4).

Corbett relies on a rich intersection of primary sources to support her thesis regarding how American Muslim religiosity is shaped. Her analysis of Rauf’s writings shows how he built upon the work of earlier thinkers. One such influence is Reverend Forest Church, whose view of “American Creed” affirmed the nation’s religious yet pluralistic nature, and Catholic pundit Michael Novak, who utilized a theological basis for neoliberal thought or “democratic capitalism” by emphasizing “individual responsibility in the context of free people, free markets and free trade” (27). A philosophical lineage emerges through Corbett’s meticulous historical and biographical research, revealing that Rauf’s father was Novak’s colleague, shared his theologically based economic outlook, and like his son, coupled Islam with the economy. Specifically, Rauf promotes corporations as providing easy access to capital (33) and insists that, to be economically successful, Muslims around the world must find a way to embrace neoliberal values in compliance with *Sharia* (loosely understood as “Islamic law”). He argues that by having institutionalized “Abrahamic ethics”, American political and economic systems inherently fulfill Islamic norms. With this reasoning, he roots Muslims within the nation’s Abrahamic genealogy, which has so far been reserved for “Judeo-Christians.”

Next, Corbett demonstrates how Rauf’s emphasis on neoliberal values of self-sufficiency reproduces problematic dichotomies espoused by Islamophobes, such as his opponent, Newt Gingrich. Both Rauf and Gingrich are inspired by common sources like Novak, “extol religiously rooted natural rights and a trajectory of political and economic liberation”, and
leverage Islamic terrorism to urge for a return to “America’s original ethics” (p. 25). What sets Rauf apart is his view of Sufism as a system allowing Muslims to complete religious obligations while gaining economic success. In chapters 3 and 4, Corbett outlines the organizations run by Rauf and his spouse, Daisy Khan, as well as their shifting philosophies. *Making Moderate Islam* explains how New Age groups, whose orientalist ideas simplified Sufism as a “mystical” and peaceful version of Islam, appropriated the tradition, and how Rauf and Khan capitalized on this representation in the 1990s. During a phase of institution building, the couple created the American Sufi Muslim Association (ASMA) to reach policy makers and interfaith leaders. Rauf was eventually identified by the State Department as an ally—his religious philosophies considered a panacea for “fundamentalist” Islam—and invited to take his message to Muslims overseas.

As Corbett argues, Rauf and Khan de-emphasized Sufism following 9/11, renamed the ASMA the American Society for Muslim Advancement, and positioned the organization as a cultural one focused on fostering an “American Muslim identity.” This rebirth emphasized the “essentials of Islam”, and rejected any attributes that clashed with the nation’s multicultural rhetoric (98). Rauf also created the Cordoba Initiative, a think tank that, like ASMA, emphasized and de-emphasized Sufism according to political tides (4). Both organizations were aimed at fostering “cultural, political and economic liberalism” (99). By the mid 2000s, Rauf and Khan were identified by the RAND Corporation as moderate allies and considered themselves models for Muslims globally.

In Chapters 5 and 6, Corbett importantly shifts her focus to race, class and gender. Here, she highlights the oft-forgotten fact that African American Muslims had been in community service long before Rauf began emphasizing volunteerism in the 1980s. While he was abroad for State Department projects, it was black Muslim leaders such as Imams Talib (Mosque of the Islamic Brotherhood) and Siraj Wahhaj (Masjid at-Taqwa) who maintained interfaith ties and continued working to alleviate economic hardship within their communities. Having endured disruption and disrepute by COINTELPRO during the civil rights era, they remained at the forefront of challenging the surveillance and criminalization of American Muslims. Yet, due in part to negative representations of the Nation of Islam, it was immigrant Muslims like Rauf’s father who “eclipsed black Americans as both models of Islamic authority and American respectability and moderation” (55). As a part of this discussion, Corbett examines rifts between immigrant and black Muslims, particularly how unaware many immigrant Muslims are of African American history and experiences. For instance, due to his lack of exposure to black Americans as well as the multicultural discourse of the 1990s, Rauf assumed that the U.S. was a post-racial society in which the civil rights movement had adequately removed barriers for African Americans. This optimism was not shared by black Muslim leaders such as Imam Siraj Wahhaj, who understood that America’s capitalist structure exploited foreign resources and domestic labor, leaving their communities both marginalized and impoverished (p. 120).

In addition to analyzing Rauf’s writings, Corbett employs ethnographic methods to provide firsthand insights that are, in ways, more captivating for the reader than her literature review alone. For six years, she immersed herself in Rauf’s Sufi community, building close relationships with regulars. Doing so confirmed racial and class disparities among members, for as she discovered, privileged Muslims used notions of individual responsibility to imply that immigrant Muslims who had not yet conformed to American norms had extremist leanings. Their religious beliefs and practices were considered sullied by “cultural influence”, while those of Rauf and his followers were deemed “authentic.” Corbett’s fieldwork also revealed
that Rauf’s followers did not always accept his injunctions passively. Rather, they negotiated them in accordance with their own views of the country, and in some cases, bristled at their imam’s tendency toward capitalism. Additionally, Corbett shows how Rauf created inclusive spaces for women at the mosque, while Khan created the Women’s Islamic Initiative for Spirituality and Equality (WISE), aimed at increasing female roles in religious leadership. Given the cultural, economic and political diversity of Muslim women, there were tensions in this regard also, for while gender inclusion comforted female converts, some Sufi women preferred following male imams.

Making Moderate Islam closes with the Park51 Community Center (“Ground Zero Mosque”), which many conservatives portrayed as a tribute to the 9/11 terrorists. Having viewed themselves as paragons within the community, Rauf and Khan were caught off guard when the project became not a celebrated beacon of American Islam, but an object of national ire. This was a key moment in the controversy, for it led Rauf to realize that he had not been as widely accepted a model Muslim as he had once thought. Consequently, his writings began acknowledging racial and class disparities in American society. While the Park51 dispute has been detailed in other ethnographies, such as Elizabeth Greenspan’s Battle For Ground Zero: Inside the Political Struggle to Rebuild the World Trade Center (2013), Corbett’s work is the first to understand it through rhetoric about “moderate Islam” that was central to it. Given its rich contributions, this book is useful to scholars and graduate and undergraduate students in Islamic studies, American studies, anthropology or any field dealing with religious subjectivities in the United States. Its accessible writing style also marks it as an important read for laypeople interested in current events related to Islam and Muslims in the United States.

Huma Mohibullah
Renton Technical College

References

Salvador Vidal-Ortiz’s, Brandon Andrew Robinson’s, and Cristina Khan’s study, *Race and Sexuality*, illuminates the role racialized sexualities play in our everyday lives. They view the overarching elements of race (and class) with sexuality (and gender) as working in connection with one another, both discursively and in quotidian experience. Contributing to Social Sciences, Black Studies, and Feminist Studies, they offer a more nuanced method to examine the relationship between race and sexuality through theoretical analysis and historical and contemporary case studies. The authors develop the term *USAmerican* in order to highlight the self-centered use of “American” to denote only people from the United States and to signify the importance of geopolitics in reproducing structures of domination. Utilizing terms like “ethno-racial” and “racialization,” they argue that the racial formation inscribed in the “USAmerican psyche” is structured on and through the racial binary of white/black, which at the same time shapes the binaristic structures of gender, sexuality, and class (7). Following scholars such as Anne McClintock and Siobhan Somerville, this book, through a social scientific lens, scrutinizes the interrelated aspects of race and sexuality as fundamentally inseparable factors that form the social configuration of our present-day world.

Organized into two parts, *Race and Sexuality* develops conceptual arguments through grounded case studies. Vidal-Ortiz, Robinson, and Khan critique the methods by which culture and socio-political structures maintain race and sexuality as distinct markers of difference. As such, Part One constructs a conceptual framework in order to discuss the systems of power that make race and sexuality concomitant in their cultural readings of human rights, sex work, and immigration for the rest of the book. Chapter One considers racialization and sexualization as imbricated processes and critique “discursive practices that have to be continually untangled and produced as distinctive” (28). In doing so, this chapter produces a literature review of feminist, gender, and sexuality studies, racial formation, and queer theory as a means to ultimately discuss intersectionality. The authors argue that much of the history of sexuality and sexuality studies scholarship, such as Candace West and Don H. Zimmerman (1987) and Judith Butler (1990; 2004), did not examine the “co-constitutive ways in which gender and other modes of difference are produced by and through each other” (38). They then turn to intersectionality as a mode of analysis that is able to contend with the ways that sexuality is raced and gendered through the work of Kimberlé Crenshaw (1991) and Patricia Hill Collins (2004). Yet, they maintain that this foundational emergence of intersectionality through the Black feminine experience is not able to expand its lens to analyze the experiences of non-Black women, and even go as far as to claim that this foundational emergence is heteronormative. Moving to the work of Cathy Cohen (1997) and Roderick Ferguson (2004), Vidal-Ortiz, Robinson, and Khan assert queer of color critique as a mode of thought that is able to unpack the diverse experiences of non-Black women, and attempt to expand their analysis to trans women of color and other social locations.

Chapter Two demonstrates how racialized sexualities influence people’s everyday lives by discussing race-based sexual stereotyping and neoliberal discourses around “personal preference,” which rationalize discriminatory acts through concealing the structural inequalities that shape these acts. Vidal-Ortiz, Robinson, and Khan contextualize various racial and sexual embodiments and show how race and sexualities intersect to produce specific social inequalities for different groups of people. For example, they spotlight “Racialized Sexualities and the ‘Down
Low’” to discuss race-based sexual stereotyping and “how race, sexuality, and gender intersect to pathologize certain forms of sexual contact and intimacy” (51). They argue that “Down Low” men position their racial identity above other identities, and thus to be Black means to be heterosexual and masculine. Ultimately, they conclude that even though heterosexual white men have same-sex sexual encounters and some of these men claim the “Down Low” identity, the “Down Low” discourse depends on the racialized sexual stereotypes of hyper-sexuality and deviance attached to Black men and other men of color. Vidal-Ortiz, Robinson, and Khan show the significance of context for the multiple meanings of racial and sexual embodiment and index how the intersections of these embodiments produce social and health inequalities. Black gay and bisexual men, for instance, are most affected by HIV but often have the most limited access to HIV clinics and quality healthcare. Further, the law criminalizes HIV positive Black gay and bisexual men and reproduces their embodiments as perverse as a means to surveil Black populations.

Part Two of Race and Sexuality focuses on three case studies to index concrete examples of racialized sexualities. Another summary line needed. Through focusing on human rights, sex work, and (im)migration, Vidal-Ortiz, Robinson, and Khan highlight the importance of thinking race and sexuality together. Chapter Three focuses on human rights and examines how the notions of gender and sexuality are “framed, utilized, and unevenly evaluated” within transnational human rights. Therefore, the authors propose to interrogate the dissemination of stigma along with marked bodies and the “reorganization of Global North and South governments which supports the colonial/racial order through sexuality and gender in human rights at an international level” (64). The chapter is divided into six sections where they begin by defining key terms like “human rights” and “transnational.” They then move to “the West versus the rest” framework and discuss how it portrays the West as more progressive than countries constructed as “backward” and that this in turn veils colonial histories and legacies. Human rights discourses are articulated as universally relevant yet are constructed through a Western lens. As such, they discuss Jasbir Puar’s notion of homonationalism to explain the ways that conceptions of sexual rights are applied to race-specific consequences. Homonationalism demonizes Muslims for being “backward” on gay and lesbian issues and marks gay-friendly countries as “modern” and “democratic.” For instance, “Pinkwashing” has been coined to illuminate how Israel markets itself as a global queer destination, which in turn conceals the human rights abuses imposed on Palestinians. Vidal-Ortiz, Robinson, and Khan then spotlight the contradictions and advancements in Colombia by writing, “[We] must move beyond an ethnocentric approach that suggests any proposed political change in the North/West will be equally productive elsewhere” (87). Arguing that a different model is necessary, the authors engage coalitional politics as a model that is intersectional because it indexes the manifold variables of social inequalities.

Chapter Four centers on issues of migration and racialized desire by looking at how these categories mutually constitute sex work in discursive ways. Divided into four sections, the authors begin by contextualizing the terms erotic labor, sex work, and sexual tourism, while at the same time differentiating them from conceptions of “trafficking or other erotic labor practices in order to outline different lines of inquiry that are often ignored in images of sex work as something that is ‘forced’ and often synonymous with ‘trafficked’” (98). Vidal-Ortiz, Robinson, and Khan show how sex work and erotic labor are fundamentally racialized as a means to create a more nuanced understanding to move beyond standard conceptions of sex work that reproduce its criminality. For example, they discuss the term “illicit eroticism” in
order to show how women of color disavow this criminality by resignifying the hypersexuality imposed on their working bodies into a mode of empowered labor. Highlighting the methods by which whiteness is idealized within the sexual schema of racialization, they work to “complicate the homogeneous notion of ‘sex worker’ by locating the distribution of racial and racialized readings onto different bodies” (107). First, they turn to embodied sexualized fantasies, such as the cheerleader and the nurse, where whiteness is synonymous with respectability and rewarded as the ideal sexuality. They then look to the MILF phenomenon, sexual tourism, sex trafficking, and mail-order brides to index how this “imaginary of coercion and subservience attributed to women of color becomes operationalized” (110). In sum, this chapter challenges the reader to reconceptualize the hegemonic understanding of sex work as only ascribed to notions of gender and sexuality by illuminating how sex work is always already racialized.

In Chapter Five, Vidal-Ortiz, Robinson, and Khan argue that literature on immigration often separates discourses on race from the study of migration. Further, if read through a racialized lens, migration studies tend to negate discourses on sexuality. They discuss Kibria, Bowman, and O’Leary’s (2014) term “race-immigration nexus” to illustrate how the connections between race, sexuality, and gender are connected through ideologies, practices, and institutions, but are veiled by a cultural defense of the more “all-inclusive” human rights subterfuge found in the host society, masking its fiscally-motivated policy-making efforts. By spotlighting Clare Sear’s *Arresting Dress* (2015), which establishes the interconnections of immigration with race, gender, and sexuality through analyzing the Chinese immigrants’ assimilation into the U.S. racial order, they move to discussing sexual stereotypes of immigrants as a discursive strategy that both historically and contemporarily demonizes immigrants who are fashioned as threats to the Western nation-state (129). While the book provides an astute analysis of how race and sexuality are mutually constitutive through an empirically grounded lens, a fuller examination of the presuppositions that allow race and sexuality to become markers of difference in the USAmerican formation of social relation was necessary. Put differently, Vidal-Ortiz, Robinson, and Khan needed a richer critique of the work of racial slavery and its afterlife in delineating racial and sexual difference, especially considering the imbrication of race and sexualities in the lived experiences of non-Black people in the U.S. Yet, the conceptual framework that they construct will be crucial for upper-division undergraduate courses as well as graduate seminars because the book provides an excellent overview of how racialized sexualities shape our everyday lives.

Meredith Lee
Berea College

Wilkinson’s book *Partners or Rivals? Power and Latino, Black, and White Relations in the Twenty-First Century* represents a much-needed systematic intervention in the scholarship on intergroup relations. In her meticulously detailed mixed method analysis of intergroup relations, Wilkerson takes us beyond the typical bilateral examinations of black and Latino perceptions or white-black perceptions, to assess triangular relations, considering how each group perceives each other within a racial triad and in relation to one another – black, white, and Latino. In so doing, *Partners and Rivals* provides us with new tools to better understand our prospects for interracial coalitions as well as why and under what conditions intergroup conflict persists.

Using quantitative analyses of the 2004 National Politics Survey (NPS), the 2006 Latino National Survey (LNS), and the 2010 Congressional Election Study (CCES) alongside census data and qualitative focus groups conducted in New Orleans and its surrounding areas, Wilkinson seeks to explain whether whites, blacks, and Latinos regard each other as “partners or rivals” by “exploring perceptions of closeness, commonality, and competition among the three groups (p. 2).” She argues that there are three categories of predictors that structure black, white and Latino perceptions of one another: social contact, context, and identification with one’s racial/ethnic group and identification with other groups. Wilkinson calls this the Triangular Theory of Contact, Context, and Identification (TTCCI), which she notes “argues that unequal levels of power exist across and among African Americans, Latinos and whites fostering an ‘us versus them’ perspective, yet this mentality is shaped by these groups’ social networks, sense of power (established by their social, political, and economic environments), and identification with member of their own group and others (p. 5)” Situating her analysis firmly in the intergroup relations scholarship, Wilkinson bridges the political science, psychological, and sociological literature on racial attitudes, identity, social contact, and politics. In so doing, she makes the case that power, contact, and identity intersect in complex ways to structure intergroup attitudes and social relations.

The substantive data sections of *Partners or Rivals* are organized by racial group, with Wilkinson pairing chapters that provide quantitative analyses and focus group results on Latino perceptions, black perceptions, and white perceptions respectively. In the chapters “Latinos’ Perceptions of African Americans and Whites: A Quantitative Analysis” and “Latinos Discuss Race Relations in New Orleans” Wilkinson argues that Latinos’ generally low socioeconomic clout due to immigration status, discrimination, and insecurity conditions them to side with either whites or blacks, but that this choice is also shaped by social contact. Quantitative data shows that native-born Latinos perceive greater commonality with blacks and may adopt a minority status. Wilkerson also finds that both native and foreign-born Latinos who interact with blacks or whites feel closer to these groups, respectively. Additionally, quantitative data suggests political power can seem to mitigate feelings of threat toward blacks, while the role of economic competition is more diffuse. For instance, Latinos who believe that they live in a mostly white county perceive less economic competition with whites while residing in high threat economic environments decreases affinity with blacks. Latinos who reside in low threat economic environments, however, do not feel a lower sense of competition with blacks. In sum, Wilkinson’s quantitative data show that Latinos feel slightly closer to blacks than whites, and regard whites as greater rivals.
Wilkinson’s qualitative data, however, show the opposite, finding that Latinos in New Orleans regard whites more favorably than blacks. She suggests that perhaps this disparate finding is due to an individual’s cultural levels rather than race. While it is not entirely clear what is meant by ‘cultural levels,’ another plausible methodological explanation for this discrepancy emerges when analyzing her size and composition of her sample. In the focus groups comprising 33 Latino adults interviewed in 2009, there were no Mexican participants despite the group representing two-thirds of the Latino population and an even larger proportion of Latinos in the South. Additionally, over 1/3 of her respondents were Argentine, a national origin group that is largely understood to be more middle-class, light-skinned, and European than many other South and Central American populations. While Wilkinson acknowledges that her sample is not representative, she does not provide national origin data or other background information for her individual respondents, making it impossible for the reader to assess if there are differences (as were found in her quantitative data) by origin, immigration status or another demographic characteristic. A discussion of how these differences may have impacted her respondents’ views would have been useful and may account for the differences between the author’s qualitative and quantitative findings.

The chapters “African Americans’ Perceptions of Latinos and Whites: A Quantitative Analysis” and “African Americans Discus Race Relations in New Orleans” examine blacks’ perceptions of Latinos and whites. In Wilkinson’s quantitative analysis of black perceptions of other racial groups, Wilkinson finds that blacks do not distinguish between Latinos and whites when it comes to closeness but perceive whites as the greater rivals. Moreover, like Latinos, social interaction positively predicts closeness with both of these groups, and perceptions of commonality with one group appear to correlate with views of commonality with the other. While racial context does not appear to structure intergroup relations consistently, economic and political context does seem to matter. For example, residing in high poverty areas increases blacks’ perceptions of both Latinos and whites as competitors, though this only appears to hold in non-South contexts. Blacks who are represented by a Latino legislator also perceive greater competition with Latinos, suggesting that while contact positively improves interracial attitudes the perception of uneven power relations or labor market position undermines positive intergroup perceptions and attitudes.

In Wilkinson’s qualitative analysis of focus groups with 31 black adults conducted in 2012, blacks generally reported commonality with both Latinos and whites, though they report slightly more commonality with whites. They also reported that race matters in terms of how they understand each group. For instance, blacks perceived greater competition with whites because they felt they were not often afforded the same opportunities as whites, as opposed to Latinos, who many felt faced similar struggles and were exploited in the labor market due to their immigration status. Moreover, perceptions of Latinos appeared to be refracted through the lens of how they were treated by whites, as Wilkinson notes that blacks believed that “whites use their positions of power to disadvantage African Americans even to the point where they create competition between blacks and Latinos” (135). Despite these apparent racialized perspectives on intergroup relations, Wilkinson appears to accept at face value blacks’ claims that they do not consider race or skin tone when thinking about closeness. Given that contact actually appears to undermine positive views toward Latinos in the qualitative data, a more complex analysis of intergroup attitudes seems merited here.

Finally, Wilkinson examines white perceptions in the chapters “Whites’ Perceptions of Latinos and African Americans: A Quantitative Analysis” and Whites Discuss Race Relations in
New Orleans.” In her quantitative analysis, she finds that social contact seems to have a positive effect on perceptions of both blacks and Latinos. Context, however, has divergent effects in that living in a predominantly Latino community increases the perception of closeness with Latinos, but living in a predominantly Latino or black community decreases perceptions of closeness with blacks. In general, however, Wilkinson finds that whites perceive more closeness with blacks than Latinos and that most whites do not perceive that these groups are distinct, suggesting a kind of white/non-white divide.

Wilkinson’s qualitative sample of 21 white respondents from focus groups conducted in 2010 is not representative of the greater New Orleans community, and so again, may account for disparate findings from her quantitative data. The sample was comprised mostly of men (76%) with more than half living below the poverty line and approximately 38% unemployed. Her data shows that while whites express similar levels of commonality with both groups, they regard Latinos more favorably than blacks and that they may perceive Latinos as higher on the social hierarchy. This is reflected in the view that whites feel that blacks compete with them in the labor market, but that whites themselves feel competitive with Latinos. Wilkerson also uncovers evidence that social contact improves whites’ favorability to both blacks and Latinos, although contact in the workplace may increase perceptions of threat.

In her analysis of all three groups, Wilkinson’s quantitative data appeared to be more compelling than her qualitative data. However, she nevertheless persuasively demonstrates that perceptions of sociopolitical power, social contact, identity, and racial context shape perceptions of closeness and competition between racial groups. Wilkinson also argues convincingly that these processes can have interactive effects, underscoring the relational and hierarchical nature of race and intergroup relations in ways that are not always sufficiently theorized in the literature. In this way, Wilkinson’s concept of TCCI adds nuance to many of our existing intergroup relations theories by testing them as both complementary and competing explanations.

For example, while she finds that social contact generally improves intergroup perceptions, it can also have divisive effects, increasing a sense of closeness with one group while simultaneously diminishing closeness with another. Likewise, while threat explains relations between minority groups, it does not appear to similarly explain relations between whites and minorities, particularly with regard to political context. Partners and Rivals also contends that identification matters, in that identification with one’s group structures outgroup attitudes as well. In sum, Wilkinson’s TCCI approach provides scholars with a dynamic tool to understand how racial groups perceive one another, and how they can better account for major shifts such as demographic change or political backlash in shaping intergroup relations.

Jennifer Jones
University of Illinois at Chicago

Michael Brecher has contributed much to our understanding of the emergence of protracted conflicts. In *The World of Protracted Conflicts* he draws upon a half-century of his work to provide an exhaustive account of the emergence, persistence, and resolution of interstate disputes that continue to vex the international community. Anyone interested in understanding the development of this subfield in political science will find this book to be an impressive expansion of key concepts and ideas and an in-depth exploration across spatial and temporal boundaries.

Brecher begins by providing a multifaceted definition of protracted conflicts in the twentieth-century, which he defines as one of “at least ten years - and three or more interstate crises” (4). Protracted conflicts differ from other concepts like enduring rivalry because it accounts for as little as two actors present in the conflict to as many as nineteen actors identified in the Yugoslav conflict. Territory and identity are described as some of the basic causes in the onset of a protracted conflict, with the presence of multiple basic causes increasing the likelihood of conflict occurrence. One illustration of how multiple causes are present is found in Western Sahara. Brecher argues the dispute between Morocco and the Polisario, which represents the Sahrawi people, is primarily over territorial claims, with the ethnic differences between the Sahrawis and Moroccans an important secondary motivating factor. Multiple issue areas then make it more difficult for any one militarized dispute to resolve the underlying conflict. In the case of the territory, Brecher makes clear that areal issues are almost always present even when these objectives do not appear as the primary concern of conflict actors with two-thirds of the cases having a territorial component. Identity is framed as an in-group/out-group competition that can encompass a range of categories from ethnicity to religion. When identity is combined with another causal mechanism, the probability of a conflict occurring, persisting and eluding resolution increases. Once the conflict begins, the presence of multiple causes will lead actors to commit conflict-sustaining actions until a change in the bargaining environment. Thus, it emerges: 1) Unresolved protracted conflicts usually have multiple discordant objectives, and 2) changes in capabilities between actors and external pressures help in resolving the underlying bargaining issues.

In Part 1, Brecher explores the historical roots of protracted conflicts, examining thirty-three cases that he identifies from across the world that existed in the post-World War I era. What separates this book from much of contemporary political science is the emphasis on the long view of history. In examining the historical roots of the Angolan protracted conflict, Brecher began not with the immediate period before decolonization by the Portugual, but with the arrival of the Portuguese in southern Africa in the late 15th century. In discussing the protracted conflict between France and Germany, Brecher also continuously turns our attention to the division of Charlemagne’s empire in 843 A.D. rather than the nineteenth century, where the enduring rivalry literature traditionally dates the beginning of the dispute. Brecher’s attempt to provide breadth in not only these discussions, but in all that he has identified makes the scope of the work truly remarkable. In fact, six of the book’s thirty-three cases have a measured duration of more than one thousand years.

In Parts 2 through 4, Brecher examines the many causes for the onset, persistence, and resolution of these conflicts. It is persistence of fighting that is most interesting because it separates protracted conflicts from traditional interstate disputes. He argues that a confluence of factors change an interstate conflict into a protracted one. In addition to the presence of discordant objectives, conflicts with a balance of capability between adversaries and a series of conflict-sustaining acts are those with the higher likelihood of continuance. Another interesting finding about persistence is
that conflicts are likely to continue if they are between small and medium-sized powers, suggesting that these conflicts are allowed to fester because larger powers are not threatened. Changes in the balance of capability and/or the presence of external pressure that finally allows these protracted conflicts to reach a successful resolution. A confluence of factors often lead to resolution, as in the case of the Angolan conflict and that of France-Germany where there was not only external pressures on the actors, but also material exhaustion on all sides. When considering Angola, the long-running civil war coupled with the removal of Cuban and South African forces led to resolution. In the latter case, The United States put pressure on France and Germany because of the emerging Cold War. Brecher believes these actors might have withstood that pressure if not for the huge costs both countries absorbed in the two world wars. These conflicts illustrate that when understanding the onset, persistence and resolution of a conflict that it is never one causal factor, but rather, a myriad of causes that make conflict intractable.

Though Brecher rightly identifies power and territory as a motivation for many interstate disputes, his consideration of this issue highlights a major issue of the work¾ namely that the literature would benefit from a real exploration of race and ethnicity as it is difficult to tease these issues apart from territory. For example, in the case of Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda, a competing argument could be made that the reason the conflict persists is because perceived ethnic differences in actors cannot be overcome. Even when resources and battlefield capabilities are exhausted, the conflict persists because of deep, underlying identities that leaders have promoted and manipulated for support of their politics. That interpretation becomes more compelling when considering the interaction of interstate and intrastate protracted conflicts, which again is an issue in the DRC-Rwanda conflict, but is unfortunately beyond the scope of this text. Better identification of the causal mechanisms in the persistence of conflicts through a more rigorous case study approach such as process tracing would have strengthened the work and helped to eliminate competing explanations.

Related to the issue of exploring alternative explanations is the actual operationalization of the protracted conflict concept within the text. When considering sub-Saharan African conflicts, it is surprising that Ethiopia-Eritrea is not included. It is quite possible that for Brecher this dispute is not a protracted conflict, but this clash by his own definition has lasted over a decade and has more than three interstate crises even after excluding Eritrea’s war of independence. More clarity about case selection would allow for an evaluation of the hypotheses proposed as well as replicability by other scholars. Finally, rather than testing hypotheses about what causes a protracted conflict against all disputes, Brecher tests his hypotheses only against protracted conflicts. Thus, it is unclear if his explanation for the persistence and resolution of protracted conflicts would apply to all conflicts. It would have been helpful to have these protracted conflicts contrasted with isolated interstate disputes so one could fully see the impact of these factors in creating a protracted conflict.

Despite these limitations, The World of Protracted Conflicts is an important intervention in our understanding of the persistence of certain conflicts in today’s world even as the world as a whole might be becoming more peaceful. In the book’s conclusion we are reminded that in many of Brecher’s cases that reached resolution, external pressures played some role in ending the conflict. Such a finding points to the significance of this work for not only scholars, but for policymakers alike.

Michael Burch
Eckerd College

The causes and effects of political finance regulations around the world are often complicated. Within the United States, the first attempt at a comprehensive set of political finance regulations was almost immediately contested by the Supreme Court, requiring a series of amendments to conform to the Court’s standards. Since then, various actors have battled to shape the remaining rules, resulting in a political finance system today that looks quite different than it did in 1972. In *Checkbook Elections?: Political Finance in Comparative Perspective*, editors Norris and Abel van Es use a series of case studies and two cross-national analyses to demonstrate the ways in which an evolution in political finance regulations can take place across different national contexts. While the case studies show that each country’s political finance regime is unique, Norris and Abel van Es ably draw on common factors between these countries to make inferences about why, in general, political finance regulation is adopted and what effects it is likely to have.

The most valuable contribution of the book to the field is its methodology from all of the authors. The book uses a mixed methods approach of both quantitative and qualitative analysis that serves as a useful reminder to scholars that political finance laws should not be taken at face value using one approach. Both methods can give a robust perspective of how political finance laws function within a certain country. A simple regression analysis that relies only on whether a country has or does not have a given political finance regulation will fail to detect important nuances in their implementation. For example, if an analysis asks only whether a country has public financing provisions, it will fail to differentiate programs with robust public funding that fosters meaningful party competition, as in Japan, from those that have been effectively defunct for years from lack of use, as is the case with the presidential public financing system in the United States (103; 182). Several of the case studies explain how countries adopted reforms in response to a salient political finance scandal (including notably in Brazil, the United Kingdom, Japan, and the United States), while others sought to consolidate power or emulate other countries.

Perhaps the most valuable methodological contribution of the case studies is that they elucidate how vast a gap there often is between the *de jure* political finance laws in each country and the *de facto* implementation of those laws. While this gap arguably exists to some extent in all the countries under examination, it appears to be most pronounced in countries which have some of the strictest regulations, such as Indonesia and Russia. The authors of each of these case studies carefully describe the ways in which an ostensibly strict political finance regime has served as a cover for pay to play politics in the case of Indonesia, and an entrenched authoritarian regime in the case of Russia (102; 121). This lesson is taken onboard by Norris and Abel van Es in their second cross-national analysis, where they draw on Perceptions of Electoral Integrity (PEI) data in their regression model (241). This measure, which is based on expert evaluations of how elections work in various countries, avoids conflating the *de jure* regulations with how effective the political finance regime is in practice.

In her analysis using data from the Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), Abel van Es runs Bayesian factor analysis on the relative level of regulation of contributions, spending, public funding, and disclosure across various countries in the IDEA database, thereby constructing a continuous measure of overall state intervention. While a novel
contribution, we should be careful not to conflate the level of nominal state intervention in political finance—what is given by the IDEA data—with the actual implementation of that intervention. Moreover, the index by itself does not distinguish between intervention used for good or ill, so it may not be able to determine the circumstances under which an effective political finance regime will be adopted with respect to some set of democratic goals. Russia has the 7th highest PFRI index among countries in the IDEA database, while the Russia case study demonstrated that this intervention was not designed in such a way as to render the electoral system more competitive, but rather to maintain the power of the incumbent major party (275).

The penultimate chapter of the book deals with how effective political finance regulations are towards reaching various goals: short-term, medium-term, and long-term. This is a quite helpful differentiation, as regulation detractors will sometimes argue that a political finance regime has failed when it has not yet achieved long-term goals, such as making elections more competitive, while it has nevertheless achieved a short-term goal, such as closing the gap in fundraising between incumbent and non-incumbent candidates. As Norris and Abel van Es point out, it may take many years before a political finance regime achieves its full effects, such as reducing corruption or creating a more competitive party system (232-233). In their first regression analysis, Norris and Abel van Es find that there is a positive, statistically significant relationship between level of state intervention and the perception of the political finance regime—that is, the more state intervention, the better experts rate the political finance regime on pro-democratic values. However, the authors note there are some notable outliers, such as Sweden which rates quite low on the state intervention scale but high on the perceptions measure (242).

Their second regression model may be of more interest to policy reformers, as it directly tests the effect of the type of political finance regulation on perceptions of electoral integrity (243). Interestingly, only reporting and disclosure rules had a statistically significantly positive relationship with PEI—donations bans, spending bans, and public subsidies all had positive correlations, but failed to achieve statistical significance. While we cannot conclusively say that the latter 3 regulations are not helpful for democratic goals without time series or experimental data, this should motivate further study of how reporting and disclosure rules are so effective, and how they can be made more so in countries without rigorous political finance disclosure.

Checkbook Elections is a well-written book that incorporates experts on political finance in various countries, while also engaging in two robust cross-national analyses. These latter analyses contribute to the political finance literature by identifying specific regulations that may reduce perceptions of corruption, whereas recent literature has found that political party subsidies may be ineffective at doing so (see e.g. Bértocia et al. 2014). They also fill a gap in the literature by accounting for a country’s institutional and political framework when examining the effectiveness of its political finance regulations (Casas-Zamora 2005). The case studies make it an excellent work for students of comparative politics, particularly for those who are interested in elections. Policy reformers interested in fostering transparency and political competition will also find that there is a panoply of ideas to be gleaned from the text’s analysis of various political finance regulations implementation in a multitude of contexts. As the editors of this volume astutely observe, there is no single intervention that worked for any of the countries in the study—rather, reformers must draw from a wide range of approaches to achieve democratic goals.

Justin Koch
Georgetown University
References


It is difficult to read Hoskins and Tulloch’s *Risk and Connectivity: Media and Memories of Neoliberalism* outside of the current US context, where in the shadow of the 2016 election discussions of neoliberalism have given way to conversations about race, intersectionality, and white supremacy; populism and nativism; and terrifyingly empowered white supremacist movements. Unfairly then, the book’s focus on the crisis of neoliberalism in the wake of the 2008 global financial crisis and the role that the media played in that crisis feels disconnected from today’s urgent problems. However, this captures one of the central themes of the book—that media aids living memory, shaping how we perceive the present and past.

The authors focus on three major thematic and theoretical strands throughout the book. The first is the deep discussion of memory, in particular, the interaction of the media and memory. Hoskins and Tulloch discuss how memory shapes understandings of events, examining the ways in which memories of the economic crises in the 1930s and 1970s became touch points for the 2008 global financial crisis. Hoskins and Tulloch also look to the lack of discussion of “neoliberalism” in reporting prior to 2008 and its reemergence as a term of discussion in 2008 during the crisis. Pointing to journalists, who they identify as public intellectuals who shape understanding of the world, they tie their analysis to Giroux’s concept of the “violence of organized forgetting” (p.11). The authors broadly refer to neoliberalism as the “economic ‘free market’ model that has dominated Western globalization since the days of Thatcher and Reagan,” but spend extensive time in the book engaging with various theoretical and applied definitions of neoliberalism from a wide range of disciplines and sources (p.3, see Chapter 2).

The discussion of memory is deeply tied to the question of global risk. Here, Hoskins and Tulloch begin from Beck’s 1992 *The Risk Society*, which attempted to identify events that create system level crises. In their discussion of risk, Hoskins and Tulloch focus on the mediatization of risk as defined by Hoskins and O’Loughlin (2015) as, “The process by which risk is increasingly embedded in and penetrated by media, such that to understand, predict, assuage, employ, historicize, remember, forget, and imagine risk requires attention to that media (established and emergent) and its uses” (p.9). They focus on the 2008 global financial crisis to understand both mediated risk and the role of memory in shaping the ways in which the media interpreted the complexity of the crisis, framing it and providing meaning for readers.

In addition to memory and risk, Hoskins and Tulloch also focus on the theme of hyperconnectivity. They discuss hyperconnectivity in the form of the increasing synergies between Internet-based media and traditional media that they argue have brought more and more images of disaster, war, and collapse to people. In pursuit of this theme, Hoskins and Tulloch directly criticize Bennett and Segerberg’s 2011 widely cited article, “The Logic of Connective Action: Digital media and the personalization of contentious politics.” Hoskins and Tulloch engage in a competing analysis of the same 12 days of reporting on the G20 meeting in London in May 2009 that Bennett and Segerberg do in their article. In Hoskins and Tulloch’s analysis, they emphasize the role of the newspapers in framing the protests and draw attention to the police practice of kettling (a highly controversial method of crowd control where police surround protesters and keep them confined in a small area). They argue that Bennett and Segerberg’s article over-emphasizes the role of digital media—pushing back on Bennett and Sederberg’s argument that the presence of digital media has meant limited involvement of
formal organizations in large-scale protest and increased levels of communication with outside publics via informal channels such as social media, creating something they call “connective action.” Instead, Hoskins and Tulloch argue that attention should be paid to the elements of collective action that are timeless and have continued—specifically, the role of carnival and the physicality of protest that have always been powerful elements of collective action.

Underpinning all three themes is Hoskins and Tulloch’s discussion of neoliberalism and how the media’s engagement with the idea of neoliberalism during a major risk event such as the 2008 financial crisis shapes understanding of the event and its larger meanings. To explore these themes, Hoskins and Tulloch organize their book into two major sections and focus their analysis on the United Kingdom. The first part, titled “Memories of Neoliberalism,” articulates the theoretical stakes of their book and then engages in textual, narrative, and discursive analysis of news relating to the 2008 global financial crisis, with particular focus on the framing of the crisis and the use of neoliberalism as a concept. They analyze newspaper content from the 
\textit{Guardian}, the 
\textit{Telegraph}, the 
\textit{Daily Telegraph}, and material from tabloids such as the 
\textit{Daily Mirror} and the 
\textit{Daily Mail}, including editorials, news reporting, specialist commentary, cartoons, letters, and photographs. They also engage in deep analysis of two ethnographic case studies by Juris and by Brown and Hoskins. In the second section, titled, “Scarcity and Postscarcity,” they move through a series of case studies of their own, including the July 2005 London bombings and the subsequent 2010 coroner’s inquest, the English riots in 2011, and the 2014 publication of Piketty’s \textit{Capital in the Twenty-First Century}.

Hoskins and Tulloch’s book is dense and difficult to parse, at times feeling like a focus on a series of trees rather than the forest. As such, it is most appropriate for graduate students and scholars than more novice readers. Chapters sometimes push the reader into a deep discussion of theory and concepts or, alternatively, drop the reader into thick analysis of news stories with insufficient big picture framing. Furthermore, their evidence needs better links to the causal argument that is being made. For instance, we are never told why we should believe that newspapers are so pivotal in shaping public memory, an argument that is especially important considering the decline of traditional media globally.

Of greater concern is that the focus on neoliberalism obliterates any other major societal organizing principal—with the most notable absence being any mention of race. Using the 2011 English riots as a case study brings this problem into sharp relief. The 2011 English riots began when the Metropolitan Police shot and killed a young black man named Mark Duggan. The police claimed he had a gun, but no weapon was found on his body. After an initial peaceful protest outside a police station, there were five days of riots that began in London but then spread to other towns in England. In the wake of the riots, three major arguments about cause emerged: (1) basic criminality and bad values, (2) socio-economic resentment following several years of austerity measures by the British government, and (3) race, particularly the intersection of race, poverty, and racial profiling by the police. Studies have since shown that both socio-economic resentment as well as race and racial profiling by police fostered the unrest.

However, Hoskins and Tulloch draw on Fuchs’ argument that the rioters were driven by the violence of neoliberalism. In the case study, they grapple with the question of why scholars and the media focused on Twitter when trying to understand the underlying mobilizing mechanism of the riots. They fairly critique this focus on Twitter, as most studies after the riots found that users on Twitter were responding to events, not pushing them (except for clean-up campaigns). Instead, as the authors touch upon, the rioters, ingeniously, were often using BlackBerry’s internal, encrypted messaging to coordinate flash mobs. A similar tactic had
been used in other mass mobilizations that appeared to be organized disorder from the outside, notably the 2005 Cronulla race riots in Australia, where white Australians targeted and attacked anyone of Middle Eastern appearance, and the 2005 riots in France by Arab and African youth after a rumor spread that the police had killed two young men of North African descent. In the case of the English riots, the youth in the neighborhoods where a potent intersection of race, poverty, and police brutality set the stage for mass mobilization all had BlackBerry’s because they were cheaper than other smartphones and their core messaging app was free.

Not only does the focus on neoliberalism obfuscate many of the very real, and foundational, grievances about the racialized nature of opportunity in the UK, but in keeping their focus on neoliberalism, Hoskins and Tulloch seem to miss the opportunities that social media may provide. For instance, at the end of the English riot case study, Hoskins and Tulloch argue that the new media environment amplifies risk—but that new media is deeply tied to the “old.” This is true. But, it is also true that the new media environment removes the gatekeeping role of the old memory creators, and opens the doors to new powerbrokers in the understanding of risk. Newspapers remain important powerbrokers of meaning. But, social media has given new groups opportunities to project messages and grab hold of the ways in which memory is used and created. For instance, Freelon, McIlwain, and Clark’s 2016 study of Black Lives Matter (BLM), which drew upon 40.5 million tweets, over 100k web links, and 40 interviews of BLM activists and allies, found that social media posts were critical in spreading Michael Brown’s story nationally. They also found that protesters were able to spread their stories without needing mainstream news outlets and that activists succeeded in reaching and educating casual observers.

Hoskins and Tulloch offer a valuable framework in their examination of memory, risk, and hyperconnectivity. Their focus on continuity, such as the centuries old role of carnival in protest, rather than the new and disruptive, is also a refreshing reminder for researchers to widen focus beyond the latest digital tools. However, Hoskins and Tulloch’s exclusive focus on neoliberalism hides the fact the framework is flexible enough to take any central organizing theme of political, economic, and social life as a lens through which to understand the world.

Jessica L. Beyer
University of Washington, Seattle

References


The concept of innovation is a popular topic, but a difficult one to understand comprehensively. The call for new technological innovations is relentless in the modern era, yet creating, designing, governing and implementing innovations remains a difficult issue for policymakers and the public. As the title of this work indicates, Mark Zachary Taylor takes a macroscopic approach to explaining why some countries have excelled at developing scientific and technological innovations and why other countries have struggled. Despite this dichotomous view, the work is a mammoth undertaking that utilizes both quantitative and qualitative data. His major contribution on an organizational level is to separate “how nations innovate with why they do so” (4), noting that these two categories are often conflated. In order to separately examine these categories, Taylor explores two major criteria that are often overlooked, but contribute greatly to how innovative a society can be: social networks and creative insecurity. Taylor uses the nation-state as the category of examination to further understand why a country innovates, and perhaps just as importantly, what prevents a state from innovating effectively.

Taylor opens his work with a useful overview of the different standards and methods of measuring scientific and technological innovation. These are generally confusing and overlapping categories and innovation scholars, including political scientists, technological historians, and economic analysts, use different terms and metrics to discuss innovations, especially because the success or failure of innovations may only be identifiable in hindsight. Taylor highlights “boundaries, definitions, measurement, and data” (25) as the major categories that need to be understood initially in order to gain an understanding of the history of innovations and their cultural effects. Under boundaries, Taylor notes that his study focuses on the post-World War II era and uses the nation-state as the category of inspection. The author looks especially at outlier nations whose successes and failures at innovation cannot be explained by policies and institutions alone, acknowledging the “black box” nature of measuring innovations as highly subjective. He also breaks down his data into inputs (e.g., resources devoted to R&D), outputs (patents, publications, and products), surveys (to assess value) and indices (to aggregate and correlate these measurements).

While these different boundaries and categories are necessary to make a cohesive study, they limit his study to subjective and established categories. For instance, patent data privileges businesses and individuals who live in countries where patents are an established method of assuring property rights over intellectual endeavors. Innovations may be occurring in other, more grassroots, collaborative, and localized arenas, but patent law may not capture those innovations. Taylor acknowledges the weaknesses in his measurements, noting they are often “imprecise, indirect, and fraught with errors and potential biases” (38). However, he also notes that this is an affliction in other fields from economics to political science, and the data may still hold worth for studying incentives and impediments to innovation. Taylor then applies his approach to several unproven beliefs about the drivers of innovation, including economy size and military spending. By examining actual results when these drivers are analyzed using statistical data, he finds no strong correlation between these beliefs and actual innovative nations. He caveats his finding to note that this does not mean there is no causality, but rather that these are not the only drivers of innovation.
In the second section of his work, Taylor turns to the question of how nations innovate by debunking several popular, yet untested, beliefs behind innovation; chiefly, the idea that innovation lies solely in the realm of governmental policies and institutions. He first identifies what he calls the five pillars of innovation that governments contribute to: 1) the protection of property rights; 2) research and development subsidies and funding; 3) education; 4) research universities; and 5) trade policies. By examining the role of government in supporting these pillars, Taylor is able to go beyond the dichotomous view of whether government involvement in innovation fosters development or hinders it. Taylor notes that democratic and decentralized governments are believed to be the most effective for fostering innovation, due to more competition between developers, local input from policy-makers, and more decision-making from a diffuse population; thus, making it harder for special interest groups to impede innovations. Yet, these hypotheses are not correlated by the data available, and Taylor spotlights the United States as a chief violator of this theory. He showcases that the many innovations developed in the US in the late 1800s to 1920s came at a time when civil rights were non-existent for minorities; women were ignored politically and economically and immigrants were excised from political society, while the federal government instituted draconian measures control over industry.

He takes this analysis further by continually returning his focus to four very different nation-states: Israel, Taiwan, Ireland, and Mexico which he describes as “the most paradoxical country cases” where their prior histories of poverty and limited economic options, as well as unstable governance has not precluded them from becoming successful innovators at science and technology (S&T) (27). Taylor uses them as empirical case studies to examine the ways that socio-political and economic networks play a critical role in developing innovations in science and technology. For these states, it is not just that state governments intervened to foster the growth of S&T, but rather the specific and contextual ways in which they did that affected development. For instance, Israel, Taiwan and Ireland were all agricultural states that lacked public and private investments in science, technology, engineering and math (STEM) fields, infrastructure, communication, and research and design (R&D) projects (142). They each pursued smaller scale endeavors to raise their S&T profiles internationally, but took very different paths, with Israel’s government investing heavily into R&D and STEM training, especially around military and high-tech projects in the private sector, and combined with aggressive investments in international partnerships. Taiwan took a different path, by investing public funds into federal institutions that focused on producing high-tech goods, patenting new technologies, and growing the information technology sector. Public investment remained in the public sphere, with government control and collaboration throughout the process of S&T development, while also reaching out to foreign partners to make international connections. Taiwan’s government carved out spaces of specialization for its high-tech industries, creating a reputation for improving new technological innovations. Ireland also used government intervention to bolster their S&T development by creating an institution that oversaw investments into STEM education and infrastructure, and the Irish state developed more protections for domestic patents. Yet Taylor characterizes Ireland’s limited success in S&T innovations as stemming from investing too much into international connections, and a lack of investment in domestic companies, creating fewer long-term partnerships that Israel and Taiwan have created and continue to invest in. The final state that Taylor closely analyzes is Mexico, which he sees as a relative failure, but provides an instructive case for analysis. In general, Mexico specialization was to supply low-wage labor to internationals firms that left when new and cheaper opportunities arose elsewhere around the globe, leaving few pathways for Mexico to develop domestic S&T innovations, even
as the Mexican government failed to invest in local STEM education and protections for local S&T development. By focusing on these four states, Taylor is able to explore specific historical contexts and political issues that affected each nations’ interventions into S&T innovation and provide useful insights into the role of the five pillars of government support, as well as the importance of social networks.

In the final section of the book, Taylor focuses on why nations innovate. He first examines impediments to innovation, using the unfortunate category of technological “losers” in reference to economic, social, cultural and political stakeholders who resist the changes that innovation can bring to societies. In order to challenge these entrenched barriers to innovation, he identifies “creative insecurity” as a key element of innovation which he defines as “the positive difference between the threats of economic or military competition from abroad and the dangers of political-economic rivalries at home” (216). Taylor notes that this is not to say that the constant threat of war is what keeps a nation innovating, but rather it is the push-and-pull of domestic and international unrest that shapes innovation of a nation-state. He uses the early colonial history of the United States as an example, where the role and reach of a federal government was hotly contested, especially in relation to levels of aggression from the United Kingdom. At times of peace, pastoralists who valued a limited government resisted establishing pillars for S&T development and national economic markets. At times of war, more funding was allowed for the opposite, including establishing universities and research for innovations in manufacturing.

Taylor’s approach of using large statistical data and case studies allows him to apply more nuance to the dichotomy of success and failure by identifying the internal and external factors that created points of intervention in S&T, and how those interventions affected S&T development. He is careful to point out that the concept of creative insecurity is not a deterministic factor of innovation development but rather a probabilistic one that requires attention to how different factors integrate with one another to define singular outcomes for different states regarding technological innovation, and how the tide for innovations can ebb and flow depending on a variety of conditions internal and external to the state. Taylor’s work is adept at identifying more stars in the increasingly complex constellation of innovations research. It builds upon and adds much-needed nuance to, the oversimplified mantra of “policies and institutes” as the main drivers of innovation through statistical data and well-chosen case studies. However, while his macro-approach provides an excellent overview to the myriad of parties interested in innovation studies, including policy-makers, historians, economists, and social scientists, it is limited in terms of a granular approach to local conditions of innovation development. Because he is focused on the nation-state as the principle category of study, Taylor cannot do more than a cursory examination of specific conditions in many states. For the most part, Taylor leaves more in-depth case studies to other scholars, and instead provides a valuable framework for incorporating new variables into understanding how nations innovate and the underlying reasons for pursuing innovations.

Jennifer Richter
Arizona State University

A substantial proportion of research in American political science seeks to understand presidential elections, but these studies often overlook how political changes in the states may affect presidential election outcomes. In *Altered States: Changing Populations, Changing Parties, and the Transformation of the American Political Landscape* (2016), Thomas M. Holbrook proposes that population changes in the United States influence presidential election outcomes. He finds that many states have shifted or strengthened their partisan leanings over the past several decades. For example, Democrats made substantial gains in Colorado and Hawaii from the 1972 presidential election to the 2012 election, resulting in Colorado becoming a competitive state and Hawaii becoming a safe state for Democratic presidential candidates. On the other hand, support for Republican presidential candidates grew in Idaho during this period. Holbrook argues we need to explain these shifts in state-level presidential election outcomes, something largely missing in previous research. As a result, this work undertakes an important examination of the role of demographic trends in presidential politics, advancing the existing literature. Furthermore, Holbrook’s research demonstrates the importance of considering state politics in national elections.

Holbrook begins the book by establishing changes in the political landscape of party support across the states. His main source of data for this analysis is the state-level Democratic vote share in presidential elections from 1972 to 2012. He measures movement in states’ Democratic vote shares by comparing the average vote share in the 1972-80 elections to the average in 2004-12 presidential elections. He uses comparisons like this throughout the book to measure change in party support at the state level. As noted above, some states have become more Democratic or Republican, while others have experienced little partisan change. Explaining these shifts is the major goal of the book. Holbrook proposes that changing demographics help explain this altered political landscape.

In the second chapter, Holbrook lays out his theory, which includes two types of effects that account for state-level changes in party support. The first model holds that compositional changes in the demographic makeup of the population will affect statewide party support levels in presidential elections. For example, increases in the proportion of racial and ethnic minority voters in a state may shift the state more Democratic. He proposes that migration patterns are a major reason for these compositional changes in states’ population. The second model focuses on the role of contextual effects on party support. By contextual effects, Holbrook is referring to how the broader political environment may alter group attachments to a political party. For example, changes in the parties’ positions on race-related issues like civil rights strengthened the association of Black voters with the Democratic Party. Holbrook is interested in how growing polarization among political elites may strengthen group-based affiliations with the two major political parties. In sum, he expects compositional changes in population and contextual effects to help explain changes in the political landscape of presidential elections.

Considering the multiple causal mechanisms that seemingly occur simultaneously, Holbrook explains his theory well. His models build on previous research on political geography and politics parties, connecting them in an interesting manner. Along with his focus on contextual effects, this helps contribute to existing theories. However, the theory is complicated, making it challenging to follow at times. Thankfully, Holbrook builds the analysis in pieces to empirically
test his theoretical expectations. The chapters also include clear summary discussions, helping remind the reader of the key points.

Holbrook uses different empirical models and data to evaluate his compositional and contextual models of political change. In addition to state-level presidential vote shares, he uses state demographic and political measures collected from multiple sources, including the U.S. Census Bureau and the ANES. The empirical analysis begins by evaluating how migration affects state political outcomes by changing statewide support for Democratic presidential candidates. He examines both internal migration (state-to-state) and external migration (foreign-born individuals moving to a state). Studying both types of migration is important because it separates these politically different groups of people. He finds that states with a substantial foreign-born population increased their support for Democratic candidates. In contrast, the percentage of internal migrants in a state does not explain changes in party support. Expanding on existing research, he then proposes where internal migrants move from is a key factor influencing partisan allegiances in a state. Holbrook finds that when a state experiences in-migration with people moving from liberal states, it increases the statewide support for Democratic presidential candidates. Likewise, when it is largely people from conservative states moving to a state, it shifts the state more Republican. These findings establish that foreign-born migration and internal migration contribute to changes in states’ partisan leanings.

Next, the author examines how compositional changes in state populations connect to changes in party support in presidential elections. This is where other key determinants of party support enter the empirical models, including socioeconomic status and race. Due to group-based attachments to political parties, Holbrook expects that changes in group strength in the electorate relates to shifts in support for presidential candidates. For example, Democrats should see more vote gains in states experiencing larger increases in their non-white population. Holbrook finds that changes in a state’s non-white population does affect statewide party support, but Democrats gained the most in states with large increases in the proportion of the population with an advanced degree. Using multivariate models, Holbrook also finds that internal and foreign-born migration are major drivers of composition changes in the state population (e.g., foreign-born migration increases the racial diversity in a state) and changes in party support in the states.

Holbrook provides a comprehensive look at how population change affects party support in the states. However, the research overlooks other key factors influencing presidential outcomes, including the role of parties in mobilizing voters. Previous research finds that political parties and other organizations’ mobilization efforts can significantly affect the turnout of people, including Black and other minority voters (e.g., Wielhouwer 2000; Michelson 2003; Philpot, Shaw, and McGowen 2009). Holbrook finds that Texas conflicts with his expectations because increases in the foreign-born population have not resulted in increased support for Democratic presidential candidates. At least in the last few election cycles in Holbrook’s sample, the Texas Democratic Party and related groups did a poor job turning out minority voters, especially Latino/a voters. This offers a partial explanation for why Texas does not fit the predicted outcomes. It is surprising how little attention is paid to party mobilization since Holbrook co-wrote an important article demonstrating the effect of state-level mobilization on presidential election outcomes (Holbrook and McClurg 2005). In the book’s conclusion, he does note that population changes only have the potential to shift the political leanings of a state. They are not deterministic. Parties and other entities mobilizing voters can play a key role in that process. This recognition is important, but it needed incorporation in the analysis.
Accordingly, some models needed to include more than changes in population characteristics. For example, including national party transfers to state and local parties as a measure of party mobilization, similar to his previous research. This would help more fully explain changes in state-level Democratic vote shares in presidential elections.

After establishing the connections between changing demographics and state political outcomes, Holbrook moves to evaluating the effect of a changing political context on state electoral outcomes. He demonstrates that growing polarization among party elites has strengthened the connections between group characteristics and party support. Although the changing relationships between group characteristics and party strength due to the broader political context does affect party support in the states, the effect is not as large as changes in the composition of the state population.

Overall, Holbrook’s empirical analysis provides thorough tests of his theory. His research offers convincing evidence that compositional changes in state populations and contextual effects help explain changes in state-level party support in presidential elections. Although there are some data limitations, he is transparent about the issues and works to address them. However, the analysis does not explore the interactions and intersections between some of the population characteristics. Using aggregate data is reasonable, but it overlooks important intersections of some demographic identities when considering party affiliation, like race and gender. Moreover, while Holbrook’s research examines the role of minority populations in the changing political landscape, it does not deeply engage with research on race and ethnicity in politics. This is understandable since the book’s main causal mechanism is population change, leaving room for race and ethnicity scholars to build on. For example, Holbrook focuses on elite polarization as a significant contextual effect, but racial attitudes may also condition the relationship between groups and party affiliation. Finally, as mentioned above, the analysis omits some factors influencing changes in party support in the states. These issues do not significantly weaken the tests of Holbrook’s theory, but they do identify some necessary next steps to fully understand the causes of state-level changes in party support.

Holbrook’s work demonstrates that population and contextual changes influence the underlying partisan preferences of states, which then affects electoral outcomes. This is a major finding that connects population changes to political change. Additionally, his research places an important focus on the role of context and changing relationships, items often overlooked in research. *Altered States* significantly contributes to our understanding of the relationship between demographic changes, political parties, and electoral outcomes. It will be important for scholars across a variety of subfields (e.g., state politics, political parties, electoral politics) to consider and incorporate Holbrook’s findings in future research.

Jaclyn J. Kettler
Boise State University
Does the American Revolution need a rebirth? For the general public, the Revolution is as alive as ever. Aside from it being a constant in schools of all levels throughout the nation, one need only look to *Hamilton: An American Musical*, HBO’s *John Adams*, AMC’s *Turn*, or the success of popular historians like Ron Chernow and David McCullough to see its appeal. Furthermore, each year millions visit Revolutionary historical sites from Boston’s Freedom Trail to George Washington’s Mount Vernon. In 2017, the Revolution even got its own museum. Then why is this volume necessary? While the public continues to embrace the American Founding, in recent years the topic is no longer as popular with academics. Acknowledging this, *The American Revolution Reborn*, edited by Patrick Spero and Michael Zuckerman, is a calculated and welcome addition to the historiography.

Born (or “reborn”) from a 2013 identically named conference in Philadelphia, the book features fifteen chapters authored by established and rising scholars, with an introduction and conclusion by the editors (the conference’s co-chairs). Bringing together many of the premier Revolutionary historians, the conference was a stunning achievement and *The American Revolution Reborn* is as ambitious. Spero doesn’t mince words in his introduction, saying that the authors “aim to cast the American Revolution anew” and “they mean to reinvigorate the field” (3). With the 250th anniversaries of the American Revolutionary events already in progress, the timing is perfect and this book’s potential scholarly impact is great.

At its heart, the book aims to “complicate” the Revolution by de-mystifying it, removing “its romantic memory,” and portraying it “as a civil war as much as a fight for independence” (2, 4). Divided into four parts, *The American Revolution Reborn* frames older historiographical interpretations and presents novel methodological focuses. The book excels in environmental and global history, thereby anticipating the Omohundro Institute’s recent “Vast Early America” trend.

Part I “Civil Wars: Challenging the Patriotic Narrative” takes issue with a view of a homogeneous or even dominantly Patriot populace. Overall, this section effectively uses conflict between different Revolutionary narratives. Here, Americans emerge not as just Patriots but as Loyalists and overwhelmingly neutral. Michael A. McDonnell shows the importance in using “personal accounts of war,” but misses the point of varied understandings of liberty and asserts fairly generic criticisms (14). Travis Glasson is adept at untangling the interplay of political loyalties with “personal relationships, varying understandings of self-interest, fear and changing assessments” (36). He explores those “stuck in the middle” and fills a major gap in studies of “the ‘neutral’ or the ‘disaffected’” that he claims, “formed a large proportion, and perhaps a majority, of the population of the future of the United States” (31). Meanwhile, Aaron Sullivan complicates the matter in his discussion of revolutionaries’ failures to “recognize” neutrality, and thereby made the Patriots “vulnerable to accusations that their own governments were likewise being imposed on the people against their will” (56). Kimberley Nash similarly plays with the question “who is American?” in examining who is denied full citizenship based on race, gender, or religion. Denver Brunsman examines the impressment of sailors by the British and Americans and suggests that—aside from devoted Patriots and Tories—there could be forced loyalty. Benjamin Franklin’s role in attempting “sea paroles” and prisoner exchanges is fascinating and enlightening. Brunsman argues against a standard idealistic Patriot perspective,
but he does it with more balance than the other chapters in this section.

Part II “Wider Horizons: Decentering the Nationalistic Narrative” takes the Revolution global and is the most effective section as a stand-alone. In examining the Revolution in comparison to the 1707 Act of Union between England and Scotland, Ned C. Landsman creates something very original. Linking Franklin, John Adams, and Scottish moral philosophy, Landsman presents that the British fear of the American colonies outpacing them was the chief obstacle to a union between the two, in what “constitutionally…might have provided the closest thing to a viable middle ground between the positions of Britain and its colonies” (108). In this intriguing take, the Declaration of Independence was a reaction to a British failure to incorporate America. Katherine Carté Engel explores the fear of an Anglican bishop and correctly offers the Revolution as a significant event in religious history that forced Protestants to consider their ties in light of a political intrusion on religious liberty. Using the British presence in Africa after the French and Indian War, Bryan Rosenblithe attempts to tie the Revolution “within the interlinked histories of British colonial expansion, political conflict, and administrative reform in the Atlantic world” (151). But, despite its originality, the connections remain obscured. Combining religion with education, Mark Boonshoft offers the book’s best chapter in highlighting the major impact schools played on the revolutionary generation through institutionalized beliefs that translated into “teachers and students [leaving] the schools in droves to take positions of civil and military leadership” (169). It effectively weaves education as supporting the Patriot cause and is the rare example of a chapter highlighting social mobility.

Part III “New Directions,” as the name suggests, offers three fundamentally novel approaches. Zara Anishanslin, whose *Portrait of a Woman in Silk* is one of the best-written and most original recent works on early American history, traces the origins of a piece of human skin allegedly taken from a white man tortured by Native Americans. Against the background of General Sullivan’s war against the Seneca, she convincingly shows the power of this relic to convey truth, regardless of the validity of the story, and allow the creation of “a narrative that shifted the burden of blame for Revolutionary violence away from the patriots and onto Native Americans” (190). David C. Hsiung brilliantly links environmental, military, and civilian history through a study of saltpeter (a primary ingredient of gunpowder) recipes “long ignored by historians” (220). With the specter of the defeat at Bunker Hill looming, Hsiung concludes that the lack of powder during the war was not the result of bad saltpeter, but rather a low yield—pointing the finger at lack of civilian production. Although lacking any commonality, these chapters are all highly innovative, with Matthew Spooner’s advancement that the Revolution was responsible for making slavery profitable in the backcountry no exception.

Part IV “Legacies: The Afterlife of the American Revolution” is the least impressive section because many of the conclusions aren’t that surprising. That said, Aaron Spencer Fogleman’s discussion of post-Revolution migration suggests a wider openness in American society different from many of the other chapters. Edward Gray’s look at the Mason-Dixon line strays too far from the Revolution itself. David S. Shield’s partly historiographical and partly theoretical chapter casts abolitionists as the heirs to the Revolution against the flawed liberty of revolutionaries in Texas and Canada. Placing the Revolution in a modern context, Zuckerman’s conclusion centers on conflicted memory and restates the volume’s important goal of “returning the Revolution to its place at the symbolic heart of American history” (302).

This book should be commended for attempting to academically re-center the Revolution. But while it offers new and exciting scholarship, the book has flaws in conception and the overall portrayal of the Revolution’s historiography and memory. Zuckerman confusingly
calls it “a subversive book,” that is “refreshing” a “tired conversation” (301-302). Certainly it would be “subversive” against the mythical Revolution of yesteryear, but this debunking of the Revolution and the Founders has existed in the historiography for decades (for example in the work of Howard Zinn, Gary Nash, Woody Holton, Rosemarie Zagarri, and Holger Hoock). Thus the book is not radical, despite McDonnell’s complaint that “After almost 230 years, can we tell a different story?” (12). Different stories are being told and there has been an excessive academic dismissal of traditional Patriot/Founder narratives. One need only observe the backlash against Gordon Wood’s comments on the waning academic interest in the Founding in the Wall Street Journal and on C-Span and the Age of Jackson Podcast.

For Zuckerman, the authors “have little interest in defining or even exploring the distinctive character of the revolutionaries or the American people those founding fathers have long been alleged to represent” while “spurn[ing] the nation-building” tale. As McDonnell puts it, “The first step would have to be to uncouple the war from the founding of a nation” (12). But the Revolution and the founding generation (not just “founding fathers”) did create a nation. As Fogelman notes, despite its contradictions, the Revolution “caused a great deal of change in American society” (252). More than that, it is responsible for the United States and numerous international revolutions.

Despite these criticisms and aside from an inherent lack of flow that plagues all collected volumes, the American Revolution Reborn is a worthwhile read. Naturally in intending to “reinvigorate the field” its audience is academic (3). Still, its collected essays have strong classroom potential. Overall the book is comparable and compatible to The Oxford Handbook of the American Revolution. This is an important book, but in retelling all of these “new” Revolutionary stories does that mean that there isn’t room to revisit old ones? The Revolution was and is the defining moment in American history—a fact the public and academics all should remember.

Craig Bruce Smith
William Woods University
Surveillance by Ashaki M. Jackson and Treasure by Anna Marine Whitehead are books of poetry that creatively explore Black existence. Surveillance analyzes the role that videos play in shaping the meaning of Black life and Black death, reinventing what we understand as “surveillance.” What is often considered to be an objective form of evidence emerges as a device that puts the lifeless Black body on display. While Surveillance may be read as a straightforward account of what it means to be Black in the United States, Treasure takes readers on an abstract journey to understand the dream world. Its unfamiliar similes and metaphors illuminate the various nuances of Black existence. Both texts intend to lead readers on a discovery of Blackness; Surveillance on a broader scale, and Treasure in an intimate manner that calls for more questioning.

Surveillance contains 19 poems, each naming either what surveillance has captured about Blackness or how captured footage of Blackness has shaped the public observer’s view of it. The book opens with a quote by The Speaker, which frames poems that follow with the idea that Blackness can simultaneously occupy either end of a given spectrum. For example, The Black Speaker can be both “innocuous and cannibal” (Jackson, n.p.) Such a description highlights the role of public perception in reproducing how Blackness is understood to operate and realigns the focus on how Blackness is being surveilled.

The specific videos that are referenced in this book of poetry are those that capture the destruction of the Black body by the police thereby initiating the roles of the observed and the observer; the observer being both the police and the public, and the observed being the Black body. Jackson shows that “the public” is often separated from Blackness, which reflects the lack of humanity offered to Black people who are often not considered to be a part of the collective. Because of this separation, they must be surveilled. Each poem reinforces this reality by placing the reader into the role of an observer. Descriptions allow for re-visualization of clips of death by police officers. At times, the speaker is ironic or sarcastic, adding commentary to videos that would otherwise stand alone in the view of the public. In other words, the dark irony created in this poetry accentuates how much Blackness itself is linked to aggression, menace, grief, and, ultimately, death.

One of the opening poems is crucial to setting the tone for understanding Blackness as dangerous. “Police Accounts Give the Public Charity” incorporates quotes from police officers who attempt to justify murder. Insertions made by the speaker draw attention to what the officers are actually saying. For example, one line reads, “He gave me no choice’ He was Black” (Jackson 2). The inserted commentary indicated by the immense amount of space differentiates between the words spoken by the officer and the translation of what is actually being said. This description of why this police officer committed murder emphasizes this idea that Blackness alone “induced panic” (Jackson 2).

Jackson reinforces this conclusion in other poems like “Standard American Similes with Interchangeable Blacks.” Here, the title is repeated twice in the poem’s stanzas and its power emerges clear both times. Throughout, similes highlight how common it is for Black life to end in the public eye while simultaneously highlighting how many Black folks die. Brackets
surrounding “Walter” in the following line are intended to convey the interchangeability of names: “The night is as black as skin / It falls slowly / publicly like a {Walter}” (Jackson 19). Tellingly, this same line appears on page five of the book, only it reads with “{Eric}” instead (Jackson 5). These two versions of the same poem exist at each end of the book and capture the repeated dehumanization and violation of the Black body by white America, which forces the reader to not only realize how Black death has been normalized but that it should also be expected.

Other poems in the text bring the reader to similar understandings of Blackness but in different ways. Each is consistent in that they use little to no punctuation and offer the reader plenty of white space on the page, leaving the reader with a sense of emptiness and space to consider Black death. In very little words, Jackson is able to create heavy meaning that cannot be easily left behind. In these short poems, readers are reminded that surveillance is indeed hard evidence while learning that it is this evidence that reinforces the Black body’s place in the world.

*Treasure* offers a more personal experience. Rather than feel as though they are watching the speaker uncover a hidden pattern of truth, readers may feel as though they have dived into the mind of the speaker. At times the poems seem to reflect a longing for self-discovery. The book and its poems are longer than those found in *Surveillance* and vary between prose and poems of exaggerated line spacing, which together adds to the feeling that no matter what one sees in this world, Blackness can be present. Right away one notices the smaller text and the addition of white space given that the back of most pages is intentionally left blank. This visual experience falls in line with the book’s tendency to play with time and space, not only pointing to the obvious fact that Blackness has existed everywhere and will continue to do so, but also implying that Blackness is transcendent.

Throughout *Treasure*, visuals are also interjected between poems. The meaning of the images is not explicit; however, the presence of these graphics offers an understanding that Blackness is forever present, no matter how Blackness is making its presence. Some memorialize Black death while others depict Black resilience and creativity. Given that we are not left to visualize the words of the text on our own, but are given some visuals, the reader is forced to reconsider their understanding of Blackness as it relates to both time and space. *Treasure* is able to assert that Blackness is “imprisoned by loss,” but also that Black lives are “lives that do not stand vertically” (Whitehead 25).

A piece of prose near the middle of *Treasure* shows the speaker inviting the reader to a middle school. It reads, “every Tuesday and Thursday we will pass the permanent tack-board display from the prior year’s Black History Month featuring Emmett Till. We see dead people. We are in middle school and the truth we know is Black history is uncontainable, un-tackable” (Whitehead 59). When prompted to go to middle school, the reader shifts through time only to learn that Black history itself has no time. An accomplishment that one can associate with this line is that it seems to empower Blackness in its claims that Black history cannot be contained while simultaneously making clear that the history being presented is one of the destruction of the Black body in the name of whiteness. Though *Surveillance* seems to only highlight the subjugation of the Black body, *Treasure* accomplishes the same while also looking to how Blackness can be powerful.

Both of these texts are instrumental in offering an understanding of Blackness that is both expansive yet limiting. In specifically analyzing Black death through surveillance media, *Surveillance* is able to highlight the fact that Blackness is both everywhere and nowhere. The
instant that it is noticed, it ceases to exist, due to denied humanity that is inevitably linked to observation and objectification. Similarly, *Treasure* acknowledges the destruction of Blackness that is inescapable, even when acknowledging of its power and legacy. These books of poetry provide readers with a new angle to understand the nuanced existence that embodies Blackness in both life and death. Black folks exist on a paradoxical plane where they are forced to navigate survival in a reality they have no say in.

Amber Gordon
University of Southern California
A Note on Passing

Dr. Byrdie Larkin, 1952-2019

It is with deep sadness that we report the passing of Dr. Byrdie Larkin, a long-time member of the National Conference of Black Political Scientists. Dr. Larkin died unexpectedly in her home on June 2. She previously served on NCOBPS’s Executive Council and W.E.B. Du Bois Book Award Committee, as well as the Executive Board of the Alabama Political Science Association.

Dr. Larkin was a proud graduate of Clark Atlanta University’s doctoral program in political science. She retired in 2016 after a four-decade career at Alabama State University. She was the former chair of ASU’s Department of History and Political Science. An advocate for gender equity in higher education, she was the only tenured woman in her department.

For many journalists in Alabama, Dr. Larkin was the principal expert on racial policy and black politics in the state. Her insight on Alabama politics can be found in Time, Tuscaloosa News, Montgomery Advertiser, and Associated Press. She also served on the Advisory Board of Endarch: Journal of Political Research.

Although trained in political science, Dr. Larkin spent her retirement years working on creative writing projects. Her 2017 novel, Reservoir, reflected her abiding faith, love of HBCUs, and life-long ties to Alabama. Her previous book, That Our Faith May Be Tested, was a collection of spiritual testimonies about her childhood, family, and challenges as a young professor.

NCOBPS remembers Dr. Larkin for her brilliance, kind-heartedness, and down-home sensibilities. We will truly miss having Dr. Larkin and her sister at our annual meetings. We send condolences to the Larkin family, ASU, and her home church, Mt. Gillard Baptist Church in Montgomery. Sympathy cards and other correspondences can be sent to her sister, Lula Darnell Larkin, 118 Harold Street, Troy, Alabama 36081.

Sekou Franklin
Middle Tennessee State University
INVITATION TO THE SCHOLARLY COMMUNITY
The National Political Science Review (NPSR)
Invitation to the Scholarly Community

The editors of the National Political Science Review (NPSR) invite submissions from the scholarly community for review and possible publication.

The NPSR is a refereed journal of the National Conference of Black Political Scientists. Its editions appear between two and three times per year and comprise the highest quality scholarship related to the experiences of African-Americans in the American political community, the African diaspora in the Western Hemisphere, and on questions of Black Politics globally. It also focuses on the international links between African-Americans and the larger community of nations, particularly with Africa.

Among the more common areas of research, which the NPSR considers for publication, are those typically associated with political theory and history; gendered politics; diasporic and internationalist movements; political behavior and attitudes; the performance of political institutions; the efficacy of public policy, interest groups, social movements; interethnic coalition building; and theoretical reflections that offer insights on the minority political experience. On the basis of recent interest, the NPSR also considers work on the role of culture in politics.

Manuscripts should be submitted in the following format. Submissions should follow the style conventions of the American Political Science Review (APSR). The journal Style Guide is available upon request. Two copies of the submissions should be conveyed electronically to the editors at the e-mail addresses listed below. One copy of the submission should include author information comprising the name that will appear in the published version along with author institutional affiliation and e-mail addresses. The other copy should delete author information from the title page. Please indicate the lead author in cases of multiple authors. Manuscripts should not carry footnotes at the bottom of the page but should be inserted as endnotes. They should not exceed thirty typewritten pages; should be double-spaced, inclusive of notes and references; and should be prepared and sent to the editors in the Microsoft Word format. Graphics should be done in grayscale rather than in color.

Manuscripts are reviewed on a rolling basis. Further queries about the NPSR as well as submissions may be addressed (e-mail only) to the editor at:

Dr. Tiffany Willoughby-Herard, Ph.D.
Associate Professor, University of California Irvine
Managing Editor, National Political Science Review
E-mail: npsreeditors@gmail.com