Challenging the Legacies of Racial Resentment

Challenging the Legacies of Racial Resentment

Black Health Activism, Educational Justice, and Legislative Leadership

Tiffany Willoughby-Herard
Julia Jordan-Zachery, editors

National Political Science Review, Volume 18

A Publication of the
National Conference of Black Political Scientists

Transaction Publishers
New Brunswick (U.S.A.) and London (U.K.)

Library of Congress Catalog Number: 2016027268
ISBN: 978-1-4128-6431-2
eBook: 978-1-4128-6394-0
Printed in the United States of America

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Names: Willoughby-Herard, Tiffany, 1973- editor of compilation. | Jordan-Zachery, Julia Sheron, editor of compilation.
Title: Challenging the legacies of racial resentment : Black health activism, educational justice, and legislative leadership / Tiffany Willoughby-Herard and Julia Jordan-Zachery, editors.
Description: New Brunswick [New Jersey] : Transaction Publishers, 2016. | Series: National political science review ; volume 18 | Includes bibliographical references.
Identifiers: LCCN 2016027268 (print) | LCCN 2016047162 (ebook) | ISBN 9781412864312 (paperback : acid-free paper) | ISBN 9781412863940
Subjects: LCSH: African Americans--Medical care--Government policy. | Blacks--Medical care--Brazil--Government policy. | Medical policy--United States. | Medical policy--Brazil. | African Americans--Civil rights. | Blacks--Civil rights--Brazil. | African American political activists. | Political activists--Brazil. | African Americans--Education--Political aspects. | United States--Race relations--History--21st century.
Classification: LCC RA448.5.N4 C52 2016 (print) | LCC RA448.5.N4 (ebook) | DDC 362.1089/96073081--dc23
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2016027268

Contents

Editors' Note

The content of volume 18 of the *National Political Science Review* (*NPSR*) reflects the sweep of research questions, themes, and patterns of power relations that underpin the study of Black politics. With the passing of a much-beloved mentor, editor Dr. Michael Mitchell, the journal enters a transitional period of intentional remembrance and deep reflection. Michael joined the ancestors and was followed by so many others without whom we could not have made our way or imagined our roles in the projects of Radical Black Politics: Jerry Watts, Otis Madison, Savannah Carroll, and Cedric Robinson. Michael Mitchell's mantra of *scholarly excellence* and cross-generational research collaboration created a high standard for the new editorial board and editorial advisory board to follow. We enter this new challenge with gratitude for the incredible model of integrity that Michael Mitchell, Lucius Barker, Matthew Holden, Georgia Persons, and David Covin established.

Health activism and health policy domestically and globally is a consistent emphasis in this volume of the *National Political Science Review* that develops explicitly out of the long research in this area conducted by former editor, Dr. Georgia Persons. The research in this volume explores how new opportunity structures in Brazil and the United States have called into question whether medical Jim Crow has ended. Careful attention to intersectionality, grassroots organizing, executive politics, and health service organizations provides depth and dimension to the many different scales and levels of analysis at which research on health activism continues to be conducted. While the authors point to the demonstrable evidence of presidential politics (Henrique Cardoso, Luíz Inácio Lula da Silva, Dilma Rousseff, and Barack Obama) influencing and shaping debates on racialized and gender health disparities, they also demonstrate how the legacies of what Alondra Nelson has called "the distinctly hazardous risks posed by segregated medical facilities, professions, societies, schools; deficient or nonexistent health services; medical maltreatment;and scientific racism" continue to impact black people and shape the course of life (*Body and Soul: The Black Panther Party and the Fight Against Medical Discrimination*, 2011, 24). Such research provides an invigorating reminder of the "medical civil rights movement" (ibid.) that shaped the contours of black feminist politics and the ideas and policies that still necessitate black women's political mobilization and the long commitment health policy research by former *NPSR* editor, Georgia Persons. Such questions are particularly apt given how American political commentator and humorist, Larry Wilmore, has dubbed the marked rise in anti-Black racial resentment during the transition to a post–Obama Administration era the "Un-Blackening." The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (2010, 2012) remains the signature Obama Era policy. The Affordable Care Act will continue to have a decisive impact on that portion of the

racial wealth divide that has been created by generations of medical discrimination and the financialization of health care. The Affordable Care Act has changed the political narrative about health care as a right in subtle ways while also creating new institutional structures that give voice to health care and reproductive justice activists. Thus, coming to truly understand enduring forms of racial resentment is inextricably linked to the fight against medical discrimination.

Contributors Albert Samuels and Neal Allen document features of this rise in racial resentment. Samuels argues that the concept, "nullification" helps us understand the resegregation of schools. Allen argues that the recurring backlash against Black people's attempts to enter the public sphere and civic life as free and equal citizens indicates that the very idea of "emancipation" has to be reconsidered. Neal Allen's American Political Development essay contends that emancipation must have more substantive meanings and effects than what can be captured in the largely symbolic politics of an "event." Emancipation, if theorized properly, is understood as a particular set of political relations and is not merely a moment. Fundamentally, Allen is asserting that emancipation, as currently understood, is a very weak index of the contemporary power and substantive voting rights of African-American people. More than that, Allen insists that emancipation ought to be an "organizing principle" and if it is, our politics are certainly shifting under our feet at this very moment. Recourse to such nineteenth-century concerns and concepts registers a profound shift in Black politics and also offers keen insight into the urgency that has animated the mass movement against omnipresent police and vigilante violence against Black women, men, and children. Such raw violence, though articulated most spectacularly through state murder by police officers, must be understood as part and parcel of a whole web of social policies and programs that disadvantage and cause what cultural geographer Ruth Wilson Gilmore has called "premature death" (*Golden Gulag: Prisons, Surplus, Crisis, and Opposition in Globalizing California*, 2007). From #BlackLivesMatter in the United States to #FeesMustFall in South Africa nonviolent youth–led protest movements the world over have turned their attention to state violence (including murder in custody, illegal stops, illegal search and seizure, illegal detention), and the broken promise of schools as anchors of community life and livable neighborhoods. Such are the necessary reminders that the racialized welfare state has resulted in hundreds of millions of dreams deferred. Contributors also document the continued commitment by Black legislators and Black voters to antidiscrimination on immigration and same-sex marriage. Carley Shinault and Richard Selzer and Donn Worgs provide robust empirical analysis that suggests that the political experiences of Black people constitute an important backdrop and embedded scenario even when policy issues are framed against Blackness. That these scholars raise questions about how racial Blackness shapes immigration and same-sex marriage indicates how significant intersectional frameworks continue to be. While deep and profound variation in Black public opinion certainly matters both longitudinally and in moments of critical elections, the ethos of consolidating the dreams of abolitionist democracy and expanding freedom throughout this society and the world continues to galvanize Black political thought and action. "Woke" Black politics teaches us that we do in fact have the power, resources, and authority to make meaningful change.

To this end, the Trends section offers brief yet full-throated conversations between senior and emerging scholars. Each of these invited and refereed essays reflect the ethos

of the Freedom School and are modeled after Teach-Ins and Speak-Outs, forms of pedagogy that have returned with deep necessity in these times of teaching and learning with the second post-civil rights generation. Paying special attention to the ways in which Blackness is made to function at the discursive and representational level, M. Shadee Malaklou's essay on "Teaching Trayvon" explores the complexities of challenging the White nationalist commonsense that links Black youth and Black masculinity and Black people (regardless of gender identity) who take up any amount of space (whether sleeping on their grandmother's couches or biking or walking in the stairwells of their own apartment buildings) with social threat, danger, and criminality. These Trends conversations provide real-time insights on the many forms of anti-Blackness that have compelled the last three years of civil disobedience and participation in mass action by black youth and their allies. Next we include thoughts on the daily activism of #BlackLivesMatter, Los Angeles with co-founder Melina Abdullah and reflections on the 2016 presidential election with Robert Smith and Melanye Price. Long time activists, Tommi Hayes and Mali Collins, raise provocative questions that bridge generational divides and approaches. Zulema Blair's insights about the particular constraints and supports necessary to increase the quality of undergraduate student political participation ought to be read alongside these Trends articles. Blair's empirical research on civic engagement at colleges of access makes the case for making political participation by first generation students legible.

Donn Worgs' essay on morality politics explains that when it comes to civil liberties, employment, and antigay discrimination, African-Americans support LGBT rights while also strongly opposing same-sex marriage rights. Exploring the contexts (2003–2012) which generated laws in favor and against same-sex marriage in the seventeen states that took up the policy and in the states that had substantial numbers of Black legislators enables Worgs to identify and interpret how and why black legislators vote in ways more liberal than their constituents and their party. While increasing majorities of people would no longer consider being LGBT a sin or an addiction, voters continue to face a dizzying array of campaign media designed to get out the vote specifically around a range of activities that patently don't belong in the same conceptual category. Since the larger body of political-science scholarship does not consistently disentangle rights and identities from leisure practices from health questions in the morality politics research, Worgs also does not consider the unusual pairing of LGBT rights, gambling, and abortion—and all fall under the rubric of "morality politics"—here. Nevertheless, Worgs' study provides illuminating findings for interpreting how Black legislators make sense of "the most galvanizing" policy issues of the last decade and that are all too often understood through notions of decency. In fact, it is the question of decency that makes "morality policy issues" such a compelling puzzle for Black politics since prosegregationists typically justified their many forms of anti-Black racism through racist discourses about Black people being inherently indecent with regard to sexual morality. As Black politics continues to consider how Black sexualities and gender norms have political salience, our scholarship will be compelled to examine the history of how Blackness as a social and political identity has been linked to caricatures of Black sexuality as avaricious, unfeeling, and impervious to harm. Using the rubric of "morality politics" raises stimulating questions about how Black legislators provide ethical leadership on issues which make some Black religious voters squeamish or which they consider to be nonnormative.

Françoise Cromer's article troubles distinctions between informal politics, political mobilization, resistance politics, and community organizing. Cromer's research has important implications for why and how a phenomenon like independent Black women's health and cultural organizations belong in conversations about Black politics. Plumbing the experiences of systematic discrimination by health and legislative authorities, Cromer explains why Black women create spaces like Het Heru. Whether we decide that their ideas and practices meet the criteria of the political or remain in the more sociological arena of resistance politics and community organizing, Het Heru is certainly politically significant, and the courage to read their work as part of the political sphere suggests the malleability of "the political" as a concept for real-world problem-solving.

By troubling such neat distinctions between informal politics, political mobilization, resistance politics, and community organizing, Cromer charges political scientists to access their courage and their hearts in ways that might have a positive impact on black women's lives. What political scientists do and don't do has a real impact on whether Black women live or die. The kinds of research questions that we ask about Black women's lives profoundly shapes whether Black women make it back from the hospital or not. If we can agree as scholars of Black politics that Black women's lives matter then the issues of concern for Black women must be political priorities and must guide our definitions of "the political." When Black women do not make it back to their families after interactions with the health care system then we must acknowledge what anthropologist and writer Zora Neale Hurston told us in 1937, Black women are still the "mule of the world." Cromer demonstrates that we have a unique responsibility as researchers to transform such conditions into healing and survival. Deeming Black women's grassroots survival practices as being beneath the criteria of the political fails ethically. To suggest that a set of social practices do not meet the criteria for "the political" reminds us that there are stiff hierarchies that constitute knowledge production and who can participate in it. This is likely why Black women organize health activism in the ways that they do and where. Julia Jordan-Zachery's research explores institutional intersectionality through an examination of AIDS service Oorganizations and how they understand the continued stigma, structural violence, invisibility, and respectability politics that shape how HIV/AIDS policy is constructed and implemented. Political anthropologist Kia Lilly-Caldwell offers a substantive history of the changed legal framework provided by race-conscious laws to improve the health of Black people in Brazil. Laying out the complex history that made health activism for Black people a central agenda item for executive governance returns us to the importance of the global ties across the Americas among researchers of the Black movements that span the entire hemisphere. This turn toward reproductive justice research is timely and incredibly necessary.

These questions of the contemporary framework of Black politics are reflected in our book reviews as well. Book Review Editor, political historian Keisha Blain, has assembled books on Black internationalism and Black women's left traditions in Britain, South Africa, the United States; two new works on race and the law; a fearless new book on Frantz Fanon; a mixed-method study on the politics of popular culture; and an important new book on AIDS and mourning in the early days of the pandemic.

In this era of tremendous social change we acknowledge the tremendous political courage of radical movements all around the world and the incredible courage of the

families of those who have lost loved ones. We salute your demands for justice and your unwillingness to quietly accept state and interpersonal violence. We continue to say their names and organize in their memory. To the fallen we say, ¡Presente!

Special thanks goes to Armand Demirchyan for his Editorial Research Assistance, for his attention to detail, and his care to the intellectual and political project of the *NPSR*. And we welcome Editorial Research Assistant, La Shonda Carter, who continues to prove herself diligent, devoted, and an intellectual giant in her own right.

Tiffany Willoughby-Herard

Research Articles

Black State Legislators and Morality Politics

*Donn Worgs**
Towson University

Abstract

In recent years, there have been many high profile examples of African-Americans mobilizing to influence "morality policy" issues. The most galvanizing of these issues has been same-sex marriage. This study examines how Black state legislators have responded when faced with legislation that would either restrict marriage rights or expand the rights of same-sex couples. An examination of Black state legislators' votes on these measures reveals that most have opposed restrictions on marriage rights, usually at a higher rate than other Democrats. When confronted with legislation expanding rights of same-sex couples, a majority of Black legislators support these measures. This voting record stands in contrast to the attitudes and voting behavior of the broader Black population as indicated by opinion data and exit polling. This divergence from the position of the broader population is likely the result of personal attitudes of the legislators and political party strategy.

Keywords: African-American legislators; Morality politics; Black legislators; State legislators

In recent years, morality policy issues have sparked atypical political mobilizations among African-Americans. In Maryland, for example, African-Americans led by Black churches and pastors mobilized against the expansion of legalized gambling and in opposition to same-sex marriage. A number of Maryland legislators noted that these were the most extensive mobilizations around pending state legislation coming out of the African-American communities in recent memory.[1] While social conservatism is not new to African-Americans, what is fairly new is the political mobilization around these kinds of issues. These attempts to promote policies related to individual morality represent a deviation from the traditional issues around which African-Americans have mobilized.

This phenomenon has been visible since 2004, when "moral-values issues" garnered much political attention during the presidential campaign and election. Moral-values issues, in particular abortion and same-sex marriage, were much discussed as having an

* Direct correspondence to dworgs@towson.edu

impact on the outcome of the election (Hillygus and Shields 2005). While those issues did not lead Blacks to support the re-election of President Bush, we did see moments of mobilizing around "morality"—in particular in support of restrictions on same-sex marriage (Tucker-Worgs 2011).

So-called morality policy issues have been distinguished from other issues (non–morality policy issues) because they entail at least one coalition of advocates that "portrays the issue as one of morality or sin and uses moral arguments" to promote their policy preference (Mooney 2001, 3). Importantly, this categorization is not based on any objective inherent characteristic of the issue but rather "depends on the perceptions of the actors involved and the terms for debate among them" (4). These debates are "framed in terms of fundamental rights and values, often stemming from religious imperatives" (Studler 2001, 39).

Scholars who study morality policy issues have found that they have higher levels of public participation and that policymakers tend to be more responsive to public opinion on these issues, than on other nonmorality issues (Mooney and Schuldt 2008). In recent years, the most salient of these morality policy issues have been abortion; lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender (LGBT) rights (especially same-sex marriage); gambling; and the death penalty. Interestingly, large portions of African-Americans have often taken "conservative" positions on such morality issues (Tate 2010).[2] This stands in contrast to the position of the Democratic Party—which of course, most Blacks are aligned with and which the vast majority of Black legislators are a part of. This raises a simple yet compelling question—how do Black legislators respond when faced with morality policy issues? Do their positions reflect the attitudes of the broader Black population? Or do they more closely align with the stance of the Democratic Party? To begin to answer this question, I examine how Black state legislators have responded when confronted with perhaps the most galvanizing morality policy issue in recent years—the issue of same-sex marriage.[3]

Below I begin with a brief discussion of Black legislators followed by an examination of how Black state legislators have voted when confronted with legislation seeking to expand the rights of same-sex couples or limit marriage rights to couples consisting of one woman and one man, and explore some likely explanations of the responses of these legislators. The examination of Black legislators' votes on these measures reveals that most have supported the rights of same-sex couples. In states considering restrictions on marriage rights, only a minority have actually voted for these restrictions. Further, in states considering legislation expanding rights of same-sex couples, a majority of Black legislators have supported these measures. This voting record stands in contrast to the broader Black population. Black legislators are more "liberal" on the issue than the Black population in general, as indicated by opinion data and exit polling. This divergence from the position of the broader population is likely the result of personal attitudes of the legislators themselves, although political party strategy may also be a key factor.

Black Legislators and Black Representation

With the extraordinary growth of Black elected officials in the decades following the Civil Rights Movement, scholars have asked questions about the significance of this phenomenon. Do Black legislators represent the interests of Black communities more effectively than White legislators? At the heart of this is a concern about whether

descriptive representation (the extent to which the legislative body reflects the broader population) will lead to more substantive representation (the extent to which a group's interests are reflected in the outputs of a legislative body) (Pitkin 1967).

The literature indicates that it does, though the picture is somewhat complex. Black legislators have been found to differ from their White colleagues in some important ways. Importantly, Black legislators are more likely to place issues of importance to Black communities on the public agenda and in legislation (Haynie 2001; Baker and Cook 2005). Beyond getting issues on the agenda, studies have sought to assess the impact of Black legislators by examining the outputs in policy areas that are consistently viewed as priorities for African-Americans. The weight of the evidence points to Black legislators having a positive impact on outputs in key policy areas—in particular education, welfare, and healthcare (Owens 2005; Preuhs 2006). On the whole, the literature suggests that Black legislators provide a higher level of substantive representation of the interests of Black communities—whether in terms of votes on key issues or in terms of aggregate voting patterns.

Importantly, the effect of the legislators has been found to be distinct from the impact of the districts—meaning that the behavior of Black legislators is not just based on who they represent. They behave differently from White legislators who represent majority or near majority Black districts (Bratton and Haynie 1999). Jeunke and Preuhs concluded that Black legislators (and Latino legislators) add a level of representation beyond that of White legislators that "resembles the trustee model" for their group's interests (Jeunke and Preuhs 2012, 713).

It also appears to be the case that Black legislators approach decisions in ways that differ from their White colleagues. Preuhs and Hero found that both Black and Latino legislators "employ different cues in decision making regarding minority group concerns which go beyond just being 'more liberal' in their policy stances" (Preuhs and Hero 2011). They noted that their research suggests that "rather than simply greater intensity on a liberal-conservative spectrum, which generally emphasizes economic/class cleavages, minority representatives see a second, racial dimension of policies as highly salient" (169).

The differences in behavior between Black legislators and their White counterparts extend not just to voting or the issues they place on the legislative agenda. Broockman, for example, has found that Black legislators were more intrinsically motivated to help Black individuals in need of assistance, even when doing so offered no political reward as when helping individuals not in their district (Broockman 2013). This supports Mansbridge's notion of surrogate representation—"when legislators represent constituents outside their own district" (Mansbridge 2003, 515).[4]

There are also differences among Black legislators. Especially noteworthy are the differences related to gender. Black women, while underrepresented (Hardy-Fanta et al. 2006), actually behave differently from their non-Black and Black male colleagues. Orey et al. found that Black legislators in Mississippi are more likely to introduce progressive legislation than their White colleagues, and Black women legislators were more likely than Black men to introduce such legislation (Orey et al. 2006). The authors attribute this to the "unique perspectives" these legislators possess in relation to their peers.

Thus we know a good bit about the behavior of Black legislators in general. Yet, what we know does not necessarily point us to what we are likely to find in the context of morality

politics. Studies seeking to assess levels of substantive representation look at policy areas like education, health care, welfare, etc. (ostensibly progressive issue areas) or specifically race-related issues. Morality politics can be a different animal. As Preuhs and Hero note, Black legislators will deviate from the normal liberal-conservative cleavage when their group's concerns are at stake. Morality politics are such that an issue can be thought of in different ways, and group interests may be understood in varying ways. For example, same-sex marriage has largely been opposed by many on the basis of religious belief, yet many Black opponents have also discussed the issue in relation to the challenges of the Black community (Tucker-Worgs and Worgs 2014). Thus, opposing same-sex marriage has been understood (or at least argued) by many as a necessary step in the protection of the already fragile Black family. Of course not all Blacks view the issue in this manner, but the point is that morality issues may stand apart from the normal political cleavages and may (or may not) stand apart from issues of race.

Given such a context, how have Black state legislators responded to the issue of same-sex marriage? While a majority of Blacks have been opposed to same-sex marriage, Democrats as a whole have shifted over the years to the point where a significant majority supports same-sex marriage. I turn now to a brief overview of Black communities' responses to the issue followed by a review of how Black state legislators have voted on the issue.

The Battle for Same-Sex Marriage

When the Supreme Court issued its ruling in *Obergefell v. Hodges*, in June of 2015, it effectively made same-sex marriage legal in all fifty states. This ruling was the culmination of two decades of legislative and judicial maneuvering around the issue. Same-sex marriage arrived on the national political agenda during the1990s after the Hawaii Supreme Court ruled that laws denying marriage rights to same-sex couples violated the state constitution's equal protection clause (NCSL 2013a). The ensuing outcry and debates set off a wave of legislative efforts at both the federal and state levels aimed at restricting marriage rights to one man and one woman. The outcome was the passage of the federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) in 1996, along with dozens of states passing similar legislation. Ultimately, thirty-two states passed a version of DOMA, restricting marriage to one man and one woman (NCSL 2013b).

In the early 2000s, another wave of legislation commenced following a ruling of the Massachusetts Supreme Court, which found that that state's DOMA was unconstitutional (NCSL 2013a). Opponents of same-sex marriage then called for both federal and state constitutional amendments defining marriage as between a man and a woman. Although a federal amendment was never passed, state after state legislators and activists set about amending state constitutions to define marriage as being limited to one man and one woman. By 2012, thirty states amended their constitutions to restrict marriage to one man and one woman (NCSL 2012).[5]

The process in each state consisted of getting the proposed amendment on a state ballot. In some states, the measures were brought to the ballot as a result of petitions, while in others, the measures were placed on the ballot as a result of legislative action. Subsequently, every state that had such an amendment on a ballot saw the measure pass, with the exception of Minnesota, where voters rejected the amendment in 2012 (NCSL 2012).

The Minnesota vote reflected how drastically attitudes shifted in recent years. For most of the period, the issue was on the public's agenda; a majority of the US public opposed

same-sex marriage rights. The Pew Research Center, Gallup, and others consistently found opposition to same-sex marriage among a majority of the population until recent years. For example, in 1996, Pew found 65% of the population opposed allowing gay and lesbian couples to marry legally. By 2004, that majority was down to 60%, and by 2008, only 51% opposed allowing gay and lesbian couples to marry. The downward trend continued through 2015. In the weeks before the Supreme Court decision in *Obergefell v. Hodges* was announced, their survey found only 39% of the population opposed allowing same-sex couples to marry (Pew 2012, 2015).

Aside from the drastic shift, two additional characteristics of the population's attitudes stand out. First, the difference between Democrats and Republicans increased over time. As attitudes in general have shifted, the differences between the parties expanded. In 2004, 78% of Republicans and 50% of Democrats opposed same-sex marriages. By 2015, those numbers had shifted to 63% of Republicans and 29% of Democrats opposed—a thirty-four percentage point difference (Pew 2015). A second interesting characteristic has been the position of African-Americans.

African-Americans and Same-Sex Marriage

African-Americans have consistently had higher rates of opposition to same-sex marriage than the population as a whole. Pew reported 67% of African-Americans opposing same-sex marriage versus 60% of the total population in 2004. The General Social Survey data reported comparable numbers that year with 67% of Blacks in opposition versus 54% of Whites (Sherkat et al. 2010). Even in 2015, when 39% of the total population were in opposition, 51% of African-Americans opposed, and only 41% supported same-sex marriage (Pew 2015).

Notably, African-Americans, the vast majority of whom are Democrats or lean Democratic, consistently opposed same-sex marriage at rates significantly higher than Democrats as a whole and much closer to rates of Republicans. In 2008, Gallup reported that 52% of Democrats thought same-sex marriages should be recognized by law, as opposed to 30% of Blacks and 22% of Republicans (Newport 2008). Even with the constant shift in attitudes, Blacks, as a group, are closer to the Republicans than to Democrats as a whole as the 41% of Blacks who favored same-sex marriage are closer to the 34% of Republicans than the 65% of Democrats (Pew 2015).

Yet African-American attitudes on LGBT rights are not so simple. As Sherkat et al. have noted, while African-Americans oppose same-sex marriage rights at a higher level, they also are more supportive of certain civil rights for LGBT people than Whites (Sherkat et al. 2010; Lewis 2003). While Blacks are more likely to condemn LGBT people, they are "more likely to support laws prohibiting antigay discrimination" (Lewis 2003, 76). When controlling for education and religion, Blacks are also more likely to favor gay civil liberties and support gay employment rights (Lewis 2003).

Explanations for the higher levels of Black opposition to same-sex marriage have focused on religion—both religious affiliation and religiosity. Religion has been shown to be a key factor in influencing support for or opposition to same-sex marriage (Sherkat et al. 2010). In particular, affiliation with Catholicism and certain Protestant denominations are positively related to opposition to same-sex marriage. Sherkat et al. found that much of the Black-White difference in attitude is attributable to differences

in religious affiliation—specifically Blacks' rate of affiliation with Baptists and other Protestants, as well as the high levels of religious participation.[6]

As political debates and mobilizations around the expansion or restriction of same-sex marriage rights unfolded, African-Americans played varied roles within these efforts. African-Americans were at times out front in support of efforts to restrict marriage rights to one man and one woman, or in opposition to efforts to legalize same-sex marriage. As Tucker-Worgs (2011) has shown, in the context of the 2004 presidential election campaigns where same-sex marriage became one of the high profile "moral-values issues," a number of Black ministers spoke out individually as well as through coalitions formed to oppose expanding marriage rights (Tucker-Worgs 2011). In the 2008 campaign to support California's state constitutional amendment (which appeared on the ballot as Proposition 8 where it was approved by voters), Black communities were targeted for organizing, and some Black churches and church leaders played key roles (Arbajano 2010). More recently, following President Obama's statement in support of same-sex marriage, there were a number of public statements from Black ministers—individually as well as part of collective groups opposing the president's position (Harris and Constable 2012; Douglas 2012).

This opposition, led largely by religious leaders, reflects the findings that attribute Black opposition in general to certain widespread religious beliefs. Yet, other Black leaders have also been out front in support of marriage rights. In particular, many high-profile Black religious and civil rights leaders including Rev. Jesse Jackson, Rev. Al Sharpton, NAACP head, Rev. Ben Jealous, each took public stances in support of same-sex marriage. Beyond the high-profile national figures, as the debates unfolded in states around the country, often local ministers (particularly some associated with the NAACP) came out in support of same-sex marriage rights.[7] Thus we have a varied picture with a majority of the population opposed to expanding marriage rights and national elites and some local elites supporting such an expansion.

African-American Legislators and Same-Sex Marriage

Given this complex picture of support and opposition, how have Black state legislators responded when confronted with legislation seeking to expand or restrict rights for same-sex couples? To answer this question, I examined states that had a substantial number of Black legislators (at least ten) in 2003, which also had a final floor vote on legislation either restricting marriage rights (defining marriage as between one man and one woman) or expanding the rights of same-sex couples during the period of 2003 through 2012.[8] This resulted in a list of seventeen states. Among these, twelve voted on legislation in opposition to same-sex marriage, and five states voted on legislation to expand rights for same-sex couples, including two that passed civil unions and three that voted on the legalization of same-sex marriage.[9] I consider these two sets of laws separately given the variation in the types of laws and the differences in the contexts that generated the bills.

Restricting Marriage Rights

Considering the twelve states voting to restrict marriage to one man and one woman, we see some interesting variation in how African-American legislators cast their votes across the various states (see Table 1).

Table 1.
Votes on Legislation Restricting Marriage Rights

State		House Vote				Senate Vote				% Voting Yes
		Y	N	*P/NV**	*A***	*Y*	*N*	*P/NV*	*A*	
Alabama	Total	85	7	*9*	*1*	30	0	*5*		
Year of vote—2005	Dems.	45	7	*9*	*1*	20	0	*5*		All Dems.—75
# of Black Leg.—34	Blacks	9	7	*9*	*1*	6	0	*2*		Blacks—44
Georgia	Total	122	52	*3*	*3*	40	16			
Year of vote—2004	Dems.	50	50	*3*	*3*	10	16			All Dems.—45
# of Black Leg.—49	Blacks	4	33	*1*	*1*	0	10			Blacks—9
Indiana	Total	70	26		*4*	40	10			
Year of vote—2011	Dems.	11	24		*4*	2	10			All Dems.—25
# of Black Leg.—13	Blacks	0	7		*2*	0	4			Blacks—0
Louisiana	Total	87	11		*6*	31	6		*2*	
Year of vote—2004	Dems.	53	10		*3*	16	6		*2*	All Dems.—77
# of Black Leg.—31	Blacks	12	9		*1*	3	5		*1*	Blacks—48
Mississippi	Total	97	17	*5*	*3*	51	0		*1*	
Year of vote—2004	Dems.	49	17	*5*	*3*	26	0		*1*	All Dems.—74
# of Black Leg.—45	Blacks	11	17	*5*	*2*	10	0			Blacks—47
Missouri	Total	130	26	*3*	*4*	26	6		*2*	
Year of vote—2004	Dems.	40	26	*3*	*4*	8	6			All Dems.—55
# of Black Leg.—17	Blacks	6	7		*1*	1	2			Blacks—41
North Carolina	Total	75	42	*2*	*1*	30	16		*4*	
Year of vote—2011	Dems.	10	42		*1*	0	16		*3*	All Dems.—14
# of Black Leg.—25	Blacks	2	16			0	6		*1*	Blacks—8
Ohio	Total	72	22	*5*		18	15			
Year of vote—2004	Dems.	12	21	*4*		0	11			All Dems.—25
# of Black Leg.—16	Blacks	4	7	*2*		0	3			Blacks—25

(Continued)

Table 1. (Continued)

State		House Vote				Senate Vote				% Voting Yes
		Y	N	*P/NV**	*A***	*Y*	*N*	*P/NV*	*A*	
South Carolina	Total	96	3	*16*	*9*	42	1		*3*	
Year of vote—2005	Dems.	28	3	*16*	*3*	17	1		*3*	All Dems.—56
# of Black Leg.—33	Blacks	10	3	*10*	*2*	4	1		*3*	Blacks—42
Tennessee	Total	88	7	*1*	*3*	29	3		*1*	
Year of vote—2005	Dems.	42	7	*1*	*3*	13	3		*1*	All Dems.—76
# of Black Leg.—19	Blacks	10	3	*1*	*2*	2	1			Blacks—63
Texas	Total	101	29	*8*	*11*	21	9		*1*	
Year of vote—2005	Dems.	15	29	*7*	*9*	3	9			All Dems.—25
# of Black Leg.—15	Blacks	1	10	*2*		1	1			Blacks—13
Virginia	Total	76	22	*2*		28	11			
Year of vote—2006	Dems.	19	21			7	11			All Dems.—45
# of Black Leg.—17	Blacks	10	2			0	5			Blacks—59

*Present but not voting **Absent

Source: State House and Senate Journals.

The array of votes on legislation restricting same-sex marriage is somewhat surprising given what we have seen regarding African-American opinion on the issue. First, in almost every state, Black Democratic legislators were less likely to support these bans than their Democratic colleagues—the exceptions being Ohio, where Blacks voted the same as their fellow Democrats, and Virginia where they supported the measure at a higher rate. The contrast between Black Democrats and non-Black Democrats can be seen in Figure 1. The difference between Blacks and non-Black Democrats as a whole is somewhat striking—especially in the Southern states. In Mississippi and Alabama, where the restrictions passed the legislatures with very little opposition, the only "No" votes came from Black legislators. Both states recorded unanimous votes in support of the measures in their Senates, and only a handful of "No" votes in their Houses of Representatives (seven in Alabama and seventeen in Mississippi). Louisiana was not much different as nine of the eleven "No" votes (against the restrictive measure) in the House, and five of six "No" votes in the Senate came from African-Americans.

Close inspection of the votes also reveals that the lack of support for these measures in some states was actually more pronounced than just those who voted "No". There was also a substantial number of Black legislators who either "abstained" or were "present but not voting."

Figure 1.
Percentage of Legislators Voting for Restrictions.



South Carolina is probably the best example in this regard, as ten of the Black members of their House were present but did not cast a vote, as compared to six non-Black members.

The most interesting example among the Southern states is Georgia. In 2004, the state's legislature considered legislation that would place a state constitutional amendment limiting marriage to one man and one woman on the 2004 general election ballot. The legislative action gained national attention as the measure was initially stopped largely due to the lack of support of the Black legislators (Jacobs 2004). Despite the "No" votes of all ten Black senators, the measure passed that chamber and was sent to the House. Due to Georgia law, a two-thirds vote was required for success. Initially, thirty of the Black representatives voted "No", while eight were either absent or present but not voting. Only one Black legislator voted for the measure which came up short by some three votes. Ultimately, a second vote was taken. This time, while the one who had voted for the measure changed his vote, four others who had not voted shifted to "Yes" votes, thus helping the measure to pass. Thus, with the first vote, among the forty-nine black legislators, only one had actually cast a vote in favor of the legislation. Even when it passed, only four legislators had voted "Yes."

Of course, while most Black state legislators opposed these measures, many were supporters. In fact, some were outspoken supporters. In Alabama's House of Representatives, it was a black legislator who introduced the measure into that chamber (*Mobile Register* 2005). In both the Alabama and Mississippi Senates, there were no Black senators who voted against the bans. Still, in only a few cases do we find a majority of Black members of a chamber actually voting in support of restrictions on marriage rights (only five). Taken in total, Virginia and Tennessee were the only states where a majority of Black state legislators voted to restrict marriage to one man and one woman.

Virginia, though, proves the complexity of the issue. While Black legislators here were more supportive of prohibiting same-sex marriage than their Democratic colleagues, there seems to be an interesting regional dynamic as almost all of the non-Black Virginia

Democrats who opposed the measure came from the Northern Virginia suburbs of Washington, DC—an area with culturally more in common with the "North" than the "South." But most interesting about Virginia was a media account which noted that three Black legislators, who voted to limit marriage to one man and one woman, later changed their position and urged voters to reject the ban. As one legislator stated: "Like the blind man cured by Jesus, even after much prayer, the first time I looked at this amendment, I didn't see its breadth or its basic meanness . . . Only after I was touched a second time was I able to see this amendment in its true light." (Stallsmith 2005)

The fact that most Black legislators did not vote in support of these measures stands in contrast to the position of Black voters. As Hine (2011) has shown, some 66% of Black voters (as measured by exit polls) voted in favor of these constitutional bans when they appeared on state ballots during the general elections in 2004, 2006, and 2008 (Hine 2011).

Looking specifically at the exit polls in particular states, the contrast is striking. Exit polls were conducted in five of the twelve states in this study (National Election Pool 2005, 2007). As Table 2 shows, in each case a significant majority of the black voters claimed to vote in support of the measure. It is notable that in both Georgia and Ohio a majority of Black voters supported the amendment, while few black legislators voted to restrict marriage rights. Virginia again presents an interesting example, as it is the only state where the Black legislators supported the amendment at a higher rate than Black voters at large. Yet, recall that three of those legislators later changed their position on the measure. It is not clear what that means, but it does suggest the picture is somewhat complex. What is clear, however, is that on this issue, Black legislators have a more liberal voting record than the Black populace at large.

It should be noted that there is an interesting time dimension to these votes. Most of the votes to restrict marriage rights occurred from 2004 to 2006, with only the North Carolina and Indiana votes coming after 2006, as both votes came in 2011. These recent votes were among the most opposed to constitutional bans. In Indiana, we see that all of the Black legislators opposed the ban. In North Carolina, only two of the twenty-six Black legislators voted in support of the constitutional amendment. The level of opposition to these measures may reflect the overall shift in attitudes of the legislators, or perhaps a recognition of a shift in attitudes among constituents.

Table 2.
Exit Polls of Black Voters

State	% Voting Yes	%Voting No	% Did Not Vote	% of Black Legislators Voting Yes
Georgia	74.7	22	3.3	9
Ohio	55.8	38.5	5.3	25
Mississippi	68.4	26.4	5.2	47
Tennessee	87	13	0	63
Virginia	56.8	41.6	1.7	59

Source: National Election Pool National Exit Polls 2005, 2007.

Table 3.
Votes on Legislation Expanding Rights of Same-Sex Couples

State		House Vote				Senate Vote				% Voting Yes
		Y	N	P/NV	A	Y	N	P/NV	A	
Connecticut	Total	85	63	*3*		26	8		*2*	
Year of vote—2005	Dems.	71	25	*2*		21	3			All Dems.—75
# of Black Leg.—13	Blacks	6	3	*1*		3	0			Blacks—69
Illinois	Total	61	52	*2*	*3*	32	24	*1*		
Year of vote—2010	Dems.	55	12	*2*	*1*	31	6			All Dems.—80
# of Black Leg.—30	Blacks	18	1	*1*		9	1			Blacks—90
Maryland	Total	72	67		*2*	25	22			
Year of vote—2012	Dems.	70	26		*2*	24	11			All Dems.—71
# of Black Leg.—43	Blacks	20	13		*1*	6	3			Blacks—60
New Jersey	Total	42	33			24	16			
Year of vote—2012	Dems.	42	4			22	2			All Dems.—91
# of Black Leg.—17	Blacks	13	0			3	1			Blacks—94
New York	Total	80	63	*3*		33	29			
Year of vote—2011	Dems.	77	15	*3*		29	1			All Dems.—85
# of Black Leg.—30	Blacks	13	6	*2*		9	0			Blacks—73

Source: State House and Senate Journals.

In sum, the story that emerges from the states voting to ban same-sex marriage is clearly that Black legislators were typically more "liberal" on the issue than both their Democratic colleagues, and the Black population as a whole, as indicated by opinion data and exit polling.

Expanding Marriage Rights

In contrast to what we see in the states considering legislation restricting marriage rights, the picture that comes from the states considering legislation that would expand marriage rights is a bit different when we compare Black legislators to other Democrats but the same when we compare Black legislators to the broader Black population. While there was not unanimity in the voting, a majority of Black legislators consistently supported legislation expanding the rights of same-sex couples. This is demonstrated in Table 3.

Figure 2.
Percentage of Legislators Voting for Expanding Rights.



The five states that considered legislation that would expand marriage rights include two that considered legislation creating civil unions and three that considered legislation legalizing same-sex marriage. In the two states considering civil unions (Illinois and Connecticut), the legislation would provide some of the benefits of married couples, though not all. Regardless, there was still opposition to civil unions as they were viewed as an expansion of rights. In both cases, Black legislators were very similar to their Democratic colleagues—with a significant majority voting in support of the new laws (Figure 2). Black legislators had a slightly lower rate of support in Connecticut but a slightly higher rate of support in Illinois.

In the three states considering legislation that would legalize same-sex marriage, a majority of the Black Democrats voted in favor, yet they still display some interesting variation. In New Jersey, only one of the seventeen Black legislators voted "No" to legalizing same-sex marriage, while in New York, six of thirty (all of whom were in the House of Representatives) voted "No".[10] Maryland stands out with the largest proportion of "No" votes among the Black legislators. This is especially notable in the House of Delegates where the vote was twenty in favor and thirteen against legalizing same-sex marriage. Black legislators comprised just over a third of the Democrats in the chamber but provided half of the twenty-six Democratic votes against the legislation.

Despite the fact that Maryland had the largest proportion of Black legislators vote against legalizing same-sex marriage, the overall proportion that supported the measure still stands in contrast to the position of the Black populace in general. After the passage of the measure, a coalition led by Black religious leaders was able to collect more than enough signatures on a petition to have the measure be subject to a referendum in the general election in November of 2012. Prior to the election, opinion polls consistently found a majority of Blacks in the state opposed the measure (Gonzales 2011, 2012;

Wagner et al. 2012). After the election in which a majority of the state's voters voted in support of legalizing same-sex marriage, exit polls reported that, while the vote was close among Blacks, a majority of Black respondents claimed to vote against legalizing same-sex marriage and only 46% voted for legalization (Blake 2012).

Taken altogether, we see that Black legislators, as a group, have been clearly in support of laws expanding marriage rights. In each context this has been the case, although in some cases, they were a bit less supportive than other Democrats. This is a simple finding, but when placed in the context set out at the beginning of this paper, it is actually a bit surprising. The consistent opposition within the Black community would suggest greater opposition among legislators. When taken together with the votes cast against measures restricting marriage rights to a man and a woman, the picture that emerges of Black state legislators on this issue is fairly consistent. As a group they are consistently opposed to restrictions on marriage rights, and most have supported legislation that would expand rights for same-sex couples.[11]

Discussion

The examination of the voting records reveals that, as a group Black state legislators did not support restrictions on same-sex marriage. In fact, Black Democratic state legislators have usually been less supportive of restrictions on marriage rights than their fellow Democrats. When confronted with bills that would expand the rights of same-sex couples, Black legislators were consistently supportive. Thus, as a whole Black state legislators clearly differ from the broader Black population. I turn now to some preliminary thoughts on why these legislators' votes diverge from the attitudes of Blacks in general.

For years scholars have wrestled with the question of what influences the decisions of legislators (Kingdon 1981). Constituents, colleagues, party leaders, executives, interest groups, and the legislators' own personal attitudes, all are important factors—to varying extents—in influencing the decisions legislators make on particular issues (ibid.). Explaining the divergence between Black legislators' voting record and the attitudes and voting record of the Black public on same-sex marriage requires getting a sense of which of these factors were most influential for Black legislators facing this legislation. Scholars who have studied legislative behavior around morality issues have consistently found certain key influences impacting legislative behavior—primarily centering on the individual legislator's attitudes and constituent preferences. Individual characteristics like ideology, partisanship, culture, and especially religious affiliation tend to be related to legislative behavior (Oldmixon 2002; Mooney 2001; McTeague and Pearson-Merkowitz 2013). Yet there is also strong evidence that citizens may wield more influence on morality issues than on nonmorality issues (Mooney 2001). These issues have higher than normal levels of citizen participation, and studies suggest that policy makers tend to be more responsive to citizen values on morality issues than on nonmorality issues (Mooney 2001). Focusing specifically on gay rights issues, Haider-Markel (2001) found that partisanship, ideology, religious affiliation, and constituency preferences are the key factors that drive legislator behavior.

Taken together, the past research suggests an array of influences centering on the individual legislator's attitudes (based on ideology, partisanship, cultural and religious affiliation), as well as the attitudes of their constituents who are more active and influential

in the realm of morality policy than in nonmorality issues and whose preferences are shaped by religious and ideological/cultural characteristics. For most legislators, then, their individual attitudes and the influence of the constituents are usually the primary factors. However, while these findings may be consistent for legislators in general, when looking at Black legislators specifically, the picture has been much less clear. Oldmixon and Calfano, for example, found that both the race of legislator and the Black proportion of a district were inconsistent predictors of voting behavior on LGBT issues (2007). The challenges for understanding Black legislative behavior on morality issues may be due to the level of aggregation used in examining religion—viewed by many as the key factor. Most Black voters are often placed in a category of "Black Protestant," which may not sufficiently grasp nuanced diversities among Black religious traditions. Tucker-Worgs has shown that within the realm of "Black Protestant" there are substantial differences among churches in terms of theological orientation, and these differences are related to the public engagement activities these churches engage in (Tucker-Worgs 2011). Moreover, McKenzie and Rouse (2013) have shown that Evangelicalism (which is strongly related to anti-LGBT rights positions) operates differently among Blacks than for Whites.

All of this suggests that we will need to look closely at Black legislators specifically in order to gain a stronger understanding of their voting behavior with regard to the divergence from the Black population as a whole on so-called morality issues. Personal attitudes may be the key, but detecting those attitudes through general labels (e.g., religious denomination) may be particularly challenging.

Ultimately, understanding legislative behavior in this area may require an intensive focus on particular states. An examination of Maryland, for example, suggests three key factors shaped the votes of Black legislators: legislator's personal attitudes, constituent pressure, and Democratic Party strategy. This was evident, for example, in both on and off the record statements of Black state legislators regarding the legislation legalizing same-sex marriage. They emphasized the significance of their personal attitudes as well as the attitudes of their colleagues, the position of their constituents, and the needs of the Democratic Party (Tucker -Worgs and Worgs 2014). While it is not surprising that they would claim their own attitudes drove their individual vote, many attributed the same motive to their colleagues—even those they differed with. In speaking of their colleagues off the record, a number attributed their colleagues' votes to their religious beliefs (or lack of belief) or even their sexual orientation. Some claimed their own vote was a response to constituents who had brought significant pressure. One legislator acknowledged that his/her support, as well as the votes of a few others came because the Democratic governor, who had once been opposed to same-sex marriage, made passage of the legislation a priority (ibid.).

The Maryland case would suggest that the divergence between the votes of Black legislators and the broader Black population, which was more opposed to legalizing same-sex marriage, would be explained by the strategy of the Democratic Party and the legislators' personal attitudes. This might very well be the case in other states as well. Subsequent studies of this or other morality policy issues should pay special attention to these factors.

A review of media accounts of the debates and controversies surrounding the votes in the various states in this study provides some support for this suggestion. For example, during 2004 many believed that voters coming out to oppose same-sex marriage would

also provide an advantage for Republicans. In Louisiana, for example, the public vote on the constitutional amendment limiting marriage to one man and one woman was ultimately held on a compromise date (separate from the date of the 2004 general election) in order to garner Democratic legislators' support for the measure in the legislature (Anderson 2004, 5). Likewise, there was a perception in Georgia that the proposed amendment to limit marriage to one man and one woman was a ploy to bring out general election voters that would lean Republican. The chair of the Georgia Legislative Black Caucus claimed, "the whole thing is designed to whip up a frenzy to get people to the polls . . . We have to see this for what it really is" (Jacobs 2004, 11). This led some who claimed to oppose same-sex marriage to oppose putting the measure on the ballot. Another Georgia legislator who opposed the measure stated, "I'm a pastor and I don't support gay marriage, but I resent people playing political football with our religious beliefs" (ibid.).

But still, in Georgia, as in other states voting on legislation restricting marriage rights, the majority of Democrats as a whole supported the restrictions. Black legislators deviated not only from the stance of their Black constituents but also from their party colleagues. This suggests that their personal attitudes may have been a more critical factor in their voting decisions than either constituent stances or the Democratic Party's strategy. Still, to really get a sense of the extent to which party strategy may have been a factor in particular states will require an in depth study of particular cases.

With regard to personal attitudes of the legislators, it would not really be a surprise to find that Black state legislators are more "liberal" on these issues than the broader Black population. Black elite attitudes and behavior is often more liberal than the broader Black population on social policy issues such as welfare, immigration, and crime (Tate 2003), and Black legislators have been found to be more consistently liberal than White colleagues (Lublin 1997). But it still stands worth noting that this divergence exists in this realm of morality policy as well. What drives these attitudes may vary, but media accounts suggest that one theme that seems to have resonated among Black legislators was the opposition to discrimination. Among a number of Black legislators, there was a stated reluctance to codify policies restricting rights into law. While rejecting the equation of gay rights with the civil rights of African-Americans, a recurring theme was that these measures reflected discrimination. A Georgia legislator expressed this sentiment noting, "What I see in this is hate . . . I'm a Christian, but if we put this in the Constitution, what's next? People with dark hair? You're opening the floodgates for people to promote their own prejudice" (Jacobs 2004, 11). As a Tennessee legislator put it, "We fought all these years against discrimination, and I'm not going to stand for it now . . . As an African-American, I have been a victim of discrimination, and I could never join the oppressors and vote with them." (Commins 2005, B2). The same sentiment could be found among legislators who supported legalizing same-sex marriage. Even some who claimed to disagree with homosexuality expressed an interest in removing discriminatory barriers from existing laws (Tucker-Worgs and Worgs 2014).

Conclusion

In this particular case of morality politics, Black state legislators are not only more liberal than the broader Black population, but they are also often more liberal than their other Democrats. When faced with legislation seeking to restrict marriage rights, most stood in

opposition and usually were more opposed than the other Democrats. When faced with legislation expanding the rights of same-sex couples, a significant majority supported the measures. There are some important implications of this voting record. Two, in particular, are worth noting here. First, it illustrates that the liberal divergence extends beyond issues like welfare or crime to same-sex marriage and likely other morality policy issues. Second, and perhaps most significant, may be that Black legislators might play a buffer role against the implementation of social conservative policies that their Black constituents may prefer. This is not to suggest that Black legislators should be considered a vanguard of social justice, but they can blunt populist positions—especially social conservative policies. Of course, they may also serve to blunt popular socially progressive measures as well.[12]

Ultimately, more research is needed to dissect the roots of the differences between the population attitudes (and votes) and the legislators' votes on the issue. An in-depth focus on particular states and individual legislators may uncover how these decisions were made and reflect more general criteria or priorities that shape the voting behavior of Black legislators on this and related issues. Further, we ought to explore other issues which may display a similar divergence (abortion rights, gambling, the death penalty, etc.). Lastly, we need to explore more deeply the extent to which Black legislators have served as a buffer to the advancement of socially conservative policies or agendas that a majority of African-Americans might support.

Notes

1. Black state legislators in Maryland were interviewed by the author during the year following passage of legislation legalizing same-sex marriage. See Tucker-Worgs and Worgs (2014) for full discussion of the Maryland case.
2. In her analysis of opinion data from 1980 through 2008, Tate noted that while there had been some shift toward liberal positions on issues like abortion and LGBT rights, a larger portion of blacks opposed abortion under any circumstances (with polling results ranging from 16% to 25%) than whites (10% to 14%), and only one-third to forty-six percent of blacks supported abortion under any circumstances, with the remainder (34% to 50%) supporting abortion only under certain circumstances (incest, rape, etc.). While a majority of blacks opposed discrimination against gays and lesbians in employment and military service, a majority opposed the rights of gays and lesbians to adopt children (Tate 2010).
3. This analysis, which is part of a broader examination of morality and African-American politics, is based on reviews of legislative voting records, interviews with state legislators, polling data, election results, and accounts in local and national media outlets.
4. This is not to say that Blacks are the only legislators who practice this form of representation. As Mansbridge notes, this can occur for various kinds of groups. The point here is that Black legislators are more likely than White legislators to act in the interests of Blacks who are not their constituents.
5. At present Indiana is in the midst of that process—having passed legislation to put an amendment on the state ballot. State law requires passing such legislation in consecutive legislatures before it can be placed on the ballot for voters to approve (Allen 2011). The California Amendment was struck down by a federal district court. This ruling was appealed to the US Supreme Court, which upheld the ruling in its decision in *Perry v. Hollingsworth*. However, the decision allows for the possibility of a future challenge to the district court ruling.
6. Arbajano (2010) argues that while much of the difference between Blacks and Whites is attributable to religion, there is still a difference when controlling for religion.
7. This was the case in both North Carolina and Maryland—the states most recently at the center of the issue as one (Maryland) moved to legalize same-sex marriage, and the other (North Carolina) moved to prohibit it by constitutional amendment (Harris and Constable 2012; *The Herald–Sun* 2012).
8. If a state had more than one such vote during this period, I only included the most recent vote. Indiana is the only state that had more than one such final vote during this period.
9. The twelve states that voted on legislation restricting marriage rights included ten that passed legislation placing a constitutional amendment defining marriage as between one man and one woman on the ballot for an upcoming election. The other two states were Indiana, which passed similar legislation

but which would need to pass the measure again in a succeeding legislature in order for it to actually get on the ballot, and Ohio which passed a state statute—their version of DOMA. Later that same year (2004), an amendment to the Ohio state constitution was placed on a general election ballot as a result of a petition drive.

10. In New Jersey, the legislation was ultimately vetoed by the state's Republican Governor Chris Christie.
11. While not included in this study, it is worth noting that Washington, DC, also seems to fit what we have seen. There, the city council voted 11 to 2 to legalize same-sex marriage in 2009. Of the seven Black council members, five voted in support of the measure, and only two voted against the law (Wiley and Wiley 2009).
12. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for highlighting this point.

References

Allen, Kevin. 2011. "Senate Oks Marriage Amendment." *South Bend Tribune*, March 30, 2011. NewsBank.

Anderson, Ed. 2004. "Ban on Same-Sex Marriage Sails through State Senate – Voters Could Decide on Measure this Fall." *The Times-Picayune*, June 10, 2004. NewsBank.

Arbajano, Marisa. 2010. "Are Blacks and Latinos Responsible for the Passage of Proposition 8? Analyzing Voter Attitudes on California's Proposal to ban Same-Sex Marriage in 2008." *Political Research Quarterly* 63(4): 922–32.

Baker, Andy, and Corey Cook. 2005. "Representing Black Interests and Promoting Black Culture: The Importance of African American Descriptive Representation in the U.S. Congress." *DuBois Review* 2 (2): 1–20.

Blake, Aaron. "A Shift on Gay Marriage." *The Washington Post*, November 11, 2012.

Bratton, Kathleen, and Kerry Haynie. 1999. "Agenda Setting and Legislative Success in State Legislatures: The Effects of Gender and Race." *The Journal of Politics* 61 (3): 658–79.

Broockman, David. 2013. "Black Politicians are More Intrinsically Motivated to Advance Blacks' Interests: A Field Experiment Manipulating Political Incentives." *American Journal of Political Science* 57 (3): 521–36.

Commins, John. 2005. "Same-sex Marriage Heads for 2006 Vote." *Chattanooga Times Free Press*, March 18, 2005. NewsBank.

Douglas, William. 2012. "Many Black Pastors Remain Opposed to Same-sex Marriage." *McClatchy-Tribune News Service*, May 31, 2012. LexisNexis Academic.

Gonzales, Patrick. 2011. "Maryland Poll." Gonzales Research and Marketing Strategies. Accessed April 13, 2015. http://www.gonzalesresearch.com/polls/Maryland%20Poll%20October%202011.pdf

———. 2012. "Maryland Poll." Gonzales Research and Marketing Strategies. Accessed April 15, 2013. http://www.gonzalesresearch.com/polls/Maryland%20Poll%20September%202012.pdf

Haider-Markel, Donald. 2001. "Morality in Congress: Legislative Voting on Gay Issues." In *The Public Clash of Private Values*, edited by Christopher Mooney, 115–29. Washington, DC: CQ Press.

Hardy-Fanta, Carol, Pei-te Lien, Diane Pinderhughes, and Christine Sierra. 2006. "Gender Race and Descriptive Representation in the United States." *Journal of Women, Politics and Policy* 28 (3/4): 7–41.

Harris, Hamel, and Pamela Constable. 2012. "Churches Grapple with Gay Marriage." *The Washington Post*, May 14, 2012. LexisNexis Academic.

Haynie, Kerry. 2001. *African American Legislators in the American States*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Hillygus, Sunshine, and Todd Shields. 2005. "Moral Issues and Voter Decision Making in the 2004 Presidential Election." *PS: Political Science and Politics* 38 (2): 201–9.

Hines, Mark. 2011. "Race, Religion and the Voting Gap: An Analysis of Voter Choice on Same-Sex marriage State Ballot Initiatives." Master's Thesis, Georgetown University. Accessed April 15, 2013. http://repository.library.georgetown.edu/pdfpreview/bitstream/handle/10822/553766/hinesMark.pdf?sequence=1.

Jacobs, Andrew. 2004. "Black Legislators Stall marriage Amendment in Georgia." *The New York Times*, March 3, 2004. LexisNexis Academic.

Jeunke, Eric, and Robert Preuhs. 2012. "Irreplaceable Legislators? Rethinking Minority Representatives in the New Century." *American Journal of Political Science* 56 (3): 705–15.

Kingdon, John. 1981. *Congressmen's Voting Decisions*. New York: Harper and Row.

Lewis, Gregory. 2003. "Black-White Differences in Attitudes toward Homosexuality and Gay Rights." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 67: 59–78.

Lublin, David. 1997. *The Paradox of Representation*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Mansbridge, Jane. 2003. "Rethinking Representation." *American Political Science Review* 97 (4): 515–28.

McKenzie, Brian, and Stella Rouse. 2013. "Shades of Faith: Religious Foundations of Political Attitudes among African Americans, Latinos, and Whites." *American Journal of Political Science* 57 (1): 218–35.

McTeague, John, and Shanna Pearson-Merkowitz. 2013. "Voting from the Pew: The Effect of Senators' Religious Identities on Partisan Polarization in the U. S. Senate." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 38 (3): 405–30.
Mobile Register. 2005. "Same-Sex Marriage Ban moves Closer to Passage." *Mobile Register*, February 17, 2005. NewsBank.
Mooney, Christopher. 2001. "The Public Clash of Private Morality: The Politics of Morality policy." In *The Public Clash of Private Values*, edited by Christopher Mooney, 3–18. Washington, DC: CQ Press.
Mooney, Christopher, and Richard Schuldt. 2008 "Does Morality Policy Exist? Testing a Basic Assumption" *The Policy Studies Journal* 36 (2): 199–18.
National Conference of State Legislators (NCSL). 2012. "Same-Sex Marriage and Domestic partnerships on the Ballot." Accessed April 5, 2013. http://www.ncsl.org/legislatures-elections/elections/same-sex-marriage-on-the-ballot.aspx
———. 2013a. "Same Sex Marriage Laws." Accessed April 5, 2013. http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/human-services/same-sex-marriage-laws.aspx
———. 2013b. "State Laws Limiting Marriage to opposite Sex Couples." Accessed April 5, 2013. http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/human-services/state-doma-laws.aspx
National Election Pool, Edison Media Research, and Mitosky International. 2005. *National Election Pool General Election Exit Polls, 2004.* ICPSR version. Somerville, NJ: Edison Media Research/New York: Mitofsky International [producers], 2004. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor].
———. 2007. *National Election Pool General Election Exit Polls, 2006.* ICPSR04684-v1. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor].
Newport, Frank. 2008. "Blacks as Conservative as Republicans on Some Moral Issues." *Gallup*. Accessed April 5, 2013. http://www.gallup.com/poll/112807/blacks-conservative-republicans-some-moral-issues.aspx.
———. 2012. "Half of Americans Support Legal gay marriage." *Gallup*. Accessed April 5, 2013. http://www.gallup.com/poll/154529/half-americans-support-legal-gay-marriage.aspx.
Oldmixon, Elizabeth, and Brian Calfano. 2007. "The Religious Dynamics of Decision Making on Gay Rights Issues in the U.S. House of Representatives, 1993–2002." *Journal of the Scientific Study of Religion* 46 (1): 55–70.
Olmixon, Elizabeth. 2002. "Culture Wars in the Congressional theater: How the U.S. House of Representatives Legislates Morality, 1993–1998." *Social Science Quarterly* 83 (3): 775–88.
Orey, Byron, Wendy Smooth, Kimberly Adams, and Kisha Harris Clark, 2006. "Race and Gender Matter: Refining Models of Legislative Policy Making in State Legislatures." *Journal of Women, Politics and Policy* 28 (3/4): 97–119.
Owens, Chris. 2005. "Black Substantive Representation in State Legislatures from 1971–1994." *Social Science Quarterly* 86 (4): 779–91.
Pew Research Center. 2012. "More Support for Gun Rights, Gay Marriage than in 2008, 2004." Accessed March 1, 2013. http://www.people-press.org/2012/04/25/more-support-for-gun-rights-gay-marriage-than-in-2008-or-2004/
———. 2015. "Support for Same-Sex Marriage at Record High, but Key Segments Remain Opposed." Accessed October 16, 2015. http://www.people-press.org/2015/06/08/support-for-same-sex-marriage-at-record-high-but-key-segments-remain-opposed/
Pitkin, Hanna. 1967. *The Concept of Representation*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Preuhs, Robert. 2006. "The Conditional Effects of Minority Descriptive Representation: Black Legislators and Policy Influence in the American States." *The Journal of Politics* 68 (3): 585–99.
Preuhs, Robert, and Rodney Hero. 2011. "A Different Kind of Representation: Black and Latino Descriptive Representation and the Role of Ideological Cuing." *Political Research Quarterly* 64 (1): 157–71.
Stallsmith, Pamela. 2006. "Delegates Won't Back Marriage Measure – Proposed Ban of Same –Sex Unions Too Broad, Say Previous Supporters." *Richmond Times Dispatch*, October 19, 2006. NewsBank.
Studler, Donley. 2001 "What Constitutes Morality Policy? A Cross-National Analysis." In *The Public Clash of Private Values*, edited by Christopher Mooney, 37–51. Washington, DC: CQ Press.
Sherkat, Darren, Kylan Mattias de Vries, and Stacia Creek. 2010. "Race, Religion, and Opposition to Same-Sex Marriage." *Social Science Quarterly* 91 (1): 80–98.
Tate, Katherine. 2003. *Black Faces in the Mirror: African Americans and Their Representatives in the U. S. Congress.* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
———. 2010. *What's Going On?: Political Incorporation and the Transformation of Black Public Opinion.* Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press.
The Herald–Sun. 2012. "National NAACP Head: All Eyes on N.C." *The Herald–Sun*, January 29, 2013. LexisNexis Academic.

Tucker-Worgs, Tamelyn. 2011. *The Black Megachurch; Theology, Gender and the Politics of Public Engagement.* Waco, TX: Baylor University Press.
Tucker-Worgs, Tamelyn, and Donn Worgs. 2014. "Black Morality Politics: Preachers, Politicians, and Voters in the Battle Over Same-Sex Marriage in Maryland." *Journal of Black Studies* 45: 338–62.
Wagner, John, Aaron Davis, Peyton Craighill. "Md. Leans toward Same-sex Marriage." *The Washington Post*, October 10, 2012.
Wiley, Dennis, and Christine Wiley. 2009. "Gay Marriage in our Black Church." *The Washington Post*, December 20, 2009. LexisNexis Academic.

Civic Engagement Is a Process: Lessons from a First-Year Public Administration Course

Zulema Blair[*]
CUNY—Medgar Evers College

Abstract

Given the growing civic engagement gap between nonselective and selective colleges, this article addresses the question: How can colleges of access produce more civically engaged and community-minded individuals? As Flanagan and Levine have demonstrated (2010) it is evident that opportunities for civic engagement are not evenly distributed across social class, race, and ethnic groups. To fill this void, colleges of access were approached by the Association of American State Colleges and Universities (AASCU) to implement a campus-wide infrastructure to increase civic engagement of their students. Medgar Evers College (MEC) of the City University of New York (CUNY), a predominantly Black institution (PBI) and college of access, is used as a case in point to examine and provide suggestions about a strategy for implementing the civic mission and what is needed going forward. A key finding is that civic learning is the first and necessary step of civic engagement. Therefore, civic learning is a necessary protocol for persons with low socioeconomic status, such as students enrolled in colleges of access, because it allows them to develop a public voice thereby increasing their ability to successfully participate in civil discourse.

Keywords: Colleges of access; Civic engagement; Predominantly Black institutions; Civic learning; Public administration

Introduction

Over the last decade, there has been an amplified drive toward increasing civic engagement, community service, and service-learning initiatives in college life. This emphasis has gained momentum due to the widening of the civic engagement gap between colleges of access and selective colleges (Cress et al. 2010; Flanagan and Levine 2010). In an attempt to fill this void, Campus Compact, the Carnegie Foundation, and the New York Times (NYT) launched a national initiative called the American Democracy Project (ADP)

* Direct correspondence to zulemablair@yahoo.com

through the network of the Association of American State Colleges and Universities (AASCU). The aim of ADP is to substantially increase the number of students from colleges of access (schools with open-admissions policies) and involve more of them in the fabric of American civic life. As a result, retention and graduation rates would increase (Cress et al. 2010). Colleges and universities of access were then approached by AASCU to create and implement a campus-wide infrastructure to increase civic engagement among their students.

Colleges of access such as community colleges (40% of all college students), some of the nation's historically Black colleges and universities (HBCUs), and predominantly Black institutions (PBIs) were chosen, because they represent the majority of college student population as well as diversity, and the admissions policies for these institutions is known to benefit and matriculate low-income, Black, Brown, first-generation, and nontraditional college populations (U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics 2015). The college presidents, provosts, deans, faculty, staff, and students of the participating colleges heeded this call and committed the necessary resources to join this initiative. However, these colleges were often left to their own devices to develop and implement their plans.

Medgar Evers College (MEC) of the City University of New York (CUNY) is a PBI that became a part of the ADP initiative. Founded in 1969 and named for the late civil rights leader Medgar Wiley Evers, its mission is to provide quality educational services for the residents of Central Brooklyn, which has the largest concentration of African-Americans in all of North America. MEC generously committed resources in line with its historical mission and in order to lend a voice from the perspective of African-American students. However, in spite of the push forward to implement, there remained a significant gap between the desire to affect institution-wide civic engagement actions and actually achieving it. Implementing and sustaining the civic engagement movement on MEC's campus was difficult if the students themselves did not have a history of being civically engaged; therefore, predominately relying on them to foster a commitment to community engagement proved disappointing. Other colleges of access expressed similar findings (Center for Community Colleges Student Engagement 2013).

While there is no consensus why the call for civic engagement has not been answered by these college students, previous research suggests that institutions of higher education have not done their part and have drifted away from emphasizing the civic engagement of their students. They believed that incoming students were socialized for this by their families, communities, and peers (Checkoway 2001). This assumption has some merit; however, not all students are fortunate enough to have these kinds of experiences prior to entering college. This seems particularly true for students attending colleges of access (Porter 2006).

This article explores the question: How can colleges of access produce more civically engaged and community-minded individuals? To address this question, the article will use MEC as a case in point to examine and provide suggestions about how to increase the civic engagement of these students in similar contexts. Findings suggest that civic learning is a necessary protocol for "leveling the playing field" for individuals who have low socioeconomic status such as students enrolled in colleges

of access. Civic learning can allow students to develop a public voice by increasing their ability to converse, deliberate, and participate in social and cultural issues of the day. In addition, developing civic knowledge can also help colleges and universities achieve their educational goals, including helping students launch successfully into their chosen profession.

Conceptualizing the Civic Mission

Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995) state that the three requirements for civic engagement are civic skills, time, and money. This is particularly true when students are viewed through the prisms of their colleges and universities. Students who choose MEC are predominantly low-income, first-generation, African-American individuals from the surrounding neighborhood, who often lack these resources and consequently may not see the benefit of being civically engaged. Although, these same issues may exist elsewhere in other access schools, by comparison MEC and other PBIs lack these resources to a greater degree (Mulvey 2008, 20; U.S. Code Section 1059e).

When ADP was implemented at MEC, senior leadership identified student leaders and faculty representatives who could find ways for students to become involved both on and off campus. Faculty members were reassigned and relieved from some of their course obligations to coordinate and correspond with other members of the ADP network, along with the parent organization, AASCU, and partners such as the NYT. The plan was for students, faculty, and administrators to present their findings at ADP's annual conference. AASCU provided member institutions with examples about how to implement initiatives, such as by celebrating Constitution Day, developing websites, advocating NYT readership, hosting voter registration drives, and incorporating other civic opportunities into the curriculum. At MEC, we found that these were great learning experiences that did engage students, but they were insufficient to sustain a movement or continued interest in civic involvement, with the exception of only a small number of students. Because typically students in access educational institutions do not yet have the civic knowledge and sufficient civic skills, they may not take advantage of these opportunities, especially if they do not understand the positive effects that civic engagement activities will have on them.

However, the lack of sustainability for these civic initiatives does not translate into a lack of a desire for a more representative community or address the cause of the widening gap that exists between research and private colleges and universities, as discussed in the literature (Center for Community Colleges Student Engagement 2013). It simply means that some of these civic initiatives/events such as Constitution Day, voter registrations drives, and the like, were not relevant to the daily experience of these low-income African-American college students as they live in their Central Brooklyn neighborhood, their city, or even their country.

Students at MEC need to be equipped to respond to issues that they see, feel, and hear about daily, by individuals that look like them and have similar communication styles. They need to be involved with issues that pique their interests as African-American males and females who live, for example, in the epicenter of "stop and frisk" and gentrification. They need to be immersed in issues that directly impact them while, at the

same time, learning about the institutions that may be directly or indirectly responsible for interpreting the Constitution and setting up voting for all levels of government. Through this exposure, it is then and only then that they will be able to comprehend and become involved with civic initiatives that are capable of transforming them and hence the broader society.

However, given that little research has been completed in the area of institutional structure and engagement especially where PBIs and student engagement are concerned, ADP participants were left to write their own script for civic involvement, which did not necessarily translate into data points for documenting civic action (Porter 2006). Given the lack of a sufficient knowledge base, faulty presumptions may be developing about who is or is not committed to civic engagement, because African-American students, like those at MEC, may have a different understanding about what it means to participate.

Defining Civic Engagement

Civic engagement is defined as "working to make a difference in the civic life of our communities and developing the combination of knowledge, skills, values, and motivation to make that difference. It means promoting the quality of life in a community, through both political and non-political processes" (Ehrlich et al. 2000, vi). Civic engagement encompasses service learning, volunteerism, and other community initiatives that serve to benefit specific segments of racial, cultural, and ethnic groups in society, depending on the individual or group that is implementing these civic acts. It may be done on an individual level or collectively, to address issues of public concern (Ehrlich 2010). Overall, to be civically engaged means that one has developed a civic identity and an affinity with an issue that deeply affects a group with which he or she is closely aligned. Those who engage issues civically find the collective via institutions, networks, or governance processes, and seek to deliberately bring about positive change according to the identity that they have developed (Cooper 2005).

But the term civic engagement has different meanings to different individuals and different groups. For African-Americans in particular, precollegial experiences such as K–12 education, income, family structure, neighborhood life, and other life-bearing circumstances often reduce the path toward civic activities and/or civic and political socialization (Porter 2006). And civic engagement is difficult to market to college-age individuals especially low-income and racial and ethnic groups who are consumed with working to find themselves and figure out what to do about their passions in life. They believe that they have more pressing priorities than being involved with civic issues. For African-Americans, the most popular and identifiable phrase that is associated with civic engagement is "giving back to the community"; this may be difficult for African-American students and others who may not have, as yet, developed a love for that community or an objectivity about its problems. This attitude challenges colleges, MEC in particular, to address social inequities to better the lives of individuals including our students. MEC is taking up that call by encouraging civic engagement and showing its benefits, as it finds ways to speak in a language that is relevant, because that will foster student involvement.

Using a similar understanding of civic engagement, ADP provided an appropriate assessment of what it takes to achieve civic engagement; what is omitted, however, is the means to draw students in so that they will connect and bond to what it means for them. While the definition that Ehrlich et al. (2000) puts forward is appealing to individuals who already have a clear understanding of civic engagement, others who do not have this same understanding will not see its benefits or perhaps not even find a way to engage meaningfully. Rather, colleges of access must take a stronger stance when nudging students toward civic engagement. Engagement must become a fundamental rite of passage and part of the cultural narrative that must take place if an individual intends to develop politically, economically, or socially, because the narrative of civic engagement is bigger than the individual; it is connected to developing skills to advance entire communities.

When becoming civically engaged, individuals and communities are enriched. Individuals expand their social networks and become involved with people more influential than themselves, which can help them enhance their existence and community life, even if they do not yet have a "giving back" mindset. But without this emphasis, the student will immediately question what civic engagement will do for them personally. Essentially, the student is inquiring, whether it is rational for them to invest in something that takes a great deal of time and energy when they have more urgent needs and obligations. In other words, they will ask, "What's in it for me?" This is a valid question that many investors in ADP and other civic engagement initiatives need to address, given that the face of the college student has changed significantly over the last decade.

Here are some relevant statistics. Of the approximately 20.6 million students who are enrolled in higher education, 37% are people of color. The majority of all students need some form of financial aid, and 40% of America's college students are enrolled in community colleges or "colleges of access." Seventy-two percent of college students attend a public university, the median age is twenty-seven, and there are just as many students that live on campus as live off campus. These numbers suggest that, while some initiatives are appropriate for this college generation, ADP leaders need to acknowledge that there is no one standard definition of civic engagement that works in all contexts. The experiences and relationships that these college students have with their communities are extremely diverse. Hence, the definition of civic engagement by Ehrlich et al. (2000) should also be expanded to incorporate the racial, ethnic, and socioeconomic diversity that exists in society and in particular, higher education, even if their definition provides a solid conceptual basis.

The definition of civic engagement itself can also be better targeted to stress the implicit personal value of committing to civic initiatives. This would include a roadmap to support scholars throughout their tenure in college, so that they will have resources available to help students achieve civic engagement goals. Accordingly, the groundwork for civic engagement should be broken into phases so that each year of study generates a new set of outcomes as well as a progression in the types of civic activities in which students participate; this in turn will increase their civic morale and that of the scholars. It will also enhance the reputation of the college or university in its community. It is then and only then that African-American students will understand that voter registration drives are important or that Constitution Day is a part of their experience. But before MEC students,

for example, reach this level of commitment, they have to become better and more persuasively oriented to civic engagement through a systemic educational learning process.

Civic Engagement through Civic Learning: The First Step

To be part of the narrative and develop this morale, one must be exposed to civic learning; therefore, a plan for civic education must be developed by educational institutions if civic engagement is the intended outcome. Scholars have not paid close attention to the idea of civic learning as a step-by-step learning process to ensure a more engaged student body (Boyte 2005; Ehrlich 2000; Nie, Junn, and Stehlik-Barry 1996). Also, those who have acknowledged civic learning as a key component are not being forceful enough with their argument, especially where specific groups are concerned. This is especially clear to public administration faculty members.

It is the conviction of this article that civic learning is a first and necessary step of civic engagement. This article is from the vantage point of a public administration faculty member and uses a case study method as a means to test a new way to teach civic engagement at a college of access. Civic engagement involves a process that occurs in stages, beginning in a student's first year and progresses each academic year, so that educational institutions will become invested in the culture of engagement, so it will become a standard for their graduates. There should be opportunities for civic learning in the college's general education curricula to ensure that all students have access to this process. Additionally, courses that are "naturals" for civic learning, such as Environmental Science, Education Policy, American History, and so on, should be identified to encourage a culture of civic awareness and engagement inside the classroom. Other "naturals" include social science courses, because they analyze political, economic, and social institutions (Hillygus 2005). Thus, the social sciences may also be ripe settings for civic learning. But there is an "action-step" missing. This step is intentionally making civic learning a necessary protocol in order to help "level the playing field" for individuals who have a low socioeconomic status, such as MEC students.

Civic learning is helpful and important to young African-Americans, in particular, because their contact with political, economic, and social institutions has not always generated positive outcomes. For example, street-level bureaucrats and public servants, such as police officers, are not always culturally receptive to African-Americans (Bass 2001). Additionally, real estate agencies, banking institutions, and so forth have not sufficiently signaled the fact that there may be opportunities for more African-Americans to become involved in political, economic, and social issues (Wilson 2007). While these institutions need to address African-American concerns, civic learning is also necessary to help African-American students develop an awareness of these issues as well as the advocacy methodology needed to produce better and more positive experiences for their communities.

Civic learning allows students to develop a public voice by increasing their ability to converse and deliberate about the issues of the day that may have otherwise been stifled or negated. It builds awareness about where African-Americans fit into the entire civil society—all institutions that exist between the family and the state. Civic learning also builds group consciousness and teaches students about privilege and power influences related to race, so that they can envision themselves as change agents

and problem solvers. Without systematic, well-conceived civic learning, only a very small percentage of African-American college students will be equipped to challenge the issues of the day. Further, if colleges and universities are not encouraged to create infrastructure for civic learning, their relationship with their community may never develop, or it may sour.

Civic learning produces the necessary identity formation, psychological orientation, and interest needed to increase civic and political activism for the greater good of society. All aspects of developing civic knowledge, whether through participating in associational life or experiential and service learning, are learning processes similar to those in which students begin working in their profession while attending college. As a result of this learning, civic engagement becomes part of one's professional experience and lifestyle. For African-Americans, it is a form of advocacy, which in their professional lives, displays their cultural competency.

Civic learning also builds internal efficacy—an awareness or knowledge base of what it means to become involved and create the necessary foundation needed to build an active citizenry. There is a direct relationship between civic learning and civic/political participation, which is geared toward the understanding of specific content areas such as the concepts and principles related to being a citizen. In addition, informed citizens need to know the structures of local, state, and federal government; the legislative process; the judiciary; and executive functions of government. More commonly, an informed citizen also needs to know the rules of engagement in local politics and such things as agenda setting and Robert's Rules of Order.

Implementing Civic Learning in the First Year

The Four Stages of Civic Learning

This paper proposes a protocol with four stages of civic learning. Although all stages are equally important to meeting the threshold of becoming an engaged citizen upon graduation, the focus of this paper is to suggest ways to increase civic learning in colleges of access, and the discussion and analyses will be limited to the first two stages of the first year of college within the context of MEC as an example of an access college.

Stage one of civic learning is the classroom phase. Research suggests that most of students' learning takes place during their first two years; however, a good number of students do not make it to their second year. Therefore, it is necessary to grab their attention the moment they enter college and engage them quickly. Students must become active learners in their freshmen year, and more important, they need to become involved using uncomplicated methods. One obvious discipline, which can be used for civic learning, as it has been described, is public administration.

Public administration is often seen as a subdiscipline of political science. The field of public administration in the United States was born as a methodology to administer and manage government programs. It was first popularized in the United States by Woodrow Wilson, who was also a political scientist as well as president of the American Political Science Association (APSA). Even though its roots trace back to political science as a discipline, pubic administration's origins can also be traced to psychology with respect to the study of organizational behavior; finance, with respect to government budgeting;

sociology, with respect to bureaucracy; human resource management; and the work of Max Weber (1864–1920), who was an influential German sociologist, philosopher, jurist, and political economist. Thus, public administration provides a comprehensive overview of what it means to interact with government and civic society at both micro and macro levels.

Public administration is about implementing public policy. The very nature of this discipline is action, and it is civic oriented, which makes it a viable option for increasing civic learning and filling the gap between the theory and aspirations of civic engagement (Denhardt 2007). Many may say that this discipline is ripe for civic engagement, and that may be true, but it must systemically lend itself to civic engagement in the first year, so students can use this information in their respective disciplines later and in extracurricular activities.

Public administration is important for civic learning, because it focuses on managing institutions in a nonpolitical fashion. The field has widened to include all subject areas and disciplines. It invites an interdisciplinary approach, since it allows students of varied disciplines to raise questions in their respective fields and direct them to appropriate gatekeepers. It can show students how each discipline influences the civil society. For example, education majors have a vested interest in learning about the rules and regulations imposed by the Department of Education, such as curriculum; the same holds true for environmental agencies and mental health institutions. Therefore, on top of individual expertise, students are required to learn about the administrative and managerial operations of their profession. Thus, public administration caters to each discipline, and more important, it allows individuals to respond to the call of civic service in their own line of work.

First-year courses, such as Introduction to Public Administration, give students an opportunity to become more intimately involved with their communities, giving them a practical approach that provides insight to civics and decision making in government. Knowledge of public administration is key to civic learning, because the government interacts with citizens through administrative agencies, no matter their socioeconomic status. Thus, courses that educate students about public administration will also help impart the civic skills that students need to advocate for their communities.

This particular phase introduces students to civic knowledge and competence that is needed to participate in civic discussions as well as to begin to analyze and discuss current events. This civic knowledge increases one's level of personal competence and effectiveness otherwise known as internal efficacy or learning to exercise one's civic voice. As students hone their civic voices, they will begin to identify entry points to gain access into institutional channels; however, one classroom experience is not enough; this brings us to stage two.

Stage two begins the practical phase of civic learning. This is the extracurricular phase where students join a student club affiliated with their discipline or personal interest. This particular stage is crucial as extracurricular activities have been shown to improve civic participation (Kahne and Spote 2008). Being a part of a student club gives students an opportunity to organize their fellow members as well as themselves. Students collectively decide on objectives and make decisions necessary for working out differences. As a member of a student club, civic identity is nurtured, sociability increases, and the

club creates a reference point that aids in the formation of civic understanding (Yates and Youniss 1999). Essentially, students develop and practice civic skills through their participation.

Through club membership students develop networking and negotiating skills that are transferable to other more diverse groups and initiatives. These skills help prepare them for leadership, as does contact with student affairs personnel who can act as mentors for leadership training. As a result, students have more confidence to reach out to the community with their club activities through the assistance of their faculty and peer advisors. But patience is needed, because some, prior to joining these organizations, may not have had the opportunity to be part of an organization. Membership in these volunteer organizations is the first step to becoming a part of larger social institutions that debate policy issues about their lives.

Stage three is the internship/field/service-learning experience, which is a combination of students, faculty, college administrators, and career mentors. First, internships cultivate necessary learning tools and give the experience needed to enter one's profession. It is a prime opportunity for students to substantiate the theories they learn in the classrooms as they are exposed to the organizational life of that particular field. Second, internships help students bond and interact with individuals in their field/discipline and assist them in building a larger career network for themselves, which in turn, spurs interest in public affairs and the broader community. This phase of civic learning is a prime methodology for increasing one's social capital. Thus, the more opportunities students have for service-learning, the more likely they are to develop civic awareness.

Stage four is the professional service stage that matures with one's career objectives. During this stage individuals are able to respond to problem areas in their disciplines as "student leaders." At this stage, students are ready to mentor others. Students will feel the necessity and confidence to become more involved in extracurricular activities or organizations outside the college community that will foster their growth and development.

Going Deeper into Stages One and Two

Delving deeper into stages one and two is not meant to sell stages three and four short, because all have their place in a systematic approach. However, the purpose of this research is to focus primarily on colleges of access. Therefore, it is necessary to observe that some colleges of access do not provide for a junior or senior year comparable to four-year institutions; some individuals attend community or junior colleges that conclude with a sophomore year. Thus, this analysis on increasing civic engagement in colleges of access will give a cursory summary about what comes after stage one and two for continuity purposes.

Two hypotheses that will be tested are:

H1: Students who take part in the first-year experience of civic learning are more likely to become civically aware than students who do not.

H2: Students who take part in the extracurricular phase of civic learning are more likely to perform community service than students who have not.

Introduction to Public Administration: A Case Study

To assess the effect that the Introduction to Public Administration course has on satisfying the first-year experience of civic learning, a survey was conducted on students at MEC, who took the course but are not public administration majors. A survey as a self-identified construct of civic awareness was used, because civic awareness, as defined in this article, is infused as a value in the protocol and functions as a means by which students develop enough awareness to respond to issues that impact their community. Only when students have "learned" enough will they become aware and be adequately prepared to respond to civic issues. Thus, self-identified civic awareness was used because only the students themselves will know when they become "aware."

Conducting a survey exclusively on nonpublic administration majors would allow unbiased responses, since students would recognize the effect that this course has on them. Public administration majors are also beneficiaries of the Introduction to Public Administration course, but they will unsurprisingly speak up for their chosen discipline. Also, research on the effects of institutional structure on engagement is limited, because data is not nationally representative due to the fact that schools opt to take part in surveys such as the National Survey of Student Engagement (NSSE) (Porter 2006). This particular survey is intended to give a description of the student population and also gain some tentative feedback on the potential this course has for imparting civic skills and knowledge that can be incorporated into a larger framework that can be applied to all students regardless of their major or interests. There were two hundred nonpublic administration majors who were selected to participate in the survey.

This course was chosen to accommodate MEC's student population, because there are no prerequisites; all students have a right of entry to this course as long as they have been admitted to the college even if they have not completed their developmental courses—courses that correct deficiencies in college-level reading, writing, and math. Approximately 85% of MEC's first-time freshmen need at least one developmental course; students who have not met these requirements are also allowed to enroll in this course. No student is left out of the process, so that he/she has at least begun the first stage of his/her civic engagement; this is civic learning.

Results

In analyzing the data, both a descriptive and logistic regression analysis was employed. Table 1 presents a descriptive analysis of the three sets of variables that were utilized to accommodate these analyses. The first group consists of a student's social characteristics; i.e., age, gender, race, and ethnicity. Age was measured in the years given; gender was coded 1 for female and 0 for males. Ethnicity was coded 0 for African-American, 1 for Latino, 2 for Asians, 3 for Caribbean, and 4 for other; race was coded 0 for white, 1 for black, and 2 for brown.

Students enrolled in this course are a microcosm of the MEC population. Ninety-five percent are of African descent, and the average age is twenty-seven. The average age for the students surveyed by this instrument is twenty-seven with the youngest being eighteen and the oldest fifty; 64% are females and 36% are males. Of these Black students, 51% are African-American, 32% are Caribbean, 9% are Latino, 2% are Asian, and 6% consist of other. This is not surprising since Central Brooklyn is home to the largest Black population in all of North America, as mentioned previously, and is often referred to as Black Brooklyn.

Table 1.
Frequency Distribution

Variables	Frequency	Percentages
Age		
18–24	44	46.4%
25–35	37	38.3%
Over 35	15	15.3%
Gender		
Female	63	62.4%
Male	38	37.6%
Race		
Black	95	95%
White	1	1%
Brown	4	4%
Ethnicity		
African-American	51	51%
Caribbean	32	32%
Latino	9	9%
Asian	2	2%
Other	6	6%
Year		
Freshman	29	28.4%
Sophomore	35	34.3%
Junior	22	21.6%
Senior	15	14.7%
Graduate	1	1%
College Life		
Major		
Business	56	54.4%
Liberal Arts and Education	32	31.2%
Sciences	15	14.6%
Student clubs		
Yes	35	34.3%
No	67	65.7%
Activities		
Yes	45	44.6%
No	56	55.4%
Employed		
Yes	60	60%
No	40	40%

(*Continued*)

Table 1. (Continued)

Variables	Frequency	Percentages
Standardized Test		
GED	20	20%
Yes, SAT	27	27%
Yes, ACT	2	2%
No	40	40%
Career		
Yes	26	26%
No	74	74%
Classroom Experience		
civics		
Freshman	56	57.1%
Sophomore	30	30.6%
Junior	9	9.2%
Senior	3	3.1%
Service learning		
Yes	66	66.7%
No	30	30.3%
Maybe	3	3.0%
Classroom		
Freshman	32	35.6%
Sophomore	36	40%
Junior	17	18.9%
Senior	5	5.6%
PA103		
Freshman	63	61.8%
Sophomore	30	29.4%
Junior	7	6.9%
Senior	2	2%

The second group of variables reflecting college life includes students' current year in college; current major; and whether or not they are members of a student club, employed, consider themselves as having a career, participate in community activities, and have taken any standardized exams prior to entering MEC. Current year in college was recoded 0 for freshman, 1 for sophomore, 2 for junior, 3 for senior, and 4 for graduate school. As far as majors, business majors were recoded 0, liberal arts and education majors were re-coded as 1, and sciences were recoded as 2. For the following variables: student club, employed, career, and activities, if they displayed the characteristic, they were coded 1 and 0 otherwise. For standardized exams, 0 for none, 1 for GED, 2 for SAT, and 3 for ACT.

Not surprisingly, 61.3% of these students completed this course when they were freshmen, 29.4% as sophomores, 16.9% as juniors, and 2% as seniors. Sixty percent of these students enrolled in this course entered college without taking the Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) or the American College Test (ACT). They either entered with the General Equivalency Diploma (GED) or had never taken a standardized exam. With respect to college life, 34.3% of these students belong to student clubs but 65.7% do not. Although 58.3% were employed at the time that they took this course, almost 72% stated that they do not yet have a career. Finally, 54.4% of the students are business majors; 31.2% are liberal arts, education, and social and behavioral students; and the remainder 14.4% are from the sciences.

A third group of variables reflecting classroom experience include: academic year that they began civics education, academic year that their major allows them to become civically engaged via classroom experience, and whether or not students have the opportunity for service-learning in their majors. These variables were assigned the following code: 1 for displaying the characteristic and 0 otherwise. 57.1% stated that they had the opportunity to begin their civic education as freshmen, 30.6% as sophomores, 9.2% as juniors, and 3.1% as seniors. 66.7% stated that there are opportunities for service learning in their majors while 30.3% stated that they do not, and 3% were unsure. Finally, 35.6% have the opportunity to become civically engaged via classroom experience as freshmen, 40% as sophomores, 18.9% as juniors, and 5.6% as seniors.

In analyzing the data further, a logistic regression analysis was employed since the dependent variables—civic awareness and community service—are both qualitative. This analysis properly determines the effects that the independent variables have on both dependent variables and serves as a baseline model for incorporating the influence an introductory public administration course has on civic learning.

Table 2 presents the results of the three types of influences on civic awareness and community service for students who have taken PA 103 and reflects the following equation:

$$Y = B_0 + B_1\,(Demographics)_i + B_2\,(College\ Life)_i + B_3\,(Classroom\ Experience)_i + B_4\,(Year\ of\ Intro\ to\ Public\ Admin)_i + E_i,$$

The civic awareness model correctly predicts 37.75% of the cases. While this model could be further improved with a larger sample, it is only meant to provide some insight in what could be done to include colleges of access into the larger conversation on civic engagement. Civic awareness was measured through a statement that required respondents to agree or disagree with the statement: "After taking this course, I became more aware of my community." Those who agreed were recoded as 1 and all others as 0. Similarly, community service was measured through a statement that required respondents to agree or disagree with the statement: "This course encouraged me to do more community service." This self-reported measure was used to analyze the impact this course had on students' civic awareness because given the lack of diversity and relevancy the definitions of civic engagement has with respect to the African-American community and the need to acknowledge and capture the unique experiences of students' civic activities, it was necessary to give them the freedom to self-assess how much this course had improved their civic knowledge and awareness. The dynamism of this course allows students to

Table 2.
Logit Model of Civic Learning on Civic Awareness and Community Service

	Civic Awareness	Community Service
Demographics		
Age	-0.033(.605)	-.345(.562)
Gender	-0.286(.771)	-.480(.712)
Ethnicity	-0.034(.304)	.149(.301)
College Life		
Year	0.690*(.412)	.717*(.386)
Major	-0.431(.484)	-.310(.493)
Student Club	1.442(.989)	1.440*(.864)
Activities	1.095**(1.013)	2.294**(.945)
Employed	0.007(.997)	-.015(.859)
Test	-1.738*(.972)	-1.202(.921)
Career	1.796(1.259)	1.688(1.139)
Classroom Experience		
Civics	0.086(.786)	.103(.785)
Service Learning	0.482(.867)	-.625(.494)
Classroom	1.428***(.512)	1.621***(.517)
Year of Intro to PA Course		
Freshman	23.211****(1.468)	22.645****(1.142)
Sophomore	20.308	20.143
Junior	-1.075	-.880
Senior		
N	103	
Percent Correctly Predicted	37.75***	37.69***
Chi-square	110.149	

One-tailed tests:*p<.10 **p<.05 ***p<.01 ****p<.001

learn enough content about where they fit within the civic spectrum and whether or not they will move to stage 2 in their civic learning experience.

Those who agreed with the statement that "After taking this course, I became more aware of my community" were recoded as 1 and all others as 0. The course was measured based on the academic year that this course was completed. It was coded as a stratified variable ranging from 0 to 3, with 0 reflecting freshman year and 3 reflecting their senior year. Most variables in the civic awareness model were statistically insignificant with the exception of current year in college, activities, taking standardized exams prior to entering MEC, classroom experience, and the Introduction to Public Administration course when taken as a freshman.

As far as the community service model, 37.69% of the cases were correctly predicted. Most variables were also insignificant with the exception of current year in college, activities, classroom experience, and the Introduction to Public Administration course when taken as a freshman and being a member of a student club. The differences between the two models were the facts that the test was significant with respect to civic awareness but insignificant for community service, and the student club was insignificant for civic awareness but significant for community service. Both hypotheses are confirmed but warrant further discussion.

Discussion

In the Introduction to Public Administration course, students survey a variety of topics, including jobs that are available in the public service arena; the differences between the sectors of the economy; the impact that government has on each of these sectors; organizational management, ethics; and leadership development. Additionally, the course is expanded to engage students in current-event topics from the NYT and other New York newspapers as well as C-SPAN. The course engages individuals in the hierarchy of public policies according to the organizations that are responsible for resolving various issues. This practice helps educate students about the knowledge that is necessary to not only help their communities but also themselves, and this course delivers the information in a manner that furthers student understanding of how to advance their surroundings. However, these individuals may not have studied the political, economic, and social dynamics of their local community in a way that they can generate positive suggestions for its improvement (Nie, Junn, and Stehlik-Barry 1996). Further, many students live, attend school, and work in their communities but have little knowledge of who their community leaders are and the issues these leaders address. One assignment that brings these different variables under one heading is their final project called *Problems in My Backyard.* This project allows students to use their neighborhood knowledge and apply it to a larger social picture where different actors are identified to address these issues. Due to the fact that students have the opportunity to work on an issue that they deeply care about, they become motivated to conduct research (Walker 2000).

Students are required to conduct research on problems and concerns within their assembly district. They are required to provide statistics in the following areas along with the mean/average for the NYC area: demographics (race, age, income, housing data—percent renting/owning, gender, educational attainment), unemployment, crime, infant mortality, high school drop-out rate, HIV/AIDS, and the like, as pertains to the assembly district in which they live. They must also give an analysis of the most pressing problem in their neighborhood/district that they think needs to be addressed, provide the solution, state the agency or organization that should be approached to address this problem (their analysis may be a reflection of how they feel about this pressing problem), and report this finding to their state assemblyperson. Students must conduct a written analysis of the problem and proposed solution in a research paper format as part of their final assignment. A memo is drafted to the public official to accompany the research that the student conducted. Once this assignment is completed and handed personally to the public official, students are required to openly reflect on this analysis in their class. Here they share stories of how barriers and walls are broken down between power structures, and quite often, how they

didn't know that it was so simple to communicate with these individuals. Students are then invited to their assembly's state of the district address. For most, this is their first introduction to community service. Essentially, this course teaches them how to become a good citizen without becoming intimidated by the process. This course of action also allows students to become an official stakeholder in their community by voicing the problems through their lens. The desired outcome is that students begin to recognize the value of contributing to their community.

This service helps the public official see things directly from their constituents' points of views as opposed to their own point of view. It also assists the student to become more aware and more involved; it gives them an understanding of how representatives come to understand the problems in the community, and students begin to understand how issues are addressed. Basically, if no one is aware of troubling issues, they will be ignored, but the more they are brought to the attention of public officials, the more likely they will gain some recognition and acknowledgement.

Thus, this course was highly significant with respect to developing civic awareness. It is interesting that classroom experience was significant as well as activities, but in doing some descriptive analysis, it should be made clear that first-year students in entry-level courses can realize the types of experiences that they are receiving with respect to civic education in this particular course. Since it was clearly noted that 60% of these students have not taken a standardized exam prior to entering MEC, the students already have been declared to be disadvantaged, because verbal SAT scores are noted to be an important indicator of not only language but also civic skills (Hillygus 2005). This course helps individuals have the critical discourse that is needed to become an active citizen.

This essay speaks to one of the precollegial experiences or lack thereof. These diverse issues are often the underlying reasons for acceptance or rejection by college admissions and why or why not students track an education at a particular college or university; essentially, there are different types of colleges for different types of students. It is a matter of what kind of individual will attend a specific type of college and, in turn, how prepared and organized colleges and/or universities are to address a particular kind of student. Thus, in a setting that purposely injects diversity in its student population, some promise must exist for the struggling and underrepresented student. Colleges and universities have to pick up the slack for certain precollegial experiences, because there has been an unequal distribution of civic learning for incoming college students across the country, and depending on the college or university, the gap widens upon graduation. This lack of precollegial experience alludes to them having fewer of the necessary skills that are needed to enter into the types of discussions needed to advance their learning and, hence, engagement. Thus, at MEC this course is documented as a critical factor to promote civic learning.

The same is true for becoming a member of a student club, which was a major difference between the civic awareness model and the community service model, thus confirming the second hypothesis concerning stage two, the extracurricular phase. For example, developments such as the American Democracy Project (ADP) and Learn and Serve America have been responding to the call of service by engaging institutions of access in a process that integrates civic engagement in curricular and extracurricular activities (Ehrlich 2000). They have recognized that there has been a lack of civic duty emanating from college students and graduates. They consequently saw the need to bring this call of

service to a community that had a need for civic engagement. However, not all students participate in extracurricular activities, and so it becomes another charitable assignment, which may be viewed unfavorably or as a burden by college students overall but more so by this particular student body.

Conclusion

While it is noted that some sort of trend is needed to assess the long-term and longitudinal effects of this course on civic education, this research sought to offer a step-by-step protocol of acculturating students to civic life, albeit by focusing on civic learning. It is often believed that African-American and low-income populations do not have the confidence in our democracy to participate. Thus, where colleges, especially those where the majority of its population consist are predominantly African-American, such as MEC, implementing civic learning during one's first year is an important step.

Public administration and public service have been used both interchangeably and synonymously to bring awareness and encouragement for what this discipline has to offer and contribute to civic engagement (Denhardt 2014). Individuals and organizations alike have an ethical obligation to give back; this is a universal approach to civic engagement that has been embraced by many scholars but has been tough to implement.

Civic engagement allows individuals to eventually look outside of themselves and explore how they can affect the larger community. However, before this can take place, students have to understand themselves and how much they can honestly contribute to society. This can only be done when they are taught the basics in such a way that is directly beneficial to them. Only then can they appreciate the escalated meaning of civic engagement and famous phrases like the one uttered President John F. Kennedy in his 1961 Inaugural Address, "Ask not what your country can do for you, but what you can do for your country." Individuals are supposed to contribute to and/or have some attachment to their communities. This is especially important because these same students can end up working and running companies, organizations, or corporations. The same is true for the educational entities—colleges and universities—because not only are they placed in communities, but in some cases they are also the heart of the communities.

References

Adler, Richard P., and Judy Goggin. 2005. "What Do We Mean By "Civic Engagement"?" *Journal of Transformative Education* 3: 236–53.

Almond, Gabriel A., and Sydney Verba. 1963. *The Civic Culture*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Bass, Sandra. 2001. "Policing Space, Policing Race: Social Control Imperatives and Police Discretionary Decisions." *Social Justice* 28: 156–76.

Boyte, Harry C. 2005 "Reframing Democracy: Governance, Civic Agency, and Politics." *Public Administration Review* 65: 536–46.

Campbell, David. 2008. "Voice in the Classroom: How an Open Classroom Climate Fosters Political Engagement among Adolescents." *Political Behavior* 30: 437–54.

———. 2009. "Civic Engagement and Education: An Empirical Test of the Sorting Model." *American Journal of Political Science* 53: 771–86.

Center for Community College Student Engagement. 2013. A Matter of Degrees: Engaging Practices, Engaging Students (High-Impact Practices for Community College Student Engagement). Austin, TX: The University of Texas at Austin, Community College Leadership Program.

Checkoway, Barry. 2001. "Renewing the Civic Mission of the American Research University." *Journal of Higher Education* 72: 125–47.

Cooper, Terry. 2005. "Civic Engagement in the Twenty-First Century: Toward a Scholarly and Practical Agenda." *Public Administration Review* 65: 534–5.

Cress, Christine M., Cathy Dwight E. Burack, Giles, Jr., Julie Elkins, and Margaret Carnes Stevens. 2010. "A Promising Connection: Increasing College Access and Success through Civic Engagement." *Campus Compact*: 1–21.

Denhardt, Robert. 2014. *Public Administration: An Action Orientation, 7th Edition.* State: Thomson Wadsworth.

Edwards, Michael. 2009. *The Civil Society, 2nd Edition*. Cambridge, MA: Polity Press.

Ehrlich, Thomas. 2000. *Civic Responsibility and Higher Education*. State: Roman and Littlefield Education.

Flanagan, Constance, and Peter Levine. 2010. "Civic Engagement and the Transition to Adulthood." *The Future of Children* 20: 159–79.

Gramsci, Antonio. 2007. *Prison Notebooks*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Hillygus, Sunshine D. 2005. "The Missing Link: Exploring the Relationship Between Higher Education and Political Engagement." *Political Behavior* 27: 25–47.

Hurtado, Sylvia, Mark E. Engberg, Luis Ponjuan, and Lisa Landreman. 2002. "Students' Precollege Preparation for Participation in a Diverse Democracy." *Research in Higher Education* 43: 163–86.

Junn, Jane. 2004. "Diversity, Immigration, and the Politics of Civic Education." *PS: Political Science and Politics* 37: 253–5.

Kahne, Joseph E., and Susan E. Sporte. 2008. "Developing Citizens: The Impact of Civic Learning Opportunities on Students' Commitment to Civic Participation." *American Educational Research Journal* 45: 738–66.

Klofstad, Casey A. 2007. "Talk Leads to Recruitment: How Discussions about Politics and Current Events Increase Civic Participation." *Political Research Quarterly* 60: 180–91.

Mehaffy, George L. 2005. "The Story of the American Democracy Project: Working with Partners to Increase Civic Engagement." *Change* 37: 68–74.

Mulvey, Mary Ellen. 2008. "Under-prepared Students – A Continuing Challenge for Higher Education." *Research and Teaching in Developmental Education* 24: 77–87.

Nie, Norman H. Jane Junn, and Kenneth Stehlik-Barry. 1996. *Education and Democratic Citizenship in America*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Palmer, David L., and Christina Standerfer. 2004. "Employing Civic Participation in College Teaching Designs." C*ollege Teaching* 52: 122–7.

Porter, Stephen R. 2006. "Institutional Structures and Student Engagement." *Research in Higher Education* 47: 521–58.

Putnam, Robert. 2000. *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Communities*. New York: Simon and Schuster.

Schuetze, Hans G., and Maria Slowey. 2002. "Participation and Exclusion: A Comparative Analysis of Non-Traditional Students and Lifelong Learners in Higher Education." *Higher Education* 44: 309–27.

U.S. Department of Education. National Center for Education Statistics. 2015. *Digest of Education Statistics* (NCES 2015-011).

Verba, Sydney, Kay Lehman Schlozman, and Henry Brady. 1995. *Voice and Equality: Civic Voluntarism in American Politics*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Walker, Tobi. 2000. "The Service/Politics Split: Rethinking Service to Teach Political Engagement." *PS: Political Science and Politics* 33: 646–9.

Wilson, George. 2007. "Racialized Life-Chance Opportunities across the Class Structure: The Case of African Americans." *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 609: 215–32.

Yates, Miranda, and James Youniss. 1999. *Roots of Civic Identity: International Perspectives on Community Service and Activism in Youth.* Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.

Crossing the Mason Dixon versus the Rio Grande: Evaluating the Effect of Race on Attitudes toward Immigration Policy

Carley M. Shinault[*]
Bloomsburg University of Pennsylvania

Richard A.Seltzer[**]
Howard University

Abstract

This research evaluates changes in attitudes toward immigrants and immigration policy over five decades. Utilizing data from Gallup and CBS opinion polls between 1964 and 2012, this study explores mass opinion regarding appropriate levels of immigration, whether immigrants create competition over employment opportunities, granting of amnesty, and the likelihood of immigrants becoming productive citizens and contributing to the American economy. With particular focus on trends among African-American respondents, it is among the first empirical studies to conduct a longitudinal exploration of African-American attitudes toward immigrants and immigration policy. In contrast to literature that emphasizes competition and conflict between Blacks and Latinos, our results indicate that Blacks were more likely than Whites to express proimmigrant sentiments. Socioeconomic variables had a slightly greater effect among Whites than Blacks. In line with previous studies, respondents with less education and/or lower income were more likely to oppose the rights of immigrants. Some of these differences seem to have widened in recent years.

Keywords: Black and White attitudes; Immigration policy; Attitudes on immigration

Introduction

Since the 1960s, America has experienced a rapid growth of Latino immigrant populations. With their rising numbers has also come an increase in political representation and influence (Franklin and Seltzer 2002; McClain et al. 2003; McClain and

*Direct correspondence to cmshinault@gmail.com
**Direct correspondence to rseltzer@howard.edu

Stewart 2010; Oakford 2015). As witnessed during the 2012 presidential campaign, Latino interests have taken center stage on the national agenda and, some would argue, marginalized those of African-Americans (Kurland 2001). With the nation presently gearing up for a new wave of presidential hopefuls, both Blacks and Latinos groups have salient issues that will impact electoral outcomes. Progressive coalitions between the two groups may ensure there will be room for both needs to be addressed with thoughtful and swift action.

Although racial groups in this country are still largely segregated, research indicates that African-American communities, in particular, are more likely to be integrated with Latinos than any other racial or ethnic group (Gay 2004; Logan 2001). Given the close physical proximity of Blacks and Latinos, and similarities in socioeconomic displacement, scholars have explored the potential for establishing coalitions between the two groups (Franklin and Seltzer 2002; Jackson, Gerber, and Cain 1994). Philip Kretsedemas (2012) asserts that the wave of harsh immigration laws bear a close resemblance to the race-based exclusions of the Jim Crow era. He adds that local immigration laws have also been criticized for encouraging a new kind of racial profiling comparatively similar to the racial profiles that have been used to target black populations. Highlighting these and other common experiences of Blacks and Latinos can open the doors for deeper levels of understanding, respect, and collaboration. At the municipal level, both groups have reaped the rewards of successful coalitions. Challenging the negative rhetoric surrounding Black/Brown relations, Mark Sawyer (2005) contends such emphasis in an "effort to discipline Latina/o ideology and political behavior and prevent Black and Latina/o political alliances" (268). There are several instances where interracial coalitions led to the election of minority officials. In Chicago, for example, the 1983 and 1987 mayoral elections of Walter Washington were in many ways due to a progressive coalition of Latinos, Blacks and other minority groups. Latino activists, in particular, played a critical role in mobilizing the efforts that ultimately enabled Black-led reform forces to capture city hall. In return, Washington supported Latino city council candidates, pushed proimmigrant legislation, and paved the way for the first Latino majority congressional seat. The 2005 mayoral election of Antonio Villaraigosa was due to strong coalitions of Latinos, Blacks, and Whites (McClain and Stewart 2010). The elections of Sam Zamarippa (Georgia), Henry Cisneros (San Antonio), and Frederico Pena in Denver further demonstrate that coalition politics is still a legitimate and effective vehicle for bringing Blacks and Latinos together (Franklin and Seltzer 2002).

Additional research, however, has highlighted acute tensions and conflict between Blacks and Latinos arising from competition over scarce resources (Citrin et al. 1997; Gay 2006), which are "believed to be so intense that they adversely affect the efficacy of coalition politics as a medium for effectively mobilizing Blacks and Latinos under one umbrella" (Franklin and Seltzer 2002, 77). Though many Black and Latino political activists condemned California's anti-immigrant initiative, Proposition 187, approximately 64% of the Black electorate expressed support for the initiative[1] (Franklin and Seltzer 2002). Kenneth Meier and colleagues (2004) found that employment, in particular, creates a competitive relationship between the Blacks and Latinos, and the

gains of one group often result in losses by the other. This may not bode well for future relations given recent predictions that immigrants and their children will account for 85% of growth in the workforce over the next two decades (Vuong 2013). Claudine Gay (2006) cautions that idealized notions of intergroup unity tend to collapse when the two ethnic groups are confronted with limited employment opportunities, by the lack of educational resources, a shortage of adequate and affordable housing, and the desire among both groups for substantive political representation in the multiple levels of government.

So far, public opinion research has painted a mixed picture of Black and Latino relations, with no clear conclusions about prospects for the future (Sawyer 2005). Given the conflict surrounding the viability of Black/Brown coalitions, we believe an evaluation of public sentiment over time could shed light on shifts in attitudes toward these relationships and the potential for future social and political coalition building. This study is an evaluation of changing attitudes among African-Americans toward immigrants and immigration policy. Using data from Gallup Organization and CBS/New York Times (NYT) public opinion polls conducted between 1964 and 2012, we evaluate responses across four major themes: level of immigration, competition for employment opportunities, granting of amnesty, and contribution to the national economy. As previous research considers the extent to which gender, political orientation (Citrin et al. 1997; Schildkraut 2008), age (Neal and Bohon 2003), socioeconomic status (Mayda 2006; Miles 1992; Pantoja 2006), and national region (Neal and Bohon 2003) influence public sentiment, we include these variables to account for potential effects. Results from the three-way interactions (with race) are expected to have implications for potential interracial political coalitions and social comity.

Background

The United States has a long history of assertively regulating people's mobility across its borders and membership in their communities. In doing so, the country reaffirms sovereignty by determining who is able to cross borders into their national territories and deciding who can claim citizenship (Bauder 2011). African-Americans and Latino immigrants share similar experiences of crossing natural boundaries in search of greater opportunities in the United States. The Mason-Dixon Line, commonly known for its role in the Missouri Compromise of 1820, established a boundary between southern slave states and the free states of the north. Until the mid-nineteenth century, this natural boundary represented the line of freedom for tens of thousands of Blacks escaping slavery. The Underground Railroad provided food and temporary shelter at secret stations and guided northbound slaves across the Line. Both escaped slaves and legally free Blacks living anywhere near the Line were vulnerable to kidnapping by slave catchers. Since 1848, the Rio Grande has marked the boundary between Mexico and the United States and is a critical site where illegal immigrants cross into the country. Running across the border of southern Texas, the banks of the Rio Grande are frequently littered with life jackets, punctured rafts, or the occasional lifeless body. Tens of thousands of migrants from Mexico and South America take a long and perilous journey along ferries and "La Bestia,"[2] through violent gang territories, and down winding, mountainous roads to reach

the US border (Taylor 2013). As a result, the United States has aggressively sought to gain and maintain control over its southern borders and made the Rio Grande a site of concentrated border enforcement efforts[3] (Cornelius 2001).

Black Americans and Latino immigrants have risked (and some continue to risk) life and limb to secure for themselves the promise of freedom and a better future in America. In his description of the "multiple border crossings that govern the lives of migrating immigrants," Philip Kretsedemas (2012) recounts a journey that, with a few tweaks, could easily describe that of escaped slaves making their way north as well:

> "Some are physical; others, equally real, are legal and cultural: the departure from home, the arrival at the border of the United States, the admission into the country, the possible removal from the country through deportation, the social and cultural assimilation after arrival, and the naturalization process to become a U.S. citizen. At each crossing, the law and the lives of immigrants are tested and often changed as a result of the encounters and negotiations" (2012, 3).

For African-Americans and Hispanic immigrants, crossing these river boundaries signifies both an escape route to greater life chances and a gateway to an "outsider" existence. The experiences of both demonstrate how the process of becoming 'integrated' into the US economy is also bound up with structural dynamics that lead many to become members of a racialized underclass (Kretsedemas 2012). The heightened presence of poor Black and immigrant populations has often been met with acute responses from native residents (Wilson 1980). The labor force, in particular, fueled resentment and conflict with native workers by using the cheap labor from newcomers as leverage to drive down wages. Between 1890 and 1930, newly migrated Blacks came into direct competition for labor in the burgeoning industrial cities. They were often hired as strike-breakers, which led to violent reactions by White laborers (Massey and Denton 1993; Wilson 1980). Similarly, immigrants arriving from poorer countries are more willing to sell their labor cheaply. Beginning in the 1990s, a shift in the southern economy necessitated large numbers of unskilled and inexpensive labor. Industries such as poultry/meat processing, carpet manufacturing, oil refining, agriculture, and forestry increased the demand for low-wage immigrant workers, who were recruited from Mexico (McClain et al. 2007). Their presence often undercuts the rates demanded by existing workers and may lead to their replacement (Neal and Bohon 2003). Research by Pastor and Marcilli (2003) revealed that as the number of undocumented immigrants increased, the wages of low-skilled Black men decreased by almost 30%. This competition for labor reinforces anti-immigrant sentiments shared by advocates of restrictionist immigration policies. Paula McClain and colleagues (2007) found that Blacks in Durham, North Carolina, were more likely than non-Blacks to be concerned about the rapid growth of the Latino population and to believe continued immigration would lead to decreased economic opportunities for their race.

Throughout this nation's history, responses to the presence of new and different ethnic populations have varied. Literature on immigration in America indicates that race and nation of origin are directly linked to admittance rates (Johnson 1998). While US immigration policy in the 1800s took an exclusionary position toward Chinese immigrants, newcomers from Europe were welcomed arrivals. Between the 1850s and the turn of the twentieth century, Europeans comprised 91% of the immigrant population

(U.S. Immigration Commission 1911). Moreover, European immigrants were able to achieve the status of "undifferentiated" Americans (Neal and Bohon 2003). During the 1920s the United States enforced preferential quota system according to nationality. Twenty years later special provisions through the Bracero Program for agricultural workers from North, South, and Central America to enter and the Chinese exclusion laws were repealed. Since the 1960s the ethnic and racial composition of the United States has shifted significantly (Massey 1995), as the major source of immigration has shifted from Europe to Latin America and Asia. At 47 million strong, Latinos are the nation's largest minority group, comprising nearly 15% of the total US population (Pew 2010). One quarter of all legal immigrants (25.1%) come from Mexico (Rytina 2013), and Hispanics account the majority of illegal (76%) immigrants in the United States (Pew Hispanic Center 2009). Consequently, current residents are growing increasingly concerned about the social, economic, and political implications of the changing demographics. Public policy responses have reflected this shift in public sentiment.

In 1965, the Immigration Act abolished the national origins quota and widened America's door to immigrants (Citrin et al. 1997) and by the 1970s, American cities experienced major increases in Latino immigrant populations (Gay 2006). Around this time, issues of poverty created alliances between Blacks and Latinos; however, policies designed to promote equal access for specific groups eventually created conflicts. For example, Black concerns for desegregation created fears that support of bilingual education would divert resources, and Hispanics questioned whether they had comparable gains from affirmative action and antipoverty programs (McClain and Karnig 1990).

Latino population growth continued to increase through the 1980s. The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 created opportunities for illegal residents to gain citizenship and penalized employers of unauthorized workers. This Act was sponsored by President Ronald Reagan and in retrospect is somewhat controversial among conservatives. The decade of the 1990s witnessed the largest number of immigrants admitted to the United States since 1910—9.1 million (Pantoja 2006). The Immigration Act of 1990 raised the cap on immigration levels, created new protections for illegals, and established new categories for citizenship. The rapid "browning" of the demographic landscape, however, ultimately led to acute policy responses. Citrin et al. (1997) attest that the population shift led to an outpour of proposals to reduce immigration, seal the border with Mexico, and limit immigrants' access to government services. California's 1994 Proposition 187 denied illegal immigrants access to state-funded education and health and social services (Franklin and Seltzer 2002; Lee and Ottati 2002).[4] Although overturned, Congress responded by "doubling the INS budget, adding 1,000 more border patrol agents each year until 1997" (Pantoja 2006). In 1996, Congress passed the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act. The new laws increased the budget for border control, preference was given to skilled immigrants over family reunification, and they reduced the use of public assistance services by noncitizens (Nevines 2002; Gimple and Edwards 1999). Further, it was first time since 1924 that Congress sought to reduce the number of legal immigrants admitted into the country (Pantoja 2006).

In the short period of time since the turn of the twenty-first century, America has seen a steady decline in immigration rates. By 2000, the national immigration rate was 5.2%, down from 6.4% in the previous decade (Pew Research Center 2010)—presumably because of the recession and increased prosperity in Mexico. During the Bush years, Congress passed the REAL ID Act (2005), which established new identification requirements, enhanced border patrol, and changed visa limits for temporary workers. As the public's fears had been fueled by the highly publicized role of immigrants in the September 11 terrorist attacks, Bush's policies received very little resistance. The 2008 presidential election of Barack Obama, however, signaled a shift in immigration reform away from restriction. His support of the Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors (DREAM) Act, a proposal that offers a route to citizenship for children of illegal immigrants, gained widespread support by Latinos and raised the salience of immigration reform to the top of political debate. This support came in spite of the fact that the Obama Administration deported more immigrants annually than the George W. Bush Administration (Lopez and Gonzalez-Barrera 2013).

As a major issue during the 2012 presidential campaigns, candidates addressed immigration reform throughout campaign interviews, speeches, and debates. Ultimately 48% of Latinos turned out to vote, supporting Obama over Mitt Romney, who took a strong anti-immigrant stance, 71–27% (Gonzalez-Barrera 2013). Much of President Obama's re-election in 2012 has been attributed to the acute increase in Hispanic voter turnout. Earlier in the year, he passed the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), which allowed undocumented immigrants who arrived prior to their sixteenth birthday to receive extensions of residency (though not a pathway to citizenship). The following year, immigration reform was successfully passed in the Senate and is holding for a vote in the House.[5] While the bill strengthens border patrol and increases penalties on employers of illegal immigrants, it also provides new opportunities for citizenship and provides protection for illegal workers. As attention turns toward the 2016 elections, political parties, pundits, and policymakers are taking stock of electoral demographic changes sweeping the nation and the potential influence these changes will have on the political landscape. Presidential hopeful Hillary Clinton has already raised immigration as a key political issue and has challenged Republican candidates to debate their positions on immigration reform and a pathway to citizenship.

While attitudes toward immigrants have become more positive than negative throughout America's struggling economy (Pew 2013), the growing population and voting power of Hispanics may be perceived as a threat to other Americans (Gay 2006; Jackson, Gerber, and Cain 1994). Responses to this shift are the subject of this research. The history of US immigration demonstrates that public sentiment may again move toward a more restrictionist stance. Schildkraut (2008) cautions not to let optimism about the progress of American egalitarianism mask the importance of recognizing and understanding continued aversions to immigrants. "We may have come a long way since the National Origins Act, but negative views of immigrants continue to be a source of tension and conflict" (Schildraut 2008). Kenneth Meier and his colleagues (2004) contend that the increasingly multiethnic character of American society is a critical part of the larger political process, and whether minority groups can achieve social and political comity will greatly influence the outcome of many policy processes. Given the close link between public sentiment and

public policy, the ability to identify patterns in attitude shifts has significant implications. This research evaluates changes among attitudes of African-Americans from a time when they dominated sociopolitical discourse to today, when other marginalized groups are increasingly being included among national priorities.

Literature Review

Given the significant implications of America's changing demographic landscape, national, state, and local responses to immigration have been the site of significant research across disciplines (Lee and Ottati 2002; Mayda 2006; Neal and Bohon 2003). Race has shown to be an inconsistent indicator of attitudes toward immigrants. Claudine Gay (2006) examined how the level and distribution of economic resources within diverse areas affect Black attitudes toward Latinos. Her results indicated that the stress of living in distressed communities was not the source of anti-immigrant sentiments among African-Americans. However, in areas where Latinos were economically advantaged relative to their Black neighbors, Gay found that "Blacks were more likely to harbor negative stereotypes about Latinos, to be reluctant to extend to Latinos the same policy benefits they themselves enjoy, and to view Black and Latino economic and political interests as incompatible" (2006). As long as African-Americans were at least as economically secure as Latinos, racial attitudes were unaffected. Pantoja's (2006) findings, however, did not support the argument that Blacks harbor negative attitudes due to feelings of social or economic threat. Moreover, when compared to Whites, Citrin et al. (1997) found that Blacks were slightly less likely to advocate reducing the level of immigration.

Literature indicates that political orientation (party affiliation and political ideology) is not a significant indicator of public sentiment toward immigrants and immigration policy. Neal and Bohon (2003) investigated the attitudes of Georgia residents toward new immigrants. Overall the authors found political orientation to have little effect, with one exception. Respondents who considered themselves very conservative were significantly less accepting of immigrants than moderates. Interestingly, however, liberal respondents shared similar attitudes as conservatives. Similar findings came out in research by Citrin et al. (1997) and Schildkraut (2008).

Neal and Bohon (2003), whose research focused exclusively on the southern state of Georgia, found that age and region were significant indicators of public sentiment toward immigration. Older respondents were more likely to think that immigrants took jobs away from Georgia residents. They also found that immigrants posed a greater social threat to those with strong notions of what Georgia's demographic landscape should look like. Paula McClain and colleagues (2007) explored perceptions of economic threat among residents of Durham, North Carolina. They found that Blacks were more likely than non-Blacks to be concerned about the growth of the Latino population and to believe continued immigration would lead to decreased economic opportunities for members of the Black race. Among the most significant indicators of these beliefs was the degree to which respondents held negative stereotypic views of Latinos. These attitudes and beliefs, arguably, will lead to support for restrictionist immigration policies.

The impact of socioeconomic status on attitudes toward immigration is well documented within literature (Espanshade and Calhoun 1993; Mayda 2006; Miles 1992; Schildkraut 2008). Education and level of income are generally found to be positively associated

with acceptance of immigrants (Gay 2006; McClain et al. 2007; Pantoja 2006). Citrin et al. (1997) tested the degree to which public opinion toward immigration policy is driven by economic concerns, particularly competition for employment opportunities and the likelihood of immigrants being a tax burden. Utilizing data from the 1992 and 1994 American National Election Study (ANES), their analysis indicated that opposition to immigration decreases as respondent's level of education increases. Further, respondents in "high-threat" blue-collar jobs were more likely than those in white-collar occupations to favor a lower level of immigration. Neal and Bohon (2003), however, found that income did not significantly predict attitudes toward immigrants.

The present study goes beyond previous research on mass attitudes toward immigration in several ways. First, we address the evolution of attitudes toward immigrants and immigration policy over five decades. Taking this longitudinal view allows us to identify trends in attitudes that may correspond with the social and political climate of the country. Second, we utilize survey data from two separate pollsters (Gallup Organization and CBS/NYT) to analyze the impact of several factors on public opinion using national, rather than state or local data. Third, the results make it possible to formulate a broadened set of conceptualizations of influences on anti-immigrant sentiment.

Theoretical Framework

The potential outcomes of interactions between in- and out-groups are significant and have been studied across disciplines. Our study is guided by three dominant theories in intergroup interaction and conflict. Given the social proximity of African-Americans and immigrants, the following concepts shine light on the outcomes and attitudes resulting from their interaction.

Olzak's model of ethnic competition emphasizes the influence of a shrinking job market on native workers which stresses that economic threat, whether real or imagined, incites opposition to immigration (Citrin et al. 1997). The threat of economic competition from today's immigrants is generally observed as greatest among low-skill, low-wage occupations (Mayda 2006; Muller 1993; Passel 1994). Many Americans believe that immigrants increase unemployment among native-born citizens, depress earnings and wages, and are overwhelmingly dependent on welfare (Neal and Bohon 2003). Black men are particularly vulnerable, as they comprise approximately 36% of labor-related occupations and are more likely than Whites to be unemployed (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2012). Apart from the notion (or possibly reality) that immigrants replace the US-born in the labor force, there is the perception that immigrants are economically dependent on government subsidies, such as food stamps and Medicaid. This appears to contribute to anti-immigrant sentiments, as most advocates of restrictionist policies also believe that newcomers displace native workers and put a strain on the national budget by costing the government more in services than they pay in taxes (Citrin et al. 1997; Neal and Bohon 2003).

According to "resources" hypothesis, people who are experiencing financial stress will be more likely than the well-off to fear the implications of immigration. Further, as the ethnic composition of neighborhoods shifts, a corresponding shift in the accessibility and quality of certain services also takes place (Neal and Bohon 2003). According to Gay (2006), Blacks are the most likely to share neighborhoods and communities with

Latinos. Insecure about their own future, the economically disadvantaged are more likely to be hostile toward immigrants and to support restrictionist policy proposals (Citrin et al. 1997; Gay 2004; Neal and Bohon 2003). Neal and Bohon (2003) contend that many Blacks, in particular, express concern that the demographic transformation from Black to Brown is a racially and economically motivated attempt to displace Blacks from their own communities.

While the ethnic competition and resources provide a rationale for intergroup conflict, Gordon Allport's (1954) interpersonal contact theory provides a bit of optimism for the potential of social comity. His theory asserts that prejudice and conflict can be reduced between groups through effective communication and greater exposure. As a result, new appreciation and understanding work to diminish prejudice (Saguy et al. 2009). Effective communication, however, is dependent on conditions that are not always present between immigrants and Americans, particularly Blacks. For example, the theory stipulates that the interacting groups share equal status in the relationship. Members should have similar characteristics, and differences in achievement and experiences should be minimized (Allport 1954; Pettigrew 1998; Saguy et al. 2009). Further, groups should have informal personal interaction. Without it, group members learn very little about each other and cross-group friendships will not take place. Given the language barrier present in most cases, this condition may be especially difficult to achieve.

Methodology

We evaluate public opinion polls conducted by Gallup Organization between 1964 and 2012, and CBS/NYT polls conducted between 1986 and 2012. For the nineteen surveys included in this research, all were conducted using the telephone, and sample sizes range from 751 to 1,550.[6] Although a wide range of questions were asked regarding immigrants and immigration policy, for the purposes of this study, we only focused on four questions that allowed us to look at changes over the greatest period of time. Selected questions were repeated during at least three decades from 1960 to 2012.

Q1: Do you think the number of immigrants allowed to enter the United States each year should be increased, decreased, or kept at the present level?

Q2: Do you think immigrants coming to this country today take jobs away from American citizens, or do they mostly take jobs Americans don't want?

Q3: Which view comes closer to your own: Illegal immigrants should have amnesty and be able to live here legally, or the government should do everything it can to arrest and deport those living in this country illegally?

Q4: Which comes closer to your point of view: (1) Immigrants in the long run become productive citizens and pay their fair share of taxes, (2) Immigrants cost the taxpayers too much by using government services like public education and medical services?

Scholars across disciplines have examined the extent to which race, gender, age, partisanship,[7] education, and income[8] influence public sentiment toward immigration. We include these variables to account for potential demographic effects. Cross tabulations were run on all predictor variables and the relevant survey questions. Statistical significance on the cross tabulations was first calculated using chi-square distribution

($p < .05$).[9] We also conducted log-linear analysis to see whether the relationship between predictor variables and the four questions differed according to race (interaction effect). The method improves upon the chi-squared test because it can better handle complex interaction among variables.

Given the above theories, and the social proximity of immigrants and African-Americans, changes among Blacks should produce important findings. We expect the following results:

H_1: Black respondents will express greater anti-immigrant sentiment than Whites and will increase over time.

H_2: Socioeconomic status (income and education) will be positively associated with proimmigrant sentiment.

It is important to note that, with the use of public opinion data comes a number of limitations that should be acknowledged. Over the course of more than four decades, the two pollsters asked different variations of essentially the same question. Often, however, even minor adjustments to a question can cause differences in a respondent's interpretation. Further, research indicates that respondents tend to provide what they deem to be "socially desirable" responses to controversial survey questions (Presser and Stinson 1998). From voting behavior to religious adherence to amount of physical exercise, respondents have a tendency to present themselves in the most favorable light (Adams et al. 2005). Further, public opinion has been found susceptible to identity, issue salience, social networks, and media sources ranging from newspaper and radio to network television and the Internet (Brenner 2012; O'Connor et al. 2010; Page, Shapiro, and Dempsey 1987). Despite the challenges associated with our approach, there is evidence in the literature to justify its use, especially given that public opinion can have substantial proximate effects on public policy making (Burstein 2003; Shapiro 1982). "Public attitudes are especially important to consider because immigration is the only component of population change over which the U.S. Congress seeks to extend direct and complete supervision" (Espenshade and Calhoun 1993, 189). When public opinion is firmly held and consistently applied, it can move representative democracies to act often in decisive ways.

Results

Level of Immigration

Figure 1 illustrates all findings for Black and White respondents to the question: "Do you think the number of immigrants allowed to enter the United States each year should be increased, decreased, or kept at the present level?" The data reports the percentage of respondents who believe the number of immigrants allowed entrance should be decreased. This question was asked nineteen times by Gallup since 1964. After the 1960s, we staggered selected surveys by at least one year to avoid redundancy, resulting in eleven surveys for analysis.

With the exception of race, Table 1 illustrates only statistically significant findings for responses to the question for all predictive variables. The data reports the percentage of respondents who believe that the number of immigrants allowed entrance into the country should be decreased.

Figure 1.
"Do you think the number of immigrants allowed to enter the United States each year should be increased, decreased, or kept at the present level?"



Race: Overall, race was not a strong indicator of attitudes about the level of immigrants allowed to enter the country. The general trend, however, indicates that Whites are more likely to believe that immigration levels should be decreased. Both Black (64%) and White (70%) resistance to immigration peaked in the mid-1990s and decreased to its lowest in 2012 (26% and 39%, respectively).

Party identification: Party identification appears to influence the attitudes of Whites toward immigration to a greater extent than Blacks. On all accounts, White Republicans are more likely to prefer a reduction in immigration levels. Among Blacks, Democrats demonstrated greater resistance to immigration than supporters of other parties in 1965, 2006, and 2009.[10]

Political ideology: Overall, White conservatives were more inclined to support a reduction in immigration levels than moderates and liberals. Little change occurred for Black independents and moderates between 1993 and 2009, however support by conservatives for reducing immigration decreased from 77% to 43%.[11]

Gender: Gender had no influence among Whites. Interestingly however, Black women were consistently more in favor of restricting immigration levels than Black men in 2001, 2009, and 2011.

Age: Age is an inconsistent predictor of public opinion regarding this question. Significant results were found among Whites in four of the twelve surveys and in three among Blacks. For each year, Whites over the age of 50 were more likely to prefer a reduction in immigration. Results among Blacks were less consistent. Substantive change occurred in each age-group between 1999 and 2001. Support from older Blacks dropped significantly from 77% to 17%.[12] The opposite occurred among younger and middle-aged Blacks, whose support increased from mid-30s to almost 70% in support of a reduction in immigration levels. Some of this variation is likely to be attributed to the small sample size.

Education: Education is a good indicator of the attitudes of Whites toward levels of immigration. In most years, Whites with less than a high school degree supported a reduction more than either age-group and college-educated respondents, the least.

Table 1.
"Do you think the number of immigrants allowed to enter the United States each year should be increased, decreased, or kept at the present level?"

"Decreased"

		1964		1965		1977		1993		1995		1999		2001		2006		2009		2011		2012	
Race	White	38		43!		47		67		70		47		46		51		53!		45		39!	
	Black	36		35		53		58		64		45		48		47		39		36		26	
		W	B	W	B	W	B	W	B	W	B	W	B	W	B	W	B	W	B	W	B	W	B
Party ID	Rep			47*	23					75				56				63		51		46	
	Dem			41	41					63				38			56	45	49	36		24	
	Indep			42	16					70				43			28	50	14	42		42	
Pol. ideology	Cons.	46						70	77	75				50		57		58	43	54		48	
	Mod.	34						67	60	68				48		47		54	57	38		37	
	Lib.	31						57	29	60				35		46		38	21	34		25	
Gender	Male													47*	35			49	27		24*		
	Female													47	58			56	48		47		
Age	18–29	32*				44							37		69*					37*	32*	28	
	30–49	35				44							35		69					39	49	40	
	50+	43				53							77		17					50	21	41	
Education	Less HS	46		45		56				80				49		51	27	62		49		50	38!
	HS Grad	37		45		52				76				55		62	61	55		44		36	14
	Some Coll+	24		34		35				63				41		45	40	39		38		24	22
Income	$Low	48*		52											65		71*	62		55		48*	
	$Medium	39		43											33		28	56		44		44	
	$High	32		37											58		48	46		40		31	
Region	South	58		50		52		76	70	77	74		29*				59*			53*		44	
	Else	33		40		45		63	44	67	53		59				30			40		35	

With the exception of race, all reported data was statistically significant at the $p < .05$ level
! Race differences that were statistically significant at the $p < .05$ level
*Likelihood ratio significant at the $p < .05$ level

Between 2006 and 2012, Blacks with less than a high school degree moved more toward anti-immigration (27–38%), while high school grads and college-educated Blacks substantively grew in proimmigration sentiment.

Income: When income effects occurred, low-income respondents generally supported restricting levels of immigration. These income effects were somewhat greater among Whites than among Blacks.

Region: Region is a greater indicator of sentiments regarding this question among Whites than Blacks. In most cases, Southerners are more supportive of restricting levels of immigration than other respondents.

Competition for Employment Opportunities

Figure 2 illustrates findings for Black and White respondents to the question: "Do you think immigrants coming to this country today take jobs away from American citizens, or do they mostly take jobs Americans don't want?" The findings incorporate responses to both Gallup and CBS polls. Neither Gallup nor CBS asked this question in their 1960s or 1970s polls, or post-2006. As such, the review begins in 1984 and ends in 2006. The data reports the percentage of respondents who believe that immigrants take jobs away from American citizens.

With the exception of race, Table 2 illustrates only significant findings for responses to the question for all predictive variables. The data reports the percentage of respondents who believe that immigrants take jobs away from Americans.

Race: Overall race did not serve as a strong indicator for attitudes regarding job competition. Significant results were found only in 2006, wherein Whites (44%) were more likely than Blacks (28%) to believe that immigrants take jobs from Americans. Prior to this year, although the differences were not statistically significant, Blacks were more likely to believe such sentiments.

Figure 2.
"Do you think immigrants coming to this country today take jobs away from American citizens, or do they mostly take jobs Americans don't want?"



Table 2.
"Do you think the number of immigrants allowed to enter the United States each year should be increased, decreased, or kept at the present level?"
"Take Jobs from American Citizens"

		1984		1993		1999		2000		2003^		2006^	
Race	White	63		25		18		15		35		44!	
	Black	70		27		26		17		36		28	
		White	Black	White	Black	White	Black	White	Black	White	Black	White	Black
Party ID	Rep											45	
	Dem										46*	37	
	Indep										19	48	
Pol. ideology	Cons.										30*		33*
	Mod.										50		37
	Lib.										27		7
Gender	Male									38*	29*		16*
	Female									33	41		36
Age	18–29	64*									27*	44*	
	30–49	55									34	51	
	50+	71									47	38	
Education	Less HS	80		41		27		22*	29	44		50	47
	HS Grad	71		28		25		7	10	36		42	20
	Some Coll+	52		18		12		10	4	21		36	11
Income	$Low					29		25*	56	44	46	56	38
	$Medium					21		17	3	36	36	44	21
	$High					24		8	0	28	22	37	14
Region	South					24				39*	28*		
	Else					16				34	44		

^Survey results are from CBS/NYT public opinion polls

*Likelihood ratio significant at the $p < .05$ level

Party identification: Among Blacks and Whites, party identification is not a strong indicator of attitudes regarding job competition. Significant results were found only in 2003 for Blacks and 2006 among Whites. Among Blacks, Democrats were the most likely to believe that immigrants take jobs from Americans while among Whites, Democrats were the least likely to believe this.

Political ideology: Among Whites, political ideology is not an indicator of attitudes regarding job competition with immigrants. Significant findings were reported among Blacks in 2003 and 2006. For both years, moderates were more likely than conservatives or liberals to feel that immigrants took jobs away from Americans.

Gender: Gender is not a good indicator of public sentiment regarding this question. Among Blacks in 2003 and 2006, women were more likely than men to believe that immigrants were taking jobs away from Americans.

Age: Age had only a limited impact on this question. Among Whites in 1984, middle-aged respondents were less likely to agree that immigrants were taking jobs away. However, in 2006, the opposite occurred. The only significant age effect among Blacks occurred in 2003 where older workers were more likely to believe in this job threat.

Education: Education is a strong indicator for attitudes about job competition among Whites, but job competition occurred only among Blacks in 2000 and 2006. For both races, respondents with less education were more likely to believe that immigrants took jobs away from Americans.

Income: Income began to have a major impact in 2000. For both Black and White respondents, high-income respondents were least likely to believe immigrants competed with Americans for jobs.

Region: Region is not a strong indicator of attitudes regarding this question for either race. Significant results were found in 1999 and 2003 among Whites and in 2003 among Blacks. Southern Whites were more likely to believe that immigrants took jobs away from Americans than those who lived elsewhere. Opposite results were found among Blacks in 2003.

Granting of Amnesty

Figure 3 illustrates findings for Black and White respondents in Gallup and CBS Polls that asked the following question (or a close variation): "Which view comes closer to your own: Illegal immigrants should have amnesty and be able to live here legally, or the government should do everything it can to arrest and deport those living in this country illegally?" The data reports the percentage of participants who supported amnesty for illegal immigrants.

Table 3 illustrates statistically significant responses to the above question for all predictive variables. The data reports the percentage of respondents who supported amnesty for illegal immigrants.

Race: Race is not a strong indicator of opinions about amnesty for illegal immigrants. Of the five surveys, significant results were reported in three. Overall, Blacks are more supportive of amnesty than Whites, and (with some variation among Whites) there has been a positive trend toward a more proamnesty stance.

Party identification: Party identification is not a strong indicator of attitudes among Blacks or Whites regarding this question. Significant results were found among Whites

Figure 3
"Which view comes closer to your own: Illegal immigrants should have amnesty and be able to live here legally, or the government should do everything it can to arrest and deport those living in this country illegally?"



in 1986 and 2011. For both years, White Democrats were the most supportive of amnesty than the other two party groups. Among Blacks, significant results were found in 2006 and 2007. For both years, Black independents were most likely to support amnesty (50% and 100%, respectively).

Political ideology: Political ideology was not a good indicator of attitudes regarding amnesty for both races. In the two years in which significant results occurred (2006 and 2011), conservatives were most likely to oppose amnesty.

Gender: Gender is a strong indicator of attitudes toward amnesty among Whites but not for Blacks. For all survey years, White females were more supportive of amnesty than White males.

Age: Age is not a consistent indicator of attitudes regarding amnesty; significant results were found in three of the five surveys for both racial groups. Middle-aged White respondents were the most supportive of amnesty in 1984, but in 2006, older respondents were the most supportive. Among Blacks, younger respondents were the least likely to support amnesty in 2006 but the most supportive in 2011.

Education: The effect of education was not consistent. However, among Whites those with less education were somewhat more likely to oppose amnesty. Among Blacks in 1986, those with the least education were most likely to support amnesty, and this was reversed in 2007.

Income: Significant results were only found in 2006 among Black respondents. In that year, higher income Blacks were most likely to support amnesty.

Region: For most years, White southerners were less supportive of amnesty than those living elsewhere in the nation. Among Blacks, results fluctuated. In 2006, southern Blacks (61%) were less supportive than others (84%); however, by 2011 this pattern was reversed: 85% of Southern Blacks compared to 64% of Blacks elsewhere supported amnesty for illegal immigrants.

Table 3.
"Which view comes closer to your own: Illegal immigrants should have amnesty and be able to live here legally, or the government should do everything it can to arrest and deport those living in this country illegally?"

Amnesty

		1984		1986^		2006^		2007^		2011	
Race	White	38!		58		62		56!		63	
	Black	52		65		69		67		75	
		White	Black	White	Black	White	Black	White	Black	White	Black
Party ID	Rep			53			50		100	57	
	Dem			62			41		61	75	
	Indep			58			18		86	63	
Pol. ideology	Cons.						42		56	58	
	Mod.						70		59	62	
	Lib.						88		91	79	
Gender	Male	32*		54		56		50		58	
	Female	43		61		69		61		68	
Age	18–29	36				52	31		70	65	87
	30–49	44				61	85		52	61	65
	50+	33				69	71		82	64	78
Education	Less HS	33		61	69				80	53	
	HS Grad	43		51	73				48	71	
	Some Coll+	38		60	44				74	69	
Income	$Low						58				
	$Medium						77				
	$High						87				
Region	South	29				58	61	63		54	85
	Else	41				65	84	52		61	64

^Survey results are from CBS/NYT public opinion polls

Contribution to National Economy

Figure 4 and Table 4 illustrate significant responses of Black and White respondents to Gallup and CBS polls to the following question: Which comes closer to your point of view: (1) Immigrants in the long run become productive citizens and pay their fair share of taxes, (2) Immigrants cost the taxpayers too much by using government services like public education and medical services? The data reports the percentage of participants who believe that immigrants become productive citizens and contribute to the American economy.

Table 4 illustrates statistically significant responses to the above question for all predictive variables. The data reports the percentage of respondents who believe that immigrants become productive citizens and contribute to the American economy.

Race: Overall race did not serve as a strong indicator for attitudes about immigrant productivity and contribution to American economy. In 1994, Blacks were more likely than Whites to believe that immigrants could become productive citizens and pay their fair share of taxes (54% vs. 36%). This was reversed in 2000 (39% vs. 54%).

Party identification: Overall, party identification was not significant influence on opinions of African-Americans regarding this question. Among Whites in 1994 and 2010, it was found that Republicans were more likely to harbor anti-immigrant sentiments than Democrats and Liberals.

Political ideology: Among African-Americans, political ideology is not related to their beliefs about immigrant productivity and economic contribution. Among Whites, however, significant results were found in 1993, 1994, and 2010 and indicate that conservatives are more likely to harbor anti-immigrant sentiments than moderates or liberals. From 32% of Republicans affirming in 1993 to just 17% in 2010, the data also show a steep shift toward more anti-immigration sentiment.

Figure 4.
"Which comes closer to your point of view: (1) Immigrants in the long run become productive citizens and pay their fair share of taxes, (2) Immigrants cost the taxpayers too much by using government services like public education and medical services?"



Table 4.
"Which comes closer to your point of view: (1) Immigrants in the long run become productive citizens and pay their fair share of taxes, (2) Immigrants cost the taxpayers too much by using government services like public education and medical services?"

Productive Citizens

		1993		1994		1999		2000		2010	
Race	White	38		36!		50		54!		30	
	Black	46		54		56		39		37	
		White	Black	White	Black	White	Black	White	Black	White	Black
Party ID	Rep			31						16	
	Dem			46						45	
	Indep			37						31	
Pol. Ideology	Cons.	32		32!						17*	
	Mod.	42		37						34	
	Lib.	49		51						51	
Gender	Male			41			69*				
	Female			32			46				
Age	18–29									43*	
	30–49									31	
	50+									26	
Education	Less HS	30		26		34		37*		23	
	HS Grad	33		28		40		62		28	
	Some Coll+	46		45		61		76		39	
Income	$Low					52		35			
	$Medium					40		52			
	$High					54		64			
Region	South	32*	29								
	Else	41	61								

Gender: Gender is not a good indicator for attitudes among either race. Significant results were found in 1994 for Whites and in 1999 for African-Americans. In both cases, males were more optimistic about immigrant productivity and contribution than women. Among Whites, 41% of males compared to 32% of females believed immigrants could be productive and contributing citizens. The majority of Black males (69%), and almost half of Black women (46%) held an optimistic stance.

Age: Overall, age is not a strong predictor of public opinion regarding this question. Significant results were found among Whites in 2010. Whites over the age of fifty were least optimistic (26%) while 18- to 29-year-olds were the most optimistic (43%).

Education: While education was a poor indicator among African-American respondents, it produced significant results among Whites for each of the survey years. Results indicate that education is positively associated with optimistic attitude toward immigrant productivity and contribution. The difference between those with less than a high school diploma and those with some college education was greatest in 2010. College-educated respondents were more likely to have positive beliefs about immigrant potential than those with less than a high school degree (76% and 37%, respectively).

Income: Among Blacks, income is not a strong indicator of opinions regarding immigrant productivity. Significant results were found among Whites in 1999 and 2000. In both cases, respondents who reported having high income were more likely to believe that immigrants could be productive and contributing citizens. Middle-income groups became more optimistic during these years, moving from 41% in 1999 to 52% in 2000. Lower-class respondents however demonstrated opposite sentiments, dropping from 52% in 1999 to 35% in 2000.

Region: Region did not serve as a strong indicator for differences in attitudes. Southerners of both races demonstrated the least amount of optimism about immigrants in only one year (1993).

Findings

H_1: Black respondents will express greater anti-immigrant sentiment than Whites and will increase over time.

According to the results of our analysis, we reject our first hypothesis. Race was a relatively strong predictor of attitudes toward immigration. However, the effect was the opposite of what the authors predicted. Instead of Blacks expressing increasingly anti-immigrant sentiment and to a greater extent than Whites, Blacks were more likely than Whites to oppose decreasing immigration levels in almost all years (three of these differences were statistically significant), were less likely in 2006 to believe that immigrants took away jobs from Americans, were more supportive of amnesty in almost all years, and with the exception of 2000, were most likely to believe that in the long run immigrants became productive citizens. These findings are perhaps in line with previous research by Paula McClain and colleagues (2003) who found that despite losses in Black political power due to growing numbers of Latinos, Blacks still saw the gains as "fair". Previous research, however, cautions that as Black and Hispanic political successes increase, their political competition may be triggered, particularly in minority-dominated cities (McClain and Karnig 1990).

Among Whites, Republicans were more likely to want to reduce immigration levels, least likely to support amnesty, and least likely to believe that immigrants could become productive citizens. White conservatives were most likely to advocate a reduction in immigration levels, least likely to support amnesty, and least likely to believe that immigrants could be productive members of society. This pattern intensified in most recent years as immigration became a hot-ticket item among Republican conservatives. Interestingly, Black Democrats were somewhat more likely than Black independents to want to reduce immigration levels and were least likely to support amnesty. This finding contradicts of the common sentiment that Democrats are more progressive than independents. We are unclear why this occurs. However, we do know, for example in July 2009, that Independents were more likely to be men (60% independent vs. 30% Democrat) and to be younger. There was no clear effect of ideology among Blacks on these questions.

Age was not a consistent predictor of attitudes among either Whites or Blacks; however, gender among African-Americans produced interesting results. For three of the four questions, Black women were substantively more likely to espouse anti-immigrant sentiment than men: they were most likely to want to restrict immigration, to believe that immigrants were taking jobs away from Americans, and were least likely to believe that immigrants would be productive members of society. While the limited data prevents concluding that a trend exists, we recognize that there are numerous possible explanations for this phenomenon. African-American women have historically dominated service related occupations, an area that is increasingly becoming majority Latina (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2012; Collins 2000; Schaefer 1993). More likely to be heads of households, Black women may be experiencing greater degree of job threat than men. Interestingly, research by McClain et al. (2007) found that among Whites, women were among the most concerned about the effects of continued immigration. This is an area of research that is lacking in the literature. Future research that examines immigration from a gender perspective is strongly encouraged.

White Southerners wanted to restrict immigration, believed that immigrants took jobs away from Americans, opposed amnesty, and in one year (1993), were least likely to believe that immigrants could become productive. Region had a limited and inconsistent effect among Blacks.

H_2: Socioeconomic status (income and education) will be positively associated with proimmigrant sentiment.

Based on the results of our analysis, we accept our second hypothesis. In line with our expectations, socioeconomic status was found to positively influence attitudes toward immigrants and immigration policy. Education was the strongest predictor among Whites. In general, less educated Whites were most anti-immigrant on all four questions. The effect of education was weaker among Blacks and not as consistent. Lower-income Whites were most likely to want to limit immigration, to believe that immigrants took jobs away from Americans, and least likely to believe that immigrants could become productive members of society. There was no income effect on attitudes toward amnesty. Among Blacks, lower-income Blacks favored reduction in immigration, believed that immigrants took jobs away from Americans, and were least likely to support amnesty (in one year).

Conclusion

The debate over the viability of biracial coalitions between Blacks and Latinos has been enduring and intense. Similar experiences of social, economic, and political displacement have been identified as rationales for social comity and political collaboration (Franklin and Seltzer 2002; Jackson, Gerber, and Cain 1994). Literary consensus however is far from reach, as Blacks' and Latinos' common experiences have been found to give rise to both camaraderie and conflict. Overall, we believe that African-Americans and immigrant populations have potential for successful coalition. However, we are cautiously optimistic. While our findings indicate that Blacks are more sympathetic to immigrant populations than Whites, coalition builders must be cognizant of the potential for greater conflict among particular segments of the population.

In line with previous research on sustainability of interracial coalitions between Blacks and Latinos (Gay 2006; Jackson, Gerber, and Cain 1994), our findings indicate that socioeconomic status of both groups will directly impact the success of such an endeavor. Blacks with greater socioeconomic status are more likely to engage in political coalition building, while those with less economic security, who are likely to live in close proximity and utilize similar services as immigrant populations feel more threatened by immigrants and prefer a restrictive immigration policy. Given this trend, future policy outputs will have significant implications. Should a perceived advantage come to Latinos and immigrant populations, Black support and amicability may be compromised (Jackson et al. 1994; McClain and Karnig 1990; Neal and Bohon 2003). Recognizing that both coalitional and competitive behaviors exist between different strata of each group, efforts to forge progressive alliances may be most viable among members of middle and upper class groups (McClain and Stewart 2010).

Despite the general trend toward proimmigrant sentiment, deeply ingrained anti-immigrant sentiment persists and is likely to continue to create obstacles for successful interracial coalitions. For this reason, scholars suggest coalitions formed for the attainment of a specific political goal are the most efficient among groups with different racial or cultural backgrounds (McClain and Stewart 2010; Sawyer 2005). As outlined by Stokely Carmichael and Charles V. Hamilton (1967), biracial coalitions have the best chance for viability when: (1) both parties recognize their respective interests, (2) each party believes it will benefit from a cooperative relationship with the other, (3) each party has its own independent power base and control over its own decision making, and (4) each party acknowledges the specific goals and interests on which the coalition is based (1967, 75; McClain and Stewart 2010, 191). Though interest-based coalitions are often "short-lived tactical compromises," they can serve as stepping stones to formulating enduring ideologically based alliances (McClain and Stewart 2010). The possibilities for collaboration on policy issues are endless. Challenges such as mass incarceration of youth and adults, living wage, educational and health disparities, employment, human rights, and US policy are of paramount concern to Black and Latino communities and provide fertile ground for progressive coalitions (Sawyer 2005). As voters of color continue to increase their share of states' electorates throughout the nation, neither Democrats nor Republicans can ignore critical social issues for Blacks and Latinos (Oakford 2015). Progressive biracial coalitions will be critical and must continue to lay the groundwork for substantive political influence and outcomes that are mutually beneficial.

Notes

1. It's important to note that 54% of Blacks actually voted for Proposition 187 (Sawyer 2005). Franklin and Seltzer (2002) contend that Blacks' lackluster opposition revealed underlying tensions between Blacks and Latinos in California.
2. La Bestia, or The Beast, is a freight train that runs through Mexico to the United States border. Thousands of migrants ride atop the trains as they travel north.
3. For example, President Clinton's 1997 "Operation Rio Grande" added new INS agents across the entire Texas/New Mexico border and developed an integrated strategy to fight illegal immigration at and between ports-of-entry (Immigration and Naturalization Service 1997).
4. As noted by Sawyer (2005), the majority of Blacks voted in support of Proposition 187, 54–46%.
5. S.744—Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act.
6. See Appendix.
7. In the 1960s, most Blacks had abandoned the Republican Party. Therefore, for most surveys after 1965, we excluded the small number of Blacks who said they were Republicans.
8. We divided income into three categories: high, medium, and low. The definitions of these grouping changed over time because of the effect of inflation and growing earnings.
9. In the tables, we report all results that are statistically significant. However, we don't believe that differences of less than ten percentage points are substantively significant and are often ignored in our discussion.
10. We were unable to conduct log-linear models with party identification and race after 1965 given structural zeros because Black Republicans were excluded from the analysis.
11. We need to be careful in stating that ideology affected white attitudes more than blacks given the lack of any significant three-way interactions using log-linear models.
12. This drop in opposition between 1999 and 2001 among Blacks should be accepted with great caution as only thirteen Blacks who were interviewed were over the age of fifty.

References

Adams, Swann Arp, Charles Matthews, Cara Ebbeling, Charity Moore, Joan Cunningham, Jeanette Fulton, and James Herbert. 2005. "The Effect of Social Desirability and Social Approval on Self-Reports of Physical Activity." *American Journal of Epidemiology* 161 (4): 389–98.

Allport, Gordon. 1954. *The Nature of Prejudice*. Cambridge, MA: Perseus Books.

Bauder, Herald. 2011. *Immigration Dialectic: Imagining Community, Economy, and Nation*. Toronto, Canada: University of Toronto Press.

Brenner, Philip. 2012. "Overreporting of Voting Participation as a Function of Identity." *The Social Science Journal* 49 (4): 421–9.

Bureau of Labor Statistics. 2012. Occupational employment by race and ethnicity, 2011. United States Department of Labor.

Burstein, Paul. 2003. "The Impact of Public Opinion on Public Policy: A Review and an Agenda." *Political Research Quarterly* 56 (1): 29–40.

Carmichael, Stokely, and Charles Hamilton. 1967. *Black Power: The Politics of Liberation in America*. New York: Random House.

Citrin, Jack, Donald Green, Christopher Muste, and Cara Wong. 1997. "Public Opinion Toward Immigration Reform: The Role of Economic Motivations." *The Journal of Politics* 59 (3): 858–81.

Collins, Patricia. 2000. *Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness, and the Politics of Empowerment*. 2nd ed. New York: Routledge.

Cornelius, Wayne. 2001. "Death at the Border: Efficacy and Unintended Consequences of US Immigration Control Policy." *Population and Development Review* 27 (4): 661–85.

Espenshade, Thomas, and Charles Calhoun. 1993. "An Analysis of Public Opinion toward Undocumented Immigration." *Population Research and Policy Review* 12 (3): 189–224.

Franklin, Sekou, and Richard Seltzer. 2002. "Conflicts in the Coalition: Challenges to Black and Latino Political Alliances." *The Western Journal of Black Studies* 26 (2): 75–88.

Gay, Claudine. 2006. "Seeing Difference: The Effect of Economic Disparity on Black Attitudes Toward Latinos." *American Journal of Political Science* 50 (4): 982–97.

Gimple, James, and James Edwards. 1999. *The Congressional Politics of Immigration Reform*. Boston, MA: Allyn and Bacon.

Gonzalez-Barrera, Ana. 2013. Inside the 2012 Latino electorate. *Pew Research Center*. Hispanic Trends Project.

Immigration and Naturalization Service. 1997. "An Overview of Federal Drug Control Programs on the Southwest Border." *Office of National Drug Control Policy*. www.ncjrs.gov/ondcppubs/publications.
Jackson, Byran, Elisabeth Gerber, and Bruce Cain. 1994. "Coalitional Prospects in a Multi-Racial Society: African-American Attitudes Toward Other Minority Groups." *Political Research Quarterly* 47 (2): 277–94.
Johnson, Kevin R. 1998. "Race, the Immigration Laws, and Domestic Relations: A 'Magic Mirror' into the Heart of Darkness." *Indiana Law Review* 73 (4): 1112–59.
Kretsedemas, Philip. 2012. *The Immigration Crucible: Transforming Race, Nation, and the Limits of the Law*. New York: Columbia University Press.
Kurland, Shannah. 2001. "Brown Power vs. Black Power." *ColorLines*, 18–21.
Lee, Yueh-Ting and Victor Ottati. 2002. "Attitudes Toward U.S. Immigration Policy: The Roles of In-Group-Out-Group Bias, Economic Concern, and Obedience to Law." *The Journal of Social Psychology* 142 (5): 617–34.
Logan, John R. 2001. *Ethnic Diversity Grows, Neighborhood Integration Lags Behind*. Albany, NY: Lewis Mumford Center, State University of New York.
Lopez, M., and Gonzalez-Barrera, Ana. 2013. High Rate of Deportations Continues Under Obama Despite Latino Disapproval. Pew Research Center.
Massey, Douglas. 1995. "The New Immigration and Ethnicity in the United States." *Population and Development Review* 21: 631–52.
Massey, D., and Nancy Denton. 1993. *American Apartheid: Segregation and the Making of the Underclass.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Mayda, Anna Maria. 2006. "Who is Against Immigration? A Cross-Country Investigation of Individual Attitudes Toward Immigrants." *The Review of Economics and Statistics* 88 (3): 510–30.
McClain, Paula, Niambi Carter, Victoria DeFrancesco, J. Kendrick, Monique Lyle, Shayla Nunnally, T.C. Scotto, Jeffrey Grynaviski, and J. Johnson. 2003. What's New About the New South? Race, Immigration, and Intergroup Relations in a Southern City. In *annual meeting of the The American Political Science Association Philadelphia, PA, 2003–08* (Vol. 27).
McClain, Paula, and Albert Karnig. 1990. "Black and Hispanic Socioeconomic and Political Competition." *The American Political Science Review* 84 (2): 535–45.
McClain, Paula, Monique Lyle, Niambi Carter, DeFrancesco Soto, Lackey Victoria, Cotton Gerald, Nunnally Kendra, Scotto Shayla, Grynaviski Thomas Jeffrey and Kendrick, J. Alan. 2007. "Black Americans and Latino Immigrants in a Southern City." *Du Bois Review* 4 (1): 97–117.
McClain, Paula, and Joseph Stewart Jr. 2010. *"Can We All Get Along?": Racial and Ethnic Minorities in American Politics*. 5th ed. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
Meier, Kenneth, Paula McClain, J. L. Polinard, and Robert Wrinkle. 2004. "Divided or Together? Conflict and Cooperation between African Americans and Latinos." *Political Research Quarterly* 57 (3): 399–409.
Morris, Irwin L. 2000. "African American Voting on Proposition 187: Rethinking the Prevalence of Interminority Conflict." *Political Research Quarterly* 53 (1): 77–98.
Neal, Micki, and Stephanie Bohon. 2003. "The Dixie Diaspora: Attitudes Toward Immigrants in Georgia." *Sociological Spectrum* 23 (2): 181–212.
Nevines, Joseph. 2002. *Operation Gatekeeper: The Rise of the Illegal Alien and the Making of the U.S.-Mexico Boundary*. East Sussex: Psychology Press.
Oakford, Patrick. 2015. "The Changing Face of America's Electorate: Political Implications of Shifting Demographics." Center for American Progress. www.americanprogress.org/issues/immigration/.O'Connor, Brendan, Ramnath Balasubramanyan, Bryan Routledge, and Noah Smith. 2010. "From Tweets to Polls: Linking Text Sentiment to Public Opinion Time Series." Proceedings of the Fourth International AAAI Conference on Weblogs and Social Media.
Page, Benjamin, Robert Shapiro, and Glenn Dempsey. 1987. "What Moves Public Opinion?" *The American Political Science Review* 81 (1): 23–44.
Pantoja, Adrian. 2006. "Against the Tide? Core American Values and Attitudes Toward US Immigration Policy in the Mid-1990s." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 32 (3): 515–31.
Pettigrew, Thomas. 1998. "Intergroup Contact Theory." *Annual Review of Psychology* 49 (1): 65–85.
Pew Research Center. 2013. *Immigration: Key Data Points from Pew Research*. Washington, DC: Pew Research Center.
Presser, Stanley, and Linda Stinson. 1998. "Data Collection Mode and Social Desirability in Self-Reported Religious Attendance." *American Sociological Review* 63 (1): 137–45.
Rytina, Nancy. 2013. *Estimates of the Legal Permanent Resident Population in 2012*. Washington, DC: Office of Immigration Statistics. United States Department of Homeland Security.
Saguy, Tamar, Nicole Tausch, John Dovidio, and Felicia Pratto. 2009. "The Irony of Harmony: Intergroup Contact Can Produce False Expectations for Equality." *Psychological Science* 20 (1): 114–21.

Sawyer, Mark. 2005. "Racial Politics in Multi-Ethnic America: Black and Latino Identities and Coalitions." In *Neither Enemies Nor Friends: Latinos, Blacks, and Afro-Latinos*, eds Anani Dzidzienyo and Suzanne Oboloer. London: Palgrave MacMillen.

Schaefer, Richard. 1993. *Racial and Ethnic Groups*. 5th ed. New York: HarperCollins College Publishers.

Schildkraut, Deborah. 2008. "Immigrant Resentment: When the Work Ethic Backfires." Presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston.

Schneider, Dorothee. 2011. *Crossing Borders: Migration and Citizenship in the Twentieth-Century United States*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Shapiro, Robert. 1982. "The Dynamics of Public Opinion and Public Policy". Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Chicago.

Taylor, Alan. 2013. "An Immigrant's Journey." *The Atlantic*. August 13, 2013. www.theatlantic.com.

U.S. Immigration Commission. 1911. *Statistical review of immigration, 1820–1910 and Distribution of immigrants, 1850–1900*. 61st Cong., Dec. 1910.

Vuong, Angeline. 2013. "Infographic: Immigrants and their Children in the Future American Workforce." *Center for American Progress*. www.americanprogress.org/issues/immigration.

All but Overturned: America's Nullification of *Brown v. Board of Education*

Albert L. Samuels[*]
Southern University A&M College

Abstract

Six decades have passed since the Supreme Court's holding in *Brown v. Board of Education* declared "separate educational facilities for the races are inherently unequal." Yet, the educational landscape for still far too many Black and Latino school children more resembles *Plessy v. Ferguson.* Years of resistance to the letter and spirit of *Brown* in various forms culminated with a series of Supreme Court decisions in the 1990s that released scores of local school districts from court-mandated desegregation orders. These political and legal battles over desegregation and busing are often understood as part of the "Southern strategy" utilized by Republicans to appeal to the racial resentments of white voters who traditionally voted Democratic. This essay, by drawing parallels to the Nullification Crisis of 1832–1833, argues that the so-called Southern strategy is not a mere by-product of "white backlash" to the civil rights movement. Rather, the Nullification Crisis is the crucible for a uniquely American reactionary political tradition that opposes the ideal of multiracial democracy. Thus, America's "nullification" of *Brown* represents the *norm*, not the exception, to the pattern of American history with respect to race.

Keywords: Desegregation; Southern strategy; Nullification

Introduction

A citizens' group in the unincorporated, southeastern part of East Baton Rouge Parish, Louisiana, has drawn national attention to itself by its effort to incorporate a new city after failing in the last two legislative sessions to win authorization to create a separate independent school district. The proposed city—which would be named "St. George"—will, if created, instantly become the fifth largest city in the state of Louisiana with over 107,000 residents. An economic study commissioned by the Baton Rouge Area Chamber of Commerce reports that a wide disparity exists between the per capita income of the

* Direct correspondence to albert_samuels@subr.edu

residents of St. George and the city of Baton Rouge, the state's capital: the average per capita income of St. George residents is over $88,000 while the average per capita income of Baton Rouge residents stands at over $58,000—a $30,000 difference.[1] Over 70% of the population of the proposed city of St. George are white; by contrast, 55% of the residents who live within the city limits of Baton Rouge are Black compared to 40% who are white. National headlines have portrayed the incorporation campaign as an effort by the white, more affluent residents of Baton Rouge to leave behind their poorer Black neighbors and keep their local taxes for themselves. Supporters of the incorporation effort bitterly resent the implications of this charge, countering that they simply want more control over their tax dollars and a better education for their children than what the public schools in Baton Rouge are currently providing (Ashtari 2013; Samuels 2013).

The protestations of the St. George activists aside, one thing is clear: during the 1970s and 1980s, any proposal to create a breakaway school district would have been unthinkable because it would have conflicted with federal desegregation court orders and mandates. However, in the last two decades, the Supreme Court and lower federal courts have been increasingly willing to release local school districts from the requirements of long-standing federal desegregation orders, especially those that require mandatory, crosstown busing as part of the remedy. This has occurred despite the continued persistence of racial segregation in these school districts. As Whites have steadily moved from central cities to the suburbs over the last several decades, urban school districts have become increasingly Black and Latino and often poor (Ravtich 2013; Reardon et al. 2012; Orfield et al. 2012; Lopez 2007; Perea 2004; Samuels 2004; Mickleson 2001).

These trends have intensified despite decades of court-ordered busing, magnet schools, cooperative efforts between inner city and suburban schools, special programs, and increased funding for central city schools. By these recent decisions, federal courts are saying that the current levels of racial segregation in the nation's schools—in contrast to the period of official racial segregation during the "Jim Crow" period—are not the fault of local officials. Rather, the resilience of racial segregation in public schools is merely the by-product of the freewill choices of individuals as to where to live, work, and go to school. Consequently, the current generation of school boards and their leaders should no longer be punished for the sins of their fathers.

Moreover, the increased racial isolation of inner city schools has occurred alongside the growth of an impoverished urban underclass who (along with a host of other challenges) often find themselves saddled with decidedly inferior educational opportunities than children who grow up in more affluent neighborhoods and communities. This result is particularly worrisome given the overwhelming social science consensus linking poverty to academic underachievement in the classroom (Ravitch 2013; Reardon et al. 2012; Orfield et al. 2012; Frankenberg and Orfield 2012; Mickleson 2001; Orfield 1996). Additionally, as populations move even further from the central core of metropolitan areas, older suburban neighborhoods are experiencing signs of similar decline that have previously characterized inner cities (Ravitch 2013; Frankenberg and Orfield 2012; Orfield et al. 2012; Wilson 1997, 1987, 1978; Kozol 2012, 2006; Massy and Denton 1998). Despite these developments, there is little reason to believe that those who decry this state of affairs can expect much relief from the federal judiciary. Instead, it appears

evident that the courts have concluded that school desegregation has largely been a failed social experiment and have resolved that it is time for the nation to move on.

These developments seem a far cry from the original objective of *Brown v. Board of Education* (347 U.S. 483 [1954]). In *Brown*, the Supreme Court ruled that separate educational facilities for Black and White Americans, which were required by law in over a dozen Southern states in the Union, violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. "Separate educational facilities," the justices wrote, "are inherently unequal." However, as our nation commemorated the sixtieth anniversary of the *Brown* decision, the ideal of equal educational opportunity for all still remained an elusive goal for far too many minority children in the United States.

This essay argues that the means by which *Brown*'s ideals have been frustrated in practice can be more accurately described as a manifestation of the doctrine of nullification—a doctrine explicitly articulated by US Senator John C. Calhoun in the context of the political controversy surrounding the Tariffs of 1828 and 1832. I begin by tracing the legal and political path that the nation has embarked upon since the initial *Brown* decision, with particular emphasis on the confluence of factors which conspired to blunt the noblest aspirations of the Supreme Court's landmark ruling. This paper also documents the changing racial and ethnic demographic trends that characterize the modern public education system and the implications of the trend toward racial and economic isolation of students of different ethnic identities on the nation's economic competitiveness. Thirdly, this essay argues that the extent to which the reality of public education falls short of the ideal first announced in *Brown v. Board of Education* is not an isolated event. Specific examples from American history where the rights of African-Americans are sacrificed on the altar of states' rights and federalism litter the historical record. This reality forces a re-examination of the significance of contemporary trends of growing racial segregation in public schools. Finally, this paper concludes that the process of resegregation can take place while provoking seemingly little moral cognitive dissonance within egalitarian American ideals.

The Resegregation of American Public Education

Though the *Brown* decision occurred in 1954, real progress toward substantial desegregation of America's public schools did not begin in earnest until the late 1960s and early 1970s. Enraged by a Supreme Court ruling that they considered to be an attack on "their way of life," Southern members of congress, governors, state legislatures, and citizens' groups mobilized in a determined effort to defy *Brown* outright or, failing that, to delay or minimize its impact for as long as possible. Their defiance, combined with a predominately lackluster enforcement effort by the federal government (with rare exceptions), largely explains why only 2.3% of southern black children were enrolled in desegregated classrooms in 1964, ten years after the Supreme Court's ruling in *Brown* (Wilkinson 1979). Eventually, the US Supreme Court grew weary of the stalling techniques of Southern states and issued more forceful rulings—*Green v. School Board of New Kent County,*[2] *Alexander v. Holmes County Board of Education,*[3] and *Swan v. Charlotte Mecklenberg Board of Education*[4]—to move beyond "token integration" toward more substantial racial desegregation of public schools. These decisions, coupled with a greater willingness of the federal government to use its enforcement powers pursuant to the passage of the Civil

Rights Act of 1964 and the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965,[5] finally overcame the massive resistance campaigns of the Jim Crow South against school desegregation (Wilkinson 1979; Rosenberg 1991; Halpern 1995; Samuels 2004). During the 1968–1969 school year, 77.8% of Black school children in the South attended schools with minority enrollments of 90% or higher. By contrast, during the 1980–1981 school year, 57.1% of Blacks attended schools where racial minorities constituted 50% or greater of the student body, and the figure of Blacks enrolled in schools where 90% or more of the population was Black had fallen to 23.7%, a drop of over fifty percentage points from the same statistic twelve years earlier (Orfield et al. 2012, 34). In 1973, the Supreme Court in *Keyes v. School District No. 1*,[6] "nationalized" the *Brown* mandate by holding that school districts without an explicit history of state-mandated racial segregation in public education could still be held liable of violating *Brown* if courts find evidence of de facto racial segregation in the public schools within their jurisdictions. *Keyes* is significant for another reason: because of the large numbers of Latinos within the Denver school system who were found to be receiving substandard education when compared to White students, the Court affirmed for the first time that they, like African-Americans, also have a constitutional right to equal educational opportunity.

Keyes, as it turned out, represents the "high water mark" for federal enforcement of school desegregation. The US Supreme Court led the federal retreat with respect to school desegregation by following *Keyes* with a series of decisions that would significantly hamper the capacity of lower federal judges presiding over local desegregation cases to craft and implement effective remedies. In *Milliken v. Bradley*,[7] the Court by a 5–4 margin struck down a Detroit metropolitan school desegregation decree because it included the outlying (and overwhelmingly White) suburban districts in the plan. The lower courts had held that a Detroit-only plan could not lead to a significant level of desegregation because the city's school system was already 65% Black. However, the majority ruled that, absent a judicial finding of liability in the outlying suburbs (which were not parties to the lawsuit), the lower courts' rulings exceeded their remedial powers when they ordered an interdistrict remedy. Thus, in striking down the desegregation plan that the lower courts had ordered in the Detroit case, the Supreme Court left the district court with the one remedy that it had already held would not work. The ruling also reflected the public mood of the country: public opinion surveys indicated that close to 90 percent of White Americans favored neighborhood schools over crosstown busing; high-profile busing controversies in large Northern metropolitan areas such as Detroit and Boston provided clear evidence that opposition to desegregation was not merely a Southern phenomenon. However, whites were not alone in their opposition to court-ordered busing: in fact, busing was opposed by a sizable segment of the black community.[8]

In addition to *Milliken*, the Supreme Court made three additional rulings—two of which did not concern school desegregation per se—that would have the effect of turning the mandate of *Brown* into an elusive ideal. One year before *Milliken*, the Supreme Court held in *San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez*[9] that school children in economically impoverished school districts had no federally protected constitutional right to equity in public financing for their education with the children blessed to attend schools in wealthier districts. The Court ruled that Texas' system of public school finance, which relies primarily on local property taxes to fund public schools, did not violate the Equal

Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the US Constitution despite the fact that wealth disparities between rich and poor citizens created a substantial chasm between the funding of the San Antonio Independent School District and the nearby wealthy suburb of Alamo Heights. Three years later, the Supreme Court in *Pasadena Board of Education v. Spangler*[10] ruled that school districts were not required by the Constitution to make annual adjustments of the racial composition of their student bodies if the changes were the result of shifting demographic patterns within their communities. Specifically, the justices emphatically rejected the district court's insistence that there be no school "with a majority of minority students," setting aside the view that the absence of numerical parity among the races constituted prima facie evidence of constitutional violations on the part of the district. That same year, in *Washington v. Davis*,[11] the Court held that plaintiffs alleging job discrimination on the basis of race had to prove that their employers acted with discriminatory *intent* in order to win their cases: in other words, a showing that the decisions of employers had a disproportionate and discriminatory *impact* on minority employees would not suffice to prove that Title VII[12] of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause had been violated.

Collectively, these rulings would cripple the effort to realize the goals of *Brown v. Board of Education* in several ways. First, since Whites had been moving in ever-increasing numbers from the central cities to suburbs since the end of World War II, *Milliken* diminished the effectiveness that many desegregation decrees would have on many metropolitan school systems. As the demographic exodus from the cities to the suburbs continued through the 1980s and 1990s, the *Milliken* ruling, for all intents and purposes, virtually placed the Supreme Court's official stamp of approval on "White flight" as a strategy to avoid school desegregation (Ogletree 2005; Samuels 2004; Orfield et al. 2012). In addition, the Court's callous indifference to the wealth differences between overwhelmingly White suburban school districts and poor increasingly minority urban systems would over time trap growing numbers of poor children in separate and decidedly unequal schools. With respect to the importance of education, the Supreme Court in *Brown v. Board of Education* had said the following:

> Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments.
> Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures for education both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education to our democratic society. It is required in the performance of our most basic responsibilities, even service in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today, it is a principal instrument in awakening a child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him adjust normally to his environment. *In these days, it is doubtful that any child may be reasonably expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education* [author's emphasis]. Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on equal terms.[13]

But *Rodriguez* makes a mockery of the requirement that states provide education to all on equal terms by denying that equity in state and local financial support for schools represents a necessary requirement in order for states and local school districts to have fulfilled their obligation to all of their citizens. The effect of this ruling would leave those with no option but impoverished, underresourced urban schools no legal recourse, as far as the federal courts were concerned. Therefore, the Supreme Court laid the foundation for what Gary Orfield calls "double segregation"—the concentration of racial segregation

and poverty—that plagues urban school districts today by its holding in *Rodriguez* (Orfield et. al. 2012).

Also, the Supreme Court's adoption of discriminatory *intent* rather than discriminatory impact as the legal standard in Equal Protection cases would be applied to other civil rights issues beyond employment discrimination; this precedent would make it more difficult for minority plaintiffs to successfully mount legal challenges to alleged discrimination in a host of spheres. With respect to school desegregation, *Davis* created the opportunity of local school districts to provide "race-neutral" justifications for the continuation of racial segregation within their jurisdictions that nonetheless allowed them to argue that the persistent imbalances within their schools were not their fault. *Pasadena* provided school districts the precise rationale they could utilize to insist that they be exonerated: changing demographic patterns. If such patterns resulted from the "normal pattern of people moving into, out of, and around the school system" as opposed to the actions of school officials, the school system was not liable.[14] Such legal conclusions require courts to focus narrowly on only the actions of school officials, while simultaneously ignoring the impact of other local government actors (i.e., mayors, city councils, county commissions, planning commissions) as well as significant private sector institutions (i.e., banks, developers, real estate brokers) and the impact that their collective decisions make on the composition of public schools.

Thus, the ruling in *Pasedena* foreshadows the arguments that would be taken at face value by the Supreme Court in the 1990s as it began to release local school districts from long-standing court desegregation decrees despite evidence of the stubborn resilience of racial segregation within those jurisdictions.[15] Since local school districts are powerless to prevent these demographic shifts, the logic goes, they cannot be held legally responsible. This argument acts as if local municipalities and county governments have no control over zoning laws and the location of residential and commercial development within their jurisdictions. All of these decisions affect the property values of homeowners and adjacent businesses, with direct implications for the "desirability" (or the lack thereof) of particular neighborhoods and the schools that serve those areas. In other words, the impact of *Pasadena* rewards local communities for failing to seriously address race- and class-based residential segregation. As long as local officials are not stupid enough to blatantly make it clear that their policies are motivated by the desire to purposely discriminate against minorities, they can plausibly argue that they should be released from federal oversight of their schools.

Additionally, while the Supreme Court led the way in the federal retreat with regards to desegregation, it certainly did not act alone. Courts rarely operate within a vacuum; they frequently act in concert with other "supporting characters" in their political-legal melodramas (Rosenberg 1991; Epstein and Walker 2012). Between 1968 and 2008, Republican presidents controlled the executive branch of the federal government for twenty-eight of those forty years—and as the saying goes, "elections have consequences." Republicans built their electoral coalitions at the presidential level largely by capitalizing on the fears of Southern Whites (who had traditionally been reliable members of the Democratic Party coalition) in order to convince them to switch their allegiances to the Republican Party. Using "second generation" racial appeals, the so-called Southern strategy was largely successful in wooing Southern Whites into the Republican fold.

Within the space of a generation, it had the impact of effecting a massive transformation in the political landscape of Southern politics. With respect to desegregation, the focus shifted from advocating "segregation now, segregation forever" (Alabama Governor George Wallace's battle cry) to advocating "local control of public education," reliance on "voluntary desegregation" (as opposed to mandatory, court-ordered busing, and pushing for more "parental choice" in education). On their face, these slogans do not appear to have any overt racial overtones, yet they constitute major "dog whistles" to conservative White voters. They send an unmistakable signal to them that the Republican Party is on their side in their battle to protect their schools from do-gooders, "outside agitators," and liberal interlopers who have no respect for the traditional Southern way of life (Phillips 1969; Wilkerson 1979; Carmines and Stimson 1989; Edsall and Edsall 1991; Smith 1995; Fauntroy 2006; Lopez 2014). The Reagan administration, both by budgetary policy and by its use of its enforcement powers, made it clear that promoting desegregation was no longer a high priority for the federal government.[16]

By the mid-1990s, the cumulative effect of the shift in emphasis by the federal government had borne fruit; the Reagan and the George H. W. Bush administrations had appointed roughly 60% of the federal judiciary (Orfield 1996). These appointments, and their preference for "local control" and "judicial restraint," manifest themselves in decisions such as *Oklahoma City Public Schools v. Dowell*, *Freeman v. Pitts,* and *Missouri v. Jenkins* in which the Supreme Court allowed long-standing desegregation orders to expire despite persistent evidence of racial segregation within the effected jurisdictions. In *Jenkins*, a 5–4 conservative majority of the Court held that the rapid restoration of local control of public schools—rather than the redressing of the unconstitutional violations of the Equal Protection Clause—is the *primary objective* in school desegregation cases. This is a truly astonishing ruling given the historical circumstances that gave rise to *Brown* in the first place.

Furthermore, these rulings share the characteristic of expressing deep skepticism about the explicit use of race by state policymakers as a means to remedy the consequences of decades of racial discrimination. They mesh seamlessly with civil rights jurisprudence in other arenas—such as affirmative action and voting rights—in which policies that take race specifically into account must meet ever higher burdens of proof in order to be sustained.[17] It appears that, with respect to race, the Supreme Court believes that racial bias should be allowed to wither away on its own; never mind the fact that it emerged in American life because of specific intentionality. Further evidence for this view is seen in their recent decision in *Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1*[18] in which the Roberts Court, by a 5–4 margin, held that even the voluntary uses of race in school assignment policies may violate the Constitution if they are not "narrowly tailored."

Finally, *Rodriguez* and *Pasadena* portend another fundamental demographic change in the racial composition of America's public schools—the explosion of the Latino population. Latino students account for the majority of the growth of the non-White population in schools over the last four decades. In the 1970–1971 school year, when the era of school desegregation had just begun, Latino students constituted only 5% of the population of public schools nationally; by the 2009–2010 year, the Latino share of public school enrollment had more than quadrupled. These figures reflect the cumulative

effect of decades of rapid growth in rates of immigration from Latin America since the nation's immigration laws had been reformed in 1965. Though the Latino population is growing rapidly in parts of the country which had no history of a significant Latino presence, the population is concentrated primarily in the West, the South, and the Northeast. Since 1970, the Latino share of public school enrollment has tripled to 40% in the West, quadrupled to 16% in the Northeast, and nearly quintupled to 25% in the South (Orfield et al. 2012, 28). By contrast, the black share of the overall public school population has remained relatively stable over the same period: it increased from 15% of the national population in 1970–1971 to 16.5% in 2009–2010 (see Table 1). Ironically, the Latino share of public school enrollment is exploding at the precise historical moment when courts are weakening school desegregation. Because of decisions like *Milliken* and *Pasadena*, many school systems with large Latino populations (especially in the West) were either never under court-ordered desegregation in the first place or rendered ineffective by legal precedents that limited the capacity of federal judges to include the suburban neighborhoods within the desegregation plans.

Table 1 charts the changing racial demographics of America's public schools. It indicates that the White share of overall public school enrollment in the United States has declined precipitously in the last four decades, from 79.1% of the population in 1970 to 53.7% of the population in 2009. The White share of overall enrollment has declined most sharply in the West, the region of the country most impacted by the waves of immigration from Latin America and Asia in the last four decades. Only in the Northeast, the Midwest, and the Border states do whites constitute a numerical majority of those enrolled in the nation's public schools. Barring some unforeseen circumstances, it will not be long before the White proportion of the public school population dips below 50% nationally, thereby creating a "majority of minorities" in the nation's classrooms. This is already the case in the South and the West, the two fastest growing regions of the country. Black students continue to comprise the largest share of overall student enrollment in the South (25%), the region of the country where the largest proportions of African-Americans have traditionally resided. However, Latinos are rapidly approaching parity with Blacks as a share of the student population in the South; in 2009–2010, Latinos made up 23.7% of public school enrollment (see Table 1). Latinos are well poised to shortly overtake Black Americans as the largest minority group enrolled in public schools in the South. Latinos have already achieved virtual parity with Whites in terms of their share of public school enrollment with Whites in the West; in 2009–2010, Whites constituted almost 42% of public school enrollment in the West compared with 40% for Latinos.

Table 2 documents a growing trend of racial segregation in the nation's public schools. Not surprisingly, court-ordered desegregation made the biggest impact on Black students in the Southern region than in any other region of the country. In the 1968–1969 school year, shortly after the Supreme Court's ruling in *Green* signaled that courts would henceforth insist on desegregation plans that "realistically promise to work," almost 81% of Black students in the South attended schools in which they were in the majority; of that number, nearly all of these students attended schools where Blacks constituted at least 90% of the student body. However, by the 1980–1981 school year, the percentage of Black students who attended predominately Black schools had

Table 1.
Public School Enrollment by Region Region**

Region**	Total	% White	% Black	% Latino	% Asian
Border					
1970–1971	*	81.4%	17.3%	0.8%	0.2%
1991–1992	3,263,102	76.3%	18.0%	1.6%	1.4%
2009–2010	3,502,971	66.1%	20.3%	6.8%	2.8%
Midwest					
1970–1971	*	87.6%	10.4%	1.4%	0.2%
1991–1992	9.042,674	80.9%	12.9%	3.7%	1.7%
2009–2010	9,365,413	71.3%	14.5%	9.9%	3.1%
Northeast					
1970–1971	*	83.3%	11.9%	4.4%	0.4%
1991–1992	7,240,052	71.9%	14.5%	9.7%	3.3%
2009–2010	7,858,583	62.3%	14.9%	16.0%	6.0%
South					
1970–1971	*	66.9%	27.2%	5.5%	0.1%
1991–1992	12,568,126	59.2%	27.0%	11.9%	1.5%
2009–2010	15,649,919	46.9%	25.9%	23.4%	3.0%
West					
1970–1971	*	77.9%	6.3%	13.0%	1.6%
1991–1992	8,753,028	58.2%	6.3%	25.9%	7.4%
2009–2010	11.091,436	41.9%	5.8%	39.9%	8.2%
Nation					
1970–1971	*	79.1%	15.0%	5.1%	0.5%
1991–1992	41,859,267	66.1%	16.2%	11.6%	3.5%
2009–2010	48,307,555	53.7%	16.5%	22.8%	5.0%

Note: * Data not calculated or reported.

**States and regions used for this paper for the purposes of analysis include the Border region (Delaware, Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri, Oklahoma, West Virginia), the Midwest region (Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, South Dakota, Wisconsin), the Northeast region (Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Vermont), the South region (Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia) and the West region (Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, Utah, Washington, Wyoming).

Source: US Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics, cited in Gary Orfield, John Kucsera, and Genevieve Siegel-Hawley, *E Pluribus…Separation: Deepening Double Segregation for More Students*. Los Angeles: UCLA Civil Rights Project, September, 2012.

fallen to 57%; additionally, only 23% of Black students were enrolled in schools where Blacks comprised at least 90% of the enrollment. On the eve of *Dowell,* these figures had remained relatively stable for a decade: 61% of Black students attended schools

Table 2.
Percentage of Racial Groups in Minority Schools

Region	% of Racial Group in 50–100% Minority Schools		% of Racial Group in 90–100% Minority Schools		% of Racial Group in 99–100% Minority Schools	
	Black	Latino	Black	Latino	Black	Latino
Border						
1968–1969	71.6%	*	60.2%	*	*	*
1980–1981	59.2%	*	37.0%	*	*	*
1991–1992	58.6%	37.3%	33.1%	10.9%	22.4%	5.3%
2000–2001	67.6%	52.7%	41.6%	14.2%	19.0%	5.4%
2009–2010	69.9%	58.8%	39.8%	14.4%	19.4%	5.3%
Midwest						
1968–1969	77.3%	31.8%	58.0%	6.8%	*	*
1980–1981	69.5%	46.6%	43.6%	19.6%	*	*
1991–1992	69.8%	53.4%	29.7%	21.2%	24.5%	5.0%
2000–2001	72.9%	56.8%	47.4%	24.7%	28.2%	4.7%
2009–2010	71.6%	58.8%	44.3%	27.0%	23.4%	4.3%
Northeast						
1968–1969	66.8%	74.8%	42.7%	44.0%	*	*
1980–1981	79.9%	76.3%	48.7%	45.8%	*	*
1991–1992	69.8%	53.4%	50.1%	46.3%	31.1%	19.0%
2000–2001	78.0%	77.8%	51.3%	44.7%	25.4%	16.0%
2009–2010	77.9%	76.3%	50.6%	43.9%	21.1%	12.6%
South						
1968–1969	80.9%	69.6%	77.8%	33.7%	*	*
1980–1981	57.1%	76.0%	23.0%	37.3%	*	*
1991–1992	61.1%	75.7%	25.6%	37.7%	11.8%	7.5%
2000–2001	69.6%	77.3%	31.5%	39.6%	12.6%	9.4%
2009–2010	74.0%	79.4%	33.4%	41.3%	11.9%	11.7%
West						
1968–1969	72.2%	42.4%	50.8%	11.7%	*	*
1980–1981	66.8%	63.5%	33.7%	18.5%	*	*
1991–1992	69.4%	73.3%	26.7%	30.0%	15.5%	10.7%
2000–2001	75.5%	80.0%	30.2%	37.9%	11.9%	11.7%
2009–2010	78.1%	83.7%	29.5%	43.2%	7.1%	10.4%
Nation						
1968–1969	76.6%	54.8%	64.3%	23.1%	*	*
1980–1981	62.9%	68.1%	33.2%	28.8%	*	*
1991–1992	65.4%	73.0%	32.7%	33.9%	18.3%	10.5%
2000–2001	71.7%	78.1%	38.0%	42.0%	17.7%	16.9%
2009–2010	74.1%	79.5%	38.1%	43.1%	15.5%	14.1%

Source: US Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics, Common Core of Data, cited in Gary Orfield et al., *E Pluribus . . . Separation: Deepening Double Segregation for More Students*. Los Angeles: UCLA Civil Rights Project, September, 2012.

in which they were in the majority during the 1991–1992 school year, and nearly 26% were enrolled in schools where minorities constituted at least 90% of the student body.

The last two decades since *Dowell* has witnessed a reversal of much of this progress toward desegregation in the South. By the 2009–2010 school year, 74% of Blacks attended majority-minority schools, and 33.4% of these students attended schools where minorities formed at least 90% of the student body. While these figures have not returned to pre-*Green* levels, they represent a significant trend toward resegregation in the region of the country where *Brown v. Board of Education* had the greatest impact. No other region of the country comes close to the South in terms of the degree to which desegregation affected attendance patterns. Most notably, *Brown* was less effectual in affecting school attendance patterns in the Northeast and the West, in large part due to the impact of decisions like *Milliken* and *Pasadena* that placed most suburbs beyond the remedial power of court-ordered desegregation plans. Thus, it is no surprise that it is New York—rather than a state from the former Confederacy—in which Black public school students experience the most intense levels of racial isolation (Kuscera and Orfield 2014).

With respect to Latino students, as their share of the public school population of the nation has risen, so has their level of racial isolation. This is most acute in the Northeast region of the United States, where in the 2009–2010 school year 76.3% of Latino students attended majority-minority schools and nearly 44% of Latino students are enrolled in schools where minorities constitute at least 90% of the student body. In the West region (where Latinos comprise the largest share of the overall population), nearly 84% of Latinos are enrolled in majority-minority schools, and slightly more than half of them are enrolled in schools where minorities constitute at least 90% of the student body.

In addition to the growth of segregation by race in the last two decades since *Dowell,* there is also a significant growth in segregation by economic class as well. In the decade of the 2000s, the proportion of poor students in the overall public school enrollment nationally increased substantially. Poverty is measured by eligibility for free and reduced-price school lunches, a measure which requires families to report income in order to document a level of income consistent with the federal poverty line. As Table 3 illustrates, while all racial groups experienced increased exposure rates to poor students during this period, Black and Latino students are routinely exposed to twice the level of segregation by income as their White counterparts. *Black and Latino students start from a social norm characterized by higher concentrations of poverty in the first place; consequently, any economic trends that exacerbate the unequal distribution of wealth in society further perpetuate the gap between Blacks and Latinos when compared to the White population.*

These trends matter for several reasons. First, decades of social science research have linked concentrated poverty to conditions that produce lower educational attainment. These conditions include poor nutrition and health care, few educational resources at home, frequent involuntary moves disrupting school continuity, weaker preschool training, and more exposure to violence and abuse. Poor children more often than their wealthier peers attend schools with less experienced teachers, more remedial and special education classes, many more non–English speaking students, lower-achieving peers, fewer honors or AP classes, lower graduation rates, and much weaker connections to college, among other inequalities (Reardon et al. 2012; Delpit 2012; Orfield et al. 2012; Ravitch 2013). Second, it is the high correlation between Black and Latino students and

Table 3.
Student Exposure to Rates of Poor Students in Public Schools by Race

	% of Poor Students	Typical White Exposure to Poor Students	Typical Black Exposure to Poor Students	Typical Asian Exposure to Poor Students	Typical Latino Exposure to Poor Students
Border					
2001–200	40.6%	36.8%	51.1%	*	*
2 2009–2010	48.8%	44.5%	58.8%	*	58.7%
Midwest					
2001–2002	30.5%	23.0%	58.9%	*	52.9%
2009–2010	42.4%	35.1%	65.9%	*	61.7%
Northeast					
2001–2002	32.3%	19.9%	60.9%	37.6%	63.6%
2009–2010	37.7%	25.3%	62.9%	37.0%	63.3%
South					
2001–2002	42.2%	32.0%	55.0%	*	54.4%
2009–2010	52.7%	44.3%	65.1%	*	57.5%
West					
2001–2002	39.9%	27.5%	49.5%	36.8%	56.5%
2009–2010	50.6%	36.7%	57.5%	41.0%	66.2%
Nation					
2001–2002	37.8%	26.8%	55.5%	36.0%	57.7%
2009–2010	47.8%	37.0%	63.8%	39.2%	63.5%

Note: * Less than 4.5% of a racial enrollment.

Source: US Department of Education, National Center for Educational Statistics, Common Core of Data, cited in Gary Orfield et al., *E Pluribus. . . . . Separation Deepening Double Segregation for More Students*: Los Angeles: UCLA Civil Rights Project, September, 2012.

concentrated poverty—more than any other factor—that largely explains the persistent "achievement gap" between them and White and Asian students.

Third, the trend toward resegregation is accelerating at the very moment when the evidence for the educational benefits of diversity is getting stronger. Third, the intensification of educational inequality occurs within the context of a global economy that increasingly prizes educational achievement as the "hall pass" to economic and social mobility. This education requires not mere technical competence but "soft skills" such as diversity, exposure to different cultures, and liberal arts—characteristics more likely to be acquired in integrated educational settings (Darling-Hammond 2007; Orfield et al. 2012). These trends suggest that, barring significant government interventions to reverse course, the gap between Blacks and Latinos and the rest of the school-age population will not only remain immense, but it will also linger as a major drag on overall American economic competitiveness vis-à-vis other industrialized economies.

In summary, six decades after *Brown v. Board of Education*, there is mounting evidence that many of the inequalities that inspired it remain stubbornly resilient. After overcoming an initial period of inertia and outright defiance of the Court's mandate that "separate educational facilities are inherently unequal," there has been a steady erosion of the initial progress achieved during the 1970s. Decisions such as *San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, Milliken v. Bradley, Pasadena Board of Education v. Spangler*, and others halted the progress of this social revolution in education in its tracks. Racially coded political appeals, conservative judicial appointments, and selective civil rights enforcement all combined to push the national government's agenda to the right with respect to race by entrusting the resolution of the problems associated with racial inequality with the very states and local jurisdictions that created the problems in the first place. But the nation could not bring itself to acknowledge that this is what it was doing. The reasons that the United States finds it so difficult to acknowledge the fact that it is playing "lip service" to the ideal that all men are entitled to "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness" are the subject to which the remainder of this essay now turns.

Brown, Race, and the Doctrine of Nullification

> We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable Rights, that among these are life. Liberty, and the pursuit of happiness—That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed, - That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of those ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it. . . . .

It is no small matter that when Thomas Jefferson penned the famous words of America's Declaration of Independence, slavery of men and women of African descent in the newly christened nation had been legal for more than a century. Jefferson himself was the owner of over hundred slaves. He certainly was not alone: fifteen of the delegates to the Constitutional Convention owned slaves (Kluger 1975, 31). Given that slavery represented property—and indeed, the largest slaveholders are counted among some of the wealthiest men in the new republic—any effort to abolish slavery would not only have been furiously opposed but would have seriously imperiled the future of the entire enterprise of forging a new nation. Thus, in the South, fear of a tyrannical central government was never merely an abstract matter of political philosophy about which gentlemen could respectfully disagree; rather, the fear that a powerful national government might one day interfere with their "peculiar institution" always structured the posture that Southern political elites took toward the Union (Stamp 1957; Freehling 1966, 1990, 2007; Rogers 1970; Higginbotham 1994; Ericson 1995; Walton and Smith 2012). John C. Calhoun, one of the South's most eloquent defenders of the principle of states' rights, admits this during the heat of the Nullification Crisis in 1830:

> I consider the tariff act as the occasion, rather than the real cause of the present unhappy state of things. The truth can no longer be disguised, that the peculiar domestick [sic] institution of the Southern States [slavery] and the consequent direction which that and her soil have given to her industry, has placed them in regard to taxation and appropriations in opposite relation to the majority of the Union, against the danger of which, if there be no protective power in the reserved rights of the states they must in the end be forced to rebel, or submit to have their paramount interests sacrificed, their domestic institutions subordinated by Colonization and other schemes, and themselves and children reduced to wretchedness.[19]

In response to the Tariffs of 1828 and 1832 which substantially raised import duties on foreign goods that the South's economy relied heavily upon (and simultaneously, created an economic incentive favoring Northern manufactured products over their foreign competition), South Carolina responds by asserting that these laws are not simply bad public policy but that they are so odiously unconstitutional that the state has the right to nullify them within their borders. They advanced the notion that the Constitution represented a compact between sovereign states who had voluntarily ceded certain powers to the national government. However, the states retained all powers not specifically denied to the national government except those that the document specifically denied to them. In this view, the power to arbitrate the meaning of the Constitution was one of those powers that the Tenth Amendment reserved to the states.

Consequently, if the federal government enacted a law that a state believed violated the original terms of that compact, a state or several states acting individually or in concert (as the original signatories to the Constitution) had the power to declare that law null and void within its borders. By maintaining that the states could adjudicate whether a federal law was constitutional or not, they claimed for the states the right to "interpose" themselves between the federal government and the people to prevent the enforcement of a federal law that they believed to be unconstitutional. South Carolina's passage of the Ordinance of Nullification in 1832 did not, despite their assertions to the contrary, make those tariffs unconstitutional—they merely proclaim the state's belief that it had the right to make them null and void within the borders of the Palmetto State. Stated differently, it means that, regardless of the fact that their proclamation does not remove one letter from the federal statutes, the state declares that as a practical matter, the Tariffs of 1828 and 1832 are a dead letter as far as the everyday lives of South Carolina citizens are concerned.

In asserting the right of the state to declare a federal law null and void, the nullifiers contended that their philosophy was not a novel one; rather, they claimed that they were doing nothing more than what the Founding Fathers did during the American Revolution. Just as the Founders in America's Revolutionary era asserted their inalienable rights to "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness" in the face of a government that had become tyrannical, they were doing the same. Leading South Carolina "fire-eaters," cataloging a series of "insults and abominations," urged their fellows to reconsider the value of the Union itself. The idea of sovereign states, having agreed voluntarily to enter into a union while retaining their sovereignty, comported well with the Lockean conception of individuals retaining their inalienable rights once they left the state of nature to join society. Thus, similar to individuals, these states did not divest themselves of their rights once they joined the Union. They also specifically cited Revolutionary luminaries Thomas Jefferson and James Madison and their Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions of 1798 for support for their idea of the Constitution as an interstate compact between the states.

In advocating nullification, John C. Calhoun does not simply invoke the Thomas Jefferson who authored the Kentucky Resolution; he parrots the Jefferson of the Declaration of Independence. Jefferson's statement that "whensover the general government assumes undelegated powers" (as he asserts during the controversy over the Alien and Sedition Acts) reads almost identically to the letter and the spirit of the Declaration of Independence when it says that "whenever any form of government becomes destructive of its ends, it is the right of the people to alter or abolish it." Calhoun's opponents

understood the implications of nullification to justify the right of a state to secede from the Union, and they denounced him for it. However, the nullifiers insisted that it is they, rather than their opponents, who truly embody the spirit of the American Revolution.

This oft-forgotten episode set a template for future conflicts involving federalism—particularly those that involve the rights of African-Americans. It is not simply the case that this crisis foreshadowed the outbreak of the Civil War. Rather, it sowed the seed for the tendency to mask defenses of unchallenged White privilege in the guise of ostensibly race-neutral language with terms like "federalism," "states' rights," "local control," "individual rights," and "personal responsibility." The Nullification Crisis inaugurates the emergence of a reactionary political tradition in American politics whereby universal liberties for all American citizens are nominally declared in constitutional provisions and legal statutes but, with respect to African Americans, are denied in practice. Thus, the *principle of nullification* becomes the status quo with respect to how the nation deals with the paradox between its assertion of the universal rights of equality of all men and what Carter G. Woodson calls the "qualified citizenship" of African-Americans (Woodson 1921). Nullification, rather than dying in the embers of the "Irrepressible Conflict," instead resurfaces again and again throughout American history.

For example, the Thirteenth Amendment, enacted in 1865, abolished slavery—or so Americans are told. The text of Section 1 of the amendment reads:

> Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, *except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted* [author's emphasis], shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.

The Thirteenth Amendment cemented the military settlement on the battlefield, denying Southern states the right to hold Black men and women in bondage simply because of their skin color. But it *empowered* individuals, for the first time, to use massive incarceration of African-Americans to accomplish essentially the same objective that the amendment expressly forbids. As a consequence, scores of Blacks were rounded up for relatively minor offenses and sold as forced laborers to coal mines, lumber yards, railroads, and farm plantations until they could "repay their debts" to society.[20] Similar examples of nullification can be derived from a study of both the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. The Fourteenth Amendment, for example, conferred citizenship rights on the newly freed slaves. But the Supreme Court, through a series of decisions that narrowly construed the nature of those rights, insured that the citizenship rights of the newly freed slaves and their descendants would be of a decidedly inferior variety to those enjoyed by Whites.[21] Finally, the Fifteenth Amendment reads: "The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude." But the amendment neglects to preclude the states from using other means—no matter how thinly veiled—to accomplish the same end.[22]

The pattern of nullification persisted with respect to the policy achievements of the civil rights achievements of the 1950s and 1960s. The Supreme Court's recent decision in *Shelby County v. Holder*[23] is the quintessential example of this principle. In *Shelby County,* the Supreme Court held that the "coverage formula" in Section 4 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 which applied to all or parts of sixteen states (mostly in the old Confederacy) to be

unconstitutional because it relied on data from the 1960s and 1970s. By invalidating the formula, the Court's ruling effectively voided Section 5 of the act which required states and local jurisdictions with a history of racial discrimination to undergo "preclearance" (meaning prior approval by federal authorities) before any changes to election rules and proceedings and redistricting plans can take effect. The effect of the Shelby County decision preserves the Veteran's Recruitment Appointment (VRA) on the federal statutes' books while removing its demonstrably most effective enforcement mechanism. True, the Department of Justice (DOJ) maintains the ability to bring lawsuits under Section 2 of the act. However, by rendering preclearance null and void, state and local practices deemed objectionable by the federal government are now presumed permissible unless shown otherwise in court, a process that can take years. Whereas under the preclearance regime courts might enjoin challenged policies until they are adjudicated or settled out of court, after *Holder* litigants challenging practices they perceive to be discriminatory cannot count on injunctions or stays until their cases are heard. Because of this ruling, state and local officials are not necessarily barred from implementing the challenged practices. Consequently, the effects could be felt for years before any court addresses the harms caused by the changes.[24]

Affirmative action represents another policy arena where the principle of nullification manifests itself. In 2003, the Supreme Court in *Grutter v. Bollinger*[25] declared that state universities can take race into account for purposes of creating diversity within the classroom as long as such programs are narrowly tailored to meet a compelling interest. However, more recent decisions since the appointments of Chief Justice John Roberts in 2005 and Justice Samuel Alito in 2006 have weakened the *Grutter* ruling.[26] Most recently, in *Shuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action*, the Court let stand a 2006 state constitutional amendment approved by Michigan voters that outlawed the use of racial preferences by publicly funded institutions in hiring, college admissions, and the awarding of state contracts.[27] The referendum in question originated in response to the *Grutter* decision upholding the use of race in the admissions process at the University of Michigan Law School. Supporters of the measure insist that it is a "civil rights initiative" because it requires that all citizens, regardless of race, are treated the same as required by the Equal Protection Clause.[28] A plurality of the justices in *Shuette* insist that the key issue in the case is not the constitutionality of affirmative action itself; rather, the issue is whether voters in a state possess the right to decide whether or not to allow affirmative action. *However, by allowing Michigan's constitutional ban to stand, essentially the Court acquiesced to the nullification of one of its own precedents*.

In summary, other than making a brief "cameo appearance" in the massive resistance campaigns of the 1950s against the Supreme Court's decision in *Brown v. Board of Education*, history textbooks in American schools either scarcely mention the doctrine of nullification or discuss it only in passing if at all (Bartley 1969; Wilkinson 1979; Samuels 2004: Ogletree 2005). As this essay argues, it is simply not the case that the Nullification Crisis of 1832–1833 merely foreshadowed the outbreak of the Civil War. The principle of nullification became the status quo with respect to how the nation deals with the paradox between its assertion of the universal rights of equality of all people and what Carter G. Woodson calls the "qualified citizenship" of African-Americans (Woodson 1921).

Nullification, rather than dying in the embers of the "Irrepressible Conflict," instead resurfaces again and again throughout American history. The final section of the essay briefly explores the implications of this thesis for consideration of the state of civil rights progress in the United States for African-Americans.

Conclusion

Brown v. Board of Education may technically be the law of the land, but for far too many Black and Brown school children, *Plessy v. Ferguson* remains their lived experience. Viewed through the lens of the doctrine of nullification, the fact that *Brown* remains an elusive ideal for many Americans cannot be dismissed as simply an aberration or an anomaly. Nor it is simply the by-product of the familiar conflicts between conservatives and liberals over civil rights policy in recent decades. Rather, nullification represents the *norm* with respect to the rights of African-Americans. The declaration in the nation's founding creed that all men are created equal remains compromised by its primordial roots in a society built on the foundation of White supremacy.

It also suggests that the solution to the seemingly intractable problems of equal educational opportunity go deeper than simply merely replacing conservative judges with liberal ones. Thomas Jefferson considered tax-supported education the indispensable foundation to creating an informed public capable of discharging the responsibilities of democratic citizenship (Alexander and Alexander 1985). Public education has never simply been the instrument to provide trained workers for industry; rather, its provision (or its denial) speaks volumes as to which groups of Americans are deemed "worthy" to be included in the body politic. Thus, the persistence of structural inequality within the nation's public schools that disproportionately impacts minorities negatively strikes at the heart of the proposition that the ideal of a true multiracial democracy based on equal opportunity for all is not possible but only desirable. It requires the recognition that the protection of White privilege still remains the greatest threat to the survival of the American experiment in democracy. This foe must be met head on by those who believe that *Brown v. Board of Education* should be a reality, rather than simply an aspiration, for the widest possible number of Americans.

Notes

1. The study shows that 60% of households in the city of Baton Rouge have an income of $50,000 or less; by contrast, 60% of residents in the St. George area live in households with an income of $50,000 or higher. While 17% of Baton Rouge households receive Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) benefits (better known as food stamps), the comparable figure for St. George residents is 7% of the population. This translates into approximately 14,000 Baton Rouge households relying on SNAP benefits as opposed to less than 3,000 households utilizing this assistance within the St. George area. Also, the proposed city of St. George would include three of the wealthiest subdivisions in the state: Oak Hills Place (second), Shenandoah (sixth), and Westminister (seventh). Jim Richardson, Jared Llorens, and Roy Heidelberg, *On the Possibility of a New City in East Baton Rouge Parish*, commissioned by the Baton Rouge Area Chamber of Commerce and the Baton Rouge Area Foundation, December 1, 2013.
2. 391 U.S. 430 (1968). At issue in *Green* was a "freedom-of-choice" desegregation plan promulgated by the New Kent County School Board in Virginia. It allowed first and eighth grade students and their parents to annually choose which school to attend. In its three years of operation, not a single White child had chosen the Black school, and though 115 Black children had chosen the predominately White school, still 85% of all Black students attended the allBlack school. Many other Southern school districts had similar freedom-of-choice plans; thus, this case had national implications. All of these

"freedom-of-choice" plans were designed to minimize the amount of desegregation in public schools by arbitrarily complicating the process of registering, defining the criteria in such a way as to automatically disqualify most Black applicants and to harass and intimidate those who dared to act upon their right to an integrated education. The Supreme Court struck down the plan, holding that, rather than placing the burden on desegregation on students and their parents, school districts had an "affirmative duty" to desegregate and eliminate "root and branch" the vestiges of dual systems of public education.

3. 396 U.S. 19 (1969). This ruling occurred on the heels of *Green's* ruling that local districts had to promulgate desegregation plans that "realistically promise to work." The local school district sought a delay of a court ordered desegregation plan. In a two page per curiam decision, the justices commanded the school district to terminate the dual system "at once" and henceforth only operate unitary systems. The Court's patience with local school districts and their delaying tactics was now officially at an end: the era of "token integration" was now over.
4. 402 U.S. 1 (1971). The Supreme Court, for the first time, authorized the use of mandatory busing as a tool to effect school desegregation where other "voluntary" methods had failed to lead to meaningful racial mixture within public school systems found liable for illegally maintaining one school system for Whites and an inferior system for Blacks.
5. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 empowered the federal government to either sue or withhold federal funds from any program receiving federal financial assistance that discriminated on the basis of race, creed, color, national origin, or gender. In 1965, the Elementary and Secondary Education Act dramatically expanded direct federal funding to local school districts, which was negligible before the passage of the law. The Johnson administration's willingness to cut off federal funds to school districts which insisted on continuing engaging in blatant defiance of federal civil rights law was a major factor in prodding many school districts to recognize that the time to comply with *Brown* had come.
6. 413 U.S. 189 (1973). The case involved the school system in Denver, Colorado. In effect, the Supreme Court in Keyes put Northern and Western school systems on notice that the application of this decree was not merely restricted to the states of the Jim Crow South.
7. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
8. As late as 1989, White opposition to busing still hovered near 80% in opinion polls. Even more interestingly, a sizable number of African-Americans preferred neighborhood schools over busing. Between 1972 and 1991, Black support for mandatory busing never surpassed 60% and dipped below 50% in nine of the twenty years surveyed (Rossell 1994). In Boston, bitter antagonisms emerged between the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, which supported court-mandated busing and black community activists who favored neighborhood schooling (Bell 1980). Louisville was characterized by a gradual buildup of Black opposition to busing: a poll conducted by the University of Louisville Urban Studies Center indicated that 63% of blacks approved of busing in the first year of the plan (1977–1978 school year). By the next school year, that figure had dropped to 49%.
9. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
10. 427 U.S. 424 (1976).
11. 426 U.S. 229 (1976). The case involved a challenge by a group of black police officers in Washington, DC, to the use of a test that the department administered to determine the eligibility of officers for promotion. Black officers disproportionately received poorer marks on the exam than their White colleagues and were consequently more frequently passed over for promotions than White officers. Black officers complained that a disproportionate percentage of the content of the exam focused on skills that were unrelated to their job duties and responsibilities; they argued that the test's purpose was to deny Blacks the opportunity to advance to senior positions within the police force.
12. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination in employment based on race, creed, color, gender, and national origin.
13. 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954).
14. 427 U.S. 424,425 (1976).
15. Key precedents that signaled the Supreme Court's conviction that the federal judiciary's intervention in public schools to achieve school desegregation had gone on long enough include *Oklahoma City Public Schools v. Dowell* (111 S. Ct. 165 [1991], *Freeman v. Pitts* (112 S. Ct. 1430 [1992]) and *Missouri v. Jenkins* (115 S. Ct. 2038 [1995]).
16. The Reagan administration, for its part, dismantled the federal government's largest program promoting desegregation—the Emergency Aid Act—as part of its 1981 budget cuts. By transforming this program into a block grant that states could spend as they pleased, this decision short-circuited efforts to promote desegregation around the country. Funds formerly purposed to provide technical assistance to local districts to implement desegregation orders were diverted to educational purposes more broadly, with no necessary requirement that the ends that Brown envisioned had to be realized (Orfield et al. 2012).

Moreover, President Reagan's choice to head the Civil Rights Division of the Justice Department—William Bradford Reynolds—took every available opportunity during his tenure to take the side of states and local districts resisting courtordered desegregation plans whenever the Justice Department found itself party to a lawsuit. They even went to the Supreme Court to argue alongside Bob Jones University in South Carolina as it insisted that, as a private institution, it had a constitutional right to discriminate against blacks irrespective of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 See *Bob Jones University v. United States* (461 U.S. 547 [1983]). Though the Supreme Court emphatically repudiated the administration's blatant effort to condone overt racism, their willingness to take such a stance sent another blatant signal to the broader community of whose side the federal government was now on (Armor 1995; Halpern 1995: Fauntroy 2006).

17. Key examples with respect to affirmative action include *Croson v. City of Richmond* 488 U.S. 469 (1989) and *Adarand Constructors v. Pena* 515 U.S. 200 (1995); in the area of voting rights, see *Shaw v. Reno* 461 U.S. 574 (1993) and *Miller v. Johnson* 515 U.S. 900 (1995). All of these are 5–4 decisions in which the Supreme Court denies a local jurisdiction the power to explicitly take race into account for remedial purposes in the face of the social consequences of deliberate racial discrimination against minorities. The narrowness of these vote margins attest to the significance of the appointments during the Reagan and Bush administrations in terms of shifting the balance of power on the US Supreme Court.
18. 551 U.S. 701 (2007). This case is the first major "race case" under Chief Justice John Roberts. It consolidates two cases from Seattle and Louisville, Kentucky, involving voluntary desegregation plans that use race as a factor in making school assignment decisions. White parents in both cities whose children were denied their first preferences sued, alleging violations of the rights of their minor children under the Equal Protection Clause. Despite the fact that neither community was under a federal court order, their voluntary decision to promote diversity was held not to be a sufficiently compelling interest to justify their school assignment policies under the Fourteenth Amendment.
19. John C. Calhoun to Virgil Maxcy, September 11, 1830. Included in "Andrew Jackson: Good, Evil and the Presidency." http://www.pbs.org/andrewjackson, retrieved March 14, 2014.
20. This system of forced labor, which has gone largely unmentioned in the nation's history textbooks, endured from the end of the Civil War to the outbreak of World War II (Blackmon 2008). In her celebrated work on mass incarceration in the post–civil rights era, Michelle Alexander treats the phenomenon as if it is the product of the more recent "War on Drugs" which began in the 1970s and accelerated into the 1980s (Alexander 2010). But the War on Drugs represents the continuation, not the commencement, of the mass incarceration of African-Americans. In other ways, mass incarceration symbolizes the reenslavement of Black Americans while at the same time proclaiming to the nation and to the world that the peculiar institution no longer exists.
21. Key Supreme Court decisions that would have the effect of substantially circumscribing the rights of African-Americans include *The Slaughterhouse Cases* (83 U.S. 36 [1873]), *United States v. Reese* (92 U.S. 214 [1876]), *United States v. Cruikshank* (92 U.S. 542 [1876]), *The Civil Rights Cases* (109 U.S. 3 [1883]), and *Plessy v. Ferguson* (163 U.S. 537 [1896]).
22. Indeed, measures such as the grandfather clause, poll taxes, literacy tests, constitutional tests, and the White primary were all justified as "raceneutral" mechanisms necessary to protect the integrity of the vote. The plain fact, however, is that these measures were enforced with a ruthless efficiency that virtually scrubbed the voting rolls in the South of most African-American voters by the turn of the twentieth century.
23. 570 U.S. ___ [slip opinion] (2013).
24. Hours after the decision in *Shelby County* was announced, Texas announced that it was implementing a photo identification law that had previously been blocked by DOJ because of Section 5 objections. Among the features of the Texas voter ID law, it authorizes some forms of identification while disallowing others. For example, a college student ID is specifically not considered a valid form of identification under the law. But a hunting or fishing license is perfectly acceptable. DOJ objected to law because it concluded that it appeared aimed to target forms of identification that Democratic voters (who are overwhelmingly minority) are less likely to have, while leaving forms of identification that White (and presumably, more likely Republican) voters are likely to possess. Other states quickly followed Texas' lead: these jurisdictions legalized a plethora of laws designed to make it harder to vote. For example, Mississippi and Virginia implemented tougher voter ID requirements. Florida dramatically cut early voting and resumed a purge of its voter rolls. North Carolina passed a law that, among other things, eliminated sameday registration, wiped out a school program that registered tens of thousands of students annually, reduced the early voting period by more than 40%, and enacted a voter ID law requirement that some analysts say is harsher than that of Texas. The Justice Department immediately sued the state of Texas pursuant to its Section 2 powers; however, many legal experts argue that DOJ will have

a difficult time proving its case. The federal government will be required to prove that Texas enacted the voter ID law with purposeful intent to discriminate against minorities—a difficult legal standard to satisfy or challenge Texas' voter ID law. Steven Seidenberg, "With the Supreme Court's OK, States Begin Imposing New Laws to Limit the Vote," 100 *ABA Journal* 1–9 (Jan 2014).

25. 539 U.S. 306 (2003). This case upheld the affirmative-action program at the University of Michigan Law School. However, in a companion case, the Court struck down the affirmative-action program at the undergraduate level, holding that it was not narrowly tailored. See *Gratz v. Bollinger* 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
26. Examples of this trend include *Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District* No. 1 551 U.S. 704 (2007) and *Fisher v. University of Texas* (133 S. Ct. 2411 [2013]).
27. The ruling was issued on April 22, 2014.
28. Notably, Jennifer Gratz, the White student whose denied application to the University of Michigan in 1995 sparked the original challenge to affirmative-action policies, has been one of the leading figures in the movement to outlaw affirmative action in the state. Maggie Severns, "The Woman Who Killed Affirmative Action. Twice," *Politico*, April 22, 2014, retrieved May 8, 2014.

References

Alexander, Michelle. 2010. *The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness.* New York: New Press.

Alexander, Kern, and M. David Alexander. 1985. *American Public School Law*. St. Paul: West Publishing.

Armor, David J. 1995. *Forced Justice: School Desegregation and the Law.* New York: Oxford University Press.

Ashtari, Shadee. 2013. "Richer White People in Greater Baton Rouge Seek to Secede from Poorer Black Neighbors." *Huffington Post*, December 3, 2013, Retrieved January 28, 2014.

Blackmon, Douglas. 2008. *Slavery by Another Name: The Re-Enslavement of Black Americans from the Civil War to World War II*. New York: Doubleday.

Carmines, Edward, and James Stimson. 1989. *Issue Evolution: Race and the Transformation of rican American Politics*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Darling-Hammond, Linda. 2007. "The Flat Earth and Education: How America's Commitment tol Equality Will Determine its Future." *Educational Researcher* 36: 318–34.

Delpit, Lisa. 2012. *Multiplication is for White People: Raising Expectations for Other People's Children*. New York: New Press.

Edsall, Thomas, and Mary Crystal Edsall. 1991. *Chain Reaction: The Impact of Race, Rights, and Taxes on American Politics*. New York: W.W. Norton.

Ericson, David T. 1995. "The Nullification Crisis, American Republicanism, and the Force Bill Debate." *The Journal of Southern History* 61: 249–70.

Epstein, Lee, and Thomas Walker. 2013. *Constitutional Law for a Changing America: A Short Course*. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press.

Fauntroy, Michael. 2006. *Republicans and the Black Vote*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishing.

Frankenberg, Erica, and Gary Orfield (eds.). 2012. *The Resegregation of Suburban Schools: A Hidden Crisis in American Education.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard Education Press.

Freehling, William. 1966. *The Nullification Crisis in South Carolina, 1816–1836.* New York: Oxford University Press.

———. 1990. *The Road to Disunion, Vol. 1: Secessionists at Bay, 1776–1854.* New York: Oxford University Press.

———. 2007. *The Road to Disunion, Vol. 2: Secessionists Triumphant, 1854–1861.* New York: Oxford University Press.

Halpern, Steven. 1995. *On the Limits of the Law: The Ironic Legacy of Title VI Compliance*. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press.

Higginbotham, Don. 1994. "Fomenters of Revolution: Massachusetts and South Carolina," *Journal of the Early Republic* 14: 1–33.

Kozol, Jonathan. 2006. *Shame of the Nation: The Restoration of Apartheid Schooling in America.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

———. 2012. *Savage Inequalities*. New York: Broadway Books, [Reprinted].

Kucsera, John, and Gary Orfield. 2014. *New York State's Extreme Segregation: Inequality, Inaction, a and a Damaged Future.* Los Angeles: UCLA Civil Rights Project.

Lopez, Ian Henry. 2007. " '/A Nation of Minorities': Race, Ethnicity, and Reactionary Color Blindness," *Stanford Law Review* 59: 985–1063.

———. 2014. *Dog Whistle Politics: How Coded Racial Appeals Have Reinvented Racism and Wrecked the Middle Class.* New York: Oxford University Press.

Massey, Douglas, and Nancy Denton. 1998. *American apartheid: Segregation and the Making of the Underclass.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Mickelson, Roslyn. 2001. "Subverting *Swan:* First and Second Generation Segregation in the Charlotte-Mecklenberg Schools." *American Educational Research Journal* 36: 215–52.
Ogletree, Charles. 2005. *All Deliberate Speed: Reflections on the First Half Century of Brown v. Board of Education.* New York: W. W. Norton.
Orfield, Gary. 1996. *Dismantling Desegregation: The Quiet Reversal of Brown v. Board of Education.* New York: New Press.
Orfield, Gary, John Kucsera, and Genevieve Siegel-Hawley. 2012. *E Pluribus. . . . .Separatism: Deepening Double Segregation for More Students.* Los Angeles: UCLA Project.
Perea, Juan F. 2004. " Why Integrationism and Equal Protection Fails Latino Americans." *Harvard Law Review* 117: 1420–69.
Phillips, Kevin. 2014 [1969]. *The Emerging Republican Majority.* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Ravitch, Diane. 2013. *Reign of Error: The Hoax of the Privatization Movement and the Danger to a's America's Schools.* New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
Reardon, Sean, Elena Greval, Demetra Kalogrides, and Erica Granberg. 2012. "*Brown* Fades: The End of Court Ordered Desegregation and the Resegregation of America's Public Schools," forthcoming paper for *Journal of Policy Analysis and Management* 31: 876–904.
Richardson, Jim, Jared Llorens, and Roy Heidelberg. December 1, 2013. "On the Possibility of a New City in East Baton Rouge Parish," Baton Rouge: Baton Rouge Chamber of Commerce and Baton Rouge Foundation.
Rogers, George C. 1970. "South Carolina Federalists and the Origins of the Nullification Movement," *The South Carolina Historical Magazine* 71: 17–32.
Rosenberg, Gerald. 1991. *The Hollow Hope: Can the Courts Bring About Social Change*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Samuels, Albert. 2004. *Is Separate Unequal: Black Colleges and the Challenge to Desegregation.* Lawrence: University of Kansas Press.
Samuels, Diana. 2013. "St. George Incorporation portrayed as 'secession' in national media," www.nola.com. December 3, 2013, retrieved April 18, 2014.
Seisenberg, Steven. January 2014. "With the Supreme Court's OK, States Begin Imposing New Laws to Limit the Vote." *ABA Journal* 100: 1–9.
Severens, Maggie. 2014. "The Woman Who Killed Affirmative Action. Twice." *Politico,* April 22, 2014, retrieved May 8, 2014.
Smith, Robert. 1995. *We Have No Leaders: African Americans in the Post Civil Rights Era*. Albany: te State University of New York Press.
Smith, Robert, and Hanes Walton. 2012. *American Politics and the African American Quest for Universal Freedom* [6th ed.]. New York: Pearson Education.
Wilkinson, J. Harvie. 1979. *From Brown to Bakke: The Supreme Court and School Integration*. New York: Oxford University Press.
Wilson, William Julius. 1978. *The Declining Significance of Race.* Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
———. 1987. *The Truly Disadvantaged.* Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
———. 1997. *When Work Disappears.* Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Woodson, Carter G. 1921. "Fifty Years of Negro Citizenship as Qualified by the United States Supreme Court." *Journal of Negro History* 6: 1–53.

Court Cases

Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
Alexander v. Holmes County Board of Education, 396 U.S. 19 (1969).
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
Croson v. City of Richmond, 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
Davis v. East Baton Rouge Parish School Board, 389 U.S. 840 (1967).
Fisher v. University of Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013).
Freeman v. Pitts, 112 S. Ct. 1430 (1992).
Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
Green v. School Board of New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
Keyes v. School District No. 1, 413 U.S.189 (1973).
Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974).

Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995).
Missouri v. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. 2038 (1995).
Oklahoma City Public Schools v. Dowell, 111 S. Ct. 165 (1991).
Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, 551 U.S. 704 (2007).
Pasadena Board of Education v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424 (1976).
San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 574 (1993).
Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. _____ (2013).
Shuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration, Immigrant Rights, and the Fight for Equality By Any Means Necessary [slip opinion] (April 22, 2014).
Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1873).
Swan v. Charlotte Mecklenberg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 642 (1876).
United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1876).
Washington v. Davis 426 U.S. 229 (1976).

Personal Papers

Letter of John C. Calhoun to Virgil Maxcy, September 11, 1830. Found in "Andrew Jackson: Good, Evil and the Presidency." www.pbs.org/andrewjackson. Retrieved March 14, 2014.

Charting a Path Toward Racial Health Equity in Brazil: Health Activism, the State, and Policy Development

Kia Lilly Caldwell[*]
University of North Carolina—Chapel Hill

Abstract

While Brazilian affirmative-action programs in university admission and employment have been the subject of numerous research studies in recent years, health policies for the Black population have received less scholarly attention. This article examines the development of health policies for the Black population at the federal level in Brazil and the debates that have ensued regarding the suitability of such policies given Brazil's longstanding image as a racially harmonious society. The analysis focuses on the development of health policies within larger shifts in state engagement with racial issues from the1990s onward, particularly during the Cardoso and Lula administrations and following the 2001 World Conference against Racism. It also explores how the concept of institutional racism has been employed in Brazil and how debates about the appropriateness of health policies for the Black population and other race-conscious public policies have shaped recent legislative and policy developments.

Keywords: Afro-Brazilians; Race; Health policy; Black activists; Brazil

Introduction

Health was made a right of every Brazilian citizen in the 1988 Constitution and the *Sistema Única de Saúde* (Unified Health System, SUS) was established during the early 1990s to provide universal health care to all Brazilian citizens free of charge; however, the SUS did not begin to address racial inequities in health until the mid-2000s. Black health activists have highlighted the shortcomings of universalist approaches to health that fail to take into account racial/ethnic and socioeconomic differentials in access to health care, as well as structural conditions that may lead to worse health outcomes for racially marginalized groups (Cruz et al. 2008; Oliveira 2002; Werneck 2010). In calling for specific health policies for the Black population, Black health activists have challenged

* Direct correspondence to klcaldwe@email.unc.edu

Brazilian tenets of universalism and color blindness that fail to recognize racial and racialized differences and disparities within the broader population. These are particularly salient arguments since Brazil's Unified Health System is a form of socialized healthcare that is intended to meet the health needs of the entire population, regardless of income level. However, as some black activists have argued, the socialist principles undergirding the SUS have often failed to recognize the role of racial dynamics in shaping access to health and health care (Cruz et al. 2008, 111).

Research has shown that infant mortality, maternal mortality, and health conditions such as fibroid tumors, hypertension, type II diabetes, and sickle cell anemia affect Afro-Brazilians in disproportionate numbers (Kalckmann et al. 2007; Lopes 2005; Lovell and Wood 1998; Martins et al. 2006; Ministério da Saúde 2001; Paixão 2013; Wood and Lovell 1992). There also has been growing concern about the impact of HIV/AIDS on Afro-Brazilians, since the epidemic has begun to affect greater numbers of low-income individuals, and poverty rates among Afro-Brazilians are disproportionately higher than those among whites (Cruz et al. 2008; Taquette 2010). In addition, significant differences between the Afro-Brazilian and White populations in life expectancy and human development have been found. Based on data from the 2000 national census, the life expectancy of *Brancos* (Whites) was five to six years longer than that of *Pardos* (Browns) and *Pretos* (Blacks) (Paixão 2013, 66). Racially disaggregated calculations of the human development index for 2000 have shown that the white population had a high level of human development, with a world ranking of 33–34, while the *Pardo* and *Preto* populations had a medium level of human development, with world rankings of 99 and 96–97, respectively (Paixão 2013, 66). In Brazil's 2010 census, slightly over half of the population self-identified as being either *Pardo* (43%) or *Preto* (8%), which further underscores the significance of health equity and health policies for the Afro-Brazilian population (IBGE 2011).

This article examines how the relationship between race and health and the health status of Afro-Brazilians have been conceptualized in recent decades, particularly at the federal level and in Brazil's public health system, the SUS. The analysis traces the history of policy development to address racial health disparities over a twenty-year period, from the mid-1990s to the mid-2010s, and within a broader context of increasing policy development focused on acknowledging and addressing racial discrimination and racial inequalities. Through analysis of government documents and policies, health advocacy by Black activists, and the writings of scholars who have opposed racially specific health policies, this article explores the following questions: What factors have led to increasing recognition of racial inequities in health by the Brazilian state? How are policies and programs focused on racial inequities in health tied to shifts within the Brazilian state, and larger society, with respect to acknowledging and addressing racial discrimination? What are some continuing challenges to achieving racial health equity in Brazil?

Federal Policy Initiatives on the Black Population and Racism, 1995 to 2000

Black movement activists, particularly Black women, began to focus on health issues that appeared to have a disproportionate impact on the Afro-Brazilian population in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Concerns about forced sterilization and Black women's reproductive health provided Black women activists with an entry point for developing

work around health in major cities like São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, as well as at the national level, during the 1990s (Caldwell 2007, 2009; Damasco et al. 2012; Santos 2012). During the late 1980s and 1990s, Black women's organizations such as Maria Mulher, Geledés, Criola, Casa de Cultura da Mulher Negra, and Fala Preta provided important advocacy on health issues affecting Black women and the larger Black community, such as reproductive health, HIV/AIDS, and violence. While, in some cases, these organizations achieved a measure of success in addressing health concerns at the local level, developing broader policies at the federal level did not begin to take place until the early 2000s. In addition, although organizations such as the *Movimento Negro Unificado* (Unified Black Movement, MNU) were formed in the late 1970s, widespread denial of the existence of racism and racial discrimination made it difficult for Black activists to make a noticeable impact on state discourse or policy at the federal level during the 1980s and early 1990s (Andrews 1995; Covin 2006; Hanchard 1994).

The ideology of racial democracy was central to conceptualizations of Brazilian national identity and views of race and racism in the country for most of the twentieth century. Racial democracy also severely limited options for mobilizing against racism, since individuals and organizations that focused on racism were accused of creating racial divisions where they did not previously exist (Hanchard 1994; Twine 1998). During the early twentieth century, Brazilian sociologist Gilberto Freyre was one of the primary ideologues responsible for popularizing the belief that Brazil was a society that had avoided the pitfalls of US-style racism. Freyre also advanced the notion that Brazil was a "Luso-tropical" society or "new world in the tropics" that had developed out of a uniquely Portuguese style of colonization that encouraged racial egalitarianism and social, as well as sexual, interaction across racial lines (Freyre 1959). His 1933 book, *The Masters and the Slaves*, solidified Brazil's image as a society in which more "cordial" and "harmonious" racial dynamics found their roots in the colonial slave era (Freyre 1986 [1933]).

Idealization of racial and cultural mixing, or *mestizaje*, was central to the Brazilian version of racial democracy. Similar to other Latin American *mestizaje* ideologies, in Brazil, elites such as Freyre argued that the country's largely mixed race or *Moreno* (Brown) population was a reflection of a nonracist society in which distinctions between "Black" and "White" populations did not matter. Although Black activists critiqued and challenged the ideology of racial democracy beginning in the early decades of the twentieth century, it was difficult to completely break its hold on both official and popular views of race and racism in the country (Alberto 2011; Butler 1998; Andrews 1991). This was particularly true during periods of severe political repression and authoritarian rule, such as Getúlio Vargas' *Estado Novo* dictatorship (1937–1945) and the military dictatorship (1964–1985).

With the return of democratic rule during the mid-1980s, a new generation of Black cultural and political organizations began to emerge throughout Brazil. During the mid-1990s, the *Marcha Zumbi dos Palmares Contra o Racismo, Pela Cidadania e a Vida* (Zumbi dos Palmares March against Racism, for Citizenship and Life), was a key moment of Black movement mobilization and state action related to racial issues. It also led to important symbolic and substantive changes with respect to state engagement with racism. The march took place on November 20, 1995, the 300th anniversary of the date when Zumbi, renowned leader of Palmares, was killed. The *quilombo* of Palmares was a federation of maroon communities that existed in the northeastern state of Alagoas

during the seventeenth century. It continues to be remembered as a symbol and model of resistance to slavery, as well as Black liberation and self-determination, in Brazil and throughout the Americas.

The Zumbi March was the largest mass mobilization of Black activists in Brazilian history, with thousands of activists converging on the national capital of Brasília on a date that had become known as the Day of Black Consciousness. During a speech given on the day of the march, President Fernando Henrique Cardoso became the first Brazilian president officially to recognize the existence of racism in the country. On the same day, Cardoso also formed th*e Grupo de Trabalho Interministerial com a Finalidade de Desenvolver Políticas de Valorização da População Negra* (Interministerial Working Group with the Goal of Developing Valorization Policies for the Black Population, GTI). This federal-level working group investigated the feasibility of compensatory policies, such as affirmative action, as a way to address racism and racial inequality in the country. It also engaged in the first discussions of race and health at the federal level.

A marked change in state discourse on racial issues was evident during both terms of President Cardoso (1995–2002). This shift came largely in response to issues raised by Black activists, particularly in relation to mobilization for the Zumbi March. Drawing on the recommendations of the Interministerial Working Group formed by Cardoso, in 1996 the Brazilian Ministry of Health elaborated the *Programa de Anemia Falciforme* (Sickle Cell Anemia Program, PAF). Governmental programs and actions focusing on sickle cell anemia at the national, state, and municipal levels were also launched in 1996. The PAF focused on the reduction of morbidity and mortality due to sickle cell anemia and improving the quality of life of those living with the disease, as well as disseminating information relevant to the disease (Jaccoud 2009). However, by the end of 2002 PAF had only been implemented in a few states and municipalities in Brazil.

The Cardoso administration's response to Black activists' demands during the 1995 Zumbi March led to increased contemplation and discussion of affirmative-action policies at the federal level. Establishment of the National Human Rights Program on May 13, 1996 (the 108th anniversary of abolition) by Presidential Decree 1.904 was another important part of the Cardoso administration's response to concerns articulated by Black activists. The program proposed affirmative-action programs and advocated efforts to increase university access for Afro-Brazilians. The Human Rights Plan of 1996 also recommended that the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE) move from a color-based system of classification in the census to one based on two racial categories, *Branco* (White) and *Negro* (Black). Ultimately, this change was not made. However, the plan marked the first time that racial groups were officially recognized as targets of state policy in Brazil (Reichmann 1999).

An important health- and research-related development also took place in 1996 when data on race and skin color, known in Portuguese as the *quesito cor*, were included in declarations of live births and deaths, in the national system for live births, *Sistema de Informações de Nascidos Vivos* (SINASC), as well as in national mortality data, *Sistema de Informação sobre Mortalidade* (SIM), and data for human research subjects. This was a significant development, since data on births and deaths would now be available by skin color, thus facilitating researchers' efforts to document and examine the epidemiologic and health profile of the Afro-Brazilian population.

Policy Shifts after the 2001 World Conference against Racism

Although affirmative action was officially placed on the federal government's agenda, at least as a discussion item, after the 1995 Zumbi March, policies in this area were not implemented until after the III World Conference against Racism, Xenophobia and Related Forms of Intolerance, which was held in Durban, South Africa in late August and early September 2001. There was a marked increase in discussion and implementation of affirmative-action policies in employment and government admissions in Brazil following the 2001 World Conference against Racism. President Cardoso also made a formal gesture of support for affirmative action by signing a presidential decree on May 13, 2002, the 114th anniversary of Brazilian abolition, which instituted a national affirmative-action program in the Brazilian public administration. The development of affirmative-action programs and policies challenged Brazil's longstanding image as a society in which racial divisions and racialized forms of inequality did not exist. Affirmative-action policies also underscored the state's role and duty to ensure racial equality and justice. Through the adoption of specific, nonuniversalist policies, the Brazilian state began to acknowledge the need for differentiated policies for racial groups that historically had received unequal and discriminatory treatment.

When examining shifts in state policy on race and racial discrimination in Brazil post Durban, it is important to recognize the role that political dynamics at the national level played in creating openings for Black activists to interface with the Brazilian state in the development of public policies. As noted above, beginning in the mid-1990s, the greater openness toward discussion of racial issues displayed by Cardoso's administration played a significant role in promoting state action to combat racism.[1] In addition, marked changes in official government discourse and policy development related to racial issues took place in Brazil in 2001, as the country prepared for and responded to the Durban conference (Htun 2004; Jaccoud 2009; Martins et al. 2004; Telles 2004). An important shift in official government discourse on race occurred when President Cardoso's administration admitted to the existence of racism in Brazil in a 2001 report to the Committee for the Elimination of Racism (CERD).[2] This made Cardoso's administration the first officially to acknowledge racism in a document produced by Brazil's federal government. Prior to this, the federal government had long denied the existence of racism in the country and officially promoted the country's national image as a racial democracy (Telles 2004). In fact, official denial of racism was central to government policy throughout the twentieth century, particularly during the military dictatorship. Open discussion of race and racism was also censored during this time, making it nearly impossible for Black activists to mobilize successfully in opposition to the ideology of racial democracy.

As a number of scholars have noted, Black activists in Brazil and other areas of Latin America seized the opportunity presented by the Durban conference process to dialogue with state representatives and articulate antidiscriminatory and race-conscious policy demands (Davis et al. 2012; Turner 2002). In Brazil, the preparatory process provided an opportunity for Black activists to engage directly with the state (Telles 2004). This was an important development, which led to increased interaction between the Black movement and the Brazilian state during the early 2000s. Black activists were active in creating an opening in the political opportunity structure related to racial issues and race-conscious public policies during and after the Durban conference. Focusing on the impact of Black

activists on the state is in line with Tianna Paschel's (2010) view of the ways in which openings in the political opportunity structure are created in countries such as Colombia and Brazil. As Paschel argues, a political opening may be seen as a "change in the political opportunity structure that typically results from pressure by different civil society actors and that changes the conditions of possibility for those original civil society actors as well as others to make successful demands on the state" (2010, 739–40).

During the first and second administrations of President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (2003–2006 and 2007–2010), there was an increasing emphasis on policies and measures to combat racial discrimination, including affirmative-action programs. Lula passed federal law 10.639 in 2003, which focused on diversifying the K–12 school curriculum by mandating the teaching of African and Afro-Brazilian history. Moreover, the slogan of Lula's administration, "*Um País de Todos*" (A Country for All), reflected the government's emphasis on and commitment to create a country that was more inclusive, at least symbolically. The creation of the *Secretaria Especial de Políticas de Promoção da Igualdade Racial* (Special Ministry for the Promotion of Racial Equality Policies, SEPPIR), a cabinet-level federal secretariat, in March 2003 by President Lula signaled his administration's efforts to address racial problems in Brazil during his first term in office. In addition to focusing on issues affecting the Black population, SEPPIR's mandate also focused on underrepresented ethnic and racial groups such as Jews, Gypsies, and the Arab population in Brazil. Since the *Fundação Nacional do Indio* (National Indian Foundation, or FUNAI) is a federal agency focusing on indigenous communities in Brazil, these communities were not included in SEPPIR's mandate.[3] During the installation ceremony for SEPPIR, President Lula recognized the existence of racism in Brazil. By doing so, he followed President Cardoso's lead, becoming the second president in Brazilian history publicly to challenge the longstanding belief that Brazil was a nonracist society.

While the creation of SEPPIR was an important milestone in state acknowledgment of racial inequalities and the need to take proactive measures to combat them, it is also important to note that the creation of SEPPIR came in response to Black activists' demands and was not simply an expression of goodwill or progressive political ideology on the part of Lula. Black activists placed pressure on Lula to establish governmental mechanisms to challenge racism during the 2002 presidential election and once he was in office. SEPPIR has also been criticized for primarily having symbolic significance and for failing to achieve the goals that were set for it during Lula's first term in office (Werneck 2005). Even within this context, it is an undeniable fact that Lula's government demonstrated a higher level of engagement with Black activists, and civil society in general, than any previous presidential administration. As the first Brazilian president of a nonelite background and a leftist, Lula's election represented a historic break with elite domination of politics. In addition, a large number of Black activists were active in the Worker's Party (PT), Lula's political party, since its founding in the late 1970s, which further strengthened ties between certain sectors of the Black movement and the Lula administration.[4]

The establishment of SEPPIR made Brazil the first country in the world to have a cabinet-level government unit that focused on achieving racial equality. In so doing, Brazil fulfilled one of the major objectives of the Plan of Action from the Durban conference, which was the creation of governmental organizations to combat racism. SEPPIR was

charged with promoting racial equality policies at the municipal, state, and local levels in order to incorporate the struggle against racial discrimination and racism into all spheres of government. SEPPIR's primary objective was to focus on the development and implementation of public policies, such as affirmative-action and health policies for the Black population, in conjunction with federal ministries, such as the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Health. The notion of *transversalidade* (transversality) or the creation of cross-sectoral policies was central to SEPPIR's approach to working with other government ministries and units. Transversality has been described in documents produced by SEPPIR as the "perspective of incorporating ethnic-racial equity into the diverse initiatives of the Brazilian state" (Secretária Especial de Políticas de Promoção da Igualdade Racial 2005, 8, 9). During the early 2000s, SEPPIR sought to make race-conscious policies an integral part of all sectors of the federal government. In addition, SEPPIR worked with all three spheres of government—federal, state, and municipal—to incorporate policies that would challenge racial discrimination and promote racial equality.

The Development of Health Policies for the Black Population

During the early 2000s, there was growing recognition of the health needs of Afro-Brazilians, particularly within federal government agencies and with respect to federal policies in Brazil. As a result of work carried out by the Interministerial Working Group that was formed by President Cardoso in 1996, a publication titled *Manual de Doencas Mais Importantes, por Razões Étnicas, na População Brasileira Afro-Descendente* (Manual of the Most Important Illnesses, for Ethnic Reasons, in the Brazilian Afro-descendant Population) was published by the Brazilian Ministry of Health in August 2001. This manual discussed the impact of illnesses such as sickle cell anemia and other blood diseases, glucose-6-phosphate dehydrogenase deficiency, high blood pressure, diabetes, and hypertension during pregnancy on the African-descendant population in Brazil (Ministério da Saúde 2001). The manual was an important marker in the official acknowledgement of the specific health needs of Afro-Brazilians by the federal government and was used in subsequent years as a foundational document for health activism, as well as policy and program development. Table 1 provides a timeline of key initiatives and policies related to the health of the Black population during the 2000s. Many of these developments are also discussed below.

In 2003, more than seventy items regarding the health of the Black population were deliberated on and approved during the Twelfth National Health Conference (Werneck 2010). This unprecedented development took place at the premiere national-level gathering of government representatives, health-care professionals, and members of civil society. In November 2003, a Term of Commitment was signed between SEPPIR and the Ministry of Health that called for mutual collaboration between the two units to develop a health policy for the Black population. In early 2004 this collaboration resulted in the creation of the *Comitê Técnico de Saúde da População Negra* (Technical Committee for the Health of the Black Population), which was comprised of representatives of nearly all of the secretariats and departments of the Ministry of Health, as well as members of civil society whose work focused on the health of the Black population. In August 2004, this committee was reconstituted to include representatives from different areas of the Ministry of Health, SEPPIR, and the National Council of State and Municipal Health

Table 1.
Timeline of Key Developments Related to the Health of Black Population, 2001–2010

2001	• Publication of the *Manual de Doencas Mais Importantes por Razões Étnicas na Populacção Brasileira* • Creation of Program to Combat Institutional Racism (PCRI)
2003	SEPPIR Signs Term of Commitment with Brazilian Ministry of Health
2004	Formation of Technical Committee on Health of the Black Population in Brazilian Ministry of Health
2004	First National Seminar on the Health of the Black Population, organized by Brazilian Ministry of Health
2004	Inclusion of Health of Black Population in National Health Plan, *Plano Nacional de Saúde: um pacto pela saûde no Brasil*, calls for race/color to be included in all health records.
2004	Creation of Brasil Afroatitude Program focusing on Black Population and AIDS, National STD/AIDS Program, Ministry of Health
2006	Launch of National Policy for Integral Attention to People with Sickle Cell Anemia and Other Blood Diseases
2006	Black Movement Gains Representation on National Health Council for First Time (2007–2009)
2006	Minister of Health José Agenor Álvares da Silva Recognizes Existence of Institutional Racism in Unified Health System (SUS)
2006	National Health Council Unanimously Approves Creation of National Policy for Integral Health of the Black Population (PNSIPN)
2007	Thirteenth National Health Conference Reinforces Importance of PNSIPN for Ensuring Equity in the SUS
2008	National Health Council Creates Intersectoral Commission on Health of Black Population
2009	Approval of PNSIPN by Tripartite Intersectoral Commission Which Oversees Health Policy at Municipal, State, and Federal levels
2009	PNSIPN Becomes Official with Publication of *Portaria* 992 in the *Diário Oficial da União*
2010	National Council of Municipal Health Secretaries Publicly Affirms Commitment to Health Equity and Disseminates PNSIPN at its XXVI National Congress
2010	PNSIPN Is Included in Text of Statute of Racial Equality That Is Signed into Law by President Lula

Adapted from Werneck (2010).

Secretariats. The committee's tasks focused on promoting measures in the following areas: reducing morbidity and premature death in the Black population, consolidating the National Sickle Cell Anemia Program, widening the Black population's access to the SUS, and developing actions to promote health in *quilombo*[5] communities and capacity building of health professionals in matters related to the health of the Black population (Jaccoud 2009).

In 2004, a visible emphasis on the health of the Black population began to surface within the Ministry of Health and other federal agencies. During 2004, Brazil's National AIDS Program also began to develop initiatives focusing on the Afro-Brazilian population, and the national campaign for HIV/AIDS prevention targeted Afro-Brazilians the following year. The slogan for this campaign was "AIDS and Racism—Brazil Has to Live without Prejudice." Saraiva Felipe, then Minister of Health, issued a public statement when the campaign was launched, observing:

> We decided to have a special view for the Afro-descendant Brazilians because we verified an increase in the number of AIDS cases in this population. We decided along with NGOs, with the Special Secretariat for the Promotion of Racial Equality Policies (SEPPIR) and with black celebrities to give a focus, calling attention to the links between racism, poverty, and the increase in cases in this segment of the Brazilian population. These are people who, by being in the most poor stratum of society, have less access to health information and services, within the context of poverty and racial discrimination in the country. (Quoted in Fry et al. 2007a, 498)

Saraiva Felipe's comments were important for several reasons: (1) they expressed official state acknowledgement of the growth of AIDS cases within the Afro-descendant population, (2) they highlighted the relationship between race and class in the spread of HIV/AIDS in the Afro-descendant population, and (3) they acknowledged disparities in access to health information and services that result from racial and class inequalities. Although not stated directly, Felipe's comments also made a link between poverty, race, and the Black population's reliance on the SUS, as a free, universal health system. Felipe's open declaration regarding the existence of racism in Brazil was also influenced by discussions regarding institutional racism that were initiated during the early 2000s through the Program to Combat Institutional Racism, which is discussed below. In addition, Felipe's successor, José Agenor Álvares da Silva, publicly recognized the existence of institutional racism in the SUS in 2006, further highlighting the Ministry of Health's role in calling attention to and taking responsibility for challenging racial inequities in health. This declaration by the Minister of Health also demonstrates the impact that work related to institutional racism in Brazil had during this time. As discussed in the next section, the Program to Combat Institutional Racism played a pivotal role in shifting public and government discourses away from a focus on individual prejudice and denial of racism toward increased acknowledgment of institutional and structural practices of racial discrimination.

In 2006, the *Política Nacional de Atenção Integral às Pessoas com Doença Falciforme* (National Policy for Integral Attention to People with Sickle Cell Anemia) was launched. During the same year, the Black movement also gained representation on the National Health Council for the first time, with a mandate from 2007 to 2009. This was an important development given the National Health Council's role as the entity charged with social control (*controle social*) of health by members of civil society at the federal level. As part of Brazil's transition to democracy, social control was established as a fundamental principle and practice undergirding the country's public health system. Federal law number 8.142 of 1990 instituted national health conferences and health councils as ways to guarantee community participation in the operation of the SUS. Social control is exercised by members of civil society through health councils and health conferences that operate at the municipal, state, and federal level. These entities provide a mechanism for citizen

input into policy making and budgeting and are a means of holding the state accountable for ensuring access and quality in health care.

Perhaps the greatest single outcome of efforts to acknowledge and address the health needs of the Afro-Brazilian population was the development of the *Política Nacional de Saúde Integral da População Negra* (National Policy for the Integral Health of the Black Population, PNSIPN), also known as *Portaria* 992. This policy was approved by the National Health Council in 2006 and was officially promulgated by the Brazilian Ministry of Health on May 13, 2009 (the 121st anniversary of Brazilian abolition). It was also included as part of the Statute of Racial Equality (Law 12.288) that was signed into law by President Lula in July 2010.[6] The PNSIPN was the first federal policy focusing on the health of the Black population in Brazilian history. The PNSIPN was designed to promote health equity and address racial health disparities that disproportionately impact the health of the African descendant population in Brazil.

The text of the PNSIPN states that the policy's general objective is to "Promote the comprehensive health of the Black population, prioritizing the reduction of ethnic-racial inequalities, combating racism and discrimination in the institutions and services of SUS" (Ministério da Saúde 2009). The policy contains six general directives: (I) include the themes of Racism and the Health of the Black Population in the formation and permanent education of health workers and in the exercise of social control in health; (II) expand and strengthen the participation of the Black Social Movement in social control of health policies; (III) encourage the production of scientific and technological knowledge about the health of the Black population; (IV) promote the recognition of popular health knowledge and practices, including those preserved by African-based religions; (V) implement the process of monitoring and evaluating actions pertinent to combatting racism and the reduction of ethnic-racial inequalities in the health sector in the distinct government spheres; and (VI) develop information, communication, and educational processes that deconstruct stigmas and prejudices, strengthen a positive black identity, and contribute to the reduction of vulnerabilities (Ministério da Saúde 2009). The seven areas that comprise the PNSIPN address health from a holistic perspective, which includes health professionals, knowledge production, and antidiscriminatory messages regarding Black identity and culture, especially African-based religions. This holistic framework also highlights the broader social, institutional, and interpersonal contexts that shape health outcomes for the Black population in Brazil. Importantly, directives I and VI address the need to provide education for health professionals and develop communication and messaging practices that combatted racial prejudices, stigmas, and negative representations of the Black population within the health sector.

Although the Statute of Racial Equality made the National Policy for the Comprehensive Health of the Black Population part of federal law in 2010, several provisions related to the health of the Black population were removed from the final version of the Statute. The removal of these provisions was part of broader revisions of the Statute by conservative politicians, most notably Demosthenes Torres, a former senator from the *Democratas* Party (DEMS) and the rapporteur for the Statute. A center-right political party, the DEMS party, was one of the chief opponents of affirmative-action policies. The Statute of Racial Equality was a hotly contested piece of legislation, which along with the Law of Quotas, was challenged by conservative politicians and a good number of academic researchers.

Parliamentary deputy Paulo Paim presented the Statute of Racial Equality to the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies on June 7, 2000, as Project of Law 3.198/2000.[7] However, it went through a decade-long approval process, which resulted in key provisions being altered or removed, including many references to race and racial discrimination as well as provisions for quotas. Given the major alterations made to the Statute, many Black activists viewed the Statute as being far less powerful and effective than they hoped it would be. Federal Deputy Luiz Alberto stated that it was "an accord against the black population" (Santos et al. 2011, 53).

An early version of the Statute of Racial Equality called for inclusion of the concept of racism as a social determinant of health; however, this was omitted from the final version. Demosthenes Torres also argued that illnesses that were believed to be more prevalent in the Black population should not be included in the Statute, since the genetic basis of these illnesses was still questioned by medicine (Jeronimo 2010; Pagano 2011). These positions appear to reflect common divisions between those who advocate a social determinant approach versus a biological approach to health disparities. However, in the final version of the Statute, neither position seems to have been influential.

Articles 9 and 10, which were part of the version of the Statute approved by Congress as Project of Law 6.264/2005, were also taken out of the final version of the Statute (Santos et al. 2011, 2015). Article 9 called for the three spheres of the Brazilian government—municipal, state, and federal—to implement a plan for the execution of national policies for the health of the Black population. Removal of this article significantly weakened the ability of health activists and health advocates to call for implementation of the PNSIPN and also decreased government accountability in this area. The removal of Article 10 undermined efforts to challenge the higher rates of violence and mortality that often exist among the Black population, including maternal mortality, infant mortality, and violent deaths among Black youth.

Operationalizing the Concept of Institutional Racism

Since the mid-2000s, there has been increasing discussion of institutionalized racism within the health sector in Brazil. The concept of institutionalized racism is particularly important in the Brazilian context given the historical absence of *de jure* or legalized segregation and racial discrimination in the country and the longstanding hegemony of the ideology of racial democracy (Hanchard 1994). During 2001, the *Programa de Combate ao Racismo Institucional* (Program to Combat Institutional Racism, PCRI) was created in Brazil as a means of contributing to development policies and poverty reduction by confronting racial discrimination in institutional settings. The PCRI was also developed to address the inertia and lack of continuity in government efforts to challenge racial discrimination by focusing on the ways in which racism was embedded in the culture of Brazilian public institutions.

The PCRI was developed during the preparatory process for the 2001 World Conference against Racism. Recognizing the possibilities the conference preparatory process presented for addressing racism in Brazil, the British Government's Ministry for International Development (DFID) and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) developed the PCRI. The program was a partnership established under the supervision of the *Agência Brasileira de Cooperação* (Brazilian Agency of Cooperation, ABC), with

partners including the DFID, the UNDP, the Brazilian Ministry of Health, the Federal Public Ministry, SEPPIR, and the Pan-American Health Organization (PAHO).

The PCRI adopted a working definition of institutional racism that drew upon the transnational experiences of Black communities in the United States and Great Britain. This definition was based on the conceptualization of institutional racism that US Black nationalists Stokely Carmichael and Charles Hamilton used in their pioneering 1967 book, *Black Power: The Politics of Liberation in America*, as well as British views of institutional racism that grew out of the racially motivated murder of Steven Lawrence, a Black British young man, during the 1990s (Carmichael and Hamilton 1967). The PCRI defined institutional racism as:

> the failure of institutions and organizations to provide a professional and adequate service to people due to their color, culture, racial or ethnic origin. It is manifested in discriminatory norms, practices and behaviors adopted in the everyday work routine, which result from ignorance, lack of attention, prejudice or racist stereotypes. In whatever case, institutional racism always places people from racially or ethnically discriminated groups in a situation of disadvantage in access to the benefits generated by the State and by other institutions and organizations. (CRI 2006, 17)

In addition, the PCRI described the characteristics of institutional racism in the following terms:

> They can be seen or detected in practices that are consolidated in everyday life, processes, attitudes and behaviors that contribute to discrimination through prejudice, ignorance, lack of attention and racist stereotypes that prejudge groups. (CRI 2006, 98)

The PCRI was implemented in the municipal governments of Salvador, Bahia and Recife, Pernambuco, two capital cities located in the Brazilian Northeast, the region with the largest concentration of African descendants in the country. The PCRI's activities were focused in the areas of education, health, work, culture, legislation, and justice (Lopes and Quintiliano 2007). Although the PCRI had a somewhat broad mandate, its activities focused on health in Brazil. By addressing systemic and structural forms of racial discrimination, the concept of institutional racism broke with the long-standing tradition of focusing on individual prejudice in Brazil. It also challenged the belief that racism could not exist in Brazil because the country did not have a tradition of legal segregation and discrimination. Despite the differences between the British and Brazilian contexts, adoption of the concept of institutional racism was useful since racism historically has been denied in Brazil (CRI 2006). In addition, the concept of institutional racism allowed for discussion of racist practices whether they are conscious and intentional or not (CRI 2006). The programmatic priorities and strategies of the PCRI in Salvador also highlighted the importance of identifying and proactively challenging racism in a city that is predominantly African descendant, and thus has often been assumed to be free of racial discrimination.

Over the course of the PCRI's activities in Salvador, close to seven hundred health professionals were trained to identify, combat, and prevent institutional racism (Lopes and Quintiliano 2007). The PCRI's emphasis on providing trainings for public employees underscores the need to educate Brazilian citizens about what racism is and how institutional racism, in particular, operates. Through its workshops in the city of Salvador, the PCRI provided a space in which municipal employees could learn and think about

both everyday practices of racism and more systemic forms of racial discrimination and differential treatment. Workshops touched on both conscious and unconscious attitudes and behaviors. According to a PCRI publication, they were:

> constructed in order to encourage attention to the participants' perception based on memories, ideas, information and content that allowed for the identification of racial prejudices that inhabited the social imaginary and that contained within themselves stereotypes, impulses or desires, not always conscious, that are responsible for discriminatory attitudes. (CRI 2006, 24)

Salvador became the first city in Brazil to have a Program to Combat Institutionalized Racism as part of its municipal government. The PCRI's work was also continued by the Municipal Secretariat for Reparation (*Secretaria Municipal de Reparaçã*o, SEMUR), and combating institutional racism in the health sector was included as a priority area in the *Plano Municipal de Políticas de Promoção de Igualdade Racial* (Municipal Plan for Policies to Promote Racial Equality) for 2013–2016 (Prefeitura Municipal do Salvador 2014). A unit known as the *Assessoria de Promoção da Equidade Racial em Saúde* (Advisory for the Promotion of Racial Equity in Health, ASPERS) was formed within Salvador's municipal health secretariat in 2006 to address racial health inequities in Salvador and was also an outgrowth of the PCRI's activities. In Salvador, the PCRI resulted in both discursive and institutional shifts with regard to acknowledgement of racial health inequities and the need for focused attention on the health of the Black population. At the same time, the effectiveness of these efforts largely has been determined by politics at the municipal level and the vagaries of political appointments for positions such as the Municipal Secretary of Health.

"Dangerous Divisions": Scholarly Critiques of Race-Conscious Health Policies

The development of affirmative-action policies and health policies focusing on the Black population sparked heated debates about their legitimacy and appropriateness in Brazil, particularly within academic circles and in the national media. Opponents of affirmative action policies argued that the high degree of racial intermixture in Brazil would make identification of "Black" candidates for affirmative action nearly impossible. In addition, critics of race-conscious health policies argued that they would perpetuate biological notions of race and promote the racialization of Brazilian society. Opponents of race-conscious public policies also charged that Brazil would become racially polarized along the lines of the United States due to the enactment of affirmative-action policies and health policies for the black population (Fry et al. 2007a, 2007b; Kamel 2006; Maggie 2005a). There were also assertions that affirmative action was a form of racial privilege for Afro-Brazilians (Fry et al. 2007c).

In 2004, a prominent group of Brazilian-based scholars began to publish newspaper op-ed pieces and articles in scholarly journals that critiqued health policies for the Black population, affirmative-action policies, and then pending federal laws focusing on race such as the Statute of Racial Equality and the Law of Quotas (Fry 2007; Fry and Maggie 2004; Maggie 2005a, 2005b; Maio and Monteiro 2005).[8] These scholars were also key figures behind manifestoes submitted to the Brazilian Congress opposing the Statute of Racial Equality and the Law of Quotas. Many were based in the fields of anthropology and public health and argued that, in asserting the importance of racially specific health

policies, Black activists were "racializing" the field of health and promoting biologically based notions of race (Fry et al. 2007a).

It is important to note that scholarly critiques of health policies for the black population were published in prominent Brazilian newspapers, such as the *Folha de São Paulo*, as well as Brazil's most highly ranked public health journal, *Cadernos de Saúde Pública*. Many of the scholars who critiqued health policies for the Black population had ties to leading publishing venues, which underscores the academic capital they held and how it provided access to influential vehicles of both scholarly and public opinion. This access was facilitated by the fact that the owners and editors of these publishing venues were often sympathetic to views opposing race-conscious public policies, such as affirmative action and health policies for the black population. However, this degree of access to major media and scholarly outlets has rarely been available to black activists or scholars. As a result, critics of health policies for the Black population were able to define the terms of the debate in the public sphere, while at the same time giving the appearance of writing and speaking from a neutral and apolitical scholarly perspective. Writings that expressed support for health policies for the black population were rarely published, particularly since they could be decried as politicized expressions of Black activism and, thus, as less scholarly.

In a 2007 article published in *Cadernos de Saúde Pública*, the leading public health journal in Brazil, Peter Fry and several colleagues challenged efforts to develop specific HIV/AIDS prevention campaigns for the African-descendant population, stating:

> We are suggesting that the most recent governmental campaign of HIV/AIDS prevention, focused on the racial theme, may prejudice the national effort against the epidemic. This program, which has been widely recognized internationally, continues to be based on the principles of universality, equity and integrality that orient public policies in the area of health in Brazil. However, the racialization of AIDS is, for certain, a new element (and we would affirm it as being a troubling one) in the complex epidemiological and sociopolitical dynamic of the epidemic. (Fry et al. 2007a, 505)

These statements questioned the importance and legitimacy of racially specific HIV/AIDS prevention campaigns that had been undertaken by Brazil's National AIDS Program beginning in 2004. The authors' choice of the term "prejudice" is particularly significant, since they repeatedly argued, both in this article as well as in other publications and public statements, that race-conscious public policies would undermine efforts to achieve equality in Brazil. The authors also highlighted the emphasis on universality and equity, which has been foundational to both the National AIDS Program and the SUS, Brazil's public health system, as being important. Finally, the authors referred to racially specific prevention initiatives as a racializing practice. This use of the concept of racialization centered on concerns that biological notions of racial difference would be viewed as valid as a result of the development of race-conscious public policies (Fry et al. 2007b).

The lone dissenting response to the Fry et al.'s article discussed above was written by Marcelo Paixão and Fernanda Lopes, the only black researchers who participated in the debate published in *Cadernos de Saúde Pública*.[9] In their response, Paixão and Lopes (2007) recognize some of the same problems regarding the inadequacy of existing HIV/AIDS data that were highlighted by Fry et al.; however, they also argue for the importance of finding ways to assess the impact of the HIV/AIDS epidemic on the Black population.

Paixão and Lopes openly challenge scholars who oppose a research focus on the Black population, noting:

> For Fry et al., in the sole hope of not racializing the debate about public policies in Brazil, these [health] differentials should be maintained as prohibited terms, taboos; they should be discussed only and exclusively within academic circles and/or research groups. In spite of the gravity of the situations studied, research that analyzes data disaggregated by race/color are seen by the authors as ills in themselves, as if the debate about racial inequalities and their impact on health outcomes necessarily implies the defense of racially supremacist perspectives. (2007, 512)

The positions stated by Fry et al. and Paixão and Lopes highlight the divergent perspectives on the importance of focusing on racial health disparities that existed in Brazilian academic circles during the late 2000s. While Paixão and Lopes advocated the use of race as a variable in public health research, Fry et al. argued that this would reinforce biologically based and scientifically invalid beliefs about racial difference. As noted previously, critiques of specific HIV prevention initiatives for the Black population were in line with Fry et al.'s resistance to a variety of race, conscious public policies, including affirmative action. Given this broader political and policy context, the legitimacy of developing a focus on the black population within HIV/AIDS research and policies was hotly contested by the late 2000s.

In an article titled "O SUS é Racista?" ("The SUS is Racist?"), Marcos Chor Maio, Simone Monteiro, and Paulo Rodrigues questioned Minister of Health José Agenor Álvares da Silva's proclamation that racism was present in SUS services during the National Day of Mobilization for the Health of the Black Population in October 2006 (Maio et al. 2007). In the article, these researchers argued that, while there might be "manifestations of prejudice and discrimination" on the part of some health professionals, there was not sufficient evidence to prove that institutional racism existed within the SUS (Maio et al. 2007, 237). In doing so, they challenged the idea that racism was systemic and institutional instead, arguing that prejudice and discrimination were manifested among individual health professionals.

The development of race-conscious health policies for the Black population demonstrates the ways in which antiracist mobilization by Black activists began to impact the health sector, including the Ministry of Health, by the mid-2000s and late 2000s. These efforts took place within a larger discursive and policy environment in which there were heated debates about the appropriateness of creating public policies that explicitly acknowledged and took race and racism into account. During the 2000s, the Statute of Racial Equality and the Law of Quotas generated a great deal of controversy, although both pieces of legislation were eventually passed.[10] In addition, although efforts to develop legislation to challenge racism and promote equity were successful in some respects, the final outcomes did not always fully reflect the antiracist principles and ideals that led to the creation of laws such as the Statute of Racial Equality. In many cases, opponents of both affirmative-action and health policies for the Black population were also able to draw upon their considerable social and economic capital and connections to promote their critiques of race-conscious policies in the media, as well as in academic publications.[11] Moreover, the impact of scholarly critiques of race-conscious policies often extended beyond academic circles and influenced how conservative politicians altered legislation such as the Statute of Racial Equality.

Critics of race-conscious policy approaches have argued that affirmative action and health policies for the Black population constituted potentially dangerous approaches, since they would ultimately reinscribe biological and pseudoscientific notions of racial difference. Similar concerns have been articulated about the use of race in medicine and scientific research in the United States. However, in the US context, there has been greater recognition of the need to focus on how structural forms of discrimination and inequality, as well as larger social dynamics, shape health (Smedley et al. 2003). It is also important to recognize important differences in the extent to which racial inequities in health have been acknowledged and/or addressed in the United States and Brazil. While there is an established tradition of including race and ethnicity as variables in health data and research in the United States, the aforementioned critiques of race and health in Brazil appear to challenge the legitimacy of research on racial health disparities simply because race is included as a variable in this research. Moreover, although there are potential pitfalls associated with research on racial health disparities, including the possible reification of biological notions of race, it would likely be impossible to recognize, understand, or address differences in health outcomes between White and African-descendant Brazilians without using race as a variable of analysis. Largely due to the hegemony of the ideology of racial democracy, the policy environment in Brazil has encouraged color-blind and universalist policies that downplay, and often ignore, racial inequalities and racialized forms of social differentiation. Given this context, using race in health research and policy can be an important means of promoting health equity for the Afro-Brazilian population.

Legal scholar Dorothy Roberts has asserted that, rather than focusing on the relationship between race and biology, US researchers should give greater regard to how systemic inequalities lead to different health outcomes for different populations (Roberts 2011). This perspective has been absent from most critiques of health policies for the Black population in Brazil. In addition, as was mentioned earlier, explicit reference to racism as a social determinant of health was omitted from the final version of the Statute of Racial Equality, thus making it more difficult to address the impact of social factors on health disparities for different racial and ethnic groups.

Conclusion

This analysis of policies and initiatives focusing on the health of the Black population highlights both tremendous progress and ongoing challenges in the quest to ensure racial health equity in Brazil. Following the 2001 World Conference against Racism, gains that were made in the development of health policies for the Black population were largely due to political openings provided by the Cardoso and Lula administrations with regard to state acknowledgement of racism and the development of policies and programs to combat it. Black activists, particularly Black women activists, effectively drew upon resources provided by transnational mobilization, especially in relation to the 2001 World Conference against Racism, and worked with international donors and institutions, including United Nations agencies, the British Department for International Development (DFID) and the Pan-American Health Organization (PAHO), to consolidate a policy agenda for the health of the Black population. However, although tremendous gains were made with respect to the development of health policies for the Black population during the early 2000s, obtaining governmental funding for these policies and achieving full implementation at

the federal, state, and municipal levels have remained major challenges, often stifling the potential effectiveness of such policies.

While little data are available to assess how effectively the National Policy for the Integral Health of the Black Population (PNSIPN) has been implemented nationwide, there were signs of discontentment with the policy at the end of 2013. During this time, Black health activists openly critiqued then Minister of Health, Alexandre Padilha, for the slow pace at which the PNSIPN was being implemented. Structural changes within the federal government have also posed a threat to the effective implementation of the PNSIPN. In September 2015, President Dilma Rousseff called for the consolidation of SEPPIR, the Ministry for Women's Policies, and the Ministry for Human Rights into a new *Ministério de Mulheres, Direitos Humanos e Igualdade Racial* (Ministry on Women, Racial Equality, and Human Rights). Rousseff's decision to consolidate the secretariats caused widespread concern among Black activists and feminist activists, including Black women activists, and was part of a larger shift away from the more progressive approaches to policy that characterized the Lula administration.

On May 12, 2016, the Brazilian Senate voted to begin impeachment hearings against Rousseff, which led to her removal from office for a period of six months or until the Senate reached a final verdict regarding her presidency. Vice-President Michel Temer, of the *Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro* (Brazilian Democratic Movement Party, PMDB), immediately assumed role of Acting President; however, there was widespread discontent with him assuming office given corruption allegations against him, as well as his central role in orchestrating Rousseff's impeachment. Temer was accused of illegal financing during the 2014 elections and there were allegations that he was involved with the Petrobras (state-owned oil company) scandal that precipitated Rousseff's impeachment.

Progressive members of Brazilian civil society and many members of the international community viewed Roussef's ouster as a coup that was orchestrated by rich and powerful elites. By 2016, the right wing of Brazilian politics had been out of power for 13 years, due to the presidencies of Rousseff and her predecessor, Lula. While Rousseff was accused of maneuvering funds and tampering with budgets, there was no proof that a crime of responsibility had been committed at the time of her impeachment (Council on Hemispheric Affairs 2016). In addition, many of the politicians who fought for Rousseff's impeachment were accused of personal embezzlement and nearly a third of the 594 members of Congress were under scrutiny by the courts over claims of violating laws. Comparisons to the 1964 *golpe* (coup) by the military regime, which forced President João Goulart out of office and ushered in Brazil's twenty-one year dictatorship, were commonly made and there were deep concerns that democratic gains that had been made over the previous decades were being quickly eroded. The movement to impeach Rousseff was also highly gendered and drew on sexist beliefs and imagery to prematurely end her presidency and diminish her accomplishments as Brazil's first female president.

When Michel Temer assumed office as Acting President in May 2016, he immediately came under criticism for the lack of gender and racial diversity in his cabinet. Of the 20 ministers he initially named, all were white males. Temer also quickly dismantled important government ministries related to women's rights, racial equality, and those that represented civil society interests, including the Ministry for Women, Human Rights and Racial Equality. By dismantling this federal ministry, Temer dealt a final blow to the

institutionalization of many of the racial equality policies discussed in this article. This decision also undermined gender equality policies at the federal level. The final dismantling of SEPPIR by Temer, which began under Rousseff, was a particularly important change given its central role in the implementation of the National Policy for the Integral Health of the Black Population, as well as other racial equality policies. As this article goes to press, the status of Rousseff's presidency and the continuation of race-conscious health policies are both extremely uncertain.

Notes

1. Werneck (2005) provides a sobering critique of the Cardoso and Lula administrations' actions with regard to racism since the Durban conference.
2. This committee monitors governmental compliance with the International Convention to Eliminate All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD).
3. Health initiatives and policies for indigenous communities predate those developed for the Black population. The Subsystem for Attention to the Health of Indigenous Peoples (*Subsistema de Atenção à Saúde dos Povos Indígenas*) was established in 1999. The National Policy of Attention to the Health of Indigenous Peoples (*Política Nacional de Atenção à Saúde dos Povos Indígenas*) was promulgated by the Ministry of Health in 2002.
4. For criticisms of Lula's administration by Black women activists, see Oliveira (2005) and Reis (2007).
5. *Quilombos* continue to exist in both urban and rural areas of Brazil. Most contemporary *quilombo* communities are primarily comprised of people of African descent. Many, though not all, were formed by fugitive slaves.
6. In 2010 the National Council of Municipal Health Secretaries publicly affirmed their commitment to health equity and distributed the National Policy for the Integral Health of the Black Population during their XXVI National Congress.
7. Paim is a Black Senator from the state of Rio Grande do Sul. He served as a federal deputy from 1999 to 2002. For a recent analysis of Black politicians in Brazil, see Johnson (2015).
8. Another important example of critiques of race-conscious policies undertaken by Yvonne Maggie, Peter Fry, and their collaborators was a coedited volume titled, *Divisões Perigosas: Políticas raciais no Brasil Contemporâneo* (Dangerous Divisions: Racial Policies in Contemporary Brazil) (Fry et al. 2007b). The book contains over forty essays that critique race-conscious policies in Brazil. It also contains copies of manifestos opposing the Statute of Racial Equality and the Law of Quotas.
9. Fernanda Lopes did pioneering work on HIV/AIDS prevention and treatment for Black women in São Paulo and has also been instrumental in the development of health policies for the Black population. She worked for the British Agency for International Development (DFID) in Brazil during the implementation of the Program to Combat Institutional Racism (PCRI) and later worked with the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) on projects related to the health of the Black population in Brazil. Marcelo Paixão is a sociologist who has done pioneering research on racial differences in the Human Development Index in Brazil. For examples of their research, see Lopes (2005), Lopes and Quintiliano (2007), and Paixão (2013).
10. The Law of Quotas (Federal Law no. 12.711) was signed by President Dilma Rousseff in August 2012. It mandates that fifty percent of federal university students come from public schools. The law also calls for quotas to be granted to students from low-income families. Within these two groups, the number of *Preto*, *Pardo*, and indigenous students is required to be proportional to the percentage of each group in the state where a university is located.
11. An example of this can be seen in the publication of Ali Kamel's 2006 book *Não Somos Racistas* (We Are Not Racists), which critiqued affirmative action policies and argued that they would introduce racial antagonisms into Brazilian society. Kamel is a high-profile journalist and executive with TV Globo, Brazil's largest television network, and the Brazilian newspaper *O Globo*.

References

Alberto, Paulina. 2011. *Terms of Inclusion: Black Intellectuals in Twentieth-Century Brazil.* Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.

Andrews, George Reid. 1991. *Blacks & Whites in São Paulo, Brazil, 1888–1988*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.

———. 1995. “Black Political Mobilization in Brazil, 1975–1990.” In *The Social Construction of Democracy*, edited by George Reid Andrews and Herrick Chapman, 218–41. Washington Square: New York University Press.

Butler, Kim D. 1998. *Freedoms Given, Freedoms Won: Afro-Brazilians in Post-Abolition São Paulo and Salvador*. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.

Caldwell, Kia Lilly. 2007. *Negras in Brazil: Re-envisioning Black Women, Citizenship, and the Politics of Identity*. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.

———. 2009. “Intersectional Health Policy in Brazil: Race and Gender as Determinants of Health and Wellness.” In *The Intersectional Approach: Transforming Women’s and Gender Studies through Race, Class, and Gender*, edited by Michele Tracy Berger and Kathleen Guidroz, 118–35. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.

Carmichael, Stokely, and Charles Hamilton. 1967. *Black Power: The Politics of Liberation in America*. New York: Random House.

Council on Hemispheric Affairs. 2016. “Soft Coup in Brazil: A Blow to Brazilian Democracy.” May 12, 2016. Accessed June 15, 2016. http://www.coha.org/soft-coup-in-brazil-a-blow-to-brazilian-democracy/

Covin, David. 2006. *The Unified Black Movement in Brazil, 1978–2002*. Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Co.

CRI. Articulação para o Combate ao Racismo Institucional. 2006. *Identificação e Abordagem do Racismo Institucional*. Brasília: CRI.

Cruz, Simone, Laura López, Daniel Etcheverry, and Miriam Steffen Vieira. 2008. *Saúde Da População Negra Como Ação Afirmativa: Estratégias de Enfrentamento Ao HIV/Aids Na Perspectiva de Entidades Do Movimento Negro Na Região Sul Do Brasil*. Porto Alegre: Metropole.

Damasco, Mariana Santos, Marcos Chor Maio, and Simone Monteiro. 2012. “Feminismo Negro: Raça, Identidade E Saúde Reprodutiva No Brasil (1975–1993).” *Estudos Feministas* 20 (1): 133–51.

Davis, Darién, Tianna S. Paschel, and Judith A. Morrison. 2012 “Pan-Afro-Latin African Americanism Revisited: Legacies and Lessons for Transnational Alliances in the New Millennium.” In *Afro-Descendants, Identity, and the Struggle for Development in the Americas*, edited by Berndt Reiter and Kimberly Eison Simmons, 19–48. East Lansing: Michigan State University Press.

Freyre, Gilberto. 1986 [1933]. *The Masters and the Slaves: A Study in the Development of Brazilian Civilization*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

———. 1959. *New World in the Tropics-The Culture of Modern Brazil.* New York: Knopf.

Fry, Peter. 2007. “Afinal, aids tem cor ou raça no Brasil?” *Folha de São Paulo* 11 March.

Revista do IEA da USP 18: 67–80.

Fry, Peter, and Yvonne Maggie. 2004. “Cotas Raciais – Construindo Um País Dividido?” *Económica* 6: 153–61.

Fry, Peter, Simone Monteiro, Marcos Chor Maio, Francisco I. Bastos, and Ricardo Ventura Santos. 2007a. “AIDS tem cor ou raça? Interpretação de dados e formulação de políticas de saúde no Brasil.” *Cadernos de Saúde Pública* 23: 497–523.

Fry, Peter, Yvonne Maggie, Marcos Chor Maio, Simone Monteiro, and Ricardo Ventura Santos. 2007b. *Divisões perigosas: Políticas raciais no Brasil contemporâneo*. Rio de Janeiro: Editora Civilização Brasileira.

———. 2007c. “Apresentação.” In *Divisões perigosas: Políticas raciais no Brasil contemporâneo*, edited by Peter Fry, Yvonne Maggie, Marcos Chor Maio, Simone Monteiro, and Ricardo Ventura Santos, 17–22. Rio de Janeiro: Editora Civilização Brasileira.

Hanchard, Michael. 1994. *Orpheus and Power: The Movimento Negro of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, Brazil, 1945–1988*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Htun, Mala. 2004. “From ‘Racial Democracy’ to Affirmative Action: Changing State Policy on Race in Brazil.” *Latin American Research Review* 39: 50–89.

Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística (IBGE). 2011. “Censo Demográfico 2010: Caraterísticas da População e dos Domicílios. Resultados do Universo.” Rio de Janeiro: Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística.

Jaccoud, Luciana. 2009. *A Construção de Uma Política de Promoção da Igualdade Racial Uma Análise dos Últimos 20 anos*. Brasilia: IPEA.

Jeronimo, Josie. 2010. “Senadores aprovam Estatuto da Igualdade Racial, mas retiram cotas.” *Correio Braziliense* (Brasília), June 17, 2010. Accessed December 13, 2014. http://www.correiobraziliense.com.br/app/noticia/brasil/2010/06/17/interna_brasil,198091/index.shtml

Johnson, Ollie A. III. 2015. “Blacks in National Politics.” In *Race, Politics, and Education in Brazil: Affirmative Action in Higher Education*, edited by Ollie A. Johnson III and Rosana Heringer, 17–58. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Kalckmann, Suzanna, Claudete Gomes dos Santos, Luís Eduardo Batista, and Vanessa Martins da Cruz. 2007. “Racismo Institucional: Um Desafio para a Eqüidade no SUS?” *Saúde e Sociedade* 16: 146–55.

Kamel, Ali. 2006. *Não Somos Racistas: Uma Reação aos Que Querem Nos Transformar Numa Nação Bicolor.* Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira.

Lopes, Fernanda. 2005. "Experiências Desiguais ao Nascer, Viver, Adoecer e Morrer: Tópicos em Saúde da População Negra no Brasil," In *Saúde da População Negra no Brasil: Estudos e Pesquisas*, 9–48. Brasília: Fundação Nacional de Saúde.

Lopes, Fernanda, and Rachel Quintiliano. 2007. "Racismo Institucional e o Direito Humana à Saúde." *Democracia Viva* 34 (January/March): 8–16.

Lovell, Peggy A., and Charles H. Wood. 1998. "Skin Color, Racial Identity, and Life Chances in Brazil." *Latin American Perspectives* 25 (May): 90–109.

Maggie, Yvonne. 2005a. "Políticas de Cotas e o Vestibular da UNB ou a Marca que Cria Sociedades Divididas." *Horizontes Antropológicos* 11: 286–91.

———. 2005b "Uma Nova Pedagogia Racial?" *Revista USP* 68: 112–29.

Maio, Marcos Chor, and Simone Monteiro. 2005. "Tempos de Racialização: O Caso da 'Saúde da População Negra' no Brasil." *História Ciências Saúde-Manguinhos* 12: 419–46.

Maio, Marcos Chor, Simone Monteiro, and Paulo Henrique Almeida Rodrigues. 2007 "O SUS é Racista?" In *Divisões Perigosas: Políticas Raciais no Brasil Contemporâneo*, edited by Peter Fry, Yvonne Maggie, Marcos Maio, Simone Monteiro, and Ricardo Ventura Santos. Rio de Janeiro: Editora Civilização Brasileira.

Martins, AL. 2006. "Maternal Mortality among Black Women in Brazil." *Cadernos de Saúde Pública* 22 (11): 2473–79.

Martins, Sérgio da Silva, Carlos Alberto Medeiros, and Elisa Larkin Nascimento. 2004 "Paving Paradise: The Road from 'Racial Democracy' to Affirmative Action in Brazil." *Journal of Black Studies* 34: 787–816.

Ministério da Saúde. 2001. *Manual de Doenças Mais Importantes, por Razões Étnicas, na População Brasileira Afro-Descendente* (Série A: Normas e Manuais Técnicos, n. 123). Brasília: Ministério da Saúde.

———. 2009 *Portaria no. 992, de 13 de Maio de 2009. Institui a Política Nacional de Saúde Integral da População Negra.* Accessed on May 27, 2014. http://bvsms.saude.gov.br/bvs/saudelegis/gm/2009/prt0992_13_05_2009.html

Oliveira, Fátima. 2002. *Saúde da População Negra, Brasil, 2001*. Brasília: Pan-American Health Organization.

———. 2005. "Governo Lula e Combate ao Racismo: Há Intenções, Mas Faltam Gestos!" *Cadernos ABONG* 32: 11–14.

Paixão, Marcelo. 2013. *500 Anos de Solidão: Estudos Sobre Desigualdades Raciais no Brasil*. Curitiba: Editora Appris, Ltda.

Pagano, Anna. 2011. *Health in Black and White: Debates on Racial and Ethnic Health Disparities in Brazil.* Doctoral dissertation, Anthropology, University of California, San Diego.

Paschel, Tianna S. 2010. The Right to Difference: Explaining Colombia's Shift from Color Blindness to the Law of Black Communities. *American Journal of Sociology* 116 (3): 729–69.

Rahier, Jean Muteba. 2012. "Introduction: Black Social Movements in Latin America: From Monocultural Mestizaje and 'Invisibility' to Multiculturalism and State Corporatism/Co-optation." In *Black Social Movements in Latin America: From Monocultural Mestizaje to Multiculturalism*, ed. Jean Muteba Rahier, 1–12. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Reichmann, Rebecca. 1999. "Introduction." In *Race in Contemporary Brazil: From Indifference to Inequality*, ed. Rebecca Reichmann, 1–36. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press.

Reis, Vilma. 2007. "Black Brazilian Women and the Lula Administration." *NACLA Report on the Americas* (March/April): 38–41.

Roberts, Dorothy. 2011. *Fatal Invention: How Science, Politics, and Big Business Re-create Race in the Twenty-First Century*. New York: The New Press.

Santos, Sales Augusto dos, João Vitor Moreno dos Santos, and Dora Lucia Bertúlio. 2011. *O Processo de Aprovação do Estatuto da Igualdade Racial*. Brasília: INESC.

———. 2015. "The Defeat of Quotas within the Racial Equality Statute." In *Race, Politics, and Education in Brazil: Affirmative Action in Higher Education*, edited by Ollie A. Johnson III and Rosana Heringer, 199–221. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Santos, Sonia Beatriz dos. 2012. "Controlling Black Women's Reproductive Health Rights: An Impetus to Black Women's Collective Organizing." *Cultural Dynamics* 24: 13–30.

Secretária Especial de Políticas de Promoção da Igualdade Racial. 2005. *Relatório de Atividades 2005*. Brasília: Secretária Especial de Políticas de Promoção da Igualdade Racial.

Smedley, Brian D., Adrienne Y. Stith, and Alan R. Nelson, eds. 2003. *Unequal Treatment: Confronting Racial and Ethnic Disparities in Health Care*. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press.

Taquette, Stella R. 2010. "Interseccionalidade de Gênero, Classe e Raça e Vulnerabilidade de Adolescentes Negras às DST/aids." *Saúde e Sociedade São Paulo* 19 (Suppl. 2): 51–62.

Telles, Edward. 2004. *Race in Another America: The Significance of Skin Color in Brazil*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Turner, J. Michael. 2002. "The Road to Durban – and Back." *NACLA Report on the Americas* 35: 31–35.

Twine, France Winddance. 1998. *Racism in a Racial Democracy: The Maintenance of White Supremacy in Brazil*. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.

Werneck, Jurema. 2005. "A Luta Continua: O Combate ao Racismo no Brasil Pós-Durban." *Observatório da Cidadania* 56–65.

———. 2010. *Saúde da População Negra*. Rio de Janeiro: Criola.

Wood, Charles H., and Peggy A. Lovell. 1992. "Racial Inequality and Child Mortality in Brazil." *Social Forces* 70 (March): 703–24.

The Limits of Emancipation: Black Americans and White Southern Dominance of American Politics from the Founding to the Twenty-First Century

*Neal Allen**
Wichita State University

Abstract

This article argues that the power of Southern White politicians in the contemporary United States is best understood as the continuation of the historical exclusion of African-Americans from effective political power. This history of "distortion of democracy" includes the Southern-dominated Republican Party's filibuster of Obama administration policies, the Democratic filibuster of civil rights legislation in the middle twentieth century, the disenfranchisement of minority voters prior to the Voting Rights Act, and the two-thirds rule that gave the White South an effective veto over Democratic Presidential Nominations. Also older constitutional rules and patterns like the three-fifths clause, slave-state preferences in Supreme Court nominations, and the malapportioned Senate itself have been used by the White South to block the will of majority.

Keywords: Race and Ethnicity; Emancipation; Southern voters; Filibuster; Disenfranchisement; Voting Rights Act; Political parties

Introduction

Emancipation is commonly understood as an event, occurring at the point at which slaves became free. This event can be located in 1862 when President Abraham Lincoln issued the Emancipation Proclamation, or in 1863 when it took effect, or the end of the Civil War, or the ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment. These events are worthy of both celebration and study, and the acceptance of those of African descent as American citizens is a critical turning point in American history. But understanding Emancipation as an event diminishes the concept's contemporary significance in American politics and accepts the slavery paradigm. Emancipation should mean not only the reversal of slavery but also the achievement of full equality as American citizens.

* Direct correspondence to neal.allen@wichita.edu

Speaking to a racially mixed audience August 15, 2012, in Danville, Virginia, Vice President Joe Biden, when referring to Republican attempts to roll back financial regulations under the Dodd-Frank bill, said "they are trying to put you back in chains." Biden was criticized for unfairly injecting race into the presidential campaign, and he clarified that he was trying to contrast the administration's attempts to protect consumers with the Republican attempt to "unchain Wall Street." Whether or not the "chains" comment was smart or even intentional campaign strategy, it reflects a broader understanding of what bondage entails. Speaking to a heavily Black audience, and part of a coordinated campaign to mobilize minority voters, Biden was arguing that Republican policy would in effect shackle citizens to an unfettered financial system.

Even if Biden was merely using a historical analogy to mobilize part of the Democratic base, he was articulating a broadened understanding of bondage. He implicitly was arguing that a person or group is in bondage if they are involuntarily connected to another group or institution that is opposed to their interest or is exploitive of the "chained" group. Thus bondage is recast as a state of powerlessness in a democratic political system. If Emancipation is understood as the removal of bondage, then an inquiry into Emancipation in American history should include a focus on the power of the formerly enslaved group. That inquiry must include not just an assessment of the formal power of the formerly enslaved group but an assessment of their effective power in the political system relative to their opponents.

This paper contributes to this inquiry with a discussion of African-American political power in the electoral system from the Founding to the present. This area is at least partly quantifiable, and national elections provide points of comparison throughout postindependence American history. Also postbellum voting history allows for the identification of parties or factions that African-Americans do not vote for in the aggregate and that can be understood as opponents in democratic contestation. Emancipation is a process of empowerment, and that process did not end in the 1860s with the end of legal slavery, or in the 1960s with the end of legal segregation, or even in 2008 with the election of Barack Obama. It also can be partially reversed when the relative power of African-Americans diminishes due to shifts in the structure of American politics like the rise of a Republican party dominated by Southern Whites.

This paper advances the following interpretations of African-American political power in American history and contemporary America. First, I argue that the American electoral system has been organized to not just limit the power of African-Americans but to give additional power to the opponents of African-American empowerment. In particular African-Americans have often been counted in ways that expand and buttress the power of their opponents. Second, I argue that contemporary American politics is also characterized by systematic diminishment of African-American political power, in the ways that small states and the South have outsized influence on national politics. More generally, I argue that Emancipation must mean more than either formal citizenship, or the absence of racism, or overt discrimination.

I begin with a discussion of the power of the White South in the contemporary Republican Party and thus national politics. I then move to a discussion of the "slave power" understanding of the Founding and antebellum American politics, with particular focus on the effect of the three-fifths clause in determining representation in the House of

Representatives and the Electoral College. I then discuss how African-Americans after Emancipation were systematically removed from electoral politics and then counted as full citizens for purposes of representation, providing increased electoral power for Southern Whites. I proceed to discuss how Southern Whites exercised disproportionate influence over national politics during the segregation era.

I conclude by arguing for an expanded understanding of African-American empowerment that takes into account the effective political power, or lack thereof, that is at the disposal of Black American citizens. In particular, I argue that if the American political system is committed to the idea of Emancipation found in the Proclamation, the Reconstruction Amendments, and the work of the Civil Rights Movement, it is problematic that political power is often controlled by a political party that in the aggregate garners nearly no support from African-Americans.

Structural Advantages of Southern Whites Before and After Emancipation

Slavery in the United States was not just a condition of servitude for Blacks but an organizing principle of the political system. Institutional arrangements were specifically designed to exclude African-Americans from status as human beings and citizens and to buttress the power of the supporters of slavery. Electoral democracy requires methods of counting voters, and those methods from the Founding favored Southern White supporters of slavery. The Emancipation Proclamation and the Thirteenth Amendment ended legal slavery but did not end the practice of counting African-Americans in ways that increase the power of their opponents. The institutional advantage of Southern Whites, and opponents of African-Americans in electoral politics generally, continued after the Civil War and has reappeared with the rise of a Southern-dominated Republican Party in contemporary politics.

An argument for the continuing diminishment of African-American political power might seem incongruous with recent events. The election of Barack Obama as president in 2008 is in many ways evidence of the increasing advancement of African-American politicians, a kind of culmination of the work of the Civil Rights Movement. His election, particularly his victory over Hillary Clinton in the Democratic nominating contest, also demonstrates the effective power of African-American voters. The election of an African-American candidate, who was the clear candidate of choice of African-American voters, shows at minimum that the American political system is no longer closed to African-American candidates or the influence of African-American voters. In his first two years in office, Obama and Democrats in Congress passed the Affordable Care Act, the Dodd-Frank financial reform bill, and a substantial economic stimulus package.

A different picture emerges when we look at the power of elected officials not supported by African-Americans. The continuing power of the Republican Party, dominated by Southern whites, is magnified by structural features of American politics like the Senate filibuster and the advantage of small states in the Senate and Electoral College. The wholesale shift of Southern Whites to vote Republican has allowed the party to be competitive in national elections even while gaining the support of around one in five members of the growing non-White minority. While the policy content emerging from Southern White politicians is no longer specific exclusion and subjugation of African-Americans, they are able to limit the power of African-Americans' candidates of choice. The fact that

Barack Obama was elected and re-elected president does not change the fundamental advantages of Southern Whites.

Compared to 2000 and 2004, the presidential election of 2008 initially appears to be a recovery of Democratic fortunes in the South. Barack Obama won three Southern states—Virginia, Florida, and North Carolina—that Al Gore and John Kerry both lost. Obama won both Virginia and Florida in 2012 and only narrowly lost North Carolina. But those victories are not a reversal of the long-term decline of Democratic fortunes in the South but at best a stabilization of the party's Southern fortunes. The 2010 and 2014 midterm elections indicate that the shift of Southern Whites into the GOP column is continuing apace, with Democrats reduced to three Senate seats, isolated mainly majority-minority House seats, and in control of no state legislative chambers.

In 2008, Obama won 310 electoral votes outside the South, forty more than necessary. If we extrapolate his popular vote uniformly downward to locate the minimum winning Electoral College coalition, Obama still gets to 278 without any Southern states.[1] In presidential elections, the region is no longer what Southern Politics scholars Earl Black and Merle Black called "The Vital South" and instead is a region that will provide the majority of its electoral votes in most elections to the Republican candidate but presenting isolated opportunities to Democratic candidates.[2] It is possible for a Democrat to win a majority of Southern electoral votes but only in a landslide like Lyndon Baines Johnson's (LBJ) 1964 victory that carried with it Republican strongholds Utah, Idaho, Wyoming, Nebraska, and Kansas.

Obama's relatively poor showing in the South, and his lack of any biographical connection to the region, makes Obama the least Southern president since at least Calvin Coolidge was elected in 1924. Every president from Herbert Hoover to George W. Bush won a majority of Southern states, with the exception of Bill Clinton. The proportion of Obama's electoral votes coming from Southern states—15%—is actually similar to Clinton's 13% (1992) and 16% (1996). Obama, however, lacks the connection of residency and cultural similarity to White Southerners that Bill Clinton enjoyed.

In the Senate, the shift since Clinton's first election in 1992 has been more catastrophic for Democrats. Bill Clinton took office in 1993 with fifteen of twenty-six Southern senators as Democrats. Even after the 1994 debacle, there were eight senators from the South. The 2006 and 2008 landslides brought Democrats back up to seven, and after the 2014 Republican landslide only three Democrats remain.[3]

The Republican Party's dominance of Southern Senate elections has not only enabled it to capture the Senate in 1994, 2002, and 2014 but also has made the party's Senatorial caucus significantly more Southern. In 1992, the eleven Southern Republican senators constituted 26% of their forty-three-person caucus, and in 1996 the eighteen Southern senators were 33% of their fifty-five. After the switch of Arlen Specter in 2009 to the Democrats dropped Republicans to forty, the nineteen Southerners were 48% of Senate Republicans. Southerners were 46% of the filibuster of health-care reform that forced the use of budget reconciliation and are 43% of the caucus that unanimously filibustered the Cordray nomination in 2011. We have to go back to the Democrats in 1956 for a Senate party caucus so dominated by Southerners.

The shift of white Southern voters to the Republican Party, which was evident as early as 1952 and culminated in the landslide of 1994, carried with it the seeds of a new sectional conflict in American politics. The midterm reaction against the Clinton administration's

failed health-care reform and other policies marked the end of the biracial coalitions that led to what Black and Black called the "Democratic Domination" (Black and Black 2002, 174–176). The presidential Republicanism brought in by Ronald Reagan, and only partially reversed by Clinton in 1992 and 1996, was finally paired with Republican domination of the Southern congressional delegation. This new alignment of American politics, with the South firmly in the Republican column whether in years of Republican strength or years of Republican weakness, did not fully lead to antimajoritarian action by Southern leaders until 2009. Until then Republicans controlled at least one branch of Congress or the presidency and often all three.

The 2008 elections brought in a thirty-nine-vote Democratic majority in the House and a Democratic president with clear majorities in both the popular and electoral vote. Their fifty-nine-member Senate caucus, augmented to sixty with the addition of party-switcher Arlen Specter of Pennsylvania in April 2009, was the largest elected by either party since 1976. If old-line Southern conservatives like James Eastland and John Stennis of Mississippi and Harry Byrd Jr. of Virginia are subtracted from the reliable Democratic count, then the 2009 Democratic majority was the largest in the Senate since the mid-1960s.

The landslides of 2006 and 2008 resulted in the loss of ten Republican Senate seats outside the South. Southern Senators, with their number only reduced by three, were now the dominant regional grouping in the Senate caucus. Southern Republicans, most of whose constituents voted against Barack Obama, drew on two available resources to attempt a minority veto of the Democratic agenda: the filibuster and the fifteen Republicans from the overrepresented Great Plains and Mountain West[4] states. When Republicans were in a majority or near-majority position before the 2008 election, they did not need to draw on such resources to block Democratic expansion of federal power. After the 2010 landslide midterm elections, Southern Republicans could rely again on majoritarian institutional resources, like their majority in the House. The successful filibuster of Cordray and the NLRB nominees was the action of a 2010 majority to block the consequences of the 2008 presidential election.

The elections of 2006 and 2008 lend support to Thomas Schaller's argument, expressed in *Whistling Past Dixie: How Democrats Can Win Without the South* (2008) that divergence between Southern Whites and the rest of the country enables Democrats to win majorities for President and Congress without the South. But the use of the filibuster by a Republican Senate minority with Southerners at its core shows that only the rare Democratic supermajority can overcome Southern obstruction. Senate Democrats had to use the budget reconciliation process in the Senate to enable a fifty-six-vote majority in 2010 to preserve the 60–39 vote for the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act in 2009.[5] The forty-one Republican votes were unable to stop the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act in 2010, as Olympia Snowe of Maine abstained and Scott Brown of Massachusetts voted with all Democrats to end debate and move to what became a 60–39 vote in favor. But since the new Financial Products Safety Commission requires a director for significant regulatory powers to take effect, and that appointment did not occur until after the 2010 elections, Republicans were able to force Obama into a constitutionally questionable recess appointment made permanent only after Democratic gains in 2012.

Southern leaders have demonstrated a tendency throughout American history to limit the scope of national government power[6] when opportunities arose. While the Civil

War is the only occasion that Southern desire to thwart a national majority[7] has led to a breakdown in the national political order, the threat of system failure or breakdown has frequently been deployed to achieve Southern goals. The pressing need for a new constitution enabled slave-state delegates to the 1787 Philadelphia convention to extract protection for the slave trade, a fugitive slave clause, and most important a representation advantage with the three-fifths clause. The need to settle the 1876 presidential election without prompting a new civil war necessitated ending military Reconstruction and allowing the disenfranchisement of Black voters and the imposition of a caste system. That disenfranchisement enabled the Democratic Party, as the party of the White South, to enjoy a built-in advantage in congressional and presidential elections. The rise of a national majority in favor of national government economic intervention was blocked by Southern influence in the Democratic Party, and civil rights legislation was blocked by Southern-led filibusters in the Senate. When a veto point has been available, white Southern leaders have used it.

Slave states were able to successfully insist upon language that was protective of slavery in the 1787 constitution. The slave trade was constitutionally protected from a legislative prohibition until 1808 in Article One, Section 9, and Article Five makes this portion of Article One unamendable. The slave trade shares this protection from the extremely rare supermajority amendment process with equal representation of states in the Senate.[8] The most consequential limitation on majoritarian democracy was the three-fifths clause[9] which is often misunderstood as classifying slaves as a fraction of a person. By not mentioning slavery explicitly and protecting it effectively, the Constitution of 1787 is best understood as treating slaves as no fraction of a person and creating an institutional framework that would preserve that denial of basic humanity.

The three-fifths clause inflated the slave states' share of House seats, and thus of Electoral College votes. Walton and Smith have calculated that the clause granted 25% more House seats and 17% more Electoral College votes than would be allocated if slaves were not counted like voting citizens (Walton and Smith 2008, 12). The direct victims of this rule were White politicians in the North, the only potential allies with political power available to Southern Blacks. The consequential and relatively close presidential election of 1800, with Jefferson winning the electoral vote 73–65, would likely have resulted in an Adams victory if Southern states had not had the bonus electoral votes granted by the three-fifths clause (Finkelman 2002, 1145). Fourteen of the 138 electoral votes accrued to slave states because of the three-fifths clause, and Jefferson received all of them. The three-fifths clause also led to Southern dominance in the Jeffersonian House caucus, which was the dominant force in the House and also chose the party's uniformly successful presidential candidates from 1800–1820 (Richards 2000).

Other institutional arrangements created between the Constitution and the Civil War also were constructed to block the power of a majority hostile to Southern interests. Both the Democratic and Whig parties were intentionally designed to avoid a shift in national slavery policy by including elite and mass support from both South and non-South. John Aldridge argues that this desire to protect Southern positions and prevent a potential dissolution of the Union led to the creation of cross-sectional parties:

> The problem was that the South was a minority when the second party system was established, and it would become an ever smaller proportion of the nation . . .The problem was that a nonslave majority

existed and could exercise its majority status to end slavery or limit it more than the South would find tolerable. The trick, therefore, was how to give the South an effective and credible veto over substantial change on the slavery issue (Aldrich 1995 129).

This party system would break down in the 1850s when the Whigs were unable to maintain their Northern vote share with a platform agnostic on slavery, the antislavery Republicans replaced the Whigs, and the Democrats tilted toward their proslavery Southern supporters. The Kansas-Nebraska Act of 1854 was able to temporarily use majoritarian democracy, if on the territorial level, to prevent the Democratic Party from becoming a proslavery minority party. When territorial popular sovereignty on the issue of slavery for new states was implemented in Kansas, it led to another attempt to circumvent an antislavery majority with the attempt of congressional Democrats to accept the proslavery Lecompton constitution in contravention of the elected territorial legislature (Fehrenbacher 1978, 461–462).

But even with the breakdown of the cross-sectional party system and the loss of the "balance" of Senate seats between slave and nonslave states, in the Supreme Court the South retained a block to an antislavery majority. *Dred Scott v. Sanford* came before a Supreme Court in 1857 with five of nine Justices from slave states, and two of the Northern Justices appointed by the proslavery Democratic President James K. Polk. This proslave state bias was built into the system of Justice selection, as one Justice was customarily drawn from each Federal Judicial Circuit, and a majority of circuits were located in slave states (Fehrenbacher 1978, 285; Graber 2006, 147).

As soon as former confederate states were allowed to participate in presidential elections after the Civil War, Southern leaders used their available political resources to ensure the blockage of federal power to enforce the protections of Black rights contained in the Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. When the 1876 presidential election was disputed due to allegations of voting irregularities including intimidation of potential Black Southern voters, and the Democratic House and Republican Senate could not agree on certifying a winner, Southerners extracted a pledge to end military Reconstruction in exchange for supporting Republican Rutherford B. Hayes for president. Thus Southern states were free to disenfranchise Black voters, making the narrow Democratic presidential victories in 1884, 1892, and 1916 of questionable majoritarian status.

From the introduction of the cloture rule in the 1917 Senate until the weak and ineffectual 1957 Civil Rights Act,[10] no civil rights measure could survive a filibuster led by Southern Senators. Even the mass movement of Black voters into the electorate of the large industrial states that determined presidential elections in the 1940s and 1950s could not break the Senate filibuster of meaningful civil rights legislation. It took the combination of the Birmingham demonstrations of 1963 and the herculean effort of President Johnson and his congressional allies to produce the cross-party non-Southern supermajority (93% of non-Southern Democrats and 84% of non-Southern Republicans) needed to pass the 1964 Civil Rights Act.

The growing Southern control of the contemporary Republican Party, which takes on particular significance in periods of Democratic electoral success like 2006–08, differs from the episodes discussed previously in that it is not explicitly directed at preserving the subjugation of Black Southerners.[11] What the filibusters of health-care reform and appointments to the Consumer Products Safety Commission and National Labor Relations Board share with previous race-specific uses of countermajoritarian institutional

resources is a hostility to federal government intervention in the economy and society. This position is not uniquely Southern but has become the dominant position of the Southern White majority.

The successful drive by Southern Democrats in the late 1930s and 1940s to weaken labor protection and labor union power in federal policy is analogous to the 2009–10 congressional Republican attempt to block the Democratic agenda. Sean Farhang and Ira Katznelson (2005 13, 14) show how Southern congressional Democrats, after acquiescing in the protections for strikes and collective bargaining in the Wagner Act of 1935, worked to limit the reach of labor legislation. In particular, Southerners joined with farm-state Republicans to carve out an exemption from labor standards for agricultural employers. This exemption appealed both to the free-market values of Southerners, as well as their desire to continue the low compensation and poor working conditions of Black agricultural workers. When the national majority shifted in favor of antiunion Republicans in the 1946 election, Southern Democrats provided crucial support to pass the proemployer Taft-Hartley Act and override President Harry Truman's veto. The South was able to limit the policy effect of a profederal power majority and then join a majority to roll back federal power when non-Southern voter preferences shifted their direction.

While the recent filibusters of health-care reform and the implementation of financial services reform did not succeed in blocking legislation, they raised the threshold that profederal power majorities must clear to a level only rarely reached by modern American political parties. If the South, as the most distinctive American region, can organize itself in Congress in alliance with small-state Senators from other regions, the political system in effect will work in two different ways depending on whether the national majority includes White Southerners.

If Senators from a different region, or group of regions, could unify to use the filibuster to block Republican legislation and appointments, then the playing field would be even in its requirement of regional supermajorities to change national policy. Democrats in February of 2015 did filibuster a Homeland Security funding bill that would have rolled back President Obama's immigration executive orders of 2012 and 2014. But since this Democratic filibuster included Senators from large states like California, New York, Illinois, and Pennsylvania, it is accurately understood as a majoritarian action.

The current Southern advantage in the Senate, and thus the national government, may be overcome as previous regional institutional advantages have fallen before extraordinary supermajorities. The three-fifths clause was eliminated by the Civil War, Black disenfranchisement was reversed by the Voting Rights Act, and the current Senate cloture requirement stands at sixty votes because of a drop from the two-thirds requirement of mid-century. The elimination of filibusters for executive branch appointees and lower federal court judges in 2013 proves that reform is possible. The American political system does not permanently restrain majorities from acting against a given region's desires, as John C. Calhoun's concurrent majority intended. The South, however, has continually reasserted itself in institutional power positions that restrict the growth of the federal government.

The South's disproportionate power in the electoral system has meant that African-Americans' candidates of choice have always worked at a disadvantage. The counting of African-Americans as three-fifths of a citizen for purposes of apportionment increased the electoral power of their opponents prior to the Civil War. The counting of

African-Americans as five-fifths of a citizen after the Thirteenth Amendment, when coupled with disenfranchisement of Southern Blacks after Reconstruction, created a parallel boost in electoral power for the Democratic Party that supported continued subjugation. The Great Migration of African-Americans to Northern states with more open voting systems lessoned this effect, and the Voting Rights Act mostly eliminated it. The growing noncompetitiveness of Southern congressional and the Republican regional presidential elections are returning the region that is home to half of African-Americans to a condition where they are mostly represented by officeholders they did not choose.[12]

If Emancipation is understood as a process, instead of an event, then bondage is only ended when the political power of the formerly enslaved group matches its portion of the population. In a majoritarian democracy, determining the magnitude of such political power requires some kind of measure. One measure is the number of African-Americans achieving elected office, compared to their 13% of the population. African-Americans only approach their percentage of the population in the House, where the current forty-six make up over 10% of the body. Currently there are two Black Senators and no Black Governors.

Possibly a more accurate measure would be the number of successful candidates who are supported by African-Americans. Since the Democratic Party garners the near-unanimous support of African-Americans, Democratic electoral success could be a measure of whether the process of Emancipation has ended with a complete removal of bondage. But democracy entails that citizens and groups of citizens will be on the losing side of elections, so merely looking at Democratic voteshare or electoral success is insufficient. The institutional arrangements discussed above, however, point to an evaluation of American politics as characterized by long-term structural disadvantage for African-Americans.

If this broad generalization is correct, it has two significant implications for our understanding of American politics, focusing on historical continuity and skewed policy outcomes. Southern Whites had a built-in advantage in national politics from the ratification of the Constitution in 1787. That advantage has taken various forms: the three-fifths clause, exclusion of Black voters, and institutional power positions in Congress and the Democratic Party. Southern Whites enjoyed these advantages both when Blacks were excluded from the suffrage and also when they were formally included in the electorate but excluded in practice.

The massive movement of African-Americans out of the South in the Great Migration of the early and middle twentieth century, combined with the increasing prominence of non-Southern liberal elements in the national Democratic Party, briefly complicated this continuity of Southern White advantage. Both parties competed for Black votes in the 1940s, 1950s, and early 1960s, and cross-party coalitions passed meaningful Civil Rights legislation in 1964 and 1965. The movement of Blacks into the Democratic Party, and of Southern Whites into the Republican Party, has led to a reappearance of previous dynamics. The Republican use of the Senate filibuster to block and limit the policy agenda of President Obama and the Democratic majorities in Congress in 2009–10 was another example of a minority veto over the policy goals of African-Americans, who had helped to elect the largest Senate majority in thirty years, and a large House majority as well.

The policy effects of this Southern White advantage, and resulting African-American disadvantage, are difficult to pinpoint in contemporary American politics. The continuation of slavery until the Civil War and the reassertion of White dominance after the end of

military reconstruction in 1877 are effects of an earlier form of Southern White advantage. With African-Americans now not only part of the nationwide electorate but also often turning out in a number equivalent or higher (as in 2012) than White voters, any effect of the White Southern advantage would appear as altered public policy outcomes.

Nicholas Stephanopoulos compared electoral exit poll responses 2000–2010 with national public policy outcomes 1981–2000. He finds that not only are enacted public policies farther away from African-American preferences than available alternatives but also that African-American preferences are negatively correlated with the chances of a given public policy being enacted (2015). For Stephanopoulos, this "political powerlessness" is justification to rethink and expand the Supreme Court's Equal Protection Jurisprudence to include affirmative remedies for "discrete and insular minorities." For the purposes of this article, his findings point to the relevance of institutional arrangements that limit the effective power of African-Americans.

I propose that the end of bondage, and thus full Emancipation, should be understood as the achievement of a level playing field for the formerly enslaved group. If the concept of Emancipation is to be of continuing usefulness, it should focus on the openness of the political process to the exercise of political power by African-Americans. The previous review of relevant features of American national political process from the three-fifths clause to the contemporary filibuster that full emancipation is not yet realized.

Notes

1. 2004 and 2000 follow a similar pattern. Winning Ohio would have pushed Kerry over the top with 271. Gore's minimum winning coalition would have been 292 with Florida, although another 0.7% (7,211 votes) in New Hampshire would have got him to 271.
2. The 2012 general elections seems to have followed the 2008 pattern in the South, with Virginia, Florida, and North Carolina close and contested and all other states solidly Republican.
3. Bill Nelson of Florida and Mark Warner and Tim Kaine of Virginia.
4. Including Alaska.
5. Republicans gained a forty-one-vote filibuster-enabling status with Scott Brown's win of the Massachusetts Senate seat left open by the death of Edward Kennedy. The forty-three votes against the reconciliation bill included twenty-one Southerners—all nineteen Republicans from the region and Arkansas Democrats Blanch Lincoln and Mark Pryor.
6. Southern members of Congress have also sometimes used institutional resources and veto points to increase federal power, such as support for federal censorship of antislavery writings using the postal service, and the strong fugitive slave law contained in the Compromise of 1850. These instances stand as policy-specific exceptions to a larger tendency toward restricting national government power.
7. Since Lincoln's clear Electoral College majority of 59% was achieved by only 40% of the popular vote, the Republican policy of slavery limitation might be best understood as a plurality position, but his vote was substantially larger than either of the Democratic candidates John Breckinridge or Stephan Douglas.
8. Mark Graber argues that the traditional view of a Senate with representation by states as a bulwark of slavery does not describe several important antebellum events like the annexation of Texas and the Compromise of 1850 and that the proportionally allocated House was actually the South's chosen means of defense of slavery. He argues that the widely held view that population would expand most quickly westward from Georgia would create a slave-state majority, creating protection for policies like the legal slave trade by 1808 (105–106). Countermajoritarian power positions like the Senate and Supreme Court became the fallback positions for Southerners defending slavery after population expanded most quickly into free states of the Midwest.
9. In the context of eighteenth-century understandings of citizenship, the three-fifths clause could find justification in a theory of democracy that understood citizenship as limited to male property-holders, but of course, this is anathema to any modern theory of democracy.
10. This act, which had the effective support of Southern leaders like Richard Russell of Georgia, is best understood as an attempt to give Lyndon Johnson national credibility on civil rights without disrupting White rule in the region.

11. The opposition of White Southerners and their elected representatives to extension of the federal welfare state may have racial components, with voters and politicians linking federal aid and regulation with poor non-Whites.
12. The obvious exception to this pattern is majority or plurality African-American House seats, which make current Southern elections to the House more inclusive than pre-VRA ones. Southern African-Americans remain mostly stuck voting for losing Senate candidates and increasing the relative power of Republican-dominated states in the Electoral College.

References

Aldrich, John. 1995. *Why Parties: The Origin and Transformation of Political Parties in America*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Black, Earl, and Merle. 2002. *The Rise of Southern Republicans*. Cambridge, MA: Belknap.

Farhang, Sean, and Ira Kaztnelson. 2005. "The Southern Imposition: Congress and Labor in the New Deal and Fair Deal." *Studies in American Political Development* 19: 1–30.

Fehrenbacher, Don E. 1978. *The Dred Scott Case: It's Significance in American Law and Politics*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Finkelman, Paul. 2002. "The Proslavery Origins of the Electoral College." *Cardozo Law Review* 23: 1145–57.

Graber, Mark. 2006. *Dred Scott and the Problem of Constitutional Evil.* New York: Cambridge University Press.

Richards, Leonard. 2000. *The Slave Power: The Free North and Southern Domination 1780–1860*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press.

Schaller, Thomas. 2008. *Whistling Past Dixie: How Democrats Can Win Without the South.* Riverside, NJ: Simon and Schuster.

Stephanopoulos, Nicholas. "Political Powerlessness." University of Chicago Public Law Working Paper. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2583495, accessed Oct. 9, 2015.

Walton Jr., Hanes, and Robert C. Smith. 2008. *American Politics and the African-American Quest for Universal Freedom*. New York: Pearson.

Black Women Take Their Health into Their Own Hands: The Het Heru Healing Dance and Auset Qigong

*Françoise B. Cromer**
Stony Brook University

Abstract

In this article, I draw primarily on Black women's scholarship on intersectionality as a theoretical framework and an analytical tool to explain why Black women have taken their health and wellness into their own hands. I explore the unorthodox ways Black women organize and participate in women's wellness activities in their communities as examples of culturally responsive informal political action, resistance politics, and complimentary approaches to health. Specifically, I rely on participatory action research and textual analysis to show how both the Het Heru Healing Dance and Auset Qigong, originating in Brooklyn, New York, are examples of the way Black women have taken command of their health and wellness in the context of a health-care system, driven by growth and profits, that undermines Black women's individual and collective definitions of health and wellness. Moreover, because of the failure of political institutions (government departments and agencies, congress, the senate, and public policy) and the health industry to address their specific concerns, Black women have developed these alternative and complimentary social and collective practices. The set of questions guiding this research include: (1) how do Black American women imagine their health? (2) Why is health/the body a site of resistance for Black women? (3) What brought the women to the healing dance and qigong? (4) What were the women's expectations going into the healing dance and/or qigong? (5) How have the women changed as a result of their participation in the dance and/or qigong? (6) How do I give meaning to the individual and collective experiences of organizers and participants of the healing dance and qigong?

Keywords: Women's and gender studies; Black studies; Informal political action; Resistance politics; Women's health; Complementary health; Urban politics; Het Heru; Auset; Qigong

Introduction

". . . 'marginality' has been an excitement to creativity" (Collins 1986, 15).

The cliché, "health care is a business," is an accurate one. The fact is health care is one of the largest and most profitable industries contributing to the US economy. In August 2014 Sageworks, a financial information company, released a list of the fifteen most profitable privately held businesses in the United States with the health care and real estate sectors prevailing on that list (Huddleston 2014). Similarly, in September 2015, *24/7 Wall St.* reported on their research findings: second only to real estate, the largest industry (in seventeen states) and largest contributor to the US economy were two subsectors of health services—the ambulatory health care services industry and/or the hospitals and nursing and residential care facilities industry (Frolich et al. 2015). Alongside its growth, the health industry has emerged as a leader in employment since 2007 during a time when most other industries slowed hiring (US Department of Labor; Wright 2013).

Health care is not only dominating in the economy but it has also been foremost in public awareness due to legal and political debates on the Affordable Care Act. What is commonly known as "Obamacare" (the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act [P.L. 111–148] and the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 [P.L. 111–152]) were signed into law by President Obama in 2010. It was challenged twice in the US Supreme Court but upheld as law in a final decision in the summer of 2012 and again in the summer of 2015 (allowing states to reject the federal funding of Medicaid, the government health care program for low-income people). According to the Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, as of September 1, 2015, thirty-one states have agreed to expand Medicaid including the District of Columbia, one state is under discussion, and nineteen states oppose the expansion (The Kaiser Family Foundation State Health Facts, "State Action on Medicaid Expansion"). A core goal of the Affordable Care Act is to expand health insurance coverage to the uninsured and underinsured. Since the Affordable Care Act was passed five years ago, 16.4 million previously uninsured people now have health insurance coverage (Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs, US Department of Health and Human Services 2015). These findings demonstrate that the health industry is a critical site for the economic and the political order.

While the health industry in the United States is growing and profiting alongside the legal and political transformation of the health care system, much remains to be done given the needs of marginalized groups (Collins 1986; Kelley 1994; Cohen 1999) in relation to the allocation of health-related resources. For example, there are structural prohibitions against Black women being able to shape the national public health policy dialogue on breast cancer (Cromer 2003). Structural prohibitions are the injustices suffered as a result of: racism; sexism; poverty; being uninsured; unemployment; underemployment; and the lack of education, housing, resources, information, skills, access, and outcomes (Crenshaw 1991). Despite being the demographic most likely to die from this disease, silences and stigma against Black women still shape survival rates (Cohen 1999; Berger 2004; Hancock 2004; Motsemme 2004, 2007; Alexander-Floyd 2007; Jordan-Zachery 2009).[1] These impacts on Black women's lives most certainly shape political discourse, political participation, and political life for Black people writ large. Black women struggle to survive in a context in which political institutions and the health industry

are unresponsive to the multiple and overlapping dimensions of their lives (Crenshaw 1989; Collins 1990).

The Het Heru Healing Dance and Auset Qigong are two complimentary approaches to health and creative ways Black women have taken their health and well being into their own hands. I argue both activities constitute a form of resistance and an informal political response to marginalization and systemic failure and must be understood in the context of structural inequality. I rely on participatory action research and textual analysis to show how the Het Heru Healing Dance and Auset Qigong are two examples of the way Black women have taken command of their health in the context of a growing and profitable health care system that negates them and does not foreground their imaginaries and definitions of wellness.

The Het Heru Healing Dance consists of "eleven movements for peace and joy," and each movement depicts one of the eleven Paut Neteru principles (Amen 2010, 1990, 2011). The eleven movements are designed to flow in sync with the music, abdominal breathing techniques, visualization, and guided Het Heru meditation, placing those dancing in a state of relaxation, while exercising the core of the body and sending blood and energy throughout the limbs and to the brain. Het Heru Healing, however, is more than the dance. It is an internationally renowned brand that includes books, music, video recordings, cosmetic products, clothing, a theatrical production, and ongoing educational and practical workshops. Information on the Het Heru Healing Dance is accessible on their website and their social media. The Kamitic Het Heru corresponds to the Canaanite Hana-El, Kabalistical Netzach, Yoruba Oshun, Indus Kush Kamalatmika, and Vodoun Erzulie religious communities and social phenomenon (Amen 1990, 287).

The difference between the Het Heru Healing Dance and Auset Qiqong is qigong is the movement and cultivation of energy along the same energy-organ systems (channels) that acupuncturists work on to restore balance to the body's qi, or vital energy, by moving stagnation, tonifying deficiencies, and reducing excesses (Johnson 2000; Hole 2002; Amen 2004, 2009; Tow 2013). Based on the *Tree of Life Qi Gong* framework, Auset Qigong dance exercise combines abdominal breathing exercises, visualization, Auset-guided deep relaxation meditation, and gentle bodily movements focused on massaging points along the energy-organ channels (Amen 2004, 2009). It has only been publicly performed on two occasions, and there is no written account of Auset Qigong. The Kamitic Neteru principle of Auset corresponds to the Canaanite Gabri-El, Kabalistical Yesod, Yoruba and Vodoun Yemeya, Indus Kush Dhumavati, and Isis in Greek mythology (Amen 1990, 293). These cosmologies have found renewed centrality in organizing social and cultural life for women in Brooklyn, New York, among other places.

The set of questions guiding this research include: how do Black American women imagine their health? Why is health/the body a site of resistance for Black women? What brought the women to the healing dance and qigong? What were the women's expectations going into the healing dance and/or qigong? How have the women changed as a result of their participation in the dance and/or qigong? How do I give meaning to the individual and collective experiences of organizers and participants of the healing dance and qigong? This work explores some of the unique ways Black women imagine their health and wellness and what they do to make those visions become a reality. It is important to explore the unique ways Black women organize for their health and to think about its

political implications because what constitutes the political activities and practices of Black women has often been ignored and misunderstood across the disciplines.

In what follows, I draw primarily on Black women's scholarship on intersectionality, to discuss the history of intersectionality as a scholarly tradition and an analytic tool to explain why African-American women organize in pursuit of their health and wellness in unorthodox ways. Next, the theories of informal political action and resistance politics are discussed in relation to the activities of organizers and participants of the women's wellness events. Over the last decade I have conducted extensive research on Black women, breast cancer, and public policy, specifically the demand for inexpensive complementary and alternative approaches to health care delivery and treatment. These research questions emerge from those findings. In the section on informal political action and resistance politics envisioned as "service to my community," the Het Heru Healing Dance and Auset Qigong are presented as culturally specific, complimentary ways to optimize one's health and wellness and to increase one's confidence as part of a cultural collective empowered as political actors to take control of and determine the direction of one's well being.

Intersectionality as a Scholarly Tradition and Analytical Tool

What we now know as "intersectionality" can be traced to the writings and speeches by Black women who argue race, gender, and class converge and traverse as categories of identity and as analytical tools. Among its proponents are Maria W. Stewart (1831); Sojourner Truth (1850); Anna Julia Cooper (1892); Angela Y. Davis (1981); Gloria T. Hull, Patricia Bell-Scott and Barbara Smith (1982); Barbara Smith (1983); bell hooks (1984); Patricia Hill Collins (1986, 1990); and Kimberle' Crenshaw (1989). Though theorized for a century prior, the word "intersectionality" was coined by Black feminist legal scholar Kimberlé Crenshaw (1989) in her article, "Demarginalizing the intersection of race and sex: a black feminist critique of antidiscrimination doctrine, feminist theory and antiracist politics" where she critiques the "single-axis framework" focus on "race and gender as mutually exclusive categories of experience and analysis" because this framework distorts and ignores the "multidimensionality of Black women's experiences" (139). Instead, Crenshaw (1989, 1991) proposes an analysis between the overlapping of forms (race, gender, class) and systems of oppression (legal, political, economic, social, cultural) both inside of and outside of marginalized groups. Crenshaw is also one of the founders of Critical Race Theory in legal studies (Crenshaw et al. 1995). Since it's naming by Crenshaw (1989), intersectionality has become a key theoretical concept and an increasingly important discourse because "connected to the concept of intersectionality is the question of power—how it is constructed and used" (Jordan-Zachary 2009, 1). The work of African-American female scholars (in law, political science, history, sociology, anthropology, Black studies, and women's gender and sexuality studies) on intersectionality is particularly useful for examining my argument that Black women are organizing in their local communities as a result of the failure of political institutions (government departments and agencies, congress, the senate, and public policy) and the health industry to address their specific concerns (Cohen 1999; Harris 2001, 2010; Hawkesworth 2003; Berger 2004; Washington 2006; Alexander-Floyd 2007; Jordan-Zachery 2006, 2007, 2009; Isoke 2011). The Het Heru Healing dance and Auset Qigong are examples of Black women responding to their marginalization with community-based women's wellness

events, aimed at challenging their treatment within the health industry. The dance and qigong illustrate why Black women must organize around health.

Intersectionality is important for considering how Black women understand: 1) the connection between their experiences with health and wellness, 2) the operation of local, state, and national policies, and 3) and the intersection of race, class, and gender. For example, Evelynn Hammonds (1992), Cathy Cohen (1999), and Ange-Marie Hancock (2004) critically examine the ways Black women's issues and concerns are silenced during the policy-making process to their detriment. Hammonds (1992) and Cohen (1999) show how HIV/AIDS in 1980s was framed around White gay males but African-American women, gay men, lesbians and intravenous drug users were also infected and affected by responses stifled by "stigma, fear, rejection, invisibility, classism, sexism, homophobia, and drug phobia," even though invisible in the initial framing (Cohen 1999, 8). Cohen (1999) offers a critique of Black leaders, the Centers for Disease Control, the President, the United States Congress, and the mainstream media whose responses to the HIV/AIDS pandemic in Black communities "ranged from inadequate to neglectful" (339, chapters 3, 4, and 5).

Informal Political Action and Resistance Politics

Mainstream political science continues to be limited by traditional definitions of politics in Western political thought. Cedric J. Robinson (1980) exposes the limitations where he states, "the political came to fruition in modern thought with the theory of the State as the primary vehicle for the organization and ordering of the mass society produced by capitalism" (1). Scholars acknowledge that ongoing interdisciplinary research has challenged traditional notions of the political by focusing on the politics of every day life or quotidian politics (Kelley 1994; Cohen 1999; Berger 2004). The result has been a significant reconceptualization and expansion of definitions, assessments, and analyses of the political and political engagement. Such research considers alternative sites of political engagement outside of the state and state institutions. As Hanchard (2006) notes, the "explication of quotidian politics serves as a corrective to political and cultural analysis that reduces all politics to the state or macroeconomic factors"; in other words, politics is about more than formal direct engagement with the state (administrative and legislative), state institutions (29), and "specifically electoral competition and its resultant elected officials" (26). Instead, politics more broadly conceived is a process embedded in daily life interactions "outside the spheres of political disputation" (27). This broader conception of politics incudes "informal political articulation and nonpolitical phenomena" (27) or quotidian politics (28).

This work is grounded in research, already in progress across the disciplines, which compels us to think again about politics and political participation. My aspiration in this article is to give voice to the "silences, tears, dreams, prayers, songs, dances and other symbolic practices, which serve as critical memory sites for those who have been denied the occasion to tell their own stories" (Motsemme 2004, 5). This article aims to contribute to the conversations that are challenging traditional perceptions of the political. Political science has yet to recognize and understand the myriad political practices of Black women. Significant research has been conducted in the last twenty years on Black women in the US legislature (Brown 2014; Hawkesworth 2003), Black feminist

politics (Harris 2011; Burack 2004), and Black immigrants (Grier 2013). Yet, there is much to be learned about Black women who are active in nontraditional political spaces.

Political participation is often determined through "formal" or conventional activities associated with the state such as voting, running for public office, interest groups, financial contributions to campaigns, political parties, the military, etc. Michelle Tracy Berger (2004), scholar of women's and gender studies and political science, however, calls attention to the history of women's activism in their communities and its connection to the politicization of women and social change. Thus, Berger suggests the scope of political participation be broadened to include informal activities such as local "community paid and unpaid work" (5–18). Informal political participation captures a wider range of women's activities because it includes daily acts of resistance and struggles for survival in local communities.

If a person is not intentionally acting with politics in mind, and if a person does not consciously identify as political, can his/her behavior be labeled as political activity? Berger's (2004) broader conception of political action incorporates the creative, unorthodox, and multifaceted activities Black women participate in, within their communities, whether or not those persons organizing and participating define their actions as political or politically motivated, because their organizing efforts are individual and local community solutions to national public problems. Thus, in my view, the women who organize and participate in the Het Heru Healing Dance and Auset Qigong events are informal political actors, even though they may not define themselves as such. To organize and participate in the dance and qigong is politically important because it is an act of everyday resistance, meaning the individuals may not identify with or articulate their actions as political. Daily acts of resistance do not look like the more recognizable forms of public protest, nonviolent demonstrations, rebellion, petitioning, sit-ins, or lobbying that seek immediate redress on the local or national level. Such public activities are more commonly associated with (formal) political action.

This argument is distinct from conventional political frameworks espoused by Kelley (1994), Berger (2004), and Hanchard (2006) in that those frameworks understand politics as something that has influence on a community-wide level, effecting some sort of institutional change nationally or locally, at least. On the other hand, organizing and participating in the dance and qigong is about the individual aspiring to change the self. Both the organizers and the participants engage in the healing dance and qigong, not only as vehicles for their own wellness but also as methods for assessing and critiquing their relationship to health policy and the health-care system. Furthermore, radical Black feminists insist, "the personal is the political" (Lorde 1980; Davis 1981; Hull, Bell-Scott, and Smith 1982; Moraga and Anzaldua 1983; Smith 1983; Giddings 1984; hooks 1984, 1989; Collins 1986, 1989; Crenshaw 1989). Thus, everything a person does is political, and the personal is the starting point of all resistance or struggle. This more expansive and inclusive politics, the politics of everyday life, would envision as political, the activities of the organizers and participants in the Het Heru Healing Dance and Auset Qigong.

Zenzele Isoke (2011), scholar of women's and gender studies and political science, in her research on Black women's political activist work in Newark, New Jersey, argues, "Black women's resistance politics do not just function through efforts to spark collective action, but through the bodily sacrifices they make in order to create, nurture, and

reproduce political space" (119). The organizers of the women's wellness events that host the Het Heru Healing Dance and Auset Qigong are creating alternative sites for political engagement. That the organizers are driven by their investment in their communities and their hope for a better quality of life through increased health and wellness, is the resistance politics Isoke (2011) calls "homemaking," an extension of what hooks (1989) termed "home place." Isoke's (2011) notion of resistance politics through activist "homemaking" extends beyond the organizers and sponsors of the wellness events to the participants of the events who sustain their communities by supporting events and businesses in their local communities, while simultaneously nurturing themselves. Resistance politics is particularly useful in this discussion of the desire of organizers to provide educational outreach and services to their local communities.

Background: An Intersectional Reading of Black Women and Breast Cancer

"for African American women, intersectionality is often manifested in invisibility, otherness, and stigma produced and reproduced on Black women's bodies." (Hawkesworth 2003, 524).

From 1999 to 2001, I conducted a public policy analysis of Black women and breast cancer evaluating the extent to which Black women's questions and concerns about breast cancer were reflected in how breast cancer was defined and resonated as a national policy issue.[2] Consistent with Hawkesworth's quote, this section will discuss the ways intersectional inequalities are manifested on Black women's bodies using breast cancer as an example. Hawkesworth (2003), a political scientist, examines how "racing-gendering" operates in Congressional practices to the detriment of Congresswomen of color, revealing why their legislative objectives may fail or when successful they are rendered invisible, due to the racist and sexist attitudes of their White colleagues. Hawkesworth's "racing-gendering" analysis of Congressional practices reveals the harmful effects for Congresswomen of color. Similarly, an intersectional reading of breast cancer in Black women with a focus on race and gender emphatically highlights the deadly consequences for Black women. Specifically, disparities in survival and mortality rates facing Black women with breast cancer persist to this day, even though overall rates of incidence and mortality have slightly decreased. For example, while breast cancer incidence rates are higher in non-Hispanic White women (123.3 per 100,000) compared to African-American women (118 per 100,00), African-American women have a higher incidence rate before forty years of age and are more likely to die from breast cancer at every age than women of any other racial and ethnic group (Siegel, Naishadham, and Jemal 2013, 25).

Intersectionality is important to the focus on Black women's issues and concerns about breast cancer because such an analysis pays close attention to the ways in which Black women with breast cancer are *treated* differently from other groups of women and also the role political institutions and processes play in creating and reproducing that difference. Breast cancer is disproportionately claiming the lives of Black women, more so than any other ethnic group, even though White women have higher incidence rates. The American Cancer Society, National Institutes of Health, National Breast Cancer Coalition, and the National Black Women's Health Project acknowledge that oftentimes when Black women are diagnosed with breast cancer the cancer is at more advanced invasive stages, which makes it harder to treat. Therefore, there are poor survival rates for Black women, measured

in terms of five years, when compared to all other categories of women. Female breast cancer mortality rates per 100,000 population were 22.4 for White women; 31.6, Black women; 11.9, Asian-American/Pacific Islander; 16.6, American-Indian or Alaska Native; and 14.9, Hispanic/Latino (Siegel, Naishadham, and Jemal 2013, 25). The disparities in these rates are shocking when one considers US Census Bureau data on population by race and Hispanic origin in 2014: Non-Hispanic White accounts for 62% of the US population; Black/African American, 13%; Hispanic, 17%; American-Indian and Alaska Native, 2%; Asian, 6%; and Native Hawaiian and other Pacific Islander, 0.5% (US Census Bureau). Black/African-Americans (including all men, women, children) are only 13% of the total US population, yet Black women have the highest breast cancer mortality rates and worst breast cancer survival rates at all ages of all women. This context in which Black women are diagnosed and treated differently is central to the broader argument about how structural inequality and explicit and implicit racism/sexism function in the breast cancer medical, scientific, and organizational communities.

More than one billion dollars is spent annually in the United States on breast cancer research in the medical and scientific communities as well as state-funded programs and federal departments and agencies, yet the devastating breast cancer disparities facing Black women persist ("How much money goes to breast cancer research?" *Breast Cancer Consortium*). Cathy Cohen (1999), Michelle T. Berger (2004), and Nthabiseng Motsemme (2007) make a similar argument about HIV/AIDS with their shared focus on the health crisis in Black communities plagued with structural inequalities and the health disparities facing Black women with HIV/AIDS. Specifically, these scholars pay attention to the ways Black women are silenced and stigmatized as "worthy" deserving victims or "unworthy" deviant, irrational risk takers, in their own communities, public health debates, and policy-making structures and the creative ways Black women have addressed these issues. Breast cancer, like HIV/AIDS, is entrenched in politics. There is substantial literature now about the racial and sexual politics in which diagnosis, treatment, and cultural understandings of HIV/AIDS are situated. Breast cancer is similar, but it also differs in that most breast cancer discourse, and much of the research, tends to be blind to race and class in the United States.

Harlem, New York, was the site of my focus group of seven self-identified Black women cancer survivors and also the grassroots interviews of fifty-nine Black women on the corner of 125th Street and Malcolm X Boulevard. The seven Black women in the focus group were also members of a support group for cancer survivors founded in 1998. The focus group interview took place during one of their support group sessions, and lasted approximately seventy-five minutes. Five women in the focus group had breast cancer, one had kidney cancer, and the seventh did not disclose the type of cancer she had. The interview protocol or questionnaire for the fifty-nine Harlem respondents was developed based on the feedback from the focus group.

Interviews with the fifty-nine Black women respondents ranged in length from ten minutes to thirty minutes. Two of the respondents were self-identified breast cancer survivors while the other fifty-seven women either had not been diagnosed with breast cancer or did not divulge that information to me.

One conclusion based on the data collected from both the focus group and the Harlem sample was a desire for access to quality health care including complementary and

alternative medicine (CAM) preventive health services and treatment options, instead of unquestioned submission to conventional (allopathic) medicine and prescriptions. This was expressed as resistance to costly care, surgical and toxic chemical treatments for breast cancer, as well as dissatisfaction with the lack of information and evidence proving the connection between environmental pollutants and cosmetic products to the development of cancer cells. Allopathy, or conventional medicine, is practiced by medical doctors (MD) and osteopathic doctors (DO). MedTerms defines allopathy as the "system of medical practice which treats disease by the use of remedies which produce effects different from those produced by the disease under treatment." It is precisely the side effects of treatments, as well as the toxic and chemical treatments themselves, that the respondents are concerned with. CAM approaches are either practices that are used together with or *complement* conventional (allopathic) medicine or practices that are used in place of or provide *alternatives* to conventional (allopathic) medicine. According to the National Center for Complimentary and Integrative Health, a center of the National Institutes of Health in the United States Department of Health and Human Services, 30% of adults and 12% of children use complementary approaches together with conventional medicine. Examples of CAM approaches to health and wellness include mind and body approaches and natural products. Mind and body approaches are acupuncture, acupressure, exercise, (guided imagery, deep breathing, relaxation) meditation, massage, healing touch, hypnotherapy, yoga, dance, tai chi, qigong, aromatherapy, and music therapy. Natural products are nutrition, dietary supplements (vitamins, minerals, amino acids, probiotics), Chinese herbs and herbal formulas, botanicals, ayurvedic medicines, and homeopathic medicines (https://nccih.nih.gov/health/integrative-health).

Two examples from the interviews—woman #1 from the fifty-nine respondents and woman #3 from the focus group—relay an intersectional understanding of their positionality as Black women in Harlem, New York, receiving health care within the macrolevel health-services system. In the personal interview with a woman in Harlem, she indicated, ". . . as a breast cancer survivor, I would want policies where it would make it possible that every woman, no matter what shape, color, whatever, could get the proper care that they need, and to get it as early as possible . . ." (personal interview, September 23, 1999, #1).

The second example is from the focus group, ". . . we been walked on, we have been pushed aside all our lives and when it comes to medicine that's where I put my foot down. I am not going out like that. No way. Because see this, inside my body don't even know what color I am on the outside. So therefore you will give me the utmost respect. And you can't treat me if I can't trust you anyway" (focus group woman #3). These two narratives display the two respondents' concern and anxiety about the relationship between their race, class, and gender identities (Black, working-class women in Harlem, New York) and access to quality preventive health care (or lack of access to quality health care) for all. The Affordable Care Act aims to address the concern for access to health care, and it succeeded in insuring millions of previously uninsured and expanding coverage for millions of the underinsured. The insured and providers now need increased awareness about what this new coverage means practically.

The two narratives also demonstrate concerns with trust and treatment. Both trust and treatment concerns are linked to the history surrounding mistrust of the health-care system and medical institutions by African-Americans due to the violence repeatedly

inflicted on Black bodies (Washington 2006). It is important to interpret these seemingly neutral comments (trust, access to health care, quality treatment) from an explicitly intersectional perspective (race, class, and gender as they relate to access to care, quality of care, and trust) because an intersectional perspective exposes the haunting history of medical abuses in Black communities and the lack of sanctity in disposable Black bodies. Medical ethicist Harriet A. Washington (2006), in her text *Medical Apartheid*, documents the ways Black women's bodies (in addition to Black men and Black children) have historically been a site of physical, mental, and sexual oppression in the United States since slavery in the name of medicine. Washington (2006) details numerous unethical accounts of how Black bodies (including incarcerated Black bodies, as well as sampled, dissected, and dismembered Black body parts), have been used, publicly displayed, and even detained for the purposes of involuntary medical experimentation, exploitation, and sterilization.

It is not surprising, given the extensive history of medical abuses on the Black community and the lack of any legal, political, or medical resolution beyond "informed consent," that one of the most pressing concerns of the women interviewed was their desire to seek out complementary health approaches to optimizing their health and wellbeing. The articulation of these concerns is what moved me to this current project focused on the turn of Black women to the Het Heru Healing Dance and Auset Qigong as a way to take command of their own health and wellness in the context of an exploding health-care system that never fully recognizes them.

Informal Political Action and Resistance Politics Envisioned as "Service to My Community"

> *"Many people go to an outside source for help, but the Het Heru Healing dance shows you how to help yourself, which is priceless." (Testimonial by G.F.G. in Amen 2010, 43)*

My participatory action research on the Het Heru Healing Dance began in 2004 and Auset Qigong in 2005 with the founder of the dance Queen Mother Nesuit Maasht Amm Amen (2010) of the Ausar Auset Society International. Participatory action research is collaborative as opposed to traditional research with a focus on 'scientific objectivity' or distance between the researcher and the researched (Hesse-Bieber, Gilmartin, and Lydenberg 1999). Participatory action research refers to my attendance, participation, and observation at women's wellness events featuring the Het Heru Healing Dance and Auset Qigong. Participatory action research also accounts for informing the founder of the dance and qigong of my interest in incorporating the dance and qigong into this research project, collaborating on information with the founder and core group, and disseminating findings to the founder. Nesuit Maasht Amm has a core group of three to five women she works closely with organizing primarily Het Heru Healing Dance events. A flyer advertising a Het Heru women's wellness event in Brooklyn, New York sparked my curiosity as a researcher examining the political significance of Black women's health. I attended the event featuring the Het Heru Healing Dance. There is a registration process at the entrance of each event. From the contact information collected at the door, e-mail notices are sent to attendees, advertising future women's wellness events featuring the Het Heru Healing Dance and Auset Qigong. The women's wellness event proved to be

an example of what Black women do to resist, to survive, to heal, to maintain their sanity, and to create community(ies) outside of dominant institutions and systems.

Structural Inequalities

In order to understand why the dance and qigong are examples of Black women's response to marginalization in political institutions and the health industry, they must be situated in relation to structural inequality. One method of exposing structural inequalities is through demographics. Ausar Auset Society, New York is located in the East Flatbush/Remsen Village/Rugby section of Brooklyn where 88.3% of the population is Black (Brooklyn Neighborhood Reports, Community District Seventeen). Adjacent to East Flatbush/Remsen Village/Rugby are the Broadway Junction/Brownsville/Ocean Hill neighborhoods where 74% of the population is Black (Brooklyn Neighborhood Reports, Community District Sixteen). In contrast to those two predominantly Black districts, in Carol Gardens/Cobble Hill/Gowanus/Park Slope/Red Hook, 65% of the population is White (Brooklyn Neighborhood Reports, Community District Six).

Disparities in health are glaring when comparing data from high-income, predominantly White neighborhoods to low-income, predominantly Black neighborhoods in Brooklyn. In the predominantly Black District Sixteen, inequalities in poverty are blatant; 46.4% of children under age 18 are living in poverty compared to 12% in the predominantly White District Six. The disparity in infant mortality rates is unacceptable with 11.3% per thousand live births in District Sixteen compared to 4.7 per thousand live births in District Six. District Seventeen faces worse health outcomes than District Six when comparing obesity, 24–17.5 %; and diabetes, 12–8.7%.

These statistics validate that where a person lives impacts their health due to the material reality of structural inequalities. Brooklyn has a population of more than 2.5 million people—35% are African-American; 36% are White alone, not Hispanic or Latino; 19.5% are Hispanic or Latino; and 53% are women, according to the US Census Bureau, State & County Quick Facts for Kings County, Brooklyn, New York. In addition, 23% live below the poverty line, the average per capita money income is a little more than $25,000, and 70% of Brooklyn residents are renters and do not own homes. Geographically, Brooklyn has 35,400 people per square mile, which translates to the fact that if Brooklyn were its own city, and not one of the five boroughs of New York City, it would be the fourth largest city in the United States (United States Census Bureau). Health problems are attributed to demographics like these that reflect the social determinants of health, economic, political, social, and environmental factors. Challenged to survive under conditions of overcrowding, poverty, and health disparities, women have turned to the Het Heru Healing Dance and Auset Qigong.

"Service to My Community" Is an Outgrowth of Religious Devotion

Both the Het Heru Healing Dance and Auset Qigong originated in the Ausar Auset Society International, a Pan-African religious community headquartered in Brooklyn, New York with chapters and study groups in over thirty global cities, founded in 1973. Cedric J. Robinson (1997), scholar of Black studies and political science, traces in detail the emergence of the Black church as a political institution in the Black community in the mid-eighteenth to late eighteenth century giving voice to "the mass of Blacks" (98–102).

Robinson writes, "Most emphatically, as historians have chorused, it was the church that rose to become the central institution, the signal agency at the core of the Black community" (98). From within the Ausarian religious tradition emerged a women's wellness movement empowering women with tools for optimizing their health.

As an international Queen Mother, Nesuit Maasht Amm refers to the activities that she participates in when organizing a women's wellness event as "service to my community." Black women's political participation is oftentimes an outcome of their participation and activism in the church or in their religious organizations (Berger 2004; Robinson 1997). Thus, in my view, Nesuit Maasht Amm's politics, or what she calls "service to my community," are directly informed by her religious convictions. Queen Mother's "service to my community" through the introduction of the Het Heru Healing Dance and Auset Qigong is, in part, an outgrowth of her concerns for women's health and wellness for generations to come, as they are interconnected to her concern for her own health and wellness. A teenager and her mother exemplify this interconnectedness in the following two comments made. The first quote is from a fourteen year old girl who participated in a Het Heru Healing Dance circle in New York City, ". . . I enjoyed it, and would love to come again . . . It's a great way to bring our sisters together, and to get involved in our communities" (Amen 2010, 65). Her mother offers the following, "The Het Heru Healing Dance was a wonderful experience of sisterhood, love and energy. Experiencing it for the first-and not the last-time with my fourteen year old daughter as well as with my five-month-old baby in my womb, was especially delightful and spiritual . . ." (Amen 2010, 65). Both quotes, from mother and daughter, capture the creation of an intergenerational memory of healing and wellness between the two women and in relation to the participants.

"Service to my community" includes several activities. Nesuit Maasht Amm's activities are akin to a project manager's; she will do marketing; set or confirm event dates, venues, expenses; determine the appropriate attire and adornment for the women working with her; she conceptualizes the structure and flow of the events; and arranges for decoration, music, and lighting. In addition, she organizes child watch (although infants, toddlers, and young girls may participate). She also arranges for food preparation and serving, and she organizes a rehearsal schedule to be distributed to the women in her community who travel with her to dance and assist her with whatever needs to be done.

Michel Foucault (1978) argued, "Where there is power, there is resistance" (95–96). The Het Heru Healing Dance and Auset Qigong are an example of one of the multiple sites of resistance Foucault (1978) mentions. Resistance politics is demonstrated in the empowerment derived in Black women motivating one another to organize women's wellness events, advertising to social networks, facilitating coming together, creating alternative spaces for engagement and collaboration, and participating in events (through performance, exercise, and sharing the experience) in their local communities. Resistance politics happens at the women's wellness events featuring the dance and qigong where Black women reimagine and reclaim their communities (home) and their health on their own terms.

The historical significance and contributions of Black women, like Nesuit Maasht Amm, to the Black church are manifold. The concerns of Black church women from the eighteenth century (perhaps to the present) extend from theology to community and touch on issues ranging from women's empowerment in the church, home, work, politically

and as agents of social change. (Robinson 1997, 100–102). Contrary to controlling, demeaning stereotypical images of Black American women in inner cities like Brooklyn, as "non-deserving low-income women, welfare queens, teen mothers, HIV-positive, lesbians, hypersexual Jezebels, emasculating matriarchs, Sapphires, drug users, etc.," (Collins 1986; Jewell 1993; Cohen 1999; Berger 2004; Alexander-Floyd 2007; Jordan-Zachary 2009), women in the Ausar Auset International community in over thirty global cities, like Queen Mother Nesuit Maasht Amm, are visibly active in leadership, decision making, and organizing on all levels, and their leadership extends into their respective communities. Sociologist, Oyeronke Oyewumi (1997) argued that prior to European presence in Nigeria, Yoruba women were positioned significantly throughout the society based on seniority and not limited by western notions of gender difference and patriarchy. The female leadership's positions of authority in Ausar Auset International (including Nesuit Maasht Amm), and their "expressions of religiosity" are a "vehicle for social status" (Berger 2004, 170). Thus, the abundance of women-represented leadership positions illustrates their rejection of Western constructs of gender that serve to control and limit women's behavior. Their focus on Black women's issues does not render them "traitors" to the race (Alexander-Floyd 2007); instead, their role and title are determined by their "religiosity" or their devotion to and service to their religious and surrounding local communities as defined by themselves within the framework of their religious institution.

Sociologist Patricia Hill Collins (1986) thought themes of "self-definition" and "self-valuation" insist that Black women define themselves and "create their own standards for evaluating" their womanhood (S17–S18). Both themes are insightful for understanding the important role of the Het Heru Healing Dance and Auset Qigong as culturally responsive and transformative tools for Black women because the events create spaces for social, political, economic, and cultural engagement on health and wellness, in effect, constituting a distinctive location for resistance politics and collective action (Isoke 2011). While "self-defined, self-valuating Black women have long populated the ranks of Afro-American female leaders" (Collins 1986, S18), their visibility at the women's wellness events and in the healing dance sessions as hostesses, sponsors, and supporters is empowering for all present. The personal sacrifices of the leadership and their commitment to uplifting local communities is "homemaking" (Isoke 2011). Being present, visible, and active is conscious resistance to repressive silences and dominating stereotypical images.

Queen Mother Nesuit Maasht Amm has traveled across the United States, to the Caribbean, and to Europe performing the Het Heru Healing Dance. A participant of the dance shared her experience, "Since I was first introduced to the Het Heru Healing Dance, my life has transformed. It really amazes me how powerful eleven simple movements are. I have experienced improvement in my overall wellness and my relations with others . . ." (Amen 2010, 28). The Het Heru Healing Dance has been facilitated in various locations including Medgar Evers College in Brooklyn, New York; Bronx Community College in the Bronx, New York; the United Nations in New York City; the Shrine of the Black Madonna in Dallas, Texas; Agape International Spiritual Center in Culver City, California; Radix Beach Resort in Mayaro, Trinidad; and Lambeth Town Hall in Brixton Hill, London, the United Kingdom. There are currently Het Heru wellness circle workshops taking place in several states around the country as well as in the Caribbean and in London.

The following quote refers to the Het Heru Healing Dance as the "Womb Dance," but it reflects an underlying intersectional sensibility of the ways racism, classism, sexism have overlapped to undermine Black women culturally, politically, economically, and in relation to inadequate conventional medicine. The intersectional sensibility is also reflected in the vision of more effective alternative medicine, and hope for justice, "it is extremely important that the 'Womb Dance' be taught and expanded throughout this nation. We, as a people, need an alternative to conventional remedies. We, as women, have been giving and providing life for other cultures, while ours is being destroyed. The 'Womb Dance' is not just about stretching, it's releasing and freeing; powerful and empowering" (Amen 2010, 124–125). Culturally relevant complementary approaches to health, like the Het Heru Healing Dance and Auset Qigong, are needed that are at the same time effective, affordable, accessible, and covered by all health insurance companies. This is a concern of Black women that has not been met.

The second dimension of my participatory action research involved the Auset Qigong. There have been only two public performances of the Auset Qigong and I attended both. The debut event of the Auset Qigong was the "Heal a woman, heal a nation" retreat, fall 2005[3] in New Jersey. Queen Mother Nesuit Maasht Amm Amen introduced the Auset Qigong to the public at the retreat. The second public performance was at the "Auset Women's Wellness Day" celebrations, winter 2011 in Brooklyn, New York, also led by Queen Mother Nesuit Maasht Amm Amen. Auset Qigong combines the *Tree of Life Qi Gong* five-organ technique of movement, massage along the energy-organ channels, and visualization with abdominal breathing and Auset-guided deep relaxation meditation (Amen 2004, 2009).

While there is not scholarship to date on the Auset Qigong, there is extensive literature on qigong (Veith 1949, 2002). According to the traditional Chinese medicine paradigm (TCM), the qi or chi is, the "vital energy of life" (Ross 2009, 17–18). Qi is called the "life force" in western culture, Kundalini in Hindu culture, and Ra in Kamitic science (Amen 2004, 2009). Gong means movement, work, and cultivation. Qigong then is an ancient Chinese energy healing practice and prescription in TCM involving breathing, stretching, visualization, and meditation exercises (Tow 2013, 94; Johnson 2000, 6, 7), herbal supplements, dietary and lifestyle prescriptions, acupressure, and acupuncture (Hole 2002; Amen 2004, 2009). Qigong has been studied scientifically at the Space Science and National Electro-Acoustics Institute in Beijing and the National Atomic Energy Lab in Shanghai, China using double blind protocols on humans and animals (Hole 2002, 640). The experimental studies verified the existence of qi, and the ability to measure qi for diagnosis and treatment (Lee 1992; Seto et al. 1992; Hole 2002). In addition, qigong doctors and qigong masters who work with patients are college trained (Hole 2002; Amen 2009).

Thus, the case of the Het Heru Healing Dance and Auset Qigong are relevant for general understandings of informal political participation and women's political activities. Specifically Black women's informal political participation in the dance and qigong may confer contacts from networking (meeting women, conversing, performing the dance or qigong together, sharing experiences) and skills (organizing, advertising, marketing, fundraising) that may facilitate future participation on different levels.

The Het Heru Healing Dance and Auset Qigong, once learned, are available to all and may be practiced at home or with a group (Amen 2004, 2009). Reflecting on the

benefits of doing the healing dance in a group and individually at home, this woman's statement underscores the mental exercise and physical exercise involved that differently abled people may perform, ". . . The Het Heru Healing Dance on Mondays and Fridays became the world I concentrated and visualized on to help me, even when I was confined to bed. I absorbed the energy and the smiles and the gentle chants. I did the motions in my mind . . ." (Amen 2010, 98). Another quote emphasizes the significance of the combined mental exercise and physical exercise, "I express my emotions through movement as a professional dancer . . . The Het Heru Healing Dance deals with visualization . . . primarily on seeing goals happening and being joyful when it is accomplished . . . after doing the Het Heru dance, there has been a shift in my energy . . . No other dance has done this for me except for the Het Heru Healing Dance" (Amen 2010, 43). The eleven dance movements and qigong exercises, in effect, become *real, a lived experience*, an example of what Cherrie Moraga (1983) calls "theory in the flesh" for those who practice them. The Het Heru Healing Dance and Auset Qigong are tools for improving wellness and social empowerment, and they should be recognized as such. Women in the United States should have access to both the dance and qigong as a part of their health-care regimen in the same way qigong is an energy healing practice and prescription in China.

Narratives of Healing

"May these words serve as encouragement for other women to speak and to act out of our experiences with cancer and with other threats of death, for silence has never brought us anything of worth. Most of all, may these words underline the possibilities of self-healing and the richness of living for all women" (Audre Lorde, Cancer Journals, chapter 1).

Intersectionality makes visible the ways structural inequalities along with the failures of the US health system and political institutions converge on Black women's bodies (Crenshaw 1991; Hawkesworth 2003). Intersectionality also offers a framework for understanding the ways social location effects health outcomes and influences Black women to organize in their local communities in unorthodox ways to combat oppression and successfully sustain their efforts over time (Cohen 1999; Harris 2001; Jordan-Zachary 2006, 2007; Isoke 2011). Expanding the scope of political action to include informal political activities contributes to our understanding of organizing (and participating in women's wellness events) as informal political action, resistance politics, or "service to my community" (Berger 2004; Isoke 2011). The women's wellness events featuring the Het Heru Healing Dance and the Auset Qigong enable women to find meaning in their individual and collective experiences by providing opportunities for group support as well as spaces for women to reflect on how they perceive their health in relation to the health system and political institutions, to ask questions, and to expand discussions on innovative complementary approaches to health, enhanced wellness, and integral healthcare. Importantly, the events are spaces for political engagement, social networking, conversation, and information sharing, and as such they may offer useful ways forward in terms of how daily acts of resistance move beyond the individual organizer or participant in their local community and become part of a collective consciousness. As Audre Lorde implores, women must think of their relationship to their bodies and their ability to improve the quality of their lives as empowering, and also speak and act out.

Notes

1. See Silber et al. 2013, 70% of White women live at least five years after their breast cancer diagnosis compared to 56% of Black women.
2. Cromer, "Black women and breast cancer."
3. Incidentally, the logo "Heal a woman, heal a nation" was copyrighted in 2004 and is registered as a 501 (c) (3) federally recognized tax-exempt, not-for-profit organization in Baltimore, Maryland, called "Heal a Woman to Heal a Nation, Inc. (HWHN)."

References

Alexander-Floyd, Nikol. 2007. *Gender, Race, and Nationalism in Contemporary Black Politics*. New York: Palgrave McMillan.

Amen, Maasht Amm. 2010. *Het-Heru Healing Dance: 11 Movements for Peace and Inner Joy.* New York: Khamit Media Trans Visions, Inc.

Amen, Ra Un Nefer. 1990. *Metu Neter, Volume 1: The Great Oracle of Tehuti and the Egyptian System of Spiritual Cultivation*. New York: Khamit Media Trans Visions, Inc.

———. 2004. *Tree of Life Qi Gong, Volume1: Balancing Heaven & Earth, Achieving Spiritual Realization, Physical & Emotional Healing By Integrating Spirit, Mind & Body.* New York: Khamit Media Trans Visions, Inc.

———. 2009. *Qi Gong Healing Prescriptions for the Body, Mind and Soul.* New York: Khamit Media Trans Visions, Inc.

———. 2011. *Ra Initiation System: Optimizing Your Het Heru Faculty*. New York: Khamit Media Trans Visions, Inc.

American Dance Therapy Association. "About Dance/Movement Therapy." Accessed August 31, 2013. http://www.adta.org/About_DMT.

Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs. 2015. "The Affordable Care Act is Working." *U.S. Department of Health & Human Services.* June 24. http://www.hhs.gov/healthcare/facts-and-features/fact-sheets/aca-is-working/index.html.

Berger, Michele Tracy. 2004. *Workable Sisterhood*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Bratun U, Asaba E. 2008. "From Individual to Communal Experiences of Occupation: Drawing upon Qi Gong Practices." *Journal of Occupational Science* 15 (2): 80–86.

Brown, Nadia E. 2014. "Black Women's Pathways to the Statehouse: The Impact of Race/Gender Identities." *National Political Science Review* 16: 81–96.

Burack, Cynthia. 2004. Healing Identities: Black Feminist Thought and the Politics of Groups. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Coetzee, Zelda. 2011. "Every Dance Has Its Own Story: How Participation in Dance Empowered Youth Living in a Rural Community to Buffer an Intergenerational Cycle of Poverty." *South African Journal of Occupational Therapy* 41 (3): 50–55.

Cohen, Cathy. 1999. *The Boundaries of Blackness: AIDS and the Breakdown of Black Politics*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Collins, Patricia Hill. 1986. "Learning from the Outsider Within." *Social Problems* 33 (6): S14–S32.

———. 1989. "The Social Construction of Black Feminist Thought." *Signs* 14 (4): 745–73.

———. 1990. *Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness and the Politics of Empowerment*. New York: Routledge.

Crenshaw, Kimberlé. 1989. "Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory, and Antiracist Politics." *University of Chicago Legal Forum*: 139–67.

———. 1991. "Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence against Women of Color." *Stanford Law Review* 43 (6): 1241–99.

———. 2015. "Why Intersectionality Can't Wait." *Washington Post*, September 24. http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/in-theory/wp/2015/09/24/why-intersectionality-cant-wait/.

Crenshaw, Kimberele, Neil Gotanda, Gary Peller, and Kendall Thomas. 1995. *Critical Race Theory: The Key Writings That Formed the Movement.* New York: The New Press.

Cromer, Françoise B. 2003. "Black Women and Breast Cancer: A Public Policy Review." PhD Diss., University of California, Santa Barbara.

Davis, Angela. 1981. *Women, Race and Class*. New York: Vintage Books.

Foucault, Michel. 1978. *The History of Sexuality. Vol. 1: An Introduction*. New York: Random House.

Frohlich, Thomas C., Sam Stebbins, Michael B. Sauter and Evan Comen. 2015. "Largest Industry in Each State." *24/7 Wall St.* September 18. http://247wallst.com/investing/2015/09/18/largest-industry-in-each-state-2/#ixzz3mab6sAGC.

Giddings, Paula. 1984. *When and Where I Enter: the impact of Black women on race and class in America*. New York: William Morrow.

Goldberg Group, Burton. 1994. *Alternative Medicine: The Definitive Guide.* Washington, DC: Future Medicine Publishing.

Greer, Christina. 2014. Black Ethnics: Race, Immigration, and the Pursuit of the American Dream. New York: Oxford University Press.

Guzman-Garcia, Azucena, Julian C. Hughes, I. A. James and Lynn Rochester. 2013. "Dancing as a Psychosocial Intervention in Care Homes: A Systematic Review of the Literature." *International Journal of Geriatric Psychiatry* 28 (9): 914–24.

Hammonds, Evelynn. 1992. "Missing Persons: African American Women, AIDS and the History of Disease." *Radical America* 24 (2): 7–23.

Hanchard, Michael. 2006. *Party/Politics: Horizons in Black Political Thought.* New York: Oxford University Press.

Hancock, Ange-Marie. 2004. *The Politics of Disgust: The Public Identity of the Welfare Queen*. New York: New York University Press.

Harris, Duchess. 2001. *From the Kennedy Commission to the Combahee Collective: Black Feminist Organizing, 1960–1980.* New York: NYU Press.

———. 2010. "The State of Black Women in Politics under the First Black President." *S&F Online* 8, no. 3: 16. *LGBT Life with Full Text*, EBSCO*host*.

Hawkesworth, Mary. 2003. "Congressional Enactments of Race-Gender: Toward at Theory of Race-Gendered Institutions." *American Political Science Review* 97 (4): 529–50.

Hesse-Bieber, Sharlene, Christina Gilmartin and Robin Lydenberg. 1999. *Feminist Approaches to Theory and Methodology: An Interdisciplinary Reader*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Hole, Linda C. 2002. "Qigong: A Paradigm Shift Tool for Pain Management." In *Pain Management: A Practical Guide for Clinicians, Sixth Edition,* edited by Richard S. Weiner, 637–50. Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, LLC.

hooks, bell. 1984. *Feminist Theory from Margin to Center*. Boston, MA: South End Press.

———. 1989. *Talking Back: Thinking Feminist, Thinking Black*. Boston, MA: South End Press.

"How Much Money Goes to Breast Cancer Research?" *Breast Cancer Consortium.* Accessed August 31, 2013. http://breastcancerconsortium.net/resources/beyond-awareness- workbook/background/research-dollars/

Huddleston, Tom Jr. 2014. "The 15 Most Profitable Business Sectors." *Fortune.* August 6. http://fortune.com/2014/08/06/15-most-profitable-business-sectors/.

Hull, Gloria T., Patricia Bell-Scott and Barbara Smith (eds). 1982. *All the Women are White, All the Men are Black, But Some of Us Are Brave: Black Women's Studies*. New York: The Feminist Press.

Isoke, Zenzele. 2011. "The Politics of Homemaking: Black Feminist Transformations of a Cityscape." *Transforming Anthropology* 19 (2): 117–30.

Jewell, K. Sue. 1993. *From Mammy to Miss America and Beyond: Cultural Images and the Shaping of US Social Policy*. London and New York: Routledge.

Johnson, Jerry Alan. 2000. *Chinese Medical QiGong Therapy: A Comprehensive Clinical Text.* California: The International Institute of Medical Qigong.

Jordan-Zachery, Julia. 2006. "Commentary: The Practice and Functioning of Intersectionality and Politics." *Journal of Women, Politics & Policy* 28 (3–4): 205–12.

———. 2007. "Am I a Black Woman or a Woman Who Is Black? A Few Thoughts on the Meaning of Intersectionality." *Politics & Gender* 3 (2): 254–63.

———. 2009. *Black Women, Cultural Images and Social Policy.* New York: Routledge.

Kelley, Robin D. G. 1994. *Race Rebels: Culture, Politics and the Black Working Class*. New York: The Free Press.

———. 2002. *Freedom Dreams: The Black Radical Imagination.* Boston, MA: Beacon Press.

Lee, Richard H. 1992. *Scientific Investigations into Chinese Qi-Gong*. San Clemente, CA: China Healthways Institute.

Lorde, Audre. 1980. *The Cancer Journals*. California: Aunt Lute Books.

Moraga, Cherrie and Gloria Anzaldua. 1983. *This Bridge Called My Back: Writings by Radical Women of Color*. New York: Kitchen Table, Women of Color Press.

Motsemme, Nthabiseng. 2004. "The Meanings of Silence." *Rhodes Journalism Review* 24: 4–5.

———. 2007. "'Loving in a time of Hopelessness': On township women's subjectivities in a time of HIV/AIDS." In *Women in South African History: They Remove Boulders and Cross Rivers*, edited by Nomboniso Gasa, 369–96. Cape Town, South Africa: Human Sciences Research Council Press.

Oyewumi, Oyeronke. 1997. *The Invention of Women: Making an African Sense of Western Gender Discourses.* Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Robinson, Cedric J. 1980. *The Terms of Order: Political Science and the Myth of Leadership*. New York: State University of New York Press.

———.1997. *Black Movements in America*. New York: Routledge.

Rosecrans, Robert, and James C. Dohnal. 2009 "The Effect of Complimentary and Alternative Medicine Products on Laboratory Testing." *Seminars in Diagnostic Pathology* 26 (1): 38–48. DOI: 10.1053/j.semdp.2008.12.002.

Ross, Christina L. 2009. "Integral Healthcare: The Benefits and Challenges of Integrating Complementary and Alternative Medicine with a Conventional Healthcare Practice." *Integrative Medicine Insights* 4: 13–20.

Schlitz, M. M. 2008. The Integral Model: Answering the Call for Whole Systems Health Care. *The Permanente Journal* 12 (2): 61–68. PMCID: PMC3042294

Seto A, Kusaka C, Nakazato S, Huang WR, Sato T, Hisamitsu T, Takeshige C. 1992. "Detection of Extraordinary Large Bio-Magnetic Field Strength from Human Hand During External Qi Emission." *Acupuncture & Electro-Therapeutics Research Journal* 17 (2): 75–94. PubMed ID 1353653

Siegel, Rebecca, Deepa Naishadham and Ahmedin Jemal. 2013. "Cancer Statistics, 2013." *CA: A Cancer Journal for Clinicians* 63 (1): 11–30. DOI: 10.3322/caac.21166.

Silber Jeffrey H., Paul R. Rosenbaum, Amy S. Clark, Bruce J. Giantonio, Richard N. Ross, Yun Teng, Min Wang, et al. 2013. "Characteristics Associated with Differences in Survival Among Black and White Women With Breast Cancer." *JAMA* 310 (4): 389–97. DOI: 10.1001/jama.2013.8272.

Smith, Barbara. 1983. *Home Girls: A Black Feminist Anthology*. New York: Kitchen Table, Women of Color Press.

Springer, Kimberly. 2002. "Third Wave Black Feminism." *Signs* 27 (4): 1059–82.

Strassel, Juliane K., Daniel C. Cherkin, Lotte Steuten, Karen J. Steuten, and Hubertus J. M. Vrijhoef. 2011. "A Systematic Review of the Evidence for the Effectiveness of Dance Therapy." *Alternative Therapies in Health and Medicine* 17 (3): 50–59.

The Kaiser Family Foundation State Health Facts. Data Source: The Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured. 2015. "Status of State Action on the Medicaid Expansion Decision." *KFF State Facts*. September 1. http://kff.org/health-reform/state-indicator/state-activity-around-expanding-medicaid-under-the-affordable-care-act/.

Tow D. April 2013. "A Call for More Comprehensive, Systematic, and In-depth Investigation of the Health Benefits of Taiji and Qigong." *International Journal of Science in Society* 4 (2): 91–99. Academic Search Complete, *EBSCO host* (accessed March 13, 2014).

U.S. Census Bureau. Population Division. 2015. "Annual Estimates of the Resident Population by Sex, Race, and Hispanic Origin: April 1, 2010 to July 1, 2014" QuickFacts Beta, United States 2014. http://www.census.gov/quickfacts/table/PST045214/00.

U.S. Department of Labor. 2014. "Bureau of Labor Statistics Largest Industries by State, 1990–2013." July 28. http://www.bls.gov/opub/ted/2014/ted_20140728.htm.

Veith, Ilza. 1949. *The Yellow Emperor's Classic of Internal Medicine*. Baltimore, MD: Williams and Wilkins. Reprinted 2002. Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, Ltd.

Washington, Harriet A. 2006. *Medical Apartheid: The Dark History of Medical Experimentation on Black Americans from Colonial Times to the Present.* New York: Anchor Books.

Weiner, Richard S. 2001. *Pain Management: A Practical Guide for Clinicians, Sixth Edition.* Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, LLC. 640.

Wright, Joshua. 2013. "Health Care's Unrivaled Job Gains and Where It Matters Most." *Forbes*. October 7. http://www.forbes.com/sites/emsi/2013/10/07/health-cares-unrivaled-job-gains-and-where-it-matters-most/.

Learning from the Doers: Women of Color AIDS Service Organizations and Their Understanding of Intersectionality

*Julia Jordan-Zachery**
Providence College

Abstract

Glenn's (2000) assertion on institutional intersectionality, relative to other research on intersectionality, has not been substantively explored. Using a case study analysis of three AIDS service organizations serving primarily women of color, I analyze how intersectionality is deployed at the institutional level. Extending Black feminist standpoint theory constructs of intersectionality, I use an interpretive phenomenological approach to thematically identify and analyze what the interview discourses revealed about identity construction and understanding among indigenous organizations. The representative interviewees display a collective understanding of the organizations' identity, which captures how intersecting oppressions including but not limited to race, gender, and sexuality influence the work they do, as they simultaneously work to challenge the impact of such oppressions in service to women who are living at various points of oppression. Listening to the doers of intersectionality offers a link between the theorizing of abstract systems of power, as articulated in intersectionality theory, and its practice.

Keywords: AIDS service organizations; Black feminism; HIV/AIDS; Institutional intersectionality; Interpretive phenomenological analysis

Introduction

> *I saw first hand many of my families [sic] and friends being infected with HIV/AIDS and not being able to access the necessary resources to combat their illness. Many of these people died as a direct result of not being able to get linked to the services that they needed. [WAR] was an organization that had gained a reputation of being able to not only link HIV positive clients with the needed services, but was helping to transform it's [sic] clients lives mentally, emotionally, spiritually and financially (WAR Health Education Risk Reduction Specialist/Phelebotomist).*

* Direct correspondence to jjordanz@providence.edu

In 2000, Glenn proffered that the intersection of race, class, gender, and sexuality not only shapes individual identities but also operates as an organizing principle of collectivities, institutions, and historical and social processes. In 2009, Erica Townsend-Bell argued, "intersectionality is a theory based on and intimately concerned with lived experience, but one that has not frequently engaged directly with the question of if, and how, actual people engage in a praxis of intersectionality." I add to Townsend-Bell's claim that, among political scientists, not much attention has been paid to how institutions engage in intersectionality praxis. Thus, I posit that Glenn's assertion on institutional intersectionality, relative to other research on intersectionality as a theoretical concept, has not been substantively explored.

While there is growing research on how intersectionality influences women of color's lived reality (Crenshaw1989; Kelley 2002; King 1988) and how to do intersectionality research (Hancock 2004; McCall 2005; Strolovitch 2007; Weldon 2006), there remains a research gap. We know very little about lived experiences of indigenous institutions in these communities. According to Chun, Lipsitz, and Shin (2013, 921), "yet the action imperatives of intersectionality that have not always been well understood in the academy have enjoyed a rich and flourishing existence inside social movements—especially those organized by women of color." Using a case study analysis of three AIDS service organizations (ASOs) serving primarily women of color, I analyze how intersectionality is deployed at the institutional level. The representative interviewees of the ASOs display a collective understanding of the organizations' identities, which captures how intersecting oppressions, including but not limited to race, gender, and sexuality, influence the work they do, as they work to challenge the impact of such oppressions.

Extending Black feminist standpoint theory constructs of intersectionality, I use an interpretive phenomenological approach (IPA) to identify and analyze what the interview discourses reveal about identity construction and understanding among indigenous organizations. Listening to the doers of intersectionality provides a link between the theorizing of abstract systems of power, as articulated in intersectionality theory, and its practice. By centering the voices of the ASOs, I seek to expand the theorizing of intersectional praxis by showing how these organizations identify themselves and the work they are doing in response to multiple systems of oppression. This offers one approach that can advance our theory making, research, and practice in Black feminist studies and intersectionality theorizing.

I want to address what this project is not. It does not focus on the day-to-day functioning of the organizations. Nor does it focus on how the services provided impact the women who access the ASOs. My focus rests primarily on understanding how the organizations conceptualize themselves as responding to intersectionality while they are also operating from a point of intersectional disadvantage.

My analysis starts with the theoretical framework that describes the relationship between intersectionality, as developed primarily by academics, and the practice of intersectionality by indigenous organizations. This is followed by an overview of the organizations. Next, I detail the Black feminist interpretative phenomenological approach which I use. In the subsequent section, I present the central themes used by representatives to discuss the intersectional identities and practices of the ASOs. In the "conclusion," (thought of as more of a starting point for future research as opposed to an end) I offer

my interpretation of these themes with the goal of showing how the ASOs incorporate intersectional praxis into their self-identities.

Mapping Theory and Praxis

Intersectionality serves as a tool to identify, analyze, and describe how the ASOs frame their identities as organizations serving primarily women of color who are HIV positive or who have AIDS. The ways in which the organizations' behaviors are conceptualized reflect the theorizing occurring within academia. The ASOs recognize and respond to the relationships between racialized-gendered-classed-sexualized identity and AIDS. Combining the theorizing of Black feminists and women of color's articulations proves useful for understanding how intersectionality serves as an organizing principle for indigenous community organizations. Intersectionality takes into account how multiple forms of oppression inform the lived realities of Black women and women of color. Additionally, intersectionality seeks to understand and explain how these women respond—politically and culturally—to such oppression (Combahee River Collective 2000).

Intersectionality practice is different from other practices. The key is how to identify intersectionality practice. Black feminist theorists and critical scholars (see Combahee River Collective 2000; Hill Collins 1990; hooks 1984; Lorde 1982) identify the following tenets: self-definition, unmasking and challenging intersecting power and its institutionalization—and how it is manifested in structural inequalities vis-à-vis public policies and laws, consciousness raising among and empowering intersectionally disadvantaged populations, and social justice. I argue that institutional intersectionality praxis should: (1) recognize the functioning of intersectionality, at a societal level and within the organization; (2) acknowledge that structural/systems of domination are mutually reinforcing and inseparable; (3) engage in actions of self-definition; and (4) employ a politics of social justice that involves raising the consciousness of those they serve, and challenging interlocking systems of oppression in the lives of women of color. This is not to suggest that the institutions engage in intersectionality praxis that attends to all axes of domination equally, and at all points of time, but that intersectionality is central to their understanding of self.

> In this analysis intersectionality is understood as an idea and an ideography. As an ideograph, intersectionality serves as a catch-all word that stands in for the broad body of scholarship that has sought to examine and redress the oppressive forces that have constrained the lives of black women in particular and women of color more generally. As an idea or an analytically distinct concept, intersectionality is a moniker, identified with Crenshaw (1989), meant to describe the "intersecting" or co-determinative forces of racism, sexism, and classism in the lives of black women. . . . In its ideographic sense, intersectionality is a broad project focused on social justice theorizing and action (Alexander-Floyd 2012, 4–5).

ASOs recognize structural and individual behavior and their intersections in addressing HIV/AIDS. More importantly, they seek to give voice to a group of individuals that tend to be "othered". Additionally, the ASOs are confronting their intersectional marginality. It is in this combination that we see the expression of intersectionality as an ideography.

One sees the relationship between how intersectionality, as ideography, is used in the framing of the ASOs' identities vis-à-vis their expression of self and the basic tenets of Black feminism which have informed intersectionality theorizing. The central themes identified from the interviews I conducted, alongside other data, show how intersectionality

operates as an organizing principle in these ASOs. To elaborate on how the identity and organizing of the ASOs reflect the practices of intersectionality, I offer some general information about them.

The Organizations

This is an in-depth case study of three ASOs located in Baltimore, Maryland, and New York City. The selection of the organizations was purposive and primarily opportunistic. I sought organizations that centered women, women of color in particular, as opposed to those that focus on HIV/AIDS and eventually targeted women. To identify potential ASOs, I started with an Internet search that gave me a starting list. From there I made contact with an individual identified by many as a "key activist" in New York City. After engaging in several conversations with her and with her serving as an intermediary, I contacted organizations in the New York area. I eventually analyzed Amethyst Women's Project and Iris House. A contact from the Baltimore area assisted me in gaining access to ASOs there. I worked with Women Accepting Responsibility (WAR). At the time of the initial conceptualization of the project there was no directory of women of color–centered ASOs. Additionally, many organization were leery, and rightly so, of giving an "outsider" access. Given the limitations of the grant, I concentrated on these two areas. They have been identified as being among the top six HIV/AIDS hotspots as a result of the rates of infection among Black women (Baltimore Sun 2012). Below I provide information designed to offer a general context of the emergence of the ASOs and the context in which they operate (one organization requested that I not make some data public and I honor this request).

WAR and Amethyst Women's Project are relatively small and have a different organizational history from that of Iris House. WAR and Amethyst Women's Project have five and seven staff members, respectively, and Iris house has forty. Volunteers complement much of the work done by WAR and Amethyst Women's Project. For the most part, the organizations originated in the mid-1990s to late 1990s.[1] Two emerged from the personal experiences of the directors. In the case of WAR, established in 1995, Ms. Tucker, the Executive Director, lost her daughter to AIDS. Ms. Tucker directly confronted Black women's lack of access to care and "made a number of sacrifices" in starting the organization to ensure that other women in that Baltimore, Maryland, community would have access to care (interview by author). Aida Leon, the executive director of Amethyst Women's Project, also responded to the dearth of services targeting women in Coney Island, New York. Ms. Leon, is a long-time resident of Coney Island. After moving away for some time, she felt compelled to return to fill a service void. Amethyst Women's Project formally emerged in 1999. Iris house, with its primary office in Harlem New York, originated in 1993. It arose from the efforts of the Women and AIDS Working Group. In the individual mission statements of all three ASOs women, women of color are explicitly targeted. As indicated by one interviewee, "there is often no other place for the women of these communities to get help. There is no other place for them to go!" (Leon, interview by author). This is one example of how the organizations are working within the "cracks" that have been exposed as HIV/AIDS ravishes the Black community.

The organizations operate in spaces that are different but qualitatively similar. In each instance the ASOs are located in racialized communities. WAR is located in a community

that is 95% Black. Amethyst Women's Project is located in the Community District #Thirteen that "includes thirty-one census tracts". Of these tracts,

> 12 show high concentrations of Black/African American or Hispanic populations. What emerges are relatively small, isolated, densely populated neighborhoods of color where the most vulnerable populations live. Of the combined total of 35, 485 Black/African-American and Hispanics living in the 31 census tracks of Community District #13, an incredible 87.4% live in the 12 census tracts previously cited (Amethyst Women's Project, Website. n.d.).

According to city demographics, 60% of the population of Central Harlem, where Iris House is located, is Black, and 35% is Hispanic. The median household income, in 2009, was $27,515 and 36% of the population lived below the poverty level (Harlem Neighborhood n.d.). WAR and Amethyst Women's Project also operate in areas with comparable poverty rates. In the Garwyn Oaks neighborhood, where WAR is located, in 2009 the neighborhood's median household income was $28,893, and the population living below the poverty level was 32.9% (Live Baltimore n.d.). In Coney Island the unemployment rate is 13%, and the poverty rate is 23% (NY City.gov n.d).

Beyond the disproportionate impact of poverty, these areas have also been unevenly affected by HIV/AIDS. It is estimated that HIV/AIDS diagnoses and the number of people living with HIV/AIDS in Central Harlem is two times that of all of New York City (New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene 2006). Among persons living with AIDS in New York State, 25% reside in Brooklyn (Coney Island is in the borough of Brooklyn). Of this population 62.9% were Black and 24% Hispanic (Center for the Study of Brooklyn, n.d.). "Baltimore City residents account for more than 50% of all of Maryland's HIV cases" (Environmental Justice Board 2007). A 2011 report stated, "African American males and females lead in both their numbers of cases and the rates of these cases" (The Baltimore City Commission on HIV/AIDS Prevention and Treatment and The Baltimore City Health Department 2011).

It is important to understand the contexts in which these organizations "live." They influence the nature of their clientele and the nature of the organizations themselves. While the ASOs clientele vary by size, they serve women with similar HIV and AIDS experiences (this is not to essentialize these women but to highlight the commonality of experiences). The "typical" client is living below the poverty line and has a history of substance abuse, domestic violence, and/or incarceration. A number of women have participated in the commercial sex industry. Many of the women have relatively lower formal educational attainment and are underskilled in terms of job preparation. Several women live at a point of intersection that tends to render them marginalized and invisible. They are not only confronting this form of intersectionality, but they are also confronting intersectional stigma as they fear the stigma associated with HIV/AIDS and its intersection with race, class, gender, and sexuality. Berger (2004, 24) says that "intersectional stigma points to an understanding that women are not only *marginalized,* and socially situated (shaped by race, class, and gender), but that the category of "HIV-Positive person" is loaded with effectively negative perceptions about groups of people with the virus."

The services offered vary and are influenced by funding sources (this is discussed below). Whereas the ASOs receive private donations, the majority of their funding comes from federal grants from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Although

the presence of the organizations has been relatively stable in these communities, they, especially Amethyst Women's Project and WAR, regularly face the uncertainty of grant renewal (this is discussed below). The ASOs see themselves as not simply providing services such as testing and counseling but as organizations focused on fostering the survival and thriving of their clients. They are responding not simply to HIV/AIDS but to the intersectional stigma faced by the primary population they serve (Berger 2004). In addition to addressing the intersectional stigma of their clients, the ASOs have to confront their own intersectional disadvantage.

The organizations differ along the continuum of organizational structure: caseloads, caseload management, budget, size, geographical and local political contexts, and other factors. While I recognize that these differences influence how the ASOs deploy and understand intersectionality on a day-to-day basis, I focus my attention on the institutional understanding of power and how they respond to their structural locations. I found commonality among the ASOs in this area. I turn my attention to how I uncover and analyze these commonalities.

Approach to the Study

Multiple sources of evidence allowed me to gain an understanding of how the ASOs understood and integrated intersectionality into their identities. To do this, I conducted in-depth, semistructured interviews with six staff members and directors—five women of color and one man of color. Each director was interviewed. Questions were designed around issues of intersectionality and to draw out how and if the organizations integrated the basic principles of intersectionality into their identity. Each interview was conducted in person and lasted an average of ninety minutes.[2] After the completion of the interviews, via e-mail and phone correspondences, I was able to expand on issues raised via our face-to-face conversations. The study also relied on organizational records and program documents, web pages, brochures, and annual reports, and doing such study afforded me with a rich source of data on issues such as program history (see Patton 1990).

A central goal of this analysis is to understand the lived experiences of the ASOs from the perspective of the institutions being studied for the purpose of expanding the theorizing on the practices of intersectionality. I integrate Black feminism and an IPA. The interaction of Black feminism and IPA offer critical analytical insights as, individually and combined, they seek to give "voice" by centering the lived-body experience within a particular social structural context. IPA allows for a rigorous analysis of "idiographic subjective experiences and more specifically social cognitions" (Biggerstaff and Thompson 2008, 217). Listening (deep listening) to the responses of multiple interviewees who share similar experiences (even if not in the same manner) and interpreting their understandings of their reality (the essence of IPA) offers insights into how we understand the practices of intersectionality at the organizational level. I employ an interpretive approach as my objective was to gain an "understanding of how individuals interpret events and experiences, rather than assessing whether or not their interpretations correspond to or mirror the researcher's interpretive construct or 'objective' reality" (Mishler 1990, 427). Such a process can shed light, even if partially, on how they made sense of their experience (a key tenet of Black feminist thought).

Smith, Flowers, and Larkin (2009, 3) argue that IPA studies typically have a small number of participants, as the goal is to reveal the experiences of each individual. According to Giorgi (2008, 37), "at least three participants are included because a sufficient number of variations are needed in order to come up with a typical essence." I do not offer a "comparison" group in an attempt to show how these ASOs differ and or similar to other types of ASOs (or other nonprofit organizations). This is an approach often used more in positivist social science research as opposed to the in-depth qualitative research. Considering this, I provide an in-depth analysis of three ASOs (see Morse 1994).[3]

Narrative thematic analysis explicates the themes running throughout the interviews. Themes are units derived from patterns such as "conversation topics, vocabulary, recurring activities, meanings, feelings, or folk sayings and proverbs" (Taylor and Bogdan 1984, 131).[4] I use Taylor and Bogdan's understanding and an emergent protocol to identify themes discussed in the interviews. The themes were identified independent of theory in an attempt to privilege the voices of the interviewees. Below, I present the voices of those interviewed "to allow the reader to learn something about both the important generic themes in the analysis, but also about the life world of the particular participants who have told their stories" (Smith 2004, 42).

Explication of the Data

ASOs' framing of their identity involves connecting HIV/AIDS to gender, race, sexuality, and class and to domestic violence, substance abuse, homelessness, immigration status, and general notions of belonging. Such behavior aligns them with the larger Black feminist social movement. Black feminists have organized their politics in a manner that challenges the inequitable distribution of resources and the resulting consequences and have sought to fill the gap by offering services. These ASOs, in the words of Evelyn Higinbotham (1992, 263), seek "to develop institutions to protect the minds and bodies of Black women with multiple experiences." How they approach protecting the minds and bodies of the women in their communities is a response to and the challenges that result from the external framing of HIV/AIDS and its intersection with multiple systems of oppression. This is evident in the three dominant narratives running throughout the interviews. These narratives can be categorized as: (1) invisibility and recognition, (2) challenges around advocacy and service provision, and (3) empowering women and their communities. The responses, as they embody the basic tenets of intersectionality, show that it is not simply a concept discussed among academics but that it is responded to in the day-to-day lives of indigenous organizations.

(In)Visibility and Recognition: The Politics of Self-Definition

Various themes comprise this larger narrative; however, "visibility" is a common thread. Visibility is constructed in terms of the disease; the (in)visibility of those affected and infected by and with HIV and AIDS and the connection to age, class, race, gender, sexuality, and ideology; and the community's response to HIV/AIDS. Although not explicitly used, the respondents speak to intersectional stigma and how it challenges the being of the ASOs. In their discourses on visibility and recognition, they are confronting the spread of the disease and the absence of the women from public and political discourses. But they are also actively engaging in a project of self-definition.

HIV/AIDS and Structural Violence

Numerous and interlocking social, political, cultural, and psychological factors influence women of color's exposure to HIV/AIDS. Structural violence is often used in discussions of women of color's exposure. Structural violence is "preventable harm or damage. . . . where there is no actor committing the violence [that] emerges from the unequal distribution of power and resources or, in other words, is said to be built into the structures" (Weigert as quoted in Lane et al. 2004, 320). Interviewees do not directly reference the term structural violence; however, it is implied in their discussion of the challenges they face. As such, it becomes a part of the ideography of intersectionality in the sense that the ASOs recognize such violence and its relation to gender, class, sexuality, and race in their conceptualization of HIV/AIDS.

Recognition of structural violence is illustrated in the responses to my query about how the ASOs confront multiple forms of oppression. Notice for example how Mr. Dominguez (Amethyst Women's Project, program manager) spoke of the lasting impact of urban policies—which have resulted in race- and class-based segregated communities. He opined that urban planning is central because,

> The conditions in Coney Island did not happen accidentally. There were policy decisions being made as far back as the 1950's that impacted the composition of this community. So, a lot of what's happening here, historically, has been the product of poor urban planning (Manuel Dominguez, interview by author).

Ms. Floyd (director of Iris House) explicitly situates the multiple issues faced by her clientele as resulting from previously existing policies and political decisions, such as housing and criminal justice policy decisions. According to her,

> The other thing that I think is important is that trying to make sure our program directors understand, and we're doing [that], having a lot more conversations around the impact of race as it relates more so to structural factors that influence HIV. For instance, in Harlem, we know that, if you live in Harlem, you have a higher likelihood of having HIV. You also have a higher likelihood of being incarcerated. You also have a higher likelihood of being a substance abuser, and some of those things are things, regardless of who you are, you can be impacted by it just because of where you live. So it's a structural factor. And we know that most people who return from prison in New York City, return to Harlem. So trying to look at the fact that people coming in to access our services are already combated with all of these issues. Race being a part of it, poverty being a part of it, lack of education being a part of it, but sometimes it's not because of their own behaviors. Sometimes it's because of structurally, where you're located puts you at greater risk for all of these things. (Floyd, interview by author).

The intersectionality of racial discrimination, poverty, racial segregation, high incarceration rates, low sex ratios, fractured gender identity, gender roles, stigma, and high levels of illicit drug use results in Black women's disproportionate exposure to HIV and later AIDS (see Adimora and Schoenbach 2005; Connors 1996; Krieger 1999; Whitehead 1997; Wright 2003). In 2008, the CDC issued a report, which stated that "poverty appears to be a primary underlying factor and, as such, contributes to the risk for HIV infection among African-American women in the South. While poverty is associated with increased risk for multiple adverse health outcomes, it is typically not directly addressed in public health interventions" (Stratford et al. 2008). In their focus on location—both physical and ideological—the interviewees speak of silence around poverty, criminal justice policies, education politics, urban policies and HIV/AIDS, and the spread of the virus among

Black women; they speak to the institutionalization of power and the resulting structural violence and inequalities.

Such silence results in some not being able to see Black women and how AIDS impacts them. I asked, "How do people, not just your clients but politicians and other service agencies, funders, etc., respond to the organization's frame of HIV/AIDS as a structural issue as opposed to a behavioral or moral issue?" The answers signal the challenge of convincing individuals to move away from the behavioral/moral framing of HIV/AIDS, which renders Black women visible and invisible at the same time. Ingrid Floyd stated,

> It's a challenge because people think that it's, 'Well, we can't change that?' or 'We can't [pause] what can we do about that?' Because it's not something we can change in the course of a day or the course of a year in many cases, so I think it becomes overwhelming to a lot of people. And these conversations are, really, just starting.

She argues further that while conceptualizing HIV/AIDS as a structural issue can be "overwhelming" that it is necessary to do such if we are to challenge the spread of the disease. Ms. Floyd challenges the belief, among politicians, that there is nothing that can be done to stem the spread of HIV/AIDS. She posited,

> People think 'That's not something I can change or that's not something I can impact,' which, for elected officials, is definitely not the case because they influence the funding that's coming into the neighborhoods. And the funding is what, you know, is the issue. How do you fund the school system? How do you fund the healthcare system? So, I think, for them, it's that they don't think of it in that way, and they can't see how they can directly influence what's happening.

Ms. Floyd suggests that politicians have the power to change policies to be more responsive to the populations she and other ASOs serve but seem to lack the will to do so. In this sense she is, like Black feminist theorists, challenging the construction of this marginalized population—which is a result of the stigma of AIDS in combination with previously negative understandings of Black women and women in general.

The interviewees contend that existing discursive productions of HIV/AIDS do not provide space for linking the disease to structural factors such as poverty, patriarchy, and racism. Such a frame could open a discussion that further connects the spread of HIV/AIDS among Black women to racialized-gendered inequality. The ASOs recognize how the identity and social location of the women of color they serve sets them apart from others impacted by the virus. As such, they cannot be simply "referred to as 'women' without a complex understanding of the ways in which their social location differs from" other women and populations affected by AIDS (Berger 2004, 21). The use of intersectionality as an ideography in the framing of HIV/AIDS permits ASOs to challenge how the (Black) female body is produced and responded to in relation to HIV and AIDS.

HIV/AIDS Is Still a Problem and It's More Than Morality

As part of the larger issue of visibility, interviewees stressed that HIV/AIDS is still a problem domestically and that some individuals are ignored in the limited response to the disease. Respondents argue that although individuals are now living longer,

HIV/AIDS continues to be an ever-growing problem. According to Ms. Floyd (Iris House), "so many people have pushed the issue [HIV/AIDS] to being an issue to something that's happening abroad and not happening domestically, and [I'm] having to constantly remind people that, guess what, the rates in New York City, the rates in Washington, D.C. are just as bad as rates in many African countries." These ASOs spotlight how HIV/AIDS discourses produce certain subjects and stories while rendering others invisible (see Hammonds 1997; Patton 1991). Ms. Robin Wilder (program director of Iris House) suggested that the problem they confront is that people are "no longer interested in that [HIV/AIDS]. Because AIDS is becoming like, 'ok. It's similar to cancer'" (interview by author). Dr. Melendez (Director of Behavioral Health of Iris House) said, "well, that's what people want to believe. 'It's a chronic illness; so, what's the big deal?'" Beyond this, Dr. Melendez claimed that there is also a danger in constructing the disease as "the brown and black disease." She further stated, "That really bothers me because it gives people a false sense of, if you're not brown or black, if you're not a person of color, then, somehow, you're safe" (Melendez interview by author).

In response to this invisibility, Ms. Floyd speaks on behalf of those rendered voiceless and unseen, by continuing to

> Put those messages out that HIV is still a problem, domestically. It's still a problem in New York City. We're being forgotten. And, somebody has to, kinda light the torch to say that we can't forget about this whole community of people who are becoming infected, and . . . becoming infected with something that is completely preventable.

Ms. Floyd situates the organization in an effort to seek justice for those whom she fears will be forgotten. She challenges how pre-existing negative stereotypes are integrated into new diseases, thereby perpetuating a racial-gender-sexuality-class status quo. Such behavior, speaking on behalf of those who cannot speak or whose speech is not recognized and challenging the racial-gender-sexuality-class status quo, reflects a core tenet of Black feminist thought (Hill Collins 1986).

In their various responses to dominant discourse domains that shape the construction of HIV and AIDS, interviewees show how their agencies offer a counter narrative of HIV and AIDS. This counternarrative centers the interconnectedness of HIV/AIDS, race, sexuality, gender, and morality in multiple ways. For one, the ASOs counter the narrative that HIV/AIDS is a chronic disease that can be managed, and as such the pain, suffering, and death associated with the disease are no longer factored into how it is presented to the public—this is another form of invisibility. Such constructions ignore, for example, the economic cost associated with living with HIV/AIDS (Watkins-Hayes 2008). Second, the responses highlight the connectedness between the racialization and stigmatization of AIDS. At the core of this claim that HIV/AIDS is still a problem is the recognition that the combination of moving HIV/AIDS off of the public agenda and the racialization and gendering of the disease has implications for how the women who access their services are treated. In an attempt to fight for the placement of HIV/AIDS and the impact of the illness on the agenda of the community, ASOs seek to frame the disease away from a discourse of morality to one of justice. They engage not only the recipients of their services but also the wider community in this struggle for self-definition and response of sociopolitical structures.

Activism and Service Delivery Constraints: Challenging Power Structures

This narrative centers notions of citizenship, belongingness, and voice. Respondents highlight how the practices and programs of the ASOs are dictated by the availability of funding and accountability to funders but not necessarily by the women and communities they serve. This narrative captures how the ASOs are also operating from a point of intersectional disadvantage. Two themes comprising this narrative, political activism and service delivery, address how resources mitigate and stymie organizing. In response to these limitations, the organizations use resources to form a bridge for healing and political activity. To some extent, the ASOs embody what Springer (2001), in her analysis of Black feminist organizations, refers to as organizing their politics in the "cracks". In describing the behaviors of Black feminist organizations, Springer suggests that they were in response to the cracks that resulted from the failure of women's organizations and civil rights organizations to be inclusive of Black women. Thus, these women responded to the void by creating their own organizations. WAR, Amethyst Women's Project, and Iris House continue this tradition by operating in the cracks that result from intersectional stigma, which has left these women either unrepresented or underrepresented in the response to HIV/AIDS.

Representation and Activism

Theme one of this larger narrative speaks to the crack that results from the politics of representation and justice. The organizations recognize that they must engage the community and elected officials in their ongoing quest to (re)frame HIV/AIDS discourse to one that centers the functioning of structures and processes and away from morality if there is to be any just treatment for their clients. While wanting to engage in such activism, the ASOs confront resource shortages that affect their ability to engage in activism on a regular and consistent basis. I asked, "Was it a conscious decision not to have a permanent staff member focused on advocacy, or was it the result of a lack of funding?" In response, I was told,

> No, just funding issues. That most funding doesn't support advocacy efforts, so you have to use general operating support and, you know, we've been hoping for the last probably four or five years to have an advocacy person whom that's what they're responsible for, public policy and advocacy work, but most of that would end up coming from general operating support, which, at this point, we cannot afford (Floyd).

Ms. Floyd's (Iris House) reply appears representative of the general response I received to this question. Interviewees suggest a desire to engage the political system. However, given the limited resources, the agencies make decisions on where to concentrate their efforts and other resources. They recognized that they needed to have their collective voices integrated into the HIV/AIDS discourses and fill this "crack" by training their clients (this is discussed in more detailed below). Beyond funders' unwillingness to support activism, their funding decisions also influence the ASOs' ability to wholistically and culturally meet the needs of their clients.

Financial Constraints and Challenges to Knowledge Production

In the discussion of financial constraints, the respondents raise issues of the value and recognition of knowledge production and also the value of the organizations to the larger community. Embedded in this narrative is Black feminist theorizing that speaks

to knowledge production and its relation to race, class, and gender. The ASOs face the challenge of what Hill Collins refers to as "reclaiming the Black woman's intellectual tradition" which she says involves "examining the everyday ideas of Black women" (Hill Collins 1990, 15).

This exchange, between Mr. Manuel Dominguez (Amethyst Women's Project) and me, captures this dynamic:

> Dominguez: So they have very rigid (shift in wording), they're bureaucrats, and bureaucrats are not on the front lines. . . . as a factor that influences our work.
>
> Interviewer: Right.
>
> Dominguez: I'm constantly butting heads with these people.
>
> Interviewer: Really? About how to provide services?
>
> Dominguez: Yes. Their interpretation (shift in thought). For instance, we had an educational unit that told young people that, when it comes to HIV, any form of protection is better than no protection at all. That was what we were telling them. And of course they say, "Well, what does that mean?" I said, "Well, if you don't have a condom, get some cellophane. Do something." Then the AIDS Institute shot that down. They said, "Remove all of that language from all of your training materials. It's unacceptable to teach these people that." I said, "Well, you're not in the real world, then, because, you know what, if a young person doesn't have a condom, does that mean no condom, no sex?" That's not what it means. So, if you give them survival skills, even if they are using a ShopRite shopping bag. Whatever they do to protect themselves, but they won't accept that, and they did have us alter our curriculum and delete all of that language. Now, I argued with them. I said, "It makes no sense. It's not based on the reality of the circumstances we're dealing with. We see it." But they wouldn't buy it. [/Dialog]

The statement "we see it. But they wouldn't buy it" hints at the tension of who speaks for who and how—a cornerstone of Black feminist thought of self-definition. It represents a clash between a top-down and bottom-up approach to addressing HIV/AIDS. Dominguez suggests that a different model be used for the exchange of ideas—one that allows for the integration of practical, lived experiences.

It is not simply economic vulnerability that the agencies confront. Ms. Tucker (Director of WAR) expressed the challenge of convincing funders that the work she does is needed and vital when she asserted, "Well, sustainability. And I say it from a, um, well, from an economic level. . . . but sustainability in the face of the funders not really appreciating the work that we do" (Bernice Tucker). Mr. Dominguez also expressed this sense of economic vulnerability and questioning whether funders valued the work of the ASOs.

In response to economic vulnerability, all respondents expressed a sense of survivability. "I know we will be here. I know we will!" said Ms. Tucker. In the face of losing funding Mr. Dominquez stated, "We are in a limbo state right now. We're waiting to hear whether we've been refunded for another five years." When I asked, "What happens after June 30? Should the funding request be denied?" he said,

> [We will have to] regroup. . . . I don't think we're gonna, you know, tuck our tail between our legs and drift off into the night. I don't think that's going to happen. I don't think that's her [Ms. Leon] personality. . . . I don't think anyone out there who knows us would underestimate the value of our services.

The narratives of financial constraints and the value of knowledge production, which grows out of their unique experiences, show how the organizations respond to external

ideological currents and socioeconomic and political environments. Furthermore, I suspect this is also a response to the invisibility of Black women who are affected by HIV and AIDS. Their struggle for self-definition and self-valuation—in essence their struggle to survive—should be read as a form of activism, which Hill Collins (1990) and others posit is part of the Black women's fight for freedom.

Moving Beyond the Constraints: Consciousness Rising

Although many of the interviewees discussed the challenges confronted by the ASOs there was a sense of pride and hope that permeated much of our conversations. There was great pride in discussing the material consequences of their service provision, which represent a sense of survival and hope for institutional transformation. Each interviewee mentioned at least one client who was told "no" (in the sense that they were either denied services by another organization or confronted an ideology of hopelessness after their HIV/AIDS diagnosis) or who felt abandoned. It was reported that these individuals had made significant progress toward living a healthier, more positive life once they were able to access the services of the ASOs. Much of what was discussed reflects the concepts of consciousness raising and self-valuation reflected in Black feminist theorizing. Below I highlight the theme that speaks to the notion of empowerment: reaffirming dignity and self-worth among the women.

Reaffirming Dignity and Self-Worth

In an attempt to heal the bodies of the women, the organizations engage in practices beyond addressing the health complications of HIV and AIDS. Instead, their services include training these women in a language of self-advocacy and self-valuation. The language of self-advocacy seeks to encourage these women to engage in self-care and also the political system to (re)claim their dignity. The practice of encouraging and supporting self-advocacy is often told via stories of survival and the rebuilding of lives and families. Consider the following:

> We help our clients be independent in a world that really penalizes you for being independent . . . We developed an entrepreneurial workshop, and it's been amazing. Quick story of an almost seventy-year-old woman, who said her life was [shift in wording]. She believed that she was born to be a hoe [prostitute]. That's her quote, and to cry and say, 'I never thought I could have my little business . . . learn to buy and sell and feel like I'm worth something at almost seventy.' Or my seventy-year old, who learned the computer for the first time, because there's also a computer workshop. To see the possibility of growth, hope (Melendez).

Ms. Tucker (WAR), when asked about the rewards and success of the ASO said,

> Well, for example, I can take several of our staff. One came to us as a client, who was on death's bed; I'll introduce her to you. We had another one, who had just come out of jail. We had a re-entry program that she was involved in, and, um, she had a peer from our agency, and, then, she said she wanted to volunteer. So, she volunteered, and we put her in our job enrichment program as well. So, when she graduated from that, she came back, and she volunteered some more. And I had a position open, and, now, she's director of our re-entry program. And, um, I mean it just goes on and on and on.

Such behaviors, as described above, are "an essential component in resisting systems of race, gender, and class oppression" (Hill Collins 1990).

Additionally, women were empowered to take care of their treatment and to learn how to engage in political activism. Ms. Aida Leon's, director of Amethyst Women's Project, response shows how the ASOs encourage and foster the empowerment of the women as individuals and as part of the larger community (in the sense that they train the women to become community workers):

> I would say that the biggest success is that we've been able to, um, provide services that have been able to assist women to become grounded in their own right, in all the areas that were presented. I think that there's quite a few women that have been able to, you know, reengage themselves with family, uh, lobby around and advocate for themselves about losing their rights to their kids. **No matter how small to how big because, if we weren't here, that would never happen for any of these women.** They would just be part of the lost souls of the community. Seeing these women become empowered and reunited with their families, and creating a stable lifestyle, and establishing stable housing, you know. (emphasis added)

Beyond personal empowerment, the agencies seek to train clients to be community advocates and participants in the political process. Ms. Tucker claimed, "Whenever there's going to be a bill passed that affects Ryan White . . . we encourage our clients to get on the bus and go to Annapolis." Iris House also engages in similar actions.

Additionally, across the organizations, many of the clients are integrated to serve as caseworkers or as leaders for the various support groups. For example, Amethyst Women's Project trains about eight to ten women:

> Who are highly proficient to provide information, uh, and you send them out into the community to do that, you do a couple of things 1) you foster a tremendous increase in self-confidence and self-esteem. "I can stand in front of a group of people, and I have something to offer." The other thing that is does, when you send them, it becomes almost like a geometric kind of a progression thing, where these ten women educate ten people, then are taught to educate others. The impact of the education is not limited to a small group, but, over the course of the year, can reach as many as 2000 people, and that's significant considering that these women are fundamentally volunteers. They're not paid. I think that's the impact. I mean, I have seen women come in and they're depressed, uh, they're having problems with foster care-with their children-they have health issues-chronic health issues-and, while they're dealing with their personal issues in terms of a plan of their own, for their own growth and development, they're learning that they have something to offer, and they're obliged to offer it because they're the best ones to educate because they have lived it. And, when they do that, they alter their lives, but they also alter the community norms. They begin to alter the norms of the community in relationship to understanding HIV, and understanding what role they play in its spread, and arresting its spread (Leon).

Integrating women into the agency and training them to be advocates is political. According to Hill Collins (1990, 221), social change results from changed consciousness and the transformation of political and economic institutions. Using women to alter "community norms" embodies this idea of social change.

Part of what makes these agencies successful in reaching and retaining clients is their familial environment. They work to create a sense of family and community designed to reaffirm the value of the women they serve. As argued by Ingrid Floyd,

> The other thing that I think has been our biggest success is that we've created a family environment and not a clinical environment. Women come here and they feel a part of the agency, so they don't want to leave. Um, and that's great because it's easier for us to get them into the right doctors. It's easier for us to monitor what's going on with their health. It's easier for us to form a relationship with them to get them to modify behaviors, and that's a great thing because it's harder when we send them to larger organizations and they don't feel a connection to anyone there.

WAR, in an attempt to create a "healing space" that serves the physical and spiritual needs of its clients, offers a meditation room. This comprehensive approach that focuses on the physical and spiritual needs of the clients helps to foster familial space. This familial environment not only meets needs at an individual level, but it also promotes community building and capacity building at the community level. The ASOs perform a type of cultural work or what Bernice Johnson Reagon (1996, 263) refers to as "the entire way of community organizers to nurture itself and future generations." Nurturing serves as a form of activism that promotes and encourages social transformation. This form of nurturing aligns the efforts of ASOs with a larger Black feminist movement for social justice. The ASOs are engaging in knowledge and consciousness building among their clients while engaging in actions designed to foster social change by promoting liberatory actions at the micro and macro levels of society for women of color who are HIV positive or who have AIDS.

Discussion

> I think, if I had to just generalize about where our greatest impact has been, I would say it has been in the process of reaffirming the dignity and self-worth of people who have been discarded by society, and making them understand that they can have an impact, that they can affect change at a micro level that has an impact that's macro (Wilder).

Ms. Wilder (Iris House) speaks to the meeting point between gender, race, sexuality, and HIV/AIDS. Her statement challenges how this meeting point results in "othering," marginalization, and invisibility. In essence, Ms. Wilder encapsulates what the organizations are responding to, intersectional stigma, and how they are responding, with an intersectional praxis. The ASOs are engaging in practices that confront raced, sexualized, classed, and gendered constructions of HIV/AIDS while also strategizing a politics of resistance to such constructions. This is evidence of intersectionality as both an idea and an ideography.

In crafting their identity, the ASOs offer a space that validates the women's (and others who utilize their services) identities as valuable and important, thereby challenging intersectional stigma. The responses I received indicate a deployment of intersectionality, which is in line with Glenn's (2000) understanding of institutional intersectionality and embodies the basic tenets of intersectionality. The ASOs recognize how multiple systems of inequality create conditions for particular risk behaviors to be adopted. As such they recognize how residential segregation, past and present racial discrimination, incarceration (of large numbers of the communities' residents), the targeted marketing of legal and illegal drugs in poor neighborhoods, inadequate health care, and limited economic resources conspire to perpetuate joblessness, drug sales and use, sex work, high incarceration rates, homelessness, and untreated health problems among the most vulnerable (Chow, Jaffee, and Snowden 2003; Wilson 1987; Wright 1993). ASOs engage in a critical analysis of social and political processes and their impact on the spread of HIV/AIDS among women of color in general and Black women and Latinas more specifically. Beyond this, the ASOs also confront their intersectional marginality in their fight to have the knowledge produced by their reality be recognized and valued.

The integration of intersectionality in defining their identity and practices can be read as a form of resistance—a resistance to the dominant understanding of HIV/AIDS and

women of color. For example, the agencies seem to resist the notion that the women they serve cannot survive and become contributors to society. There is also a resistance to the notion of what the literature often refers to as the triple burden when discussing women of color and HIV/AIDS (Quinn 1993). This is not to suggest that there is no recognition of the burden of socioeconomic and structural factors that increases the likelihood of women of color contracting HIV. Instead, there is recognition that these women have agency and are not entirely "victims" and undeserving of assistance as is often suggested, directly or indirectly.

Additionally, there is an ethic of care integrated into the identity of the ASOs. Hill Collins (1986) asserts that Black women display an ethic of care and personal accountability in their personal interactions. This becomes a part of their politics. ASOs carry on this tradition of care, which according to Hill Collins results from ongoing and persistent oppression faced by Black women and their resistance to such oppression. Resistance manifests in creating a familial space that is welcoming and reaffirming to women regardless of their prior histories. The resistance is incorporated into their efforts that guide the women to new and different possibilities.

Beyond this notion of resistance and an ethic of care, there is a sense of community building. Community becomes important, as many of these agencies do not see themselves as simply responding to HIV/AIDS and the survival of their clients but to a myriad of issues that threaten the survival of the community's wellbeing—such as legal status and hunger, in their understanding of self. Part of their community-building efforts center on making HIV-positive women visible—a daunting challenge. Patton writes,

> We are each a scarred body, twisted and marked from criss-crossing both institutional definitions and our own categories. Some bodies become hypervisible in the grid of research, politics, and policy because their multiple designations align, cohere, and create a sense of continuous body across institutional and community spaces. But others' bodies disappear precisely because there is no way to link up their fragmentary definitions into something that can hold a place in political representation (1998; xii–xiii).

In an attempt to save their communities, the ASOs engage in community mobilization to challenge the understanding of HIV/AIDS and its intersection with race, class, and gender. These ASOs are undertaking a "process by which a group goes from being a passive collection of individuals to an active participant in public life" (Tilly 1978, 69). One sees this in the various attempts to encourage the clients to be advocates—on behalf of themselves and the larger community. In practice, they are engaging in attempts to make the scarred HIV-positive woman of color's body visible in a manner that is not harmful to them and their communities. Furthermore, their attempts are rendering visible what is often invisible. Such actions work against the gaze of research and policies by enabling women to see themselves through a lens of empowerment as opposed to stigma and victimization (Berger 2004; Patton 1998).

Not only are the organizations concerned with treating their clients, but they are also equally concerned with empowering these individuals and their communities. They display this intersectional practice in their response to AIDS. The ASOs construction of identity and understanding of self can prove instrumental in helping to advance our understanding of the relationship between intersectional practice and social theory. They show us how organizations that are intersectionally disadvantaged and that serve those

who are intersectionally disadvantaged work for social justice. This study provides some initial insights into ASOs targeting women of color. While it represents a good start, it also suggests that there is much more to be done. Future research should look more closely at the challenges faced by these organizations and the means for addressing these challenges. Beyond this, future research should also take a closer look at the women served by these organizations. I heard stories of how women's lives have been changed, I was also introduced to some of these women who are now employees, but there is much more to the story than what I was exposed to. As such, future research needs to capture the stories of these women who have survived. Many of them may concur with the sentiment of one woman who expressed that she was "at death's door when I walked in these doors." Indeed, this is a story of empowerment. Such stories of empowerment will deepen our knowledge of the praxis of intersectionality by "everyday" women and the organizations that serve them.

Notes

1. I suspect that the organizations originated in the 1990s in response to changes by the CDC and the National Institute of Health.
2. Interviews were taped-recorded and transcribed verbatim. Each participant, following IRB protocol, was afforded the option of not completing the interview and was informed that they could remain anonymous should they choose to do such. All participants granted permission for the identification of the organizations and the individual interviewees.
3. In determining the adequacy of the sample size, I relied on the quality and completeness of the information provided by the interviewees. I employed theoretical sampling, which focuses on the saturation of information—there is a redundancy of information and no new themes emerge—to determine that there was no need to increase the sample size. In the event that the there was no redundancy, I was prepared to include additional ASOs.
4. This approach used an emergent protocol to develop codes. This protocol involved interactive readings of the transcripts. The transcripts were read, analyzed, and coded for common themes. As informed by Willig (2001), I also consider the themes in relation to each other.

References

Adimora, Adaora A., and Victor J. Schoenbach. 2005. "Social Context, Sexual Networks, and Racial Disparities in Rates of Sexually Transmitted Infections." *The Journal of Infectious Diseases* 191(1): S115–S22.

Alexander-Floyd, Nikol, G. 2012. "Disappearing Acts: Reclaiming Intersectionality in the Social Sciences in a Post-Black Feminist Era." *Feminist Formations* 24(1): 1–25.

Amethyst Women's Project. *Amethyst Women's Project: Taking Flight.* Coney Island, NY, n.d.

Amethyst Women's Project. Accessed November 17, 2012. http://www.awp-ci.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=21&Itemid=35

Archie-Booker, D. Elaine, Ronald Cervero, and Christina Langone. 1999. The Politics of Planning Culturally Relevant AIDS Prevention Education for African-American women. *Adult Education Quarterly* 49(4): 163–76.

The Baltimore City Commission on HIV/AIDS Prevention and Treatment and The Baltimore City Health Department. 2011. Moving Forward—Baltimore City Health HIV/AIDS Strategy. Accessed February 13, 2013 http://baltimorehealth.org/info/hiv/Moving%20Forward%20_%20Full%20Report.pdf.

The Baltimore Sun. "Black Women in City Infected with HIV at Higher Rate than National Average." March 8, 2012. Accessed October 28, 2012. http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2012-03-08/health/bs-hs-aids-women-20120308_1_black-women-cases-of-hiv-infection-aids-awareness-day.

Berger, Michelle. 2004. *Workable Sisterhood: The Political Journey of Stigmatized Women with HIV/AIDS.* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Biggerstaff, Deborah, and Andrew R Thompson. 2008. "Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA): A Qualitative Methodology of Choice in Healthcare Research." *Qualitative Research in Psychology* 5(3): 214–24.

Brier, Jennifer. *Infectious Ideas: Political Responses to the AIDS Crisis.* 2009. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.

Center for the Study of Brooklyn. "The Face of AIDS in Brooklyn." Accessed October 30, 2012. http://www.brooklyn.cuny.edu/pub/departments/csb/documents/csb/2_5_10_FINAL_Face_of_HIV_AIDS_in_Brooklyn.pdf.

Chillag, Kata, Kelly Bartholow, Janna Cordeiro, Sue Swanson, Jocelyn Patterson, Selby Stebbins, Carol Woodside, and Francisco Sy. 2002. "Factors Affecting the Delivery of HIV/AIDS Prevention Programs by Community-Based Organizations." *AIDS Education and Prevention* 14(Supplement A): 27–37.

Chow, Julian, Kim Jaffee, and Lonnie Snowden. 2003. "Racial/Ethnic Disparities in the use of Mental Health Services in Poverty Areas." *American Journal of Public Health* 93(5): 792–7.

Chun, Jennifer J, George Lipsitz, and Young Shin. 2013. "Intersectionality as a Social Movement Strategy: Asian Immigrant Women Advocates." *Signs* 38(4): 917–40.

Crenshaw, Kimberle. 1989. "Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics." *University of Chicago Legal Forum* 1989: 139–67.

The Combahee River Collective. 2000. "A Black Feminist Statement." In *The Black Feminist Reader*, edited by Joy James and T. Denean Sharpley-Whiting, 261–70. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, Inc.

Connors, Margaret. 1996. "Sex, Drugs and Structural Violence: Unraveling the Epidemic among Poor Women of Color in the United States." In *Women, Poverty, and AIDS: Sex, Drugs, and Structural Violence*, edited by, Paul Farmer, Margaret Connors, and Jamie Simmons, 91–123. Monroe, MD: Common Courage Press.

Environmental Justice Board. 2007. *HIV/AIDS*. Accessed February 19, 2013. http://www.environmentaljusticepartnership.org/hiv.htm.

Giorgi, Amedeo. 2008. "Concerning a Serious Misunderstanding of the Essence of the Phenomenological Method in Psychology." *Journal of Phenomenological Psychology* 39: 33–58.

Glenn, Evelyn. 2000. "The Social Construction and Institutionalization of Gender and Race: An Integrative Framework." In *Revisioning Gender*, edited by Myra M. Ferre, Beth G. Hess, and Judith Lorber, 3–43. New York: Alta Mira Press.

Hammonds, Evelyn. 1997. "Seeing AIDS: Race, Gender, and Representation." In *The Gender Politics of HIV/AIDS in Women: Perspectives on the Pandemic in the United States,* edited by Nancy Goldstein and Jennifer L. Manlowe, 113–26. New York: New York University Press.

Hancock, Ange-Marie. 2007. "When Multiplication Doesn't Equal Quick Addition: Examining Intersectionality as a Research Paradigm." *Perspectives on Politics* 5(1): 63–79.

"Harlem Neighborhood." Accessed November 17, 2012. http://www.city-data.com/neighborhood/Harlem-New-York-NY.html.

Higinbotham, Evelyn. 1992. "African-American Women's History and the Metalanguage of Race." *Signs* 17(2): 251–74.

Hill Collins, Patricia. 1986. "Learning from the Outsider Within: The Sociological Significance of Black Feminist Thought." *Social Problems* 33(6): S14–S32.

———. 1990. *Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness, and the Politics of Empowerment*. New York: Routlegde.

hooks, bell. 1984. *Feminist Theory: From Margin to Center*. Cambridge, MA: South End Press.

Iris House, Inc. *History & Mission*. Bronx, NY, n.d.

Kelley, Robin D. G. 2002. *Freedom Dreams: The Black Radical Imagination*. Boston, MA: Beacon.

King, Deborah K. 1988. "Multiple Jeopardy, Multiple Consciousness: The Context of Black Feminist Ideology." *Signs* 14(1): 42–72.

Krieger, Nancy. 1999. "Embodying Inequality: A Review of Concepts, Measures, and Methods for Studying Health Consequences of Discrimination." *International Journal of Health Services* 29(2): 295–352.

Lane, Sandra D., Robert A. Rubinstein, Robert H. Keefe, Noah Webster, Donald A. Cibula, Alan Rosenthal, and Jesse Dowdell. 2004. Structural Violence and Racial Disparity in HIV Transmission. *Journal of Health Care for the Poor and Underserved* 15(3): 319–35.

Live Baltimore. "Garwyn Oaks Demographics and Characteristics." Accessed October 28, 2012. http://www.livebaltimore.com/neighborhoods/list/garwynoaks/.

Lorde, Audre. 1982. *Zami: A New Spelling of my Name*. New York: Crossing Press.

Lune, Howard, and Hillary Oberstein. 2001. "Embedded Systems: The Case of HIV/AIDS Nonprofit Organizations in New York City." *Voluntas: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations* 12(1): 17–33.

McCall, Leslie. 2005. "The Complexity of Intersectionality." *Signs*, 30(3): 1771–800.

Mishler, Elliot. G. 1990. Validation in Inquiry-Guided Research: The Role of Exemplars in Narrative Studies. *Harvard Educational Review* 60(4): 415–42.

Morse, Janice, ed. 1994. *Qualitative Nursing Research: A Contemporary Dialogue.* Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications.
New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene. "Community Health Profiles, 2006." Accessed November 18, 2012. http://www.nyc.gov/html/doh/downloads/pdf/data/2006c hp-302.pdf.
New York City.gov. "Southern Brooklyn" Accessed November 18, 2012. http://www.nyc.gov/html/sirr/downloads/pdf/final_report/Ch17_SouthernBrooklyn_FINAL_singles.pdf.
Patton, Michael Q. 1990. *Qualitative Evaluation and Research Methods*. Newbury Park: Sage.
Patton, Cindy. 1991. *Inventing AIDS.* New York: Routledge.
Piette, John, Ann Dill, Vincent Mor, and John Fleishman. 1990. "A Comparison of Hospital and Community Case Management Programs for Persons Living with AIDS." *Medical Care* 28(8): 746–55.
Quinn, Sandra. 1993. "Perspective: AIDS and the African American Woman: The Triple Burden of Race, Class, and Gender." *Health Education Quarterly* 20(3): 305–20.
Reagon, Bernice Johnson. 1996. "African Diaspora: The Making of Cultural Workers." In *Women In Africa and the African Diaspora*, edited by Roslyn Terborg-Penn and Andrea Benton Rushing, 263–76. Washington, DC: Howard University Press.
Smith, Jonathan. 2004. "Reflecting on the Development of Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis and its Contribution to Qualitative Research in Psychology." *Research in Psychology* 1: 39–54.
Smith, Jonathan, Paul Flowers, and Michael Larkin. 2009. *Interpretive, Phenomenological Analysis: Theory, Method and Research*, 3. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
Springer, Kimberly. 2001. "The Interstitial Politics of Black Feminist Organizations." *Meridians: Feminism, Race, Transnationalism* 1(2): 155–91.
Stratford, Dale, Yuko Mizuno, Kim Williams, Cari Courtenay-Quirk, and Ann O'Leary. 2008. "Addressing Poverty as Risk for Disease: Recommendations from CDC's Consultation on Microenterprise as HIV Prevention". Accessed April 12, 2012. http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2099321/
Strolovitch, Dara Z. 2007. *Affirmative Advocacy: Race, Class, and Gender in Interest Group Politics*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Taylor, Steven and Robert Bogdan. 1984. *Introduction to Qualitative Research Methods: The Search for Meanings*. New York: John Wiley & Sons.
Tilly, Charles. 1978. *From Mobilization to Revolution*, 69. Reading: Addison-Wesley.
Townsend-Bell, Erica. 2009. "Intersectional Praxis." Paper presented at the American Political Science Association Annual Meeting. Toronto, Canada.
Watkins-Hayes, Celeste. 2008. "The Social and Economic Context of Black Women Living with HIV/AIDS in the U.S.: Implications for Research." In *Sex, Power, and Taboo: Gender and HIV in the Caribbean and Beyond*, edited by, 33–66. Diane Douglas, Rhoda Reddock, Sandra Reid, and Dorothy Roberts. Kingston, Jamaica: Ian Randle Publishers.
Weldon, S. Laurel. 2006. "The Structure of Intersectionality: A Comparative Politics of Gender." *Politics and Gender* 2(2): 235–48.
Whitehead, Tony. 1997. "Urban Low-Income African American Men, HIV/AIDS and Gender Identity." *Medical Anthropology Quarterly* 11(4): 411–47.
Willig, Carla. 2001. *Introducing Qualitative Research in Psychology*. Buckingham: Open University Press.
Wilson, William J. 1987. *The Truly Disadvantaged: The Inner City, the Underclass, and Public Policy*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Women Accepting Responsibility. *Women Accepting Responsibility*. Baltimore, MD, n.d.
Wright, Ednita M. 2003. "Deep from Within the Well: Voices of African American Women Living with HIV/AIDS." In *African American Women and HIV/AIDS: Critical Responses*, edited by Dorie J. Gilbert and Ednita M. Wright, 29–50. Westport: Praeger.

Trends: The Pedagogy of Black Politics

"Planting the Seeds of Our Future" in Action: A Conversation with Melina Abdullah

Tommi D. Hayes[*]
University of California, Santa Cruz

The University of California's (UC) Afrikan Black Coalition (ABC) is an organization that serves as a unifying body for the nine UC campuses that have African- and Black-led-and-run student organizations, as well as various universities in the California State University system and the California community college network, along with several community organizations. Each year they gather to discuss and plan self-determined action during their annual conference. The Twelfth Annual Afrikan Black Coalition Conference was held at the University of California, Santa Barbara from February 12 to February 15, 2016. On the third day of the conference, I spoke with Dr. Prof. Melina Abdullah, a self-proclaimed "organizer-scholar-mama," *one of the convening members of the first Black Lives Matter (BLM) chapters (founded in Los Angeles, California), the chair of the Pan-African Studies Department at California State University, Los Angeles, as well as the mother of three children. It was just hours after her Sunday morning keynote that, many agree, was the best keynote address of the entire conference.*

Introduction

With an overall conference theme of "Planting the Seeds of Our Future: Defining Our Next Steps," I can imagine Prof. Abdullah was one of the first speakers whose names was brought into the space. During research for this piece, it quickly became apparent that Prof. Abdullah had planted many life-changing political and intellectual seeds. Black Lives Matter Pasadena Chapter founder Jasmine Richards, who has now chosen the last name "Abdullah" for herself, recalls, in an interview, that through a series of critical questions, Prof. Abdullah taught her that there was no point in feeling hurt about each repeated instance of state-sanctioned terroristic violence that goes unnamed as such because that feeling of hurt is predicated on an expectation that the system, as it is, could ever really serve us "justice" or something even close to it, especially when we are shown time and time again that it cannot.[1] Far from producing apathy, this movement-survival tactic can inspire us in ways that propel us into a new kind of political movement and action, just as Richards was propelled into action, just as Prof. Abdullah was propelled into action, and

* Direct correspondence to todhayes@ucsc.edu

just as I was, along with so many others, especially after the non-indictment of George Zimmerman in the murder of Trayvon Martin in 2013. Prof. Abdullah reminds us that if "it is our duty to win," as Assata Shakur has taught us, we have to first *believe* another world is possible because that's what winning looks like, and winning *is* Black Liberation in reality, actuality, and materiality.

The ABC is a political organization with winning on its mind, and the coalition's most recent political demands and gains attest to this. Late last year, in a truly unprecedented move, the ABC forced the UC system to divest tens of millions of dollars from the Corrections Corporation of America (CCA) and the Geo Group.[2] The coalition pointedly and scathingly cited these companies' direct and blatant investment in not only the *continued* criminalization of Black and Brown folks but also the necessarily planned and projected *increased* criminalization and incarceration of Black and Brown folks to ensure increased profits. These companies, *literally*, construct and oversee the consumptive and expanding global prison industrial complex that affects the lives of hundreds of millions of mostly Black and Brown folks worldwide.

In the case of corporations, and even smaller businesses, it has long been a saying in discussions of effective political organizing tactics that if you want to hurt them, hit them in their pockets. The ABC seems fully aware that, in this case, "them" is not an individual person, or even group of individuals, but is instead white supremacist and anti-Black structural violence in our university system(s) and the policies that fuel it. It seems the ABC is fully aware that the "pockets" are the network(s) of companies that profit from white supremacist and anti-Black structural state-sanctioned violence. The reality is these university systems and companies cannot continue working in the same structurally violent ways, if at all, without each other's financial support. Continuing this work and knowing the divestment from CCA and the Geo Group were only partial victories; the coalition has reissued their unmet demand that the UC system divest $425 million from Wells Fargo citing that particular financial complex as one of the top financiers of private prisons.[3] The ABC has asked us: "Why is [California's] leading system of higher education funding such an immoral system? Why is the UC actively fueling the racist criminal justice system while publicly aiming for more "diversity" within its own campuses?"[4] Those are questions for all of us to really engage with but not just in relation to the UC system, of course; it is a call for all of us to ask these questions about and in relation to our own university and college systems and networks.

And the socioeconomic and political tactic of boycotting as a type of divestment, and divestment as a type of boycotting, is not new to Black Liberation struggles. In terms of the various Black Liberation struggles and movements in the United States, boycotting and divesting has been a strategy most memorably deployed during the Montgomery Bus Boycott in Alabama. Boycotting and divesting is a necessary tactic at both the personal and the structural levels as the Montgomery Bus Boycott demonstrated before, and the Black student divestment movement is demonstrating now, albeit in and within totally different moments and contexts that cannot be flattened or collapsed into each other. Nevertheless, the sociopolitical parallels, continuities, and similarities between certain moments and movements are important to recognize. Prof. Melina Abdullah reiterates this point in this conversation.

Prof. Abdullah draws striking and salient parallels between the 1966 start of the Black Panther Party and the rise of the 1968 Black Student Movement and the 2013 start of

Black Lives Matter as a movement and the 2015 rise of what she calls the "New Black Student Movement." In both these most recent movements, the tactics have varied, but many tactics have also overlapped with previous movements. And one of the most important tactics in the Black Lives Matter movement is the exact same tactic that started the Montgomery Bus Boycott, which was a literal *disruption* and act of civil disobedience by Rosa Parks in 1955. Boycotts and divestments are necessary tactics for our struggle toward Black liberation and so are the initial acts of disruption and civil disobedience that begin some of them.

In this engaging biographical conversation, Prof. Abdullah shares how, by whom, and at what stages sociopolitical seeds were planted in her life, what helped them grow and flourish into a critical consciousness, her struggles with her own contradictions, and how she has always been propelled into political action and movement. Prof. Abdullah explains that *all Black lives matter* and how this means we cannot afford to leave *any* Black folks out of our dreams and actions for and toward Black liberation. Prof. Abdullah also lets us know where we have to draw the line in our movement spaces because some things simply can't be tolerated if we're about the liberation of *all of us*, especially Black women; Black lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans, and queer (LGBTQ) folks; and those not yet socio-politically conscious. Prof. Abdullah explains the importance of Black Lives Matter as a movement for Black Liberation, and why we can't be "episodic activists," as well as how Black Lives Matters is moving to better understand the specific needs of Black folks in the American South.

When Dr. Prof. Melina Abdullah and I began the conversation, it was decided that we'd frame it around a disciplinary perspective of Black Studies. While there is no doubt that the conversation we had for over an hour can certainly be understood within that frame, we also disrupted and expanded that frame. Our refusal to remain most legibly within our own professed frame allowed things in that neither of us could have planned for, nor imagined, prior to the conversation. With that said, I began by asking Prof. Abdullah about the excitement and the feelings she had around having been at the ABC Conference, about her involvement with the Black Lives Matter Movement, about the importance of Black Studies and activism, and about the importance of *not* seeing our scholarship and activism as rigidly separate. Here's Prof. Abdullah's answer to that question and so much more.

Names of Speakers

Melina Abdullah (hereinafter "Abdullah")
Tommi D. Hayes (hereinafter "Hayes")

Abdullah: I know this is for the National Conference of Black Political Scientists (NCOBPS) but what I walked away from the ABC Conference feeling is a deeper commitment and a renewed commitment to the discipline of Black Studies. I came into my fullest consciousness in high school, even though I was born in Oakland, and there was this consciousness that pervaded the area at the time. I'm from the "Panther cub" generation, so everybody's parents were in and around the Black Panther Party, and there's this kind of consciousness that's in the space that I was born into. But the conscious acceptance of our role as Black people, or who we are as Black people, really came during my high school years in the late 80s, early 90s as a Black Studies student. I went to Berkeley High, which was the only high school in the country with a Black Studies Department—a complete department, right? I was mentored by a wonderful man, who has since passed, named Richard Navies, and a lot of us in my generation were mentored by him. Even though there were these kinds of conflicting things—like we had Black Studies at Berkeley High, we had the kind of consciousness of the space and time, but we also had the crack-cocaine epidemic, and the

materialism, and this misogynistic space also emerging as a result of the crack-cocaine epidemic. Then there is the pimp culture that's really embedded in Oakland; Oakland has a really heavy pimp culture, so there are all these kinds of contradictory strands.

So, it was in high school that I was really exposed in a really deliberate way to who I am, and to my legacy as a Black woman. Of course, my mother helped support that—my mother is also a very conscious woman. But I just think that without Berkeley High School, and without Black Studies at Berkeley High School, I wouldn't have come into that knowing. Ultimately, I dropped out of traditional high school in the Eleventh grade (and went back in the Twelfth), but the seeds had been planted there, right? So those were seeds that began to take root when I did go on to college, and I went to Howard University in Washington, DC, and I majored in African-American Studies. Howard has played a historic role of the discipline of African-American Studies and Black Studies. And so I think for me that's really, really important, and it's kind of lifted up again *now* when we think about our contemporary struggle. So, I've always kind of had that and most clearly and intentionally after high school and during high school. Then again, in college, I got more of it.

And I think that is what we're starting to see. We can think of Berkeley High, and why was there a Black Studies Department at Berkeley High School? Well, it was tied to the Black Studies Department at San Francisco State, and, in fact, a lot of those professors from San Francisco State—people like Oba T'Shaka and others—would come and do programs at Berkeley High. So, there was all of that going on. And even though there's this kind of indirect path—again there's the importance of space, right?

When I got to Howard in African-American Studies, there was this—and Howard is particular—but this kind of Black consciousness that permeates most historically Black colleges and universities (HBCUs). So seeds again can take up root and that happened. And there are a lot of contradictions, and it's fluid, and it doesn't happen through a direct path, but I saw a lot of us going through these tensions between where we're from, the conditions that we face, and then this consciousness that's growing within us. There's this kind of internal struggle, and for me, I know for my entire time at Howard I felt—I used to say I felt schizophrenic because I had this conscious self, and then I also had this self that was really tied to materialism. I was like a fly girl! I modeled hair, and I hung out in the streets, and I would come home to Oakland, and I would be a different person than I was at Howard. It took the entire four years for me to kind of figure out how to merge my two selves, and I don't know that that ever happened, but at least the consciousness began to outweigh the kind of "street consciousness," I would say, right?

And so there was this need to struggle, and I understood the need to struggle, and I think that even that street consciousness was really, really important because now when we're thinking about the current iteration of struggle that we're in, I think, for me, it tied me more closely to it. So, the killing and brutalization of our people at the hands of the police has always been a huge issue for me, and it has always resonated with me on a soul level, and I think it's because of, again, those conditions that I faced in my own neighborhood—like I remember this one incident. In the late 80s, early 90s, because of the crack-cocaine epidemic in Oakland and living in East Oakland, we were constantly harassed by police. I remember being a young girl, being a teenager and into my early 20s, I remember the regularity of the brutality and harassment. I remember one time I was out on a date, and every time I was out on a date we got pulled over almost without exception, and we *always* got searched, every single time. We *always* had to sit on the curb, every single time. I was *always* sexually harassed by the police; every single time. I remember I had a curfew, and we were really, really late, and my father got really angry. And, I remember crying and saying, "Well dad, it's not something I could help. It was really bad this time. They left us on the curb for over an hour. They went through all my stuff. The male police officers physically searched me, and it was real bad." And my father, I don't think, realized it was happening to that degree, and I remember him telling me, "You know that's not something that's supposed to be happening," and then he let me unload everything that had been going on. And so, for me, I think that's one of the reasons that police harassment and brutality hits me so hard; it's because I also feel connected to it because up until—I think the last time that I remember being physically brutalized by police was when I was in graduate school, so it isn't like it ever stops. So for me, when I saw it, it always made me angry, it always hit me on more than just an intellectual level, and it was also an emotional response. So, each of the instances that we began to learn of involving police killing Black folk hit me and forced me to become involved.

But it wasn't until the murder of Trayvon Martin and the acquittal of George Zimmerman that I was pulled by some really beautiful, wonderful sisters who are now known as the cofounders of Black Lives Matter: Patrisse Cullors, Alicia Garza, and Opal Tometi that I kind of got involved as more than an "episodic activist". Part of what was said today at the ABC Conference is the idea of Black Lives Matter being "a movement not a moment," and I think for a lot of us recognize it's more exhausting to actually engage in these temporary uprisings than it is to just change the way we live our lives, build a movement, and shift into a new cycle. That's kind of where I am now, and I think it's connected back to Black Studies

because when you think about how Black Studies embedded this consciousness, and planted these seeds, those seeds were planted *not only* because Black Studies is an academic discipline but also because the birth of it is tied to struggle. So, there is this entire way of doing work in the classroom, this entire way of engaging in research that's *tied* to those experiences—the experiences of having to sit on the curb, the experiences of being groped by police officers, the experiences of watching boyfriends and brothers being brutalized by police and some women being brutalized as well. I hadn't heard of or personally seen it, but we see it playing out in news media now; women are being brutalized and women are being killed. Black Studies is not divorced from those realities, and I think the combinations of this call to consciousness by Patrisse, Alicia, and Opal to shift our lives, combined with the seeds that were planted in me and the work I had been doing around both Ethnic Studies demands, and the work I had been fortunate enough to be a beneficiary of with the creation of Ethnic Studies, and Black Studies in particular, combined to allow me to merge my two selves, my many selves, right? So I hope this makes sense.

Hayes: Yes. For sure. It definitely does.

Abdullah: So, I had learned by 2013 when this call happened to not engage in simply "episodic organizing", or "episodic activism", but to become an organizer as part of a movement. By that point, I was already a quote-unquote "scholar." I had already been in the academy for quite some time, and I already had a PhD. And at the same time, I was engaging in episodes. I was always an activist; I never lost that. And I was a mama. I was already a mama of three children, which I think is an important identity as well, probably *the* most important identity for me of those three—a Black mama, right? So, really what happened with the birth of Black Lives Matter, and the birth of an ongoing movement in 2013, was an opportunity for me to become an organizer-scholar-mama, and all of those things simultaneously—remembering that my role as a mother is part of why I do my organizing, that it's essential to why I do my organizing, and that my organizing work and my scholarship have to be combined. And I don't know if this should be printed—but only rich white people have time to engage in scholarship for scholarship's sake, or art for art's sake, or any of those kinds of things. For us, as Black people who understand that we are tied to other Black people—not individualistic Black people who want individual advancement but Black people who understand that we're part of a community, that we have what Michael Dawson calls "linked fate," that all of us are in the struggle together—our scholarship can't be about just writing in journals; our scholarship *must* be about advancing our people. So in many ways, it goes back to this Black Studies approach to scholarship, to the idea of Black Studies rather than "studying Black." We are not *studying* Black people; we are utilizing our discipline as the intellectual arm of the revolution, right?

Hayes: Absolutely!

Abdullah: And that's what it needs to be for us to even really justify our existence; it must be a part of the ongoing struggle, and that's kind of where we are. So today sitting there, or standing there, amidst close to a thousand Black students at the ABC Conference who are committed to organizing, it makes me think of the tremendous potential that there is. Watching the Black students not be there to just intellectually masturbate—nobody is doing panel presentations and talking about high theory, everyone is there talking about how to engage and expressing ways of engaging in intellectual spaces *as* connected with the community—it makes me recognize the moment that we're in as a part of a movement and what's being birthed right now. So we talked about 2013 as the birth of Black Lives Matter, and we can think of 2015 as the birth of the New Black Student Movement, and there are interesting parallels because if we think about the Black Panther Party being born in 1966, and then the Black Student Movement and the Third World Student Strike, being born in 1968, there's a relationship, right? So it's *two years in* for both of them: two years into the Black Power movement taking full force and two years into the Black Lives Matter movement taking hold. The Black students rise up, and that's what's happening now.

And so I think that just watching these parallels, and experiencing these parallels—I think that what we're witnessing—and I know this is for a political science journal, and I know one of the rules of political science is that we're never supposed to make predictions, so I am going to violate that because I'm not really a political scientist; my PhD just so happens to be in political science. But it's important that we recognize the parallels, *and* that we can think about what happened as the result of 1968, and think about 2015 as signaling that same thing, especially if the students are willing to go as hard, and I think they're going hard. The demands on the ABC website, I think, signals that troops are willing to go hard, right? Troops are willing to shut it down. So, having almost a thousand Black students gathering at UC, Santa Barbara to talk about their collective demands, and talk about the relationship between intellectualism,

and activism, and organizing, and the existing hegemony, and what needs to be done in terms of summoning the resistance power of our Ancestors, and our ancestral legacy, might be an indicator that we are moving toward a new resistance era that in some ways, in many ways, looks like what the Black Power era looked like. 1968 was a tremendous turning point; it was the watershed year for the Black Power Movement because it's the moment and year in which Black students and Black community came together and pushed forward in really, really revolutionary ways, so that's what I'm hoping is happening right now. I hope that makes sense.

Hayes: Yes, of course. You've given me so much to think through and also helped to generate quite a few questions. But I guess, one of the first things that you were speaking about was your position within Northern California and how there was a culture of a particular type of misogyny, as you said, coming mostly out of the debilitating effects of crack cocaine in our communities. And then, one of the things you talked about was your move from California to an HBCU in DC then back to California, and I kind of have a reverse movement, so to speak. I'm from North Carolina and went to an HBCU there—North Carolina Central University in Durham, North Carolina; I came here to California for my PhD, and I'm hoping to make my way back South. And you were speaking about how it was a constant process of trying to merge your two selves, and that has come up twice. So as we think about high school students, and college students in academia discovering new things, and parts, and pieces of themselves, if you could speak more to that radicalizing process of that merging because it seems that maybe there were two different political ideologies you may have been wrestling with. Were there ways that being in DC at Howard allowed you to come into a certain type of consciousness that being in California didn't allow in the same way that being in California allowed you to come into a certain type of consciousness that you were then able to take with you to Howard in DC?

Abdullah: So, here is just my geographic trajectory: I'm from Oakland, so I'm from Northern California, from the hood in East Oakland, and I moved to Howard in DC. I moved from Oakland to DC. I spent four years in DC and then came back to Los Angeles, which is very different from Oakland. I actually had more in common with folks in DC. When I moved to DC, it felt like Oakland because there were a lot of Black folks, and there was a cultural identity in DC that was very palpable; it was Chocolate City, right? One of the things I always say is nobody at Howard can ever say they dated me because I didn't date Howard dudes; I dated DC dudes because it felt like home, right? So I think space is really important, and so that was the geographic trajectory.

And then with regard to the merger of the two selves and what I think happened during that period was I was exposed to so much at the same time and a lot of us are. That's what happened, that's what we have, and that's what's beautiful about the HBCU experience, right? You're exposed to so much at the same time, *and* you're given complete freedom to explore all these ideas and practices because the one thing that comes *off* the table is race. Everybody is Black, right? So when I got to Howard, I don't think I saw a white person for, probably, the first six months. You had to go to Georgetown to find white people in DC, right? Not anymore but when I was there you did, and you can see it being gentrified now. But even at Howard, even now at Howard, it's Black, so you don't have to think about that question. You don't have to think about what it means to be Black, it's a constant, and of course it's given that everything is Black, so you get the freedom to think about what kind of Black person you want to be. So in many ways that call to consciousness was sped up by being at Howard. At Howard you got Black capitalists, you got Black artsy people, you got Black radicals, you got Black hippies, Black weed heads—all kinds of Black people are there—Black lumpens, you know? Every kind of Black folk is at Howard, right? And so you get to figure it out for yourself.

And you also get to kind of—and maybe I'm just now getting to the conscious recognition of this—be a little comfortable with your own contradictions. And I think, for me, I'm just now getting to understand that our lives are spent kind of examining our own contradictions. So even though you don't want to be schizophrenic, you're also not going to be the kind of a person who has no contradictions because we all have contradictions, and in fact a lot of times, it's our contradictions that make us beautiful, complex, spiritual, soulful beings, right? Think about Tupac. Why does Tupac resonate with everybody? Even now I'm looking at these kids going, "Hey, what y'all know about Tupac? He died before you had an ear to listen, so why is Tupac resonating with you?" It's those contradictions, his constant grappling with his contradictions. And I think that Kendrick Lamar is the same way, and I don't want to compare anybody to Tupac because I'm from Oakland. I'm of the same generation, so I'm not trying to compare anybody with 'Pac, but I'm saying that the people that resonate have constant contradictions. Beyoncé is a contradicted person and is trying to figure out how her contradictions work. And trying to recognize and resolve your own contradictions is part of what makes us beautiful Black people.

So I think that to see the contradictions—now I'm talking and thinking again—the contradictions are also indicators of consciousness, right? We're much more one dimensional before we come to consciousness. So for high school and college students, it's easy to be one dimensional, it's easy to kind of accept what the world gives you, and it's more difficult to be a complicated, contradicted human being, right? The world imposes on you, "You are just an American that happens to be Black," right?

Hayes: Yes.

Abdullah: And if you want to, you go, "No, I'm an African who happens to be in America," right? Then you start grappling, and you start becoming contradictory, and I think that's . . . maybe that's the purpose of our struggle at a micro-level; it's thinking about those contradictions and working to resolve them. And on a macro-level, it's kind of the same thing; on a macro-level they tell us we're Americans who happen to be Black, and then they give us this path—and this is part of what I talked about today during the keynote address—of assimilation and also promises of rewards. But that path never works, right? One, you're never completely assimilated; two, you're never completely rewarded; but, three, even if you become Oprah Winfrey or Barack Obama and get these rewards, your people can't get in there with you. When you have a degree of consciousness, you recognize that. And so on a macro-level, you begin to even reject the rewards that are thrown your way, right? You don't want those kind of tokenized rewards. And I don't want to put too much on Beyoncé's Formation performance and video, but, in a sense, that's what she did because the backlash is *real.*

Hayes: Yes! I mean, as I'm listening, there are things that are also coming up for me, especially around different contradictions, and I'm even sitting with some of the contradictions that exist here at the ABC Conference. It's like we were just in a workshop with an amazing undergrad student from UC Santa Cruz (UCSC)—and I'm a graduate student at UCSC—and her name is Kadijah Means, and she was the President—I'm sorry, *the Pharaoh* of the Black Student Union of Berkeley High just a few years ago, right? And the workshop she facilitated was teaching us how to teach, help, and support Black high school students learn about Black Liberation; and it was powerful. But then at the same time, there was a workshop that took place that, from what I've been told thus far, was full of victim blaming, particularly against Black women, as if *the* problem in the Black community is the Black woman. And yesterday there was a speaker who literally said we weren't full human beings if we were not raised with our fathers. And we sat there, and we had to listen to this, and it felt so violent even though some of us did eventually leave the space. And people were like, "Oh, you can't take those kinds of things personal," and I was like, "What do you mean? He was just taking about our mothers!" And I don't mean that in this petty or silly kind of way like, "Oh, he's talking about my mama," but he literally told me that I'm not a full person because I wasn't raised in a particular type of family—a nuclear, patriarchal family dynamic, right?

Abdullah: Right!

Hayes: So again it's all these contradictions. So what types of contradictions do you feel we absolutely cannot tolerate if we are serious about Black liberation?

Abdullah: Okay, so here's where we draw the line at Black Lives Matter. One of our guiding principles is that *all* Black lives matter, period, point blank. *All Black lives matter!* So if you come into our space, and you are behaving in a way that's misogynistic; if you are behaving in a way that's heterosexist or homophobic; if you are engaging in that kind of behavior that really comes from white supremacy—because, let's get it right, it's not indigenous to who we are as people—that is what is not tolerated in our space. Now, with that said, I don't think we can afford to throw anybody out.

Hayes: Absolutely not.

Abdullah: It's because a lot of that misogyny and heterosexism comes from not knowing how to liberate ourselves, and ignorance, right? We have to recognize that everybody is in a growth process. We want to hold up El-Hajj Malik El-Shabazz, but he wasn't always El-Hajj Malik El-Shabazz; he was once Malcolm Little, you know? We have to recognize that we have to always give space for people to grow. Let me say, I never thought Snoop Dogg would become Snoop Lion. *And remember that fool was walking women on leashes?*

Hayes: Yes!

Abdullah: He was walking naked women on leashes talking about, "My pimp hand is way strong," right? I never thought he would be Snoop Lion, never, ever, ever! And I'm not saying Snoop Lion is completely evolved; I'm saying that there was clearly an evolutionary process, and it's clearly taking place in him, right? I remember growing up in Oakland; everybody who's from Oakland—like it's a rule of my generation—no matter how conscious they are, loves "Too Short," right? So "Dope Fiend Beat"—there ain't no better beat than "Dope Fiend Beat," right? As Womanist as I am, if "Dope Fiend Beat" dropped, I'm going to rock it, right? And I remember being young, being in high school, and Short used to throw these "pimp and hoe" balls—"Players Balls" I guess we used to call them, right? And I remember, in my consciousness, I knew I didn't want to be a hoe. So I remember dressing as a pimp to go to the "Player's Ball" because I wasn't going to be a hoe. Now I understand that it's worse, actually, to be a pimp than to be a hoe.

So my long-winded point is that I think we have to check it every single time. And I want to challenge that notion that we ever have to "sit here and take it." We don't. That's part of this Black Lives Matter movement. We're going to disrupt that whenever we see it. We're going to disrupt it. We have to recognize that behavior as part of the hegemony that keeps us oppressed, right? If they're saying something crazy, we have to shut it down; I've done that before. Just about a year ago we were at this African spirituality workshop at Cal State, Los Angeles, and this beautiful, brilliant priest came and he was from the Continent—one of the most revered priests in the world. And he started doing this super-powerful energetic spiritual work, and everybody was feeling it. And then he got into how LGBTQ folk are sinners, right? So you know what, I may have wanted to be in space with this man, but we had to shut it down. We're not going to subject ourselves to that, period. *Period!* And so we have to disrupt it when we see it. We have to disrupt it even when it's our own folks, right? Disrupt it, and then figure out how to heal it. Now, are we going to never have a relationship with him again? No. But we are going to engage in a way that we can school and have a conversation.

Same thing happened when Black Lives Matter did a freedom ride during the summer to Cleveland, and a big convening—thousands and thousands of Movement for Black Lives activists—met in Cleveland, and we did a bus trip from Los Angeles. So there are fifty-five folks going from Los Angeles to Cleveland; that's a two-day trip, right? On the bus, all kinds of conversations happen. We had a conversation; they wanted to watch—and these are people, many of whom are just coming into a degree of consciousness—Hidden Colors. So we're watching Hidden Colors on the bus, and I hadn't seen it because I thought it was going to be some bullshit (BS), but we're watching Hidden Colors and at first it's good, and then Shahrazad Ali comes on and they start talking about Black people and Latinos, and then this kind of misogynistic stuff comes on, and so we have to turn it off. And we had this teachable moment where we can talk about, "Well, what does this mean for us as Black women when they're saying 'Submit to your man, and that's how we get free?' or when they kind of create these lines between Black people and Latinos, as if some Latino folks are not Black? How do we engage in that way?"

And then at the back of the bus there are these fights, right, because there are fifty-five black folks representing the full diversity of who we are—we got folks straight off the block, like they were gang members last week, sitting in the back of the bus. And we got trans folks and queer folks on the bus. So what was beautiful is the brothers who had just come off the block wanted to have conversations about what it means to be queer and trans. But some of the queer and trans folk are going, "Well I'm not here to teach you," right? So we find ourselves having a really difficult but courageous conversation. How do we engage in that conversation recognizing that there's this pain and trauma that's within all of us? How do we engage in a conversation that's a familial conversation that says, "My body has been used to teach white people for way too long, so when you ask me to teach you about who I am using my *body*, it's hurtful to me," right? And so I think those are really difficult conversations.

We had some of those conversations—I don't know if you know, but Black Lives Matter participated with the Nation of Islam in the twentieth anniversary of the Million Man March. And part of that conversation was, "Okay, well there's a history of antiqueer rhetoric coming out of the Nation, so how do we deal with that?" And what was beautiful—and I think it could be a model—is that we didn't hide the fact that we had some reservations about it, and so we were able to have conversations with leaders in the Nation about what our reservations were. And they, over the months leading up to the march, came and we had what we called "Courageous Public Conversation" in the Black community between the Nation of Islam and Black Lives Matter talking specifically about LGBTQ identity and what it means, as well as misogyny, patriarchy, and paternalism that we perceived as coming from the Nation. And so it's kind of this ongoing space in which we all are kind of learning and growing together. So that's a long answer and I'm sorry for that, but I think, again, it's the complications. It's this space that we find ourselves in as Black people where *all* Black lives have to matter. Black folks are not yet completely conscious—nobody's completely conscious—but we're still undergoing real growth, and people who are

marginalized, even within the Black community, matter. It's this idea that all of us have to matter because we can't afford to lose any of us.

Hayes: I definitely agree with that. And it all actually seems tied to something you mentioned earlier which was that after you were experiencing these incidents of being pulled over by police and searched, your father gave you the space to unload. And I think it sounds very similar to these "Courageous Public Conversations"—similar and different. I don't mean to collapse the two down because it's very different to have that type of conversation with one's father and to have those types of similar conversations in public with other Black people, right?

Abdullah: Right.

Hayes: But those two things—having those conversations and the notion of all of us mattering—are resonating as very important things that are necessary for the liberation of all of us. Just the other day, on February 12, we had our Martin Luther King (MLK) Convocation at UCSC, and Alicia Garza came and spoke. And of course we heard very similar language to what you're sharing here around this being a new moment, not a new movement, as well as it being a movement and not simply a moment and she was very, very clear about that. And she was also clear about what it means to be "a keeper of our people," and to really be able to hold anger, grief, and movement together at the same time. So, one of the questions—it was actually the first question and the last question she asked us—was, "What would we do if we *believed* we could see freedom in our lifetime?" And I mean I can imagine that can be a really big question, but what do you feel we would do if we truly believed we could see freedom in our lifetime?

Abdullah: I think that most of us are beginning to see that. I think that's what this is. The struggle is not about us *not* believing; the struggle is about us *believing*. The struggle is about us recognizing that the conditions we live under are intolerable, *and* they're not required. We don't have to live this way anymore. And I think that when Black Lives Matter was born—the first chapter is the LA chapter—the first night that we met was July 15, 2013. Patrisse summoned us to where she was living at the time, and she was living in a Black artist community called St. Elmo Village, and there were only about thirty of us. And we were there, and I remember having conversations about shifting our lives and recognizing that how we've *been* living cannot be how we *keep* living. How we've *been* surviving cannot be the way we continue to exist because we have to work toward living as full and complete human beings, and that requires movement, right? So there were only about thirty of us, and I remember closing out with the Assata chant that I closed out with today after my keynote address. And I had never heard it before that night, but I learned it from Patrisse. And you know that second line, "It is our duty to fight for our freedom! *It is our duty to win!* It is our duty to win!" When we say that over and over, for you to say, "It's our duty to win," you have to *believe* it's possible to win, right? "It's our *duty* to win!"

So I think that the explosion of Black Lives Matter, and I don't mean just the Black Lives Matter network, I mean the Movement for Black Lives—within the network itself we are tens of thousands strong. There are thirty-five chapters globally, right? It's *tens* of thousands strong. But the Movement for Black Lives is *hundreds* of thousands strong, if not more, right? People are willing to say, "We can win this. It is our duty to fight for our freedom. It is our duty to win," right? So I think that when we ask "how do we begin to live in this if we believe freedom is possible," I think there are those of us who have decided to live our lives in movement, to step into the continuum of struggle that we inherit from our Ancestors, and to recognize that getting out of that cycle of struggle was only a momentary kind of detour. And that's the truth of who we are, right? And now we're back on track, and I think that that's how we live. We live in a space where we are, I don't want to say, "fearless" because there are moments of fear, but we are courageous, we are audacious, right? We're not going to live under the confines that they've created. So when they say some BS in the classroom, we're going to say, "No that's not right!" When we watch people get all frenzied up in the consumerism of this world, we're going to disrupt it. When we see supposed spaces of democracy that are undemocratic, we're going to interrupt that, and we're going to point out the hypocrisy of it. And we're going to say things like what was said today, like "Let's forget reforming the police, let's *abolish* the police!" So that's what it means to live as if freedom is possible because freedom *is* possible, and I think that we're all beginning to wake up and recognize that.

Hayes: Yes, for sure! And that's really powerful. And there are people living toward that vision of freedom right now, not just in our lifetimes but right now, *right now, right now.*

Abdullah: Yes! *Right now*!

Hayes: And one of the things that I think gets brought up that can be a derailing argument toward living toward that freedom now is about "Black-on-Black crime"—what they call "Black-on-Black crime," as if it's not white supremacist violence as well, right?

Abdullah: Right! *Right!*

Hayes: And at the convocation, Alicia Garza said this powerful thing that I had never heard before within the context of conversations about "Black-on-Black crime." And what she said was, if we think about the analogy that folks often use about "crabs in a bucket," she highlighted how no one talks about how a bucket isn't the crab's natural habitat, right? Like people, talk about—

Abdullah: Yeah, I haven't heard her say that. That's *brilliant.*

Hayes: It was *absolutely brilliant*. And you could feel the way those words reverberated all throughout the audience, and it was so powerful. And again, really thinking about how this is not, for lack of a better way to say it, our "natural habitat," it's not our natural being. And I don't mean to use the word "natural" in a problematic way but only to highlight the analogy between the bucket, the crabs, and the fact that that's *not* their *natural* habitat.

Abdullah: Right, right.

Hayes: So, is there anything that that insight brings up for you, or how does that resonate with you within the context of political struggle and our being able to address these red-herring conversations that people like to bring into our movement spaces?

Abdullah: *Wow!* Well, I mean, there are two fundamental principles that we have as BLM, not the guiding principles, but principles that cover our overall approach. The first fundamental principle is to disrupt the current existing system, and the second is to fiercely love each other. And as your're quoting Alicia, I'm thinking, "Man, I love that woman," right? Like, she's *so* brilliant.

Hayes: Absolutely!

Abdullah: That's absolutely brilliant. And I had heard something similar before, but the illustration was less clear, but it still resonated with me, so I love the way that she takes it and moves it. Wade Nobles talks about African people being "freshwater fish who are living in salt water," right? So again this idea that this is not our natural habitat comes up. But let's not forget that there's a concerted effort to get us to believe that the problem is us, that the problem is the crab, and they don't even see the bucket, right?

Hayes: *Yes! Yes!*

Abdullah: Don't even see the bucket, right? They tell us "the problem is the crab," so let's fight the other crabs and get them all trying to either liberate themselves, ourselves from the bucket individually, but not to destroy the bucket altogether, right? And so when we hear this "Black-on-Black" crime thing, one point is, and you're absolutely right, that there is no such thing as "Black-on-Black crime," it's all white supremacy, right? It's structural violence. Of course it's what happens when you confine crabs to a closed space, where it's not their natural habitat, where they're limited in resources, where all they have to claw onto is each other. And so there is no such thing as "Black-on-Black crime." And they're pretending as if we put another set of crabs in the bucket, the results will be different, but if you put another set of crabs in the bucket, you get the same results. You never hear them calling it "white-on-white" crime but *it is*, if you want to talk about it. You get the exact same results. So I think that it's yet another attempt to divert us from recognizing the bucket, from recognizing the structure, and I think that's what comes up for me.

What's really amazing and beautiful though, as we're talking about holding the possibility of freedom, is that I'm asked that question of Black-on-Black crime at pretty much every public address that I get, and without exception, when we talk about it I always have two points I make: one, about it being structural, about it not being about the "crab" but about the "bucket," and I hadn't used those terms but

now I'm about to start, right? It's not about Black people and how we exist in Black communities; it's the way in which our Black communities are constructed and have been deprived of resources. I ask the question: "What do you think is going to happen when you don't have enough mental health resources, enough employment, when we're underemployed and unemployed, and rates show more than half of us are unemployed and underemployed?" And I think the best example we can give is youth violence and youth crime statistics that show that virtually all youth crime happens between 3 p.m. and 7 p.m. So all you have to do to almost completely eradicate youth crime is to have free, accessible, after-school programs from 3 p.m. to 7 p.m. Why are kids getting in trouble from 3 p.m. to 7 p.m.? Those are the hours between the time they get out of school and the time their parents come home, right? So all we have to do is pour resources into communities, and you see people like Ras Baraka in Newark, New Jersey, beginning to examine it, so I talk about that, and that's the first point.

And the second point I make is that because it's going to take a while to get rid of the bucket, to destroy the bucket, there is some work that can be done around the behavior of the crab, right? And so, I'm not trying to pretend there is no work that can be done, and I think Black people are overemphasizing that because all we're really asking people to do is behave in kind of super human ways. But we are superhuman. The fact that we exist proves we are superhuman people. No other people could have survived and thrived and turned scraps into soul foods, created hip-hop, practiced spirituality, raised our children, and done the things we've done—no one other than African people. No other people have done that, right?

Hayes: Absolutely.

Abdullah: So I think it's important to recognize that, but I think that with regard to so-called "Black-on-Black crime," which is structural violence and structural crime, we also have to recognize that there are people who have done the phenomenal work of helping us to be superhuman. And rather than putting all of that on to Black Lives Matter, we have to recognize that there are people who are interventionists and prevention workers. Lots of OGs and former gang members, lots of folks, you know, the folks who are "indigenous intellectuals"—intellectuals and practitioners who are indigenous to the communities that suffer the most structural violence—have been doing the work forever. I mean, the fact that we haven't completely annihilated ourselves is a testament to the phenomenal work that we've been doing in our communities. Our folks are living in war-torn states—when you think about communities like Watts, communities like my neighborhood in East Oakland, communities like parts of Baltimore, right? We're talking about war-torn states. When you think about the level at which our communities have suffered from violence, and suffered from lack of resources, where they've been completely bombed out figuratively and literally, the fact that we haven't destroyed ourselves means that people have been doing *work*, like they've been putting work in. And so I'm saying it long, but the thing is that we have to uplift those folks who have been doing that work and recognize that in getting free, everybody plays different roles to get us free.

I think Black Lives Matters is doing a phenomenal job at addressing state-sanctioned violence interweaved with structural violence, but state-sanctioned violence is not the same as structural violence. People are doing the work around, "How do we respond to structural violence?" "How do we survive?" "How do we hold on to the best of who we are under these war-torn conditions?" And I think that we have to lift that work up and recognize that's another piece of the puzzle, and everybody can't do everything, right? There's art that needs to happen; there's spiritual work that needs to happen, and you can't keep going to—it's like if you think about health, right? You have different kinds of doctors—you got your cardiologist, you got your brain surgeon, you have your general practitioner, you have your OB/GYN. You aren't going to get mad at the cardiologist because he's not or she's not operating on your brain; that's why you need a brain surgeon. And if we all are going to work together to really make people healthy, you'd have to make sure there are conversations among all these kinds of health practitioners, right? But you can't say, "What's wrong with you, brain surgeon, why didn't you give them a better dietary plan?" because that's not their job; that's the role of the dietician. And so I think that that's what we have to recognize when we're talking about Black Lives Matter, structural violence, and crime and violence within Black communities.

Hayes: Yes. Could I ask you one last question? It's a bit of a selfish question because I'm from the South.

Abdullah: Sure.

Hayes: So I'm thinking again about the idea of the container, the bucket, and the process of containment. And when I think about the Black Lives Matter movement, one of the things I struggle with—and there

are a lot of things to struggle with because, again, there are contradictions—but one of the things I find really interesting, and that I find kind of hard is that even though the majority of Black folks in this genocidal nation have been contained in and relegated to the "American South," there aren't that many Black Lives Matter chapters in the South. So do you feel there are things that get missed when we look at, let's say, what happened to sixteen-year-old Shakara who was brutalized at Spring Valley High in Colombia, South Carolina, and the fact that Colombia is surrounded by rural country, and rural towns that work and function differently than large cities, and have a very long history of a very different regional culture, understanding, and approach. So, do you feel like you can speak to some of the things that may get missed in this focus on urban centers within the Black Lives Matter network?

Abdullah: So one, we do have some chapters in the south, and we have a phenomenal sister who's engaged in a lot of that work. There's this sister named Ash-Lee Henderson who is part of the movement, one of the leads who also worked with a group called Project South, right? And so she—and we, through her—are trying to deal with the specifics of some of the oppressions in the South. That said the way that we unfold as a movement is really around autonomy; there's semi-autonomy amongst chapters. My family is also from the south; my family's from Beaumont, Texas, so when I think about the conditions, and when I think about how my family experienced racism, and how my mother, especially having been raised in the segregated south, experienced racism, I think that in a lot of ways there's less of a veneer of tolerance in the south, which can create a level of paralysis, or confining of Black people to their own communities rather than directly disrupting white supremacy. So I think we're seeing that, but we're also seeing some people kind of coming out of that. If we look at what happened after—what was the city? McKinney? The one outside of Dallas, Texas?

Hayes: Oh yes. McKinney.

Abdullah: So if we look at what happened after those kids were beaten by the police, thousands of Black folks were in the streets, and with thousands of Black folks who don't ever do this rising up and directly confronting white supremacy, I think that's an indication of a New South. And the south is still pretty segregated, but I think this rising up is an indication for a lot of us. And now that we're talking about this continuum of struggle, I think you might have started to see it—it has always been there—but I think the first time I really started to see it was with the Jena Six in Louisiana. Remember what happened then?

Hayes: Yes, yes!

Abdullah: And also, people forget that Florida is in the south, right? The Dream Defenders started there. And what's happening there? I was just in Tampa, which is totally Southern. I hadn't been there before, but we were there protesting—and now I'm giving you too much of a story—but at that gathering for the Movement for Black Lives in Cleveland, I met the parents of a young brother, fourteen-year-old Andrew Joseph, who was killed in Tampa. I don't know why I felt connected to his mother but I did, and she looked like me for some reason, she had the same roundness to her face, and we started talking and found out we were cousins! She said her family is originally from Beaumont, Texas, so we were related.

So anyway, I came down to Tampa just last weekend for the Andrew Joseph memorial service. He was killed two years ago, so it was the second anniversary of his killing, and we were protesting in front of the fairgrounds where he was abducted by the police, and by the sheriff. And there they actually had an entire exhibit at the fairgrounds called "Cracker Country," and it was a celebration of the Old South. It was a celebration of slavery! So it is important that we recognize that even though we tend to think of Black Lives Matter as being an urban movement there are chapters that are southern chapters. We have a Tampa chapter, we have chapters in Austin, we have Project South, we have a Chattanooga, Tennessee chapter, right? We have different chapters, *and* the work is different because Black people, depending on where we live, experience different forms of racism. And so sometimes the work that's happening, especially in southern communities, is less visible than the work that's happening in urban centers where we have a more dense Black population, and a Black-led population that tends to be more confrontational toward the white hegemony and the white ruling class. So I hope that answers your questions.

Hayes: For sure. Wow! Thank you so much, Professor Abdullah, for all these things. You've given us so much to think through. Thank you again for your time. It has been so dynamic and a blessing to be able to engage with you in this way.

No one could have imagined how very important Prof. Abdullah's words would be so soon after hearing them. Less than half an hour after this conversation ended, for the second night in a row at the ABC Conference, we were faced with a keynote speaker who was behaving and speaking in terribly problematic and violent ways. In those moments, what does it mean to "disrupt it every time"? What does it mean to not "sit [t]here and take it"? What does it mean to be part of a movement for Black Liberation that takes seriously our mandate to "shut it down every time" because we "recognize that behavior as part of the hegemony that keeps us oppressed"? And what did these questions and this conversation mean within the very real context of having had a grueling evening the previous day that left many of the LGBTQ folk, as well as many folks raised within non-patriarchal and non-heteronormative family dynamics, feeling erased, silenced, and really questioning why we did not disrupt the misogynistic, anti-queer, heteronormative, heterosexist, patriarchal keynote speaker? Why did we choose silence? Why did we choose to leave the space instead of disrupting it?

With all of this circulating that evening, and with Prof. Abdullah's powerful words reverberating and echoing in my mind, about ten others and myself—most notably the courageous and audacious members of the Black Student Union at UC Irvine—were moved to stage an unplanned disruption and interruption during the keynote address. And while the ABC is undoubtedly an organization with Black Liberation on its mind, the way that played out in real time was shown to be problematic and harmful. When the organization was faced with some of its own contradictions, many of its members responded by doing what Prof. Abdullah makes clear we cannot do, which is to replicate and double the violence by silencing and throwing folks out. So there we were, a group of mostly queer women who were speaking our truths to power, and we were told to leave, to be silent, to "respect the speaker," to allow things to go on just as they were planned because "we paid for the speaker to come." There was no ability for those in the audience who wished we'd simply leave, sit down, or shut up to realize that we had also paid for this speaker to come, that we were also at one point excited to share space with the speaker, that we were staging an intervention the coalition and the movement should have been proud of and able to support.

Along with Prof. Abdullah, in the workshop I attended immediately before this conversation, Kadijah Means taught us it's just as important that we recognize and grapple with who is left out, silenced, erased, and *not* chosen to lead our movements as much as we recognize who *is* chosen to lead, given voice, and praised within them. To that end, Kadijah introduced many of us to Claudette Colvin, a fifteen-year-old Black girl who refused to give up her seat on a Montgomery bus nine whole months before Rosa Parks refused to do the same.[5] What does it mean that Colvin was not chosen to be "the face" of the Montgomery Bus Boycott movement? Why was she erased and asked to be silent? One of the reasons is because she was rumored to have been pregnant (though in contemporary documentaries she has insisted that she was not pregnant at the time, but became pregnant soon after), and the local leaders, mostly men affiliated with the NAACP, decided that she could not garner public sympathy. In other words, for them, Colvin fell outside of the acceptable image of the "respectable," "responsible" Black woman who mothers within a "traditional" patriarchal nuclear family unit. While I understand their actions and choices as part of a particular strategy, it is important to push back against

these kinds of political strategies because these choices, erasures, and silences serve to devalue people, lives, and ways of being, living, and loving that *do* matter.

The erasure and silencing of Black women and girls, Black LGBTQ folk, and Black folks who do not subscribe to the harmful respectability politics that continue to drive wedges between us is nothing new. It's the same erasure, silencing, and respectability politics that kept Pauli Murray, Juanita Nelson, and Ella Baker off the buses for the "First Freedom Rides" during the 1947 Journey of Reconciliation.[6] It was the same erasure, silencing, and respectability politics that kept Bayard Rustin from being widely recognized as one of the brilliant architects of not only the 1963 March on Washington for Jobs and Freedom, but also of the entire Civil Rights Movement. It is the same erasure, silencing, and respectability politics that kept fifteen-year-old Claudette Colvin from being the face of the 1955 Montgomery Bus Boycott though she had been forcibly removed, jailed, and fined for her courageous and audacious disruptive act. As we really think about the sociopolitical parallels, continuities, and similarities across movements and moments, let us pause to think about what kinds of silences and erasures continue to exist across them as well.

As Prof. Abdullah has taught us, it is not enough to simply disrupt things, especially intra-communally. As we move through the world in the various ways we do, and if we are about the liberation of *all* of us, if we are about full and complete Black Liberation, if we believe that *all* Black lives matter, if we believe in Black Power, we *must* take seriously Dr. Prof. Abdullah's move toward collective and communal healing. Perhaps the model of "Courageous Public Conversations" Prof. Abdullah briefly mentions is where some of us can begin. It is one way, though not the only way, we can plant and nurture sociopolitical and intellectual seeds that can grow into a new kind of Black consciousness that really *is* about the liberation of every single one of us. But it is also clear that many of us must begin this work by asking ourselves these questions: Who am I silencing and erasing in my political work? Who is absent from my organizing spaces? Who am I suffocating and not allowing any room for in my Freedom Dreams? Who have I already decided cannot be "the face(s)" of Black Liberation? And then critique and disrupt that thinking so that others will not have to put their bodies, minds, and hearts on the line to do it for you because after all, "we can't afford to lose any of us."

Notes

1. To view the interview with Jasmine Richards, see http://www.commondreams. org/views/2015/07/24/movement-not-moment.
2. For the official press release from UC-ABC explaining why divestment is imperative, see http://afrikanblackcoalition. org/2015/11/30/university-of-california-has-millions-invested-in-private-prisons/. For the official press release announcing ABC's partial victory against UC private prison investment, see http://afrikanblackcoalition.org/2015/12/18/afrikan-black-coalition-accomplishes-uc-prison-divestment/.
3. For the official press release on ABC's continued movement to divest from Wells Fargo, see http://afrikanblackcoalition.org/2016/01/11/uc-divestment-from-prisons-and-its-financiers-putting-wells-fargo-on-notice-2/.
4. See again http://afrikanblackcoalition.org/2015/11/30/university-of-california-has-millions-invested-in-private-prisons/.
5. For an interview with Claudette Colvin, and to hear it in her own words, see http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=101719889.
6. For more on this, please see http://paulimurrayproject.org/connecting-durham-stories/still-walking-for-justice/ as well as http://paulimurrayproject.org/ stillwalking4justice/.

A Conversation on the 2016 Presidential Election with Robert Smith and Melanye Price

*Mali Collins**
University of California, Irvine

I interviewed scholars Dr. Robert C. Smith of San Francisco State University and Dr. Melanye Price of Rutgers University to discuss how the presidential cycle is impacting and complicating Black life, as well as their meditations on electoral projections for this presidential cycle. Drs. Smith and Price were interviewed separately, but both interviews weigh in on Black voting trends of this new cycle, the rise of what they both name as White Nationalism and how Black Lives Matter is mobilizing young black voters and the politicians they elect.

Names of Speakers

Interview I

Robert Smith (hereinafter "Smith")
Mali D. Collins (hereinafter "Collins")

I spoke first with Dr. Smith, professor of political science at San Francisco State University. Author of several books, including Polarization and the Presidency: From FDR to Barack Obama (*2015). Our goal was to incorporate social factors in voting trends, including but not limited to increased media attention to police brutality in Black communities. How will Black life impact this presidential election? How will the next president impact Black life?*

Collins: How do you think race is being "instrumentalized" by campaigns in this presidential election? I see the way these discussions change, particularly around race, when any of the Democratic candidates first use the phrase "Black Lives Matter". I think it was Martin O'Malley who first used the name of the organization and movement.

Smith: Except for the issues raised by Black Lives Matter which are mass incarceration and the inequalities of the criminal justice system—which are important issues—there has not been much focus [among the candidates] on the core issues that confront the African-American community. Programs, policies, the discussion of the many issues that lead to the concentration of poverty—I don't think except on very general terms those issues have been addressed. Again aside from the criminal-justice system, you haven't seen very much in terms of focus on race issues beyond that. Take for example the discussion on the

* Direct correspondence to malic@uci.edu

attack on affirmative action, and those kinds of antipoverty initiatives, on the Democratic side. On the Republican side, there's been some discussion, but it's been kind of misleading. Except for Black Lives Matter, there's not yet been much of a focus on the Democratic Side. But the Republicans don't really have any compelling reasons—electoral reasons—to invest in the issue.

Collins: Right. So you don't think they have any **real** reasons? You don't think it's necessary that they address the issue? Why is that?

Smith: The Republicans? Well, they understand that their constituents are not really interested in doing anything about race problems or problems with African-Americans in this country. In fact, I think part of the underpinnings of Trump and that phenomenon is White Nationalism in just that Whites feel that Blacks and Latinos are moving ahead in society at their expense and that the government is in sense on the side of minorities rather than the beleaguered White working class so to speak, so I think that the Republican campaign is exaggerated by Trump, but sure this has been a thing of Republican politics for a long time. Whites feel that they are somehow beleaguered and the government is on the side of minorities rather than them.

Collins: I know you've written about conservatism and anti-Blackness. Although you know that there are still Black voters who vote Republican and particularly a lot of people who are still enthusiastic about Ben Carson, other Black people I know are invested or interested in voting for Trump. Can you talk a little about the dynamics that would cause Black people to lean toward conservative candidates or the appeal that Republican candidates would have for Black communities?

Smith: Well, I'll be surprised if Trump receives any support. Well I have relatives who say—I don't know if they're serious when they say this—they intend to support Trump because he is a "tough man," and "he can stand up and tell the truth." But I just think that's braggadocio. I would be very surprised. But we're not going to get a very good test of it. Because there are so few Black voters in the Republican primaries, it's not likely that there will be enough in the polls and in the surveys to see if Blacks voted for Carson or for Trump because the number of Black primary voters is so small. So my guess is that that number will be miniscule or a basic dropping. Even Carson, I don't think that Carson will get much Black support. But again it's going to be hard because I would expect that hardly any state will have any more than five to ten percent Blacks in the Republican electorate and therefore will not show up in the polls. So we won't be able to really know.

Collins: What do you think is at stake for Black communities in this presidential cycle?

Smith: Essentially in a third term for Obama, I think it's useful that Sanders is running, as an explicit Socialist. I think, particularly for young voters, they will take the negative connotation out of that word, and it won't be such a big thing as it is for the idea of older people. I think that will make that a much more plausible ideological alternative in the long run, but I don't think he has very much chance of winning the nomination. And Hilary in a way, because of the record of her husband, doesn't deserve Black support either. She was part and parcel of the Reaganism of the Clinton administration on crime, on welfare, and on affirmative action—essentially the core issues on African-Americans. As I say, [she] governed in the shadow of Ronald Reagan. You know in her memoir, Mrs. Clinton said that she "supported her husband doing those things for political reasons." So it's not about Clinton; it's essentially about an Obama third-term, because of the things that Obama was able to accomplish, particularly in legislation. If a Democrat is not elected, then the Republicans will dismantle the Affordable Care Act. In addition, the Republicans will do to food stamps and Medicaid what they did to welfare: Return it to the states to fix budgets, so we cannot be entitled by law to Medicaid and to food stamps. This would do enormous damage to poor African-Americans. This election, for black people, should not be a vote for Clinton, but it should be a vote against the Republicans, particularly because they have a very harsh antipoor peoples' agenda. The Ryan budget and all the Republican candidates have said they wish to dismantle what remains of the very fragile welfare system that we have, and turn it over to the states, and that would be bad, bad, bad. So the purpose of this election, and because neither of the Democratic candidates is committed to correcting this rush toward antipoor policies, this election is not promising good things but largely pivots around stopping the bad things promised by the Republican agenda.

And of course, there's been this talk that the next president will fill two or three Supreme Court positions. And we know the next president will put at least one. And that "one" could tip the balance

of the pull toward the progressives for a long time. So to replace Scalia with a liberal progressive would allow the court to undo the damaging things the conservatives have done in the last decade or so or more.

Collins: Are there going to be differences in Black voting trends this cycle? I'm particularly thinking not only because of activism and increased media attention in Black communities since the last presidential election but also because of crises like Flint. Do you think those things are going to change the way Black people vote? Or what kind of trends do you think will happen this cycle?

Smith: I think Black Lives Mater has made a difference because they now have the attention of Obama and both the Democratic candidates. A couple of the Republican candidates have addressed this problem—Rand Paul did, for example. But beyond that, I don't think that they will be much attuned to the real concerns of African-Americans. Blacks and Browns did an extraordinary thing last election. They voted at a higher rate than Whites in the 2012 election. So I doubt that Mrs. Clinton can duplicate that; I guess because it's Obama he's going to campaign as much as he can, but I would expect a decline in Black turnout in this election compared to the two previous elections. I think across the board—male and female, young and old, North and South—Mrs. Clinton will not be able to generate that kind of enthusiasm.

Interview II

Names of Speakers:

Melanye Price (hereinafter "Price")
Mali D. Collins (hereinafter "Collins")

Dr. Price is assistant professor of Africana Studies at Rutgers University, New Brunswick. She is the author of *Dreaming Blackness: Black Nationalism and African-American Public Opinion* (2006) and provided a critical turn in our discussion on the next election. She weighed in on how she sees young Black activism impacting the election, as well as her thoughts on anti-Black rhetoric in the 2016 cycle.

Collins: What do you think Black voters' concerns are for this election?

Price: I think there are a lot of concerns with this presidential election. Most importantly, I think they should be listening; everyone should be listening to the promises made on the Right. The kinds of things they are saying they are antagonistic; they're hurtful to people of color and specifically to black people, right? The kinds of things they have been saying about immigration, crime and punishment, about welfare, about medical access, all these things . . . they are really problematic for people of color and especially for poor people of color. And so I think it'd be tempting for people of color to say, "Oh, I don't vote Republican, so I don't have to pay attention to what they're saying." I think if they'd pay attention to what they're saying, they might be more energized to vote Democratic, if that's their choice. I think people have low energy on the Democratic side. I think one of the reasons people have low energy is because they're not paying attention to what the Republicans are saying.

Collins: Robert Smith mentioned that Black people should think of this election as not necessarily a vote for Hillary or Bernie but a vote against the Republican party.

Price: So I'm of two minds. I don't really care who you pick on the Democratic side, but I'm not particularly feeling Bernie Sanders, but at this point, I think you need to understand that whoever [sic] gets the Democratic nomination . . . you need to vote for them because a vote for them is a vote against Republicans, right? So at this point, we're letting the Democratic premise work out, and that's fine with me. And who you choose, and what you choose is important. The biggest consideration of all of this should be whether or not this person is someone who can win in the general election. I don't think we are in a point where we can say, "I'm gonna vote purely on principle and not on electability." We're not at the point because people on the right are *so* dangerous.

Collins: Do you think that these dangers are indicative of our political climate, or do you think that the presence of these candidates on the right that you see as "dangerous" is foretelling of a racial turn that our country is going to take, which is toward a more explicitly racialized America?

Price: Obama ushered in probably one of the most hyperaware racial moments in this country. People became hyperaware of the changing nature of race in this country. Because it was easy for them to not pay attention to how demographics were changing in this country as long as the people in power were White. So they thought, "Oh, we know there's a huge Latino population. Oh, we know that Black women are the largest demographic of voters. We know that Black people are moving forward and making political gains, but we still own the highest positions in the land." Right now, there aren't that many Black governors. We've had maybe six Black senators. There weren't that many people in the real spaces of power to make them understand that demographic shifts were happening. I think Barack Obama brings that to full force. He sort of makes them confront that. He makes Whites confront that in a very real way. And basically, much of what I'm saying is what I'm just calling White Nationalist temper tantrum.

I want to be clear that it's not Obama's fault. Any Black president—any non-White president—probably would have brought on this same kind of ire. So it's not personal. It's symbolic. It's the symbolism of having that Black face in this White office, and it's led people to do things that are against their own principles, making people go directly against themselves; we have footage of what they said before and superstitions that are actually anathema to their interests . . . We've seen them do all of this.

Collins: I don't hear the same anti-Black rhetoric on the Democratic side, but there is a sense of White liberalism particularly in Hilary Clinton who has always boasted a campaign and project of helping poor mothers and children, or deploying code words such as "disadvantaged communities" that, in their lack of specificity, could be read as anti-Black. Do you think this speaks to her lack of ability and explicit concern for Black Americans? How do you think anti-Blackness is being played out on both sides of the race?

Price: We're at a moment where I don't think you can actually accuse the Democratic Party of being anti-Black. If it's not anti-Black, it's also not certainly pro-Black. Maybe it's "neutral-Black." Sometimes it's been anti-Black. But even in its best moments—in the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the 1965 Voting Act—it has been "neutral-Black." In its worst moments it has been anti-Black. I think there's something that's happening in this moment of racial polarization; they are finally coming to grips with the fact that they have core constituents that can actually get them into the White House. They see a way into the non-White majority. And because of that, they are playing to Blacks and Latinos. And Republicans are helping them by alienating them.

And so now, in the 1980s and 1990s, we have the Democrats running away from identity politics. They don't want anything to do with it. Nothing! They're going out of their way to appeal to soccer moms and Nascar dads and angry White males, and Bill Clinton was the architect of a lot of that. His wife is having to directly run against that. Bernie Sanders is having to run directly against that. I think a lot of that we can attribute to Black Lives Matter, who got there really early. It was in their lack of knowledge in presidential politics BLM pushed them further than anybody, right? So BLM does things that nobody should ever do at rallies. They literally jump on the stage. That changes everything. I think the demographics of who is going to get them into the White House are important. Sixty-five percent of the Democratic Party in South Carolina is Black.

And so it's an understanding of who are the people that can get them elected. One of the things that Barack Obama helped do is have some Whites and a lot of people of color and get elected. And they understand that.

Collins: So for young black voters like myself who have only had the opportunity to vote in one election or none at all, how do you think that young Black voters will impact voting trends for this upcoming election?

Price: It's hard to know. It's hard to know with young people, period. One of the things is that Black people really need the dream stuff that Obama was selling. And it's only right that what you're selling is that you can make some of their dreams come true. Clinton doesn't sell dreams very well. So it's unclear to me what it's going to look like.

I think that these kids are very activist driven. But that doesn't mean that they're voter ready. So when I talk to my students, they're very much ready to be engaged in politics, and they're protesting all over. They're ready to throw down governments in front of everybody. But that's not the same as election

politics. So it's unclear to me what that actually means. Also as young people, they are very quick to say that they may opt out of the process because they don't have a long-term investment in it.

Collins: Why not?

Price: Well, they just haven't been voting for as long, and they don't own houses, they don't have parents they're taking care of, they haven't even started paying their student loans back yet. It's all of these things that make you pay attention to the minutia of politics. They're not out trying to find nursing homes for their grandmas. They're not paying taxes for the most part. They're not trying to figure out if they're losing all the wealth in their houses. That's something that comes with age, where you start to become invested in the habit of voting. At twenty-two years you haven't developed that.

These kids . . . history is not the thing that motivates them because they're not beholden to it. They're neither excited about nor beholden to history. They don't feel an obligation to history, and they don't know a whole lot of it.

Collins: Outside of protesting or explicit activism, in what other ways do you see your students or other young people in general mobilizing in maybe not new ways but the ways political thrusts happen in the private sphere?

Price: Most of what I see is students that are engaged in very localized activism. The number of students involved in on-campus activism is higher this year than all the five years that I've been at Rutgers. When I first came here five years ago, the thing that we were talking about was the general apathy among students. Nobody would say that right now. Everybody is in full-on activist mode. Part of it is they are coming to a very clear racial understanding that many of them were not raised with. I'm not saying they didn't know they were Black, but it wasn't a politicized Blackness because they were a multicultural generation thinking it's all better that we look like a rainbow.

But now they're coming to grip with the specificity of Blackness and with the ways in which being Black represents a specific experience in the American political process.

"Teaching Trayvon" at Irvine: On Feminist Praxis, Afro-pessimism, and "Woke Work"

*M. Shadee Malaklou**
Beloit College

Keywords: Trayvon Martin; Non-Black students of color; Afro-pessimism; Wake work; Gender and sexuality studies; Race and gender in the classroom; Antiracist pedagogy; Anti-Black violence; Asian-American and Asian students; White students; Race politics; California

This essay politicizes how one might teach "non-Black" students of color, specifically Asian or Asian-American students with relative social and political or "passing White" privilege, at a large research institution about nonanalogous experiences of racial Blackness as coursework in gender and sexuality studies.[1] Antiracist pedagogy, even in such heady times as these, in which "recent discussions on intersectionality in political science have sparked increased attention in research to race, gender, and other identity categories," presents consistent challenges, specifically regarding comparative racisms (Alexander-Floyd 2014, 3).[2] The curricula I recount makes non-Black racial differences inanalogous to racial Blackness because it historicizes Black social and political and thus material life as a "becoming toward death" characterized by "accumulation and fungibility" (Wilderson 2010, 85, 26). It reads for this structure or political ontology in local sites and as embodied knowledges to animate what Christina Sharpe describes as "wake work" (2014).

I describe the practice of teaching Trayvon Martin's murder and the response his life and death elicited from legal and media institutions, including new media sites that invite citizen journalists to participate in "hashtagavism" (i.e., hashtag activism), as a special topic in summer sessions of "Gender and Popular Culture" (2013, 2014) and "Gender and Power" (2015)[3]—core courses in Gender and Sexuality Studies at the University of California, Irvine. These courses regularly attract nonmajors because they fulfill two general education credits each: Arts and Humanities, and Multicultural Studies. They especially attract nonmajors during the two summer sessions Irvine hosts annually: Summer Session 1 (June–July) and Summer Session 2 (August–September). Summer courses meet for six hours each week or a total of thirty-six hours; mine met twice a

* Direct correspondence to malaklom@uci.edu

week for two hours and 50 minutes each or a total of thirty-four hours, because each class meeting I allocated ten minutes to a break that students used to breathe new curiosities and translations into discussions.

My pedagogical approach was twofold: I anchored course topics and themes in popular cultures and trends to bait students otherwise disinterested in anti-Black violence to interrogate the ideological work of racial Blackness. As well, I operationalized a distinction between a liberal humanist model of inclusion and the more radical education in structural antagonism that is possible yet, by capitalizing on and upsetting student expectations. Students received me as a woman of color rather than a pedagogue and hoped to find in my person and politics a multiculturalist coconspirator, in other words, a "feel-good" class about Trayvon Martin and what his life and the movements surrounding his murder make meaningful for *them*. With a few exceptions, my mostly White and Asian-American students looked for themselves in reading and viewing assignments, which is to say, as Anna Sampaio does, they expected the course "to serve merely as a form of 'therapy', that is, as a learning environment centered largely, if not entirely, on sharing personal experiences and one not suited for rigorous academic analysis" (2006, 918).

I instead wielded what social and cultural capital I could in the classroom (as the pedagogue, after all) not toward liberal, colorblind, or multiculturalist ends, which can only ever entrench racial hierarchies, but toward an ethical rejection of liberal pluralism. By counterintuitively encouraging students to lean into hierarchal race knowledge, I curated a more radical lesson in anti-Black discursive-material relations. This approach reflects my training in Culture and Theory, a PhD program at Irvine in critical race, gender, and sexuality studies which at present attracts graduate students partial to Afro-pessimism: a turn in Black studies *toward* the shame in which Black persons are thought of as less and Other than human (Nyong'o 2002). I privilege Afro-pessimism in the classroom as well and especially in/as gender and sexuality studies because it

> teaches us all how we might better inhabit multiplicity under general conditions at the global scale for which such inhabitation has become (and perhaps always has been or must be) a necessary virtue. And it does so less through pedagogical instruction than through an exemplary transmission: emulation of a process of learning through the posing of a question, rather than imitation of a form of being (Sexton 2011, 8, 9).[4]

I propose "Teaching Trayvon" as a feminist project not (only) because the movements for Black life it animated are "rooted in the labor and love of queer Black women" or because they elaborate the murder of Black youth as a reproductive rights issue but also and notably because his murder underscores how "Black people are deprived of basic human rights and [dignities]" as a matter of *fact* (Garza, Tometi, and Cullors).[5] That Black lives don't and, Jared Sexton argues, *can't* (epistemologically) matter suggests that racially Black persons "inhabit multiplicity" as a series of questions, for example, about what it means to be sentient but not sovereign (Marriott 2000) or to occupy flesh as a "hieroglyphics" without signification as body (Spillers 1987).

If Black persons are structurally proscribed from the species of Man, in other words, if Black persons are subhuman and/or suprahuman, by which I mean vulnerable like dogs but dangerous like "demons"[6]—actor Michael B. Jordan reflects in an interview with Oprah Winfrey about his performance as Oscar Grant in the biographical film *Fruitvale Station* (dir. Ryan Coogler 2013), "Black males . . . are America's pit bull. We're labeled vicious, inhumane and left to die on the street"—then Black lives can only matter insofar

as they cannot matter as human and pave the way for an/Other relationality or sociality. It is to this effect that Sexton reminds us, "Black life is not lived in the world that the world lives in, but it is lived underground, in outer space" (2011, 28). Black life as "a type of living on that survives after a type of death" (23) thus anticipates the hermeneutics posthumanist feminism proclaims to seek, for instance in studies of the cyborg.

Afro-pessimism enumerates social and political constructions of the body *essential* to the study and historicity of sex and gender, pre-empting topics and themes like undifferentiated sex, matter out of place, biological determinism, sexual perversity, gender fluidity, reproductive rights, and alternative kinships, to list just a few examples (Spillers 1987; Hartman 1997; Sexton 2015). Its theoretical framework resonates in ethnic, specifically, Asian-American Studies as well, because Black persons are the *stuff* of pathology. They unconditionally experience the vitriol and disgust with which non-Black persons of color, like sexual minorities and gender nonconforming persons, are occasionally received, indeed infrequently if one is an upwardly mobile "model" minority.

Comparative Racisms

When Asian-American students of Irvine's Lambda Theta Delta fraternity posted a Blackface video to YouTube on April 16, 2013, the world took notice, if only to wag a nagging finger at students of color who, per multiculturalist dictum, should know better. Members of the fraternity, however, did not "intend" racial terror and further discounted allegations of racism precisely because as first- and second-generation Americans, they claimed not to inherit the New World's racial-*cum*-spectacular ways of seeing and knowing Black bodies, including the uniquely but not exclusively American "structures of feeling" that induce Blackface *as* minstrelsy (Williams 1954).[7]

But Tiffany Willoughby-Herard suggests that first- and second-generation Americans like Asian-Americans are certainly familiar with this history because "ideas about the non-White immigrant" in the United States are "inextricably linked to the institution of [racial chattel slavery] and ideas about the [chattel slave]" (2014, 511). Which is to say, as Claire Kim does, "Asian-Americans have not been racialized in a vacuum"; they are "racially triangulated vis-à-vis Blacks and Whites or located in the field of racial positions with reference to these two other points" (1999, 106, 107).[8] Activist Kim Tran recounts in *Everyday Feminism* that this triangulation prods Asian-Americans to invoke the Black imago as a tried-and-true strategy for activating their own "honorary Whiteness":

> The model minority myth and the criminalization of Black and brown folks in our communities have given many Asian Americans a false sense of honorary whiteness and severed us from building coalition with other communities of color. Maybe more importantly, the Black community frequently serves as our negative definition—the people we don't want to be. We're told we're not like "them". We are the products of hard work and our merit will help us rise high and far from the images of poverty and crime that define Black America (2016).

Thus, to evacuate the question of racial Blackness from the study of Asian and Asian-American subjectivities has the potential to shut down substantive conversations about how racial differences are compounded, to say nothing about how it can absolve Asian and Asian-American communities from accountability for their anti-Black racism, at the University of California and elsewhere, for example, in Brooklyn, where ten thousand people, mostly Chinese Americans, gathered on February 20, 2016, to protest

former police officer Peter Lang's conviction. Lang, who testified to shooting and killing Akai Gurley on November 20, 2014, because his firearm "accidentally" discharged, is the first New York state police officer found guilty of on-duty manslaughter in more than ten years. His supporters in Brooklyn bemoaned, "Chinese Americans count as well" (Walker and Balsamo 2016); their slogan "No scapegoat!" and allegations of "selective justice" exemplify the anti-Black racism with which Asian-American communities intuit and respond to their racial triangulations.

Of concern are not admissions policies and statistics, though I list them anyway, but the tyranny Black students' experience at public institutions of higher education because the state assumes, to paraphrase late Justice Antonin Scalia, that Black persons lack the capacity (even if they can sometimes muster the will) to compete with White and Asian or Asian-American students at "advanced" research institutions like the University of California. I am not suggesting that public institutions of higher education should oust Asian and/or Asian-American students to make room for Black ones, nor am I invoking the "Oppression Olympics" typically associated with anti-Asian bias in Black communities (Shulman and Smith 2005; Butz and Yogeeswaran 2011; Oliver and Wong 2003; Cummings and Lambert 1997; Ha 2010). Rather, I want to think critically about how the state actively resegregates K–12 public education and especially high schools that might otherwise serve and prepare Black students for admission to state universities.

Since at least 1989, Irvine has been home to more Asian and Asian-American students than any other University of California campus; by 2008, ethnically Asian students accounted for more than half of Irvine's student body (Davidson 1989; NBC News 2009). Statistics for Black enrollment are grim by contrast. According to data culled by Irvine's Office of Institutional Research, nearly two thousand ethnically Asian students matriculated in Fall 2015 compared to less than two hundred Black students. Further, while the state of California publically avows a commitment to accessible public higher education for Black students, enrollment numbers for ethnically Asian students are too frequently cited as the ringer to dispute grievances made by Black students.

Precisely because Irvine is a jewel of diversity in the University of California's neoliberal crown, its students reproduce "nostalgically grotesque" ways of looking at Black persons and cultures that bear scrutiny (Scheper 2007).[9] These "blueprints of expectation and response" (Lorde 1984, 123) are not unique but paradigmatic of relations bolstered, in the neoliberal parlance, by "inclusive excellence," which can only ever entrench racial Blackness as a structural antagonism (Sexton 2008).[10] Black students' conspicuous absence on campus Whitens Irvine, making it possible for other students of color to access its historical and social currency, regardless of how "unreliable" it has been, for example, in Asian-American history (Reft 2013; Tsang 1983, 1998, 2000, 2001). As a non-Black instructor of color, I teach racial differences and their power-knowledge regimes comparatively to underscore how social and political privilege is leveraged.

Getting Woke

The non-Black student body's hostile response to direct action organized by Irvine's Black Student Union in the weeks following Lambda Theta Delta's video, including the note "Go Back [to] Africa Slave," slipped into Black student Charity Lyons' backpack during science lab on May 7, 2013, provokes further speculation about the efficacy of the

additive model on which diversity programs at Irvine and elsewhere pivot. A program of "inclusive excellence" organizes racial differences in a lateral or horizontal and not a vertical or hierarchal array—a gesture that does nothing to dismantle relations of power. A model like Culture and Theory's, partial to Afro-pessimism, instead concedes to race relations *as they are*, contextualizing racial differences in their assigned hierarchies to think locally, globally, and comparatively. A model attendant to racial hierarchies outs racial Blackness as the "zero degree of social conceptualization" and "lacerations, woundings, fissures, tears, scars, openings, ruptures, lesions, rendings [and] punctures" exacted from Black flesh as the raw material of all race knowledge (Spillers 1987, 67).

Galvanized by events on campus and the administration's response, which was to cite these as "isolated" incidents (Cole 2015), I taught "Gender and Popular Culture" about screen cultures and anti-Black political economies in August and September 2013, as the special topic "Teaching Trayvon". Thirty-one students enrolled in my Summer 2013 course: ten Asian or Asian-American students and two Black or mixed-race students. I updated "Teaching Trayvon" to query Michael Brown's spectacular lynching and its outcry, including emergent "hashtagavism" in which Black persons are counted in social media "without counting" (Ricks 2015), when I taught the course for a second term, attracting upwards of forty-five students—sixteen Asian or Asian-American students and two Black students—in August and September 2014. I taught the final iteration of the course, by then renamed "Black Lives (Don't) Matter," in August and September 2015 to no more than sixteen students: approximately eight Asian or Asian-American students and one Black student.

"Teaching Trayvon" prompted politically vigilant and necessarily uncomfortable conversations about how new media like Facebook and Twitter and old media like broadcast and print journalism cultivate anti-Black viscera, gut, and instinct in viewer-consumers to authorize anti-Black violence. Its reading and viewing assignments queried the *politics* of blackface or "the ways in which over a period of decades and centuries Black people have been dehumanized, that is to say represented as less than human" in "the representational politics that one sees through the media" (Davis 2016, 34). The emphasis on media production and consumption was incited by events at Irvine but is neither irrelevant nor incidental. Born at the hour of another Black Lives Matter movement to abolish chattel slavery, and tasked with cohering the imagined community of a broken nation, American media in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries made Blackface the first mass-produced popular entertainment in the United States (Robinson 2007). The minstrel show caricatures racial slavery as a social good to justify anti-Black violence at the precise moment in which Black persons might qualify as human, or at the very least, at a critical moment in which the terms that (still) make Black lives structurally fungible were being debated.

Students learned how to navigate popular racialized humanist discourses of masculinity using feminist theories and methods enumerated in canonical texts like Audre Lorde's "Age, Race, Class, and Sex: Women Redefining Difference" and "The Master's Tools Will Never Dismantle the Master's House" (1984), bell hooks' *Ain't I a Woman? Black Women and Feminism* (1981), Kimberle Crenshaw's "Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence against Women of Color" (1991), Angela Davis' "Reflections on the Black Woman's Role in the Community of Slaves" (1972), and Toni

Cade Bambara's "On the Issue of Roles" (1970). I paired their texts with essays written by contemporary scholar-activists like Ta-Nehisi Coates, Mia McKenzie, Dani McClain, Monica J. Casper, Omar Ricks, Darnell L. Moore, Shahn King, and Brittney Cooper for publication in newspapers and magazines like *The New York Times, Salon,* and *The Atlantic* and on blogs like *Mic, The Feminist Wire,* and *Black Girl Dangerous*. These popular essays introduced students to urgent experiences of anti-Blackness as events unfold in real time, furnishing the case studies students used independently (at home) and collaboratively (in class) to test theoretical frameworks. One student notes in their 2015 evaluation, "This is one of the only courses I've ever completed every single reading assignment for and actually enjoyed doing it."

I committed eleven and a half hours of a thiry-four-hour course to the study of Trayvon Martin's murder, specifically to the infotainment erected to sensationalize his death and buoy George Zimmerman's legal exoneration. Students considered how Trayvon was tried for Zimmerman's crimes and further unpacked how a jury of six women, five of them white and one of them Hispanic, tried Trayvon not "as a child buying candy" but "as a thug" (Casper 2013). We discussed how and why Trayvon was tried for what juror B-37 suspects are the crimes he would have committed had he lived past age seventeen and meditated on a question that many racialized young people in this society inherit: "What could Trayvon have done, if anything, to ward off certain death?" (Davidson 2013). Or, as Charles Blow poses the question: "At what precise pace should a black man walk to avoid suspicion?" (2013).[11] I allocated an additional five and a half hours to the study of how Zimmerman curated and deployed his passing White privilege, which prompted the university's upwardly mobile Asian and Asian-American students who had enrolled in the class to indirectly but robustly interrogate their own access, however conditional, to social and cultural capital. In its third iteration—"Black Lives (Don't) Matter"—I added reading and viewing assignments to this unit about Rachel Dolezal's "transraciality," which further encouraged non-Black students of color to interrogate how the color-blind ideologies that scaffold diversity discourse authorize and enable Black erasure.

I allocated one class meeting or two hours and fifty minutes each to the units "Representing Differences" and "Coopting Differences" for which I yoked reading and viewing assignments from the inaugural year's headlines. In "Representing Differences," for example, students deliberated why a Cheerios ad in 2013 featuring a Black father, White mother, and interracial child provoked racist comments so vitriolic that Cheerios disabled its YouTube comments section (Goyette 2013). They further contemplated if interracial couplings in which no Black persons are counted incite similar vitriol, on and off screens. Also in this unit, students considered how Paula Deen's "plantation nostalgia" resonates with and reinforces her brand (Rosenberg 2013). In the unit "Coopting Differences," students interrogated visual cultures, for example, that caricature the Harlem Shake and in which celebrities like Miley Cyrus and later Ellen DeGeneres "twerk" to curate and/or parody "ratchet" personalities that objectify actual Black persons and cultures.

Reading and viewing assignments in the unit "Disembodied Identities" further prompted students to interrogate new technologies of lynching and minstrelsy, for example, in video or Google Play games and as Facebook memes. In 2014, I added "Beauty and Consumer Culture: The whiter, the better," about how hair- and skin-care industries exploit racialized ideologies of sex and gender; and "Gender and the Sports-Media Complex," about

racism in professional sports. In 2015, I added three more units to consolidate reading and viewing assignments that elaborate "the performative enactment of our ensemble of always already role-allocated individual and collective behaviors" (Wynter 2015, 32, 33). They included: "Scenes of Subjection," about the convergence of Black material death and sexual terror, for example, in staged lynchings (Hartman 1997); "Humanism and Its Black Others," about the exclusion of Black persons from Enlightenment genealogies of the Human; and "Racial Economies of Sex and Desire," about how racial differences are intuited, especially by persons of color, to distribute and arrange desire and identification and thus prefigure the conditions and relations of attraction and attachment. I allocated one class meeting or two hours and fifty minutes each to reading and viewing assignments in these units, but they provoked discussions and interlocutions in other units as well.

Coursework in gender and sexuality studies that foregrounds anti-Black political economies must outfit students with a toolbox which they can use to interrogate their own hermeneutic or sensory knowledge of the world for the ways in which this knowledge is overdetermined or saturated by the experience of living *in* an always already anti-Black world. Students must, in other words, think critically about the politics of their identifications. The task at hand is what Christina Sharpe describes as "wake work," but also and notably, *woke* work, because the Black feminist revolution hailed by the rejoinder Black Lives Matter "begins with the self and in the self" (Bambara 1970, 109). Indeed, in a world that has erected infrastructures and superstructures committed to making Black lives fungible, our students, like ourselves, must look inward to make Black lives matter.

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank my friend, colleague, and mentor, *National Political Science Review* Managing Editor Tiffany Willoughby-Herard, for her generous, attentive, and critical comments to this essay, and more to the point, for showing me the way across generations and space-times. I am lucky to count myself in your company.

Notes

1. I differentiate between Black and "non-Black" persons of color to underscore how the latter activate passing White privilege in a multiculturalist society. A multiculturalist color line invites racially distinct persons into its folds by entrenching racial Blackness as a structural antagonism (Sexton 2008).
2. See also: Jordan-Zachery, Julia. 2007. "Am I a Black Woman or a Woman Who Is Black?: A Few Thoughts on the Meaning of Intersectionality." *Politics & Gender* 3 (2): 254–263; Brunsma, David L., Peggy Placier, and Eric Brown. 2012. "Teaching Race at Historically White Colleges and Universities: Identifying and Dismantling the Walls of Whiteness." *Critical Sociology:* 1–22; Simien, Evelyn. 2004. "Black Feminist Theory: Charting a Course for Black Women's Studies in Political Science." *Women & Politics* 26 (2): 81–93; Monforti, Jessica Lavariega, and Melissa R. Michelson. "Diagnosing the Leaky Pipeline: Continuing Barriers to the Retention of Latinas and Latinos in Political Science." *PS: Political Science & Politics* 41 (1): 161–166.
3. Summer courses occasion an opportunity for the concentrated study and defense of "the dead, the dying, and those living lives consigned, in aftermath of legal chattel slavery, to death that is always-imminent and immanent" (Sharpe 2014, 60). Summer session students can immerse themselves in the "position of the unthought" and to "try to bring that position into view without making it a locus of positive value" free from the obligations of the academic year (Hartman and Wilderson 2003, 185).
4. Angela Davis makes a similar argument in her 2014 interview with Frank Barat, wherein she notes that "Black struggle in the US serves as an emblem of the struggle for freedom. It's emblematic of larger struggles for freedom. So within the sphere of Black politics, I would also have to include struggles

against repressive immigration politics. I think it's important to point to what is often called the Black radical tradition. And the Black radical tradition is related not simply to Black people but to all people who are struggling for freedom. . . . [For example,] We have to look at the way in which anti-Muslim racism has really thrived on the foundation of anti-Black racism" (Davis 2016, 39).

5. Afro-pessimism revisits Fanon's distinction in *Black Skin, White Masks* (1952) between "the fact" of racial Blackness—its "social death" (Patterson 1982) or ontological crisis (Wilderson 2010)—and the "lived experience" of racial Blackness, which endures, indeed, "survives after a type of death" (Sexton 2011, 23).
6. Recall that Ferguson, Missouri, police officer Darren Wilson testified to fearing for his life because he perceived Michael Brown, who was unarmed and approached Wilson with his hands up, as a "demon".
7. The video was posted with the disclaimer "No racism intended." Anti-Blackness, however, transcends intention; it engenders "'energies, concerns, points of attention, anxieties, pleasures, appetites, revulsions, and phobias capable of both great mobility and tenacious fixation'" (Sexton in Wilderson 2010, 7).
8. Claire Kim explains, "Racial triangulation occurs by means of two types of simultaneous, linked processes: (1) processes of 'relative valorization,' whereby dominant group A (White) valorizes subordinate group B (Asian-Americans) relative to subordinate group C (Blacks) on cultural and/or racial grounds in order to dominant both groups, but especially the latter, and (2) processes of 'civic ostracism,' whereby dominant group A (Whites) constructs subordinate group B (Asian Americans) as immutably foreign and unassimilable with Whites on cultural and/or racial grounds in order to ostracize them from the body politic and civic membership" (1999, 107).
9. "Nostalgic Grotesque" is Jeanne Scheper's description of anti-Black scopic regimes that induce pleasure and terror (2007).
10. Irvine's Office of Inclusive Excellence, which Provost and Executive Vice Chancellor Enrique Lavernia promises "will elevate UCI's commitment to equity, diversity and inclusion among faculty, graduate students and undergraduates and advance our campus as a national leader and global model for inclusion," is paradigmatic of the diversity-making that can only ever reproduce anti-Black political and libidinal relations. This office has been created, he explains, to "oversee institutional accountability, mount education and training programs, conduct responsive research, and build partnerships with universities and colleges dedicated to inclusive excellence." It will further "foster and fortify a campus culture in which faculty and students alike expect equity, support [and] diversity and practice inclusion" (Lavernia 2016).
11. Amy Davidson elaborates, "The idea that Martin, when he saw a light-skinned man looking at him strangely, should have realized his mistake and cleared out is a way of saying that he ought to have been exquisitely conscious of his blackness, of how he looked. Zimmerman's lawyers argued that Zimmerman was properly scared; more subtly, they made the case that it was perverse of Martin not to recognize and manage his own scariness. And yet there are complications in instructing a black teen-ager to start running: Martin seems to have alarmed Zimmerman and the police dispatcher both when he moved too quickly and when he was slow" (2013).

References

Alexander-Floyd, Nikol. 2014. "Why Political Scientists Don't Study Black Women, But Historians and Sociologists Do: On Intersectionality and the Remapping of the Study of Black Political Women." *National Political Science Review* 16: 3–18.

"Asian Americans blast UC admissions policy." 2009. *NBCNews.com,* 24 April 2009. http://www.nbcnews.com/id/30393117/ns/us_news-life/t/asian-americans-blast-uc-admissions-policy/#.Vp3CGfH4PIo.

Bambara, Toni Cade. 1970. "On the Issue of Roles." In *The Black Woman: An Anthology*, edited by Toni Cade Bambara. New York: New American Library.

Blow, Charles. 2013. "The Whole System Failed Trayvon Martin." *The New York Times*, July 15, 2013. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/16/opinion/the-whole-system-failed.html?_r=0.

Butz, David A., and Kumar Yogeeswaran. 2011. "A new threat in the air: Macroeconomic threat increases prejudice against Asian Americans." *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology* 47(1): 22–27.

Casper, Monica J. "No Justice for Trayvon: White Women in the Jury Box." *The Feminist Wire.* 17 July 2013. http://www.thefeministwire.com/2013/07/no-justice-for-trayvon-white-women-in-the-jury-box/.

Cole, Megan. 2015. "UCI Task Force Responds to Black Student Union Demands for Positive Campus Climate," *New University*, 24 November 2015. http://www.newuniversity.org/2015/ 11/news/uci-task-force-responds-to-black-student-union-demands-for-positive-campus-climate/.

Crenshaw, Kimberle. 1991. "Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence against Women of Color." *Stanford Law Review* 43 6(June): 1241–99.

Cummings, Scott, and Thomas Lambert. 1997. "Anti-Hispanic and Anti-Asian Sentiments among African Americans." *Social Science Quarterly* 78(2): 338–53.

Davidson, Jean. 1989. "UCI May Adopt Ethnic Course as Requirement." *Los Angeles Times*, 13 April 1989. http://articles.latimes.com/1989-04-13/news/mn-1940_1_percentage-of-asian-students-uci-has-top-percentage-uc-berkeley.

Davidson, Amy. 2013. "What Should Trayvon Martin Have Done?" *The New Yorker,* 17 July 2013. http://www.newyorker.com/news/amy-davidson/what-should-trayvon-martin-have-done.

Davis, Angela. 1972. "Reflections on the Black Woman's Role in the Community of Slaves." *The Massachusetts Review* 13(1/2) (Winter–Spring): 81–100.

———. 2016. *Freedom Is A Constant Struggle: Ferguson, Palestine, and the Foundations of a Movement.* Chicago, IL: Haymarket Books.

Garza, Alicia, Opal Tometi, and Patrisse Cullors. "A Herstory of the #BlackLivesMatter Movement: The Creation of a Movement." *Who We Are, Black Lives Matter.* http://blacklivesmatter.com/herstory/.

Goyette, Braden. 2013. "Cheerios Commercial Featuring Mixed Race Family Gets Racist Backlash." *Huffington Post,* 31 May 2013. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/05/31/cheerios-commercial-racist-backlash_n_3363507.html.

Ha, Shang E. "The consequences of multiracial contexts on public attitudes toward immigration." *Political Research Quarterly* 63(1): 29–42.

Hartman, Saidiya. 1997. *Scenes of Subjection: Terror, Slavery and Self-Making in Nineteenth-Century America.* New York: Oxford University Press.

Hartman, Saidiya, and Frank Wilderson. 2003. "The Position of the Unthought" *Que Parle* 13(2) (Spring/Summer): 183–201.

hooks, bell. 1981. *Ain't I a Woman? Black Women and Feminism.* New York: Routledge.

Jordan, Michael B. *Oprah's Next Chapter*. 2013. Season 2, Episode 246. 08 December 2013. http://www.oprah.com/own-oprahs-next-chapter/Why-Michael-B-Jordan-Says-Black-Males-Are-Americas-Pit-Bulls-Video.

Kim, Claire. 1999. "The Racial Triangulation of Asian Americans." *Politics and Society* 27(1): 105–38.

Lavernia, Enrique. 2016. "Office of Inclusive Excellence." Message to employees and students, 20 January 2016. Email.

Lorde, Audre. 1984. "Age, Race, Class, and Sex: Women Redefining Difference" and "The Master's Tools Will Never Dismantle The Master's House." *Sister Outsider: Essays and Speeches by Audre Lorde.* Berkeley: Crossing Press.

Marriott, David. 2000. *On Black Men.* New York: Columbia University Press.

McClain, Dani. 2014. "The Murder of Black Youth Is a Reproductive Justice Issue." *The Nation,* 13 August 2014. http://www.thenation.com/ article/murder-black-youth-reproductive-justice-issue/.

Nyong'o, Tavia. 2002. "Racist Kitsch and Black Performance." *Yale Journal of Criticism* 15(2): 371–91.

Oliver, J. Eric, and Janelle Wong. 2003. "Intergroup Prejudice in Multiethnic Settings." *American Journal of Political Science* 47(4): 567–82.

Reft, Ryan. 2013. "Only Some May Follow: Southern California, Asian Americans, and Housing during the Cold War." *Topics of Meta: Historiography for the Masses*, 11 November 2013. https://tropicsofmeta.wordpress.com/2013/11/11/only-some-may-follow-southern-california-asian-americans-and-housing-during-the-cold-war/.

Ricks, Omar. 2015. "# (or, Counted without Counting)," *The Feminist Wire*, 20 August 2015. http://www.thefeministwire.com/2015/08/or-counted-without-counting.

Robinson, Cedric. 2007. *Forgeries of Memory and Meaning: Blacks and the Regimes of Race in American Theater and Film before World War II.* Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.

Rosenberg, Alyssa. 2013. "TV Chef Paula Deen's Plantation Nostalgia And The Resentments of Racists." *Think Progress,* 20 June 2013. http://thinkprogress.org/alyssa/2013/06/20/2185391/tv-chef-paula-deens-plantation-nostalgia-and-the-resentments-of-racists/.

Sampaio, Anna. 2006. "Women of Color Teaching Political Science: Examining the Intersections of Race, Gender, and Course Material in the Classroom." *PS: Political Science & Politics* 39(4): 917–22.

Scheper, Jeanne. 2007. "'Of la Baker, I Am a Disciple': The Diva Politics of Reception." *Camera Obscura* 22(2): 73–101.

Schulman, Steven, and Robert C. Smith. 2005. "Immigration and African Americans." *African Americans in the U.S. Economy,* edited by Cecilia A. Conrad, John Whitehead, Patrick L. Mason, and James Stewart. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.

Sexton, Jared. 2008. *Amalgamation Schemes: Antiblackness and the Critique of Multiracialism.* Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

———. 2011. "The Social Life of Social Death: On Afro-Pessimism and Black Optimism." *In* Tensions 5 (Fall/Winter): 1–47.
———. 2015. "Unbearable Blackness." *Cultural Critique* 90(Spring): 159–78.
Sharpe, Christina. 2014. "Black Studies: In the Wake." *The Black Scholar* 44(2) (Summer): 59–69.
Spillers, Hortense. 1987. "Mama's Baby, Papa's Maybe: An American Grammar Book." *Diacritics* 17(2) (Summer).
"Student Data Enrollment." Office of Institutional Research. University of California, Irvine. http://www.oir.uci.edu/enrollment.html.
Tran, Kim. 2016. "6 Ways Asian Americans can Tackle Anti-Black Racism in Their Families." *Everyday Feminism*, 27 January 2016. http://everydayfeminism.com/2016/01/asian-americans-tackle-anti-black-racism/.
Tsang, Daniel C. 1983. "Moral Panic over Asian Gangs." *The Rice Paper* 4(no. 1) (Autumn): 18–21.
———. 1998. "Eyes Only: The Central Intelligence Agency versus Daniel C. Tsang." *Covert Action Quarterly* 65(Fall): 60–63.
———. 2000. "Losing its Soul?" and "Serve the People? Challenges in Little Saigon." In *Legacy to Liberation: Politics and Culture of Revolutionary Asian Pacific America*, edited by Fred Ho, 59–64. Brooklyn: Big Red Media; San Francisco, CA: AK Press: 217–26.
———. 2001. "Slicing Silence: Asian Progressives Come out." *Asian Americans: The Movement and the Moment,* edited by Steve Louie and Glenn K. Omatsu, 220–239. Los Angeles: UCLA Asian American Studies Center Press.
Walker, Julie, and Michael Balsamo. 2016. "Thousands rally in NYC, around US over officer's conviction." *Yahoo News*, 20 February 2016. https://www.yahoo.com/news/thousands-rally-nyc-around-us-over-officers-conviction-210615652.html?nhp=1.
"What are the instructor's teaching strengths?" Summer Session Instructor and Course Evaluation for Malaklou, Maryam Shadee: Gender and Sexuality Studies 50B Lecture A (25005), Summer II 2015. University of California, Irvine.
Wilderson, Frank. 2010. *Red, White and Black: Cinema and the Structure of U.S. Antagonisms*. Durham: Duke University Press Books.
Williams, Raymond, and Michael Orrom. 1954. *Preface to Film.* London: Film Drama.
Willoughby-Herard, Tiffany. 2014. "More Expendable Than Slaves? Racial Justice and the After-Life of Slavery." *Politics, Groups, and Identities* 2(3): 506–21.
Wynter, Sylvia. 2015. "Unparalleled Catastrophe for Our Species? Or, to Give Humanness a Different Future: Conversations." *Sylvia Wynter: On Being Human as Praxis,* edited by Katherine McKittrick. Durham: Duke University Press.

Book Reviews

Tracy Fisher. *What's Left of Blackness: Feminisms, Transracial Solidarities, and the Politics of Belonging in Britain* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), $95.00, 210 pp. ISBN: 978-0-230-33917-0 (hardcover).

On December 23, 2013, the United Nations' General Assembly adopted a resolution making 2015–2024 the International Decade for People of African Descent—a period designated to help ensure that human rights, development, and issues of equality are addressed both globally and locally. More specifically, the General Assembly selected the theme, "People of African descent: recognition, justice and development," to acknowledge the negative systemic impact and institutional legacies of enslavement and colonialism. In *What's Left of Blackness: Feminisms, Transracial Solidarities, and the Politics of Belonging in Britain*, Tracy Fisher explores the ways in which Blackness transforms into a political identity with multiple sites of gendered, ethnic, and national social categories allowing it to be adopted by African, Asian, and Caribbean communities in Britain. Fisher's pivotal work directly contributes to the literature on identity and political mobilization as well as black feminist scholarship that explores the intersections of gender, race, and political economy. In addition, Fisher's study joins a growing body of scholarship on transnational feminisms and comparative work on radical Black consciousness in the African Diaspora. Using ethnographic and qualitative methods to analyze women's organizations, Fisher provides a rich and textured picture of the complicated relationship between Blackness as a political identity and the Left and Conservative movements in the United Kingdom.

Fisher situates her work within the long tradition of scholarship that focuses on Black women as political actors. One of the key contributions of this work is the interrogation of the stability of Blackness as a political category and site of mobilization. Toward that end, Fisher seeks to answer three key questions: (1) Are Black feminisms being used to challenge homogenous constructions of the nation? (2) Are people located outside of the academy utilizing Black feminism in their everyday practices? (3) Are there political, economic, etc. consequences of explicitly identifying as a Black feminist? In an effort to answer these questions, she develops the concept of radicalized gendered Blackness, which she describes as "a political imaginary that both critiqued and embraced the politics of blackness" (10).

Using Britain as a case study, Fisher is able to analyze the ways in which Blackness represents an umbrella political identity utilized by women of Asian, African, and Caribbean ancestries to represent their individual and at times collective economic, political, and social marginalizations. Fisher underscores the important role of reflexivity while conducting ethnographic and qualitative research. She conducted several interviews and engaged in participant observation from 1997 to 2003. Additionally, Fisher was

conscious of the lack of visibility of the scholarship that women of African descent in Britain (i.e., Heidi Mirza's *Black British Feminisms*) were producing and the extensive history of grassroots organizing of Black women in Britain. Through her careful cultivation of longitudinal relationships with participants, she was able to utilize "vernacular epistemologies" and uncover the ways in which Black women's social location shapes ways of knowing and the complex relationships between information that is prioritized and the overarching goals of knowledge production.

In chapter one, Fisher begins by providing historical context on immigration, nationalism, and citizenship in Britain. The most substantial waves of migrants from Africa, Asia, and the Caribbean occurred during and after World War II. These new populations fit within specific economic sectors including agriculture, coal mining, textiles, health services, shipping, and factory work. During the war, new migrants were in food service and other support sectors for the military. Even during this period, the goal was not to make them full British citizens, and by passing legislation such as the British Nationality Act, citizenship was no longer equated with equal access. After the end of the War, migrants settled permanently in Midland and the North. Women were overrepresented in the domestic-labor sector. Direct competition with Irish and Eastern European workers and the pre-existing British population for jobs and resources also resulted in targeted violence against communities of color including the 1959 murder of Kelso Cochrane and the 1958 almost exclusively White Notting Hill riots. Parliament blamed the "colored migration" as the problem that needed to be addressed by the state, illustrating the different constructions of racial, ethnic, and gendered immigrant bodies. Fisher's exploration of violence against the communities that are viewed as "other" outside of the United States provides a comparative frame to analyze structural violence perpetuated by the state.

The disparities in treatment of African, Asian, and Caribbean populations served to foster a sense of collective identity of Blackness, which these groups used to articulate their marginalization, are explored in chapters two and three. Fisher connects the development of a Black consciousness to independence movements in Africa, Vietnam, and the Civil Rights Movement in the United States. Martin Luther King Jr.'s and Malcom X's visits to Britain during the 1960s also served as key events in the history of Black Britain. These visits helped to establish several transracial and anti-imperialist movements such as the Radical Action Adjustment Society (RAAS) and Black Liberation Front. These groups emerged in several urban areas in Britain including London, Liverpool, Manchester, Birmingham, and Nottingham. The Campaign Against Racial Discrimination (CARD), a black umbrella organization for the Indian Workers Association of Great Britain, the National Federation of Pakistani Organizations, and the West Indian Standing Conference Organization was founded in 1965. Initially, East African–Asians were able to immigrate more easily than their African and Caribbean counterparts because they were granted British passports under the colonial system. The shift from the Labour to the Conservative Party revoked this privilege by introducing the 1968 East African Asians Commonwealth Immigration Act, which controlled and limited their immigration. While these connections are important, one wonders if members of the African, Caribbean, and Asian communities maintained institutional connections to grassroots organizations in Africa and the Caribbean.

In chapter two, Fisher highlights the ways in which the 1978 film *Black Britannica* illustrates the interconnections of racism and state capitalism. Since discourses in both the public and private spheres focus on controlling Black migration, concerns over the actions of "undesirable" migrants, and reducing the influx of migrants from Africa, Asia, and the Caribbean, the conservative government and new coalition government introduced institutional changes that drastically impact Black women's organizations. In her study, Fisher explores these transitions in several key women's groups. For example, the Brixton Black Women's Group (BBWG) was established because the Black Power Movements did not adequately incorporate gender and feminist concerns. According to Fisher, BBWG focused on addressing "sexism, employment discrimination, police brutality, reproductive rights issues, insufficient opportunities for child care, housing and education" (65). They were Pan-African, mixed race and included Irish women who were not considered White. Another organization, the Organization of Women of African and Asian Descent (OWAAD) was founded in the late 1970s by students and organizers. They had four main goals: "1) to oppose all forms of racism, sexism, and discrimination against black people, 2) to support working class as well as anti-imperialist struggles, 3) to build links with black women's groups nationally, 4) to foster a better understanding of the members experiences of racial, sexual and economic exploitation" (78). Finally, Fisher discusses the Southwark Black Women's Centre (SBWC), a multiracial class-based government-funded organization created in 1982. The organization prioritized self-help and advocacy in the areas of "domestic violence, improved access to employment, education, and healthcare as well as broader human rights issues" (103).

In the latter part of the book, Fisher discusses how the supplanting of the Greater London Council (GLC) and the subsequent creation of women's and race units in the 1980s fundamentally changed the ways women's groups organized and accessed funding from the state. Margaret Thatcher's emphasis on privatization and centralization was reflective of the Conservatives' efforts to reduce public expenditures. The fact that women's organizations had to compete with each other for funding and not use intersectional frames exacerbated internal tensions in multiracial groups around setting priorities for the organization. Additionally, the emphasis of the new Labour-Conservative coalition government changed the tenor of Black women's organizations from radical sites of political mobilization to groups that helped communities access goods and services from the state. This problematic adoption of a liberal rather than radical black feminist agenda was heavily debated within the BBWG with members raising concerns about the implications of accepting state funding. Also, OWAAD essentially abandoned efforts to challenge cultural norms around issues of sexuality and gender roles, increase access to education, and confront internal class tensions among their members. The perceived disconnect between activists and the communities they represent became a broader area of critique of internal gender hierarchies.

Fisher's examination of these organizations provides insights into tensions between advocacy for policy change and efforts to meet the basic needs of women who are economically vulnerable. Additionally, Fisher elucidates the tensions between feminist scholars, feminist activists, and communities. The differences she highlights among the organizations also raise additional questions. One wonders, for example, how women involved in these different groups understand and utilize the concept of Blackness. Are

women's organizations now creating multiple sites of Blackness, or has the term changed to represent national racial categories rather than a unifying political one? Finally, what are the ways in which gender, class, race, nationality, religion, etc. create new forms of organizing for women in Britain?

Despite these concerns, Tracy Fisher's *What's Left of Blackness* expands our understanding of citizenship, identity, and nationalism in Britain while also articulating the instability and limitations of the category of Blackness. Fisher successfully links these variations to specific interventions by the British state, which served to undermine the progressive mobilization efforts of civil society organizations. As neoliberalism continues to alter the strategies groups employ to access resources, Fisher's study outlines the ways in which activists in Britain are cultivating new sites of resistance by using their connection to the state to increase their capacity to navigate the political system.

Adryan Wallace
University of Hartford

Dayo Gore. *Radicalism at the Crossroads: African American Women Activists in the Cold War* (New York: New York University Press, 2011), $25.00, 231 pp. ISBN: 978-0-8147-7011-5 (paper).

Dayo Gore's groundbreaking study, *Radicalism at the Crossroads: African American Women Activists in the Cold War,* details the "collective political biography" of largely understudied Black communist-oriented women (4). Contributing to the fields of Black Studies, Women's Studies, and History, Gore sheds light on the ways in which these women organized and created tightly knit networks. Utilizing a range of rare sources such as archival papers, FBI files, government documents, oral histories, and interviews, Gore explores the intellectual and political contributions of several women including Claudia Jones, Alice Childress, Lorraine Hansberry, Beulah Richardson, and Vicki Garvin. Identifying these women as "protofeminists," she recognizes the way in which they set the precedent and groundwork for organizing around issues of gender and sexual politics. She writes, "these women's radical engagement with race and gender debates was a crucial tool that enabled them to claim space to articulate the intersections of black liberation and women's equality" (5). As a major theoretical framework, Gore borrows Evelyn Brooks Higginbotham's "'race as a metalanguage'" in conceptualizing their activism as it relates to gender (48). The first of its kind, the distinctive nature of her book highlights the voices of left-leaning women and captures their racial and gender politics.

Divided into five chapters, this book chronologically traces Black women's radical left leadership from the 1930s to the 1970s. Gore opens the first chapter by introducing the readers to these key female figures, highlighting the similarities and differences in their class background, migration patterns, and education that shaped their activism during the 1930s. In chapter two, she utilizes Beulah Richardson's poem, "A Black Woman Speaks . . . of White Womanhood, of White Supremacy, of Peace," as a compelling example of women's efforts to place race and gender at the forefront. Recited at the American People's Peace Congress in the early 1950s Richardson admonished the perpetuation of White womanhood rooted in the "domination of black women" (63). Emphasizing the terror of White supremacy, Richardson highlights the historic distinctions among Black women and White women and encouraged White women to dismantle a racist framework by building alliances with Black women in the struggle for racial equality.

In addition, Gore examines the public discourse on the Black family published in the *Negro Digest* in the late 1940s highlighting the woman-centered writings of Ann Petry and Pauli Murray. Petry sharply criticized Black male patriarchy, debunked the matriarchal thesis, and characterized traditional wifely duties as oppressive. Murray discussed homosexuality and pointed out the institutional structures intentionally

designed to disunite Black men and women. Murray believed that racial biases inhibit the educational and economic mobility of Black men as she argued that Black women's attempt to overthrow White supremacist patriarchal norms produced a disproportionate amount of unmarried professional Black women. Black women, she noted, were situated at the lowest level of the racial hierarchy and social ladder. On the other hand, women such as Alice Childress and Lorraine Hansberry used the arts as a space to articulate their feminism. Both playwrights used their work as a form of resistance in which they engaged intersectionality, debunked racial stereotypes of Black women, and castigated White supremacy. Gore provides a close examination of Communist Party member Claudia Jones and examines Jones' political theories through her writings on the relationship between Black radicalism and women's liberation. Gore highlights Jones's criticism of the capitalist system for its profiteering and abuse of women specifically in the employment sector.

Offering a compelling assessment of the Rosa Lee Ingram case, chapter three uncovers women's organizing efforts on behalf of Ingram, a Black woman sharecropper. During the 1940s, she defended herself with the assistance of her teenage boys against the sexual assault of John Stratford, a White neighboring sharecropper, and ultimately killed him. The state of Georgia charged Ingram with the murder of Stratford and condemned her and her young sons to death. Gore explores Black women's efforts to support Ingram and her family through organizations including the Civil Rights Congress' National Committee to Free the Ingram Family (NCFIF), the Women's Committee for Equal Justice, and the Sojourners for Truth and Justice. She outlines the variety of approaches from the leadership of women in these organizations such as petitions, letters, and the formation of delegations to meet with governmental officials. Some of the most notable acts included the solicitation of W.E.B DuBois to draft a United Nations brief as well as organizing a protest in which agitators dressed as historic female figures in an effort to connect the past with the present struggle for women's equality by the NCFIF. The interracial work of the Women's Committee for Equal Justice and the Sojourners for Truth and Justice brought to the forefront racialized and sexualized terror endured by women. The unwavering activism of the women in these groups led to the freedom of Ingram and her children. These groups focused on women's "politics of protection" and refigured women's concerns as central to the Black freedom struggle (77).

Chapter four focuses on the contributions of Black Communists Marvel Cooke and Vicki Garvin. Marvel Cooke explored the horrific mistreatment and discrimination of Black women endured in their labor as domestics in the mid-1930s in the article, "The Bronx Slave Market," which she penned with Ella Baker. Her advocacy took shape in her work as a journalist for *The Daily Compass* and the *New York Amsterdam News* in which she continued to write articles on the experiences of Black women working as housekeepers. She also served as a powerful force in assisting with the development of a union for the *New York Amsterdam News* via the American Newspaper Guild. As a result of her work, New York Mayor Fiorello LaGuardia developed governmental initiatives to address the exploitation of Black women workers in the Bronx. Similarly, Vicki Garvin wrote about women's labor conditions in the *Freedom* newspaper. Her activism centered on labor issues and trade unions. Her worthy accomplishments include promoting the formation of a union to protect workers during her tenure with the National War Labor

Board, planning the National Negro Labor Council's convention, as well as serving as a mentor for Malcolm X.

Chapter five illustrates the obstacles faced by Garvin, Cooke, and Thelma Dale Perkins to secure employment due to the folding of several leftist groups. Gore explains the emergence of new organizations including the Negro Women's Action Committee (NWAC) and the development and success of the *Freedomways* journal. She outlines the civil rights work of the NWAC as well as their involvement in the Women of Africa and African Descent Conference in Accra, Ghana. She explains the ways in which *Freedomways* journal served as a feminist platform for Black women on the left. She champions Maude White Katz for challenging New York's inadequate educational structure and places her actions in context with other demonstrations that occurred during this time period including the Harlem Nine case and the Ocean Hill-Brownsville protests in Brooklyn. She highlights Katz's *Freedomways* article, "End Racism in Education: A Concerned Parent Speaks" in which she utilized Black power theories to ground her analysis and lambasted the educational system for its racism and questionable hiring practices. The section on Vicki Garvin's work abroad in Nigeria, Ghana, and China speaks to the ways in which women on the left fused transnationalism with national politics. The last section of the chapter addresses the 1970s, paying particular attention to the experiences of Angela Davis and Joan Little. In particular, Gore showcases the ways in which Little's defense of her body mirrors the Ingram's case in the late 1940s. She demonstrates the personal politics of these Black women activists and their successes in mobilizing around women's issues. Gore eloquently reshapes history by filling the missing links with the lost stories of Black communist–affiliated women's day-to-day organizing. While at times she seems to overwhelm the reader with details, these women's narratives enrich our understanding of Black women's history.

Mary Phillips
Lehman College, City University of New York

Sora Y. Han. *Letters of the Law: Race and the Fantasy of Colorblindness in American Law* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2015), $40.00, 165 pp. ISBN: 978-0-8047-8911-0 (cloth).

In *Letters of the Law*, Sora Han takes readers on an adventure into the dreamwork of the law in order to deconstruct what she calls the fantasy of color blindness that haunts the landscape of American Constitutional jurisprudence. By Han's rendering, it is a Daliesque landscape to say the least, one where time folds back on itself and space is subject to wild gravitational fluctuations. Setting aside expected methods of legal analysis, Han proposes instead to "offer a protocol that is based on the trace of law's internal memories of slavery and black freedom struggle, which is to say, those unmemorializable events of both individual and collective experience for which the fantasy of colorblindness stands in" (16). Her interdisciplinary approach draws primarily from critical race theory and although she situates herself alongside scholars such as Patricia Williams and Derrick Bell, she also draws extensively from Freud, Lacan, and Derrida.

In the Introduction, "Letters of the Law," Han sets up her theoretical scaffolding and provides readers with a map of what is to come. Here she introduces the central conceit of the text—the fantasy of color blindness—as well as what she calls the "poetics of the plea." In sum, as she writes, "critical race theory, as this book approaches it, is the place in law where a poetics of the plea persists as a beautiful and horrifying descent into the law's language and the dreamwork that emerges there" (15). The case at the center of her inquiry in this chapter is *Brown v. Board of Education* (1954), which she situates as part of a "plural temporality" that moves back to *Plessy* and forward to *Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1* (2007) simultaneously.

Chapter one, "Decompositional Rights," takes the distinction between civil, social, and political rights as its center. Beginning with language from Harlan's dissenting opinion in *Plessy*, Han traces the idea of a color-blind Constitution through the *Civil Rights Cases of 1883*, *Dred Scott*, and into the present, arguing that while Harlan's dissent invoked the prospect of a color-blind Constitution, social rights were not subject to the same constitutional elevation as civil and political rights. Social rights, according to Han, were intentionally shunted aside thus giving rise to the decomposition she sees at work across the cases she selects for examination. Taking a cue from Robert Cover's observation that law is the projection of an imagined future upon reality, Han asserts that, "[c]olorblindness is the projection upon reality of the imagined future of this 'new constitutional right' that promises, still, to abolish slavery" (43). The failure of this new constitutional right, and

its inability to excise a history of slavery from the law, inspires Han to identify what she calls "dispossessive citizenship":

> A dispossessive citizen's claim does not invent new rights, but new decompositions of rights. [*Dred*] *Scott* lays bare that what is at stake in the break between slavery and freedom is this revocative mode of citizenship, which is then cast variously across the historic *Civil Rights Cases of 1883* and its murderous envy; *Plessy* and its birth of the 'color-blind' signifier as code for a permanent black social inequality; and today's affirmative action cases and their diversionary rationales of diversity (52).

In short, she argues, despite judicial or legislative action, social inequality remains outside the gaze of the law thereby sustaining the vestiges of slavery, excavating them from the past, and projecting them simultaneously onto the present and the future.

In chapter two, "Colorblind Judgment," Han pursues further the idea of a decompositional right. She argues that "this decompositional right that unhinges the possessory relation between citizenship and civil rights lives in the form of an echo where the law admits a certain helplessness of judicial review in the face of its founding violence in racial difference" (19). The three foundational pillars of chapter two are *Adarand Constructors Inc*., *Korematsu*, and *Antigone*. Her particular concern with *Adarand Constructors* was the Supreme Court's decision in that case to subject all federal affirmative-action policies to strict scrutiny. She also notes that Justice O'Connor added a "wish to dispel the notion that strict scrutiny is 'strict in theory, but fatal in fact.'" (55; citation omitted). *Korematsu* enters the scene not in its original form as the 1944 decision upholding the internment of Japanese-American citizens on the West Coast but in its 1984 iteration wherein the Court set aside Korematsu's original criminal conviction. She quotes from the Court's retraction at length and then examines that text through a Lacanian reading of *Antigone* in order to conclude that "just as the superegoic madness of Creon's persecution of Antigone could not guard against Antigone's desire, colorblind judgment cannot guard itself against an 'other dimension' of law that is there in the fracture *within* the judicial opinion" (72; citation omitted, emphasis in original).

Han offers readers the clearest most succinct summary of her argument at the outset of chapter three, "Racial Profiling." She writes:

> So far I have detailed how the colorblind fantasy of national history and judicial review has its foundations in slavery. Within this imaginative realm of racial jurisprudence, the black claim cannot register political belonging and takes the legal personality of dispossessive citizenship. Further, this dispossessive citizenship echoes in the abyss of judicial review as an infinitely returning plea. However, instead of inhabiting this racial limit of judicial review as the bottomless well of legal reason, the law is preoccupied with perfecting legal universality (73).

In this chapter, she sets herself to the task of mining cases that brought sexual privacy and racial profiling into the same texts. *Lawrence v. Texas* (2003) takes center stage, but the Georgia Supreme Court's opinion in *Powell v. State* (1998) and the US Supreme Court's decision in *Prigg v. Pennsylvania* (1842) are also pressed into the service of supporting her argument. Her critique of *Lawrence*, extended to the other cases as well, centers on what she calls the "apostrophizing" of race that made *Lawrence* what it was. The case originated when police received a false complaint of a "nigger going crazy with a gun," a report called in by the jealous boyfriend of Tyrone Garner, Lawrence's sexual partner

(76; citations omitted). In Han's telling of the story, *Lawrence* became the watershed case that it did because the fantasy of color blindness made it possible for the Court to see the prosecution of *Lawrence* as potentially injurious to the sexual privacy, indeed the property right, that is, White male sexuality.

"The Purloined Prisoner," the fourth and final chapter of the book, "descends into the plural forms of 'letter' that signify formal rule (letter of the law), epistolary correspondence (addressed letter), the symbolization of speech's sounds (alphabet letter), literature (*belles lettres*), and learnedness (man of letters)" (96). Han's hope for this chapter is to outline the fantasy of color blindness as a "world-making, territorializing" practice that results in a refinement of how we understand the Constitution's guarantee of free expression (96). A central concern of the chapter is with the censorship of prisoners' correspondence with the world outside prison walls, and although the point is less clearly articulated than readers might hope, it seems that she is tracing the fantasy of color blindness here again as the apostrophe marking the racial disparity at work in the American carceral regime.

Salvador Dali's *Sentimental Colloquy* features a flat, barren landscape onto which the artist has manifestly rendered the painting's vanishing point. In the center of the image a grand piano/waterfall dominates the scene while gaunt figures on bicycles with stones on their heads and veils trailing behind them transect the painting's sight lines. Han's project—tracing the fantasy of color blindness from slavery into the law's present—invokes this image of a dominant, immovable object (race and law's fantasy of color blindness), resistant to the flight of perspective into another future and oblivious to the movements of the burdened figures whose path it obstructs. *Letters of the Law* will find its audience among scholars of critical race theory who are already well versed in the legal materials she brings to the center of the text. Her precise focus on fragments of language coupled with minimal discussions of context will make the book less accessible to readers who are curious about or unfamiliar with the cases she recruits to her project. Her looping, complex prose sets the book outside the grasp of an undergraduate audience, and her analytic ouroboros may challenge more advanced readers or those who desire more predictable, linear clarity from legal discourse. Han is at her best when she weaves unexpected textual threads around her chosen theoretical architecture. Despite her focus on the fantasy of color blindness, this is a colorful book indeed.

Joe Rollins
Queens College and the Graduate Center, City University of New York

Robert Trent Vinson. *The Americans Are Coming! Dreams of African American Liberation in Segregationist South Africa* (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2012), $26.36, 236 pp. ISBN: 978-0-8214-1986-1 (paper).

In *The Americans Are Coming! Dreams of African American Liberation in Segregationist South Africa*, Robert Trent Vinson, associate professor of History and Africana Studies at the College of William & Mary, sets himself an ambitious task. Focusing on the period from 1890 to 1940, Vinson aims to present Black South Africans as "part of a two-way transatlantic traffic of peoples, institutions, and ideologies" and thus "reframe South African and American studies in transnational, not comparative, contexts" (4, 5). He succeeds in that effort. Vinson's well-researched book not only shows how and why Black South Africans came to see African-Americans as allies in their struggle for independence but also provides new and important insights into the depth and longevity of Garveyism in Africa and throughout the Atlantic World.

The first part of *The Americans Are Coming!* examines the initial alliance of African-Americans and Black South Africans. The first chapter opens with the story of the Virginia Jubilee Singers. In 1890, these graduates of Virginia's Hampton Institute traveled to Cape Town, South Africa. Vinson argues that, during their nearly five-year stay, the African-American singers articulated an "up from slavery" narrative that resonated with Black South Africans. In fact, the troupe's performances laid the foundations for subsequent interactions between African-Americans and Black South Africans as well as future imaginings of African-Americans by Black South Africans.

Vinson analyzes both in his second chapter. Years after embracing boxer Jack Johnson as the embodiment of Black masculinity and the refutation of White supremacy, some Black South Africans continued to welcome African-American missionaries to their communities. Vinson shows, too, that the model of industrial education for Blacks pioneered at Hampton and entrenched at Booker T. Washington's Tuskegee Institute gained favor among Black South Africans who once hoped for British victory in the South African War but now felt disillusioned by the chauvinism of White missionaries and the crass modernization projects of the unified South African state. For founders of the new African National Congress (ANC), forging real and imagined ties with "advanced" African-Americans like Washington allowed them to visualize new possibilities of liberation and transnational racial identities that far exceeded the provincial ethnic identities that many Europeans preferred for Africans.

By scrutinizing these developments, Vinson brings much-needed attention to the ways in which the politics and educational policies espoused by Washington and his ilk attained global appeal. But the real significance of Vinson's work comes in its second part. In his third chapter, Vinson charts the ascension of Marcus Garvey and the growth

of his Universal Negro Improvement Association (UNIA). He follows the paths of African-American and West Indian sailors who brought news about the UNIA and copies of its publication (the *Negro World*) with them to South Africa. There these Black Americans also helped establish more UNIA chapters than in any other African country. As Vinson notes in his fourth chapter, Black South Africans found much to recommend in the visions of Black liberation espoused by Garvey, even propagating his message of Pan-African unity after the demise of the UNIA leader in the United States. He shows that men like ANC leader James Thaele "appropriated [Garvey's] ideas to fit local contexts, pointed to his jailing as motivation to organize against White supremacy, and debated the utility of American Negro models to advance their own political strategies" (101).

The Americans Are Coming! provides a pioneering account of Garveyism in Africa. And yet it does much more than that. In his penultimate chapter, Vinson introduces readers to Wellington Butelezi, a Zulu who, in the late 1920s, began to claim that he was an African-American doctor who had come to deliver Black South Africans from oppression. He disappears from the historical record in the 1940s—his claims to US citizenship and education, UNIA membership, and prophetic power long since disproven. Rather than dismissing Butelezi as a mere charlatan or chiding the hundreds of Black South Africans in the Transkei region who followed him, Vinson explores the meanings of Butelezi's American persona. He concludes that not only "[Butelezi's] myth of self sparked a myth of liberation from America that never came," but it also "led to a political movement that reverberated throughout the Transkei for several decades" (118). This is outstanding storytelling and laudable historical analysis. Through the example of one remarkable man, Vinson is able to show how Garveyism permeated grassroots politics in South Africa long after the demise of its Jamaican founder.

As with any transnational history, the difficulty lies in bridging two different national historiographies. Vinson is largely successful in that regard, but he misses an opportunity to further link the histories of African-Americans and Black South Africans. His last chapter details Black South Africans' final prophecies of African-American liberation on the eve of World War II and the onset of new political ties between US-educated Black South Africans, like ANC President Alfred Xuma, and African-Americans including missionary Max Yergan and entertainer Paul Robeson. It brings the book to an abrupt conclusion, informing the reader that the dreams of African-American liberation that flourished in the preceding decades contributed to the rise of a global antiapartheid movement. Readers would greatly benefit from an additional chapter or epilogue demonstrating how Garveyite ideals or Washingtonian influences persisted in the antiapartheid activism led by Blacks on both sides of the Atlantic. Extending the chronology would have further linked US and South African historiographies while solidifying Vinson's larger point about the enduring effect of the transnational ties explored in his work.

This critique aside, Vinson has written an important work. It not only provides fresh insights into the significance of Garveyism in African intellectual and political life but also opens up new avenues of inquiry into the mobilization of Garveyite teachings at the grassroots level throughout the Atlantic world. His final essay on sources and methodology facilitates future research into this topic, allowing interested researchers a succinct and clear overview of the South African, US, and English newspapers; the British and South African governmental archives; the US research repositories; and the oral histories that

contributed to *The Americans*. Indeed, the impact of and interest taken in Vinson's work has already been made evident in Adam Ewing's *The Age of Garvey: How a Jamaican Activist Created a Mass Movement and Changed Global Black Politics,* a work that pushes the study of the African revivalists, politicians, and community organizers who embraced Garvey's Pan-African political approaches in exciting directions. There is then no reason to doubt that further scholarship on the long impact and, to appropriate Vinson's wording, "kaleidoscopic" manifestations of Garveyism in diasporan Black political culture rest on firm foundations.

Brandon R. Byrd
Vanderbilt University

Dagmawi Woubshet. *The Calendar of Loss: Race, Sexuality, and Mourning in the Early Era of AIDS* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 2015), $38.95, 169 pp. ISBN: 978-1-4214-1655-7 (paper).

Protesters gather to challenge a state guilty of violence and oppression. Their work is urgent, for the thing that has taken their loved ones might easily claim their own lives as well. Refusing to accept society's indifference to their suffering, the protesters repeatedly list the names of the dead, obsessively tallying their losses. Meanwhile, they must constantly refute the media's dehumanizing portrayals of the departed. The work is hard, but they strive for increased agency in the midst of unceasing tragedy and loss.

The above could describe any of the protests against racist policing since the deaths of Trayvon Martin, Michael Brown, Eric Garner, and Freddie Gray, among many others. However, the above could also describe the grassroots political and artistic response of gay men, both black and white, during the early years of the US AIDS epidemic. This political and artistic response is the subject of *The Calendar of Loss*, a new book by Dagmawi Woubshet, an associate professor of English at Cornell University. Early AIDS mourning, especially by gay men of color, is more than worthy of study. However, with the recent rise of Black Lives Matter, Woubshet's larger questions about the ways in which mourning structures Black subjectivity and the political value of sorrow in the midst of unspeakable loss make this work especially timely.

In *The Calendar of Loss*, Woubshet brings together queer studies and African-Americans' studies to examine a rich and varied "archive of mourning" (66) that ranges from the iconic work of painter Keith Haring to letters written by Ethiopian AIDS orphans to their deceased parents. In these sources, Woubshet finds the "poetics of compounding loss" shared by mourners as they struggled to make sense of a deadly and stigmatized new disease. Reactions to AIDS in the United States between 1981 and 1996, and in Ethiopia during the late 1990s, were marked by both official inaction and social rejection. In both countries, governments and individuals alike turned a blind eye and a cold shoulder to people when they developed AIDS and died. Woubshet writes that in response, friends and loved ones mourned the "disprized dead" in public and in print and thus "consecrated new queer connections and counterpublics" (12).

Woubshet argues that these queer counterpublics defied normative expectations of mourning, which he traces to Freud's essay "Mourning and Melancholia." This ideal calls on the mourner to recover from loss and quickly "move on" with his or her life. In contrast, the artists and authors in Woubshet's study displayed inconsolable grief. They listed and counted dead friends and lovers and reflected on their own certain demise, as many were HIV positive themselves. Moreover, the onslaught and imminence of death yielded a rage among early AIDS mourners, who could not and would not simply

"get over" the deaths of so many. Whereas Freud would label these men "pathological mourners" (17) for their prolonged melancholy, Woubshet aims to recover and highlight the political nature of their mourning, not only in ACT UP-style protest actions but also in the poetry, prose, and visual art through which gay men responded to the early years of the AIDS crisis.

As an alternative to Freud's framework, Woubshet turns to the theories of Black mourning sketched by Fred Moten, Karla Holloway, and Abdul JanMohamed. Throughout Black culture, they find the same sense of imminent and ever-present death coupled with defiant protest that characterized early AIDS mourning. However, the connection between Black mourning and AIDS mourning goes beyond theory or abstraction. Woubshet includes in his study a number of Black gay authors who directly referenced Black spirituals in their work as they tried to make sense of the "many thousands gone" from AIDS. Herein lies Woubshet's chief contribution to AIDS scholarship, as he reads the mourning of both Black and White gay men through an analytical lens that is explicitly both Black and queer. Whereas much of the critical AIDS scholarship has marginalized people of color, and particularly *queer* people of color, here they take center stage.

Throughout the first three chapters of his study, Woubshet weaves together texts of mourning from White and Black gay authors alike. In the first chapter, Woubshet uses slave spirituals to read work by the poets Paul Monette, who was White, and Melvin Dixon, who was Black. His reading not only highlights their shared sense of imminent death and compounding loss but also throws into sharp relief the ways in which the two authors experienced AIDS differently. Whereas Monette wrote about AIDS as interrupting his own embodiment of the American dream, Dixon referenced the sorrow songs in order to elegize those who died from AIDS and protest their loss as part of a longer history of the devaluation of Black life.

In the second chapter, Woubshet examines acts of remembrance for the dead. These include the obituaries that Black gay poet and performer Assotto Saint wrote for his partner and friends. These obituaries made clear that they were gay men who had died of AIDS, addressing the very facts that were often omitted from official obituaries. Thus, he fought against the erasure of both homosexuality and AIDS by creating an alternative, public archive through which gay men with AIDS—and Black gay men in particular—would be remembered. These obituaries were a critical part of the "new black queer counterpublic" (58) that Saint's cohort of Black gay artists and writers asserted in the late 1980s and early 1990s in the face of their own exclusion from both Black and gay mainstream culture.

Next, Woubshet interprets the work of White gay visual artist Keith Haring in the context of postindustrial New York. More specifically, he examines hip-hop, the graffiti that inspired Haring, and the epidemic that would later take his life. Like early rap, Haring's work registers the manifold forms of physical and structural violence that characterized Black life in 1980s New York. Familiar works such as the 1989 poster *Ignorance = Fear*, which Haring created for ACT UP, appears alongside the 1985 painting *Michael Stewart—U.S.A. for Africa*, which is a gruesome commentary on the police killing of a young New York graffiti artist. Here, Woubshet finds the same sense of imminent mortality and defiance of social apathy that distinguishes the work of Monette, Dixon, and Saint.

In the fourth and final chapter, Woubshet shifts focus to Ethiopia in the late 1990s, where AIDS was met with the same stigma and official silence that marked the early

years of the epidemic in the United States. He examines the work of Sudden Flowers, Ethiopia's first AIDS arts collective. Among other things, the group helped AIDS orphans write letters to their deceased parents. Reading through these "epistles to the dead" (111), Woubshet finds the same "poetics of compounding loss" that he identifies elsewhere, as the children reflect on their own interrupted lives and uncertain fates. These letters, he argues, "[belie] the normative symbols of innocence and futurity with which we interpellate children" (140). In this way, the children's mourning fosters their own political agency, contradicting Western media images that often render them "only as objects of pity and charity" (144).

To be sure, recuperating the political agency of children and challenging mainstream media portrayals of Africa are worthy goals. However, Woubshet stretches his framework a bit too far in this chapter. The paradigm of "Black mourning" that he draws on is not essentially Black; it is rooted in the African-American experience. When Woubshet draws on this paradigm in examining work by White American authors, he does so either to denaturalize their understanding of AIDS and its meanings, as in Monette's case, or to place their work in historical and social context, as with Haring. But it not clear that the normative expectations of grief and sorrow that Woubshet describes in the Euro-American context apply to Ethiopia as well, especially given the country's "elaborate tradition of mourning" (x).

In this way, the fourth chapter does not fit with the rest of the book. Cultural responses to AIDS in Ethiopia deserve their own examination. Furthermore, many other African-American gay writers and organizations, whose work is not adequately understood, could have populated this study. Alternatively, Woubshet might have taken an explicitly transnational approach, tracing an international queer counterpublic of AIDS mourning through the work of Black South African gay and AIDS activist Simon Nkoli, for example. On the other hand, if we are meant to conclude that AIDS structured mourning in particular ways throughout the African diaspora, or even cross-culturally, we need further examples for comparison.

Woubshet offers an important entry into the interdisciplinary field of AIDS scholarship, which has too often treated African-Americans as marginal to or derivative of the story of AIDS among White Americans. More broadly, he opens up important questions about the ways in which we make sense of the precarity of Black life, in both national and diasporic contexts. Those questions not only illuminate Black grassroots politics as they unfold but also shed light on the ways that "black mourning" can speak to the present and future across centuries of sorrowful resistance.

Dan Royles
Florida International University, Modesto Maidique Campus

Lewis R. Gordon. *What Fanon Said: A Philosophical Introduction to His Life and Thought* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2015), $17.28, 216 pp. ISBN: 978-0823266098 (paper).

Professor Lewis Gordon's new book, *What Fanon Said: A Philosophical Introduction to His Life and Thought*, accomplishes two things that make it an essential text for both first-time readers of Fanon (especially undergraduate and graduate students interested in political theory) and academics who have published on him. First, Gordon introduces Fanon's life with biographical details and historical background that contextualizes his writings. Second, he writes a trenchant and thorough analysis of the existing secondary literature, which will be helpful for the uninitiated.

For example, Gordon examines sexuality with Fanon's seemingly homophobic remarks in his first book, *Black Skin, White Masks* (translated from the French *Peau noir, masques blancs*). In the book, Fanon confesses his "nausea" when he hears a man express attraction towards another man (65). However, a close reading places these remarks in context, because Fanon was citing an article by Michel Salmon that perpetuated the myth of the African body as purely sexual. Here, an aspect of Gordon's text that stands out is his reliance on Fanon's original words in French instead of the English translations. A particularly troublesome aspect in some of the secondary academic literature and discussion on Fanon is the extent to which scholars have projected their own language onto Fanon, erasing or obfuscating what he actually *said* in French as well as English (6). Gordon demonstrates throughout the book how sections from *Black Skin, White Masks* could leave the reader with only a partial truth of what Fanon said if he or she is not provided with the proper translation. For instance, Gordon writes that Fanon's use of the word "failure," as it is translated into English, most closely matches the French word "échec," meaning "defeat or setback" (24). However, the word Fanon uses for failure, *ratés*, has a specific psychoanalytical meaning

> To refer to not measuring up, of failing to meet a standard, as in the expression *raté de père*, a man failing to meet the expectations or standards of fatherhood . . . Fanon is thus referring to the frustration not only of missing the mark but also of the repercussions, which, inevitably, lead to therapy (ibid.).

Published in 2008, the most recent English translation of *Black Skin, White Masks* by Richard Philcox reads "misfires" (7). Without the proper context and translation, the reader is left with an incomplete understanding of Fanon's intention.

Frantz Fanon was formerly trained as a psychiatrist in Lyon, France after serving in World War II. Upon graduating with his medical degree, Fanon could have selected any place in the world to start his career. However, he chose the French colony of Algeria, demonstrating a choice to say "goodbye to a life of comfort and had chosen the path

of a life dedicated to social transformation and revolutionary struggle" (80–81). Fanon was trained by François Tosquelles, "founder of the school of 'institutional therapy' . . . [which] required the integration of everyday life into the therapeutic process" (79). In essence, the institutional therapy approach to psychiatric treatment emphasized the importance of social interaction with others and integration within the community. In other words, Fanon saw relational activity as an essential condition to alleviating patient illness, which one can see reflected in his political writings as well.

Although Gordon criticizes the pedantry of some of the secondary literature on Fanon as focusing too much "around the *facts* in the book instead of its main argument," he does not elevate Fanon to a status beyond reproach (96). For example, Gordon examines Fanon's analysis of the blues in his essay "Racism and Culture," which can be found in the collection of essays, *Towards the African Revolution.* Gordon writes, "The error Fanon makes is the fallacy of causal permanence, where the conditions that lead to the appearance of a phenomenon become those by which the latter are maintained" (88). Fanon argued that the blues only exist because of racial oppression and that "the end of racism is the death knell of great black music" (ibid.). Although the blues is an aesthetic performance birthed by the anguish and suffering of slavery, that does not mean its individual reception is not universal. Not all listeners have to have the same experience in order to connect with music; they just find something about the words or rhythm they can relate to. In other words, the blues is not an epistemic closure but an invitation to confront the past and make something beautiful out of it. Both Fanon's interpretation and Gordon's analysis highlight the central point of Fanon's political theory. First, the colonized were not passive or unchanged by revolution but produced their own revised values throughout the process. Second, it is necessary to always question the truth, as Fanon writes in *The Wretched of the Earth:* "Nobody has a monopoly on truth, neither the leader nor the militant" (139). The colonial situation shatters any preconceived notion of a universal truth. As Gordon writes, Fanon illustrates that in the colonized society, "their normative theories are . . . attuned to the actual world in which the colonized and colonizing subjects live." (129)

The best part of Gordon's latest book is that it highlights Fanon's central philosophic contribution—he was a philosopher of ethics and did not just call for the overthrow of France's colonialist-capitalist socioeconomic order. Fanon described not only the problem of colonialism and racism in France and its colonial empire but also the imperative of building democratic spaces to rehabilitate both the colonized and colonizer. Although Fanon is consistent in terms of what he advocates, to read him as purely a Marxist for the non-Western world or as a local theorist unable to transcend his time would be a mistake. Instead, Fanon should be read as an ethicist who navigates the vagaries of the human psyche in its entirety.

Brooks Kirchgassner
University of Connecticut

Caroline Wanjiku Kihato. *Migrant Women of Johannesburg: Everyday Life in an In-Between City* (Johannesburg: Wits University Press, 2013), $95.00, 196 pp. ISBN: 978-1-137-29996-3 (Hardcover).

In *Migrant Women of Johannesburg: Everyday Life in an In-Between City*, Caroline Wanjiku Kihato sets out to explore "the experience of living between geographies" through a group of women, who have crossed borders to arrive in South Africa's most populous city, Johannesburg (xiii). The women are mostly from Central, Eastern, and Southern African countries. The author argues that previous studies of Johannesburg focused too closely on a narrative from "above" (e.g., governance, service delivery, and inequality) and not enough on the ways in which social actors and the city's politics, regulatory systems, and local economies intertwine "to produce new forms of urban life" (14). She appeals to a view from "below" that situates her study in the social history tradition. Kihato further insists on foregrounding the story of the city's migrant women to subvert the masculinist tendency of urban studies that obscures women's roles in constructing the city (18). To fill this void, utilizing participant observation, group interviews, and photographs, Kihato examines how migrant women have come to "dwell in the liminal" (16) or the city's in-between space, negotiating and refashioning it in everyday life.

Beginning with one woman's journey of being smuggled from Kinshasa as human cargo, chapter one details the ways in which Johannesburg (historically known as "the city of gold") is a city of "between and betwixt." It is that sticky threshold that expands and limits opportunities and the hopes of those (South Africans and foreign-born migrants) trapped in limbo for an indeterminate time. It is also connected to the people's imagining of their lives being geographically, socially, and economically here and there or elsewhere. The people here live in flux, constantly waiting for the next move. Johannesburg, as Kihato characterizes it, is hybrid and contradictory, consisting of things legal and illegal, formal and informal, and visible and invisible that are best observed through the stories that migrant women tell of their lives. Their gendered, ethnic, class, and national locations in the city not only require researchers to look closer at the threshold to analytically put it into focus but also to shift attention away from the "official cartographies" that make Johannesburg recognizable as a public urban space (20).

Chapter two delves into issues commonly associated with mobile populations from the African continent in postapartheid South African society—that is, illegal or criminal activities and policing or "urban governance." Kihato reminds us that a critique of an African state's ability to handle socioeconomic and political crises is the crux of the discourse on urban governance. Having made that point, she highlights the "[c]ross-border women's interactions with the state on Johannesburg's streets" through policing in the city center (27). The example of a court appearance notice, issued to one of the women

for illegally trading in a restricted area, exposes the ensemble of interactions between capital, state government, city authorities, and foreign-born migrants. While legislative mechanisms empower local authorities—namely, the police—to enforce order, that power, combined with their relationship with the people they regulate, also enables the authorities to extend law enforcement informally to set new rules and practices in the streets. According to Kihato, the uncertain legal status of migrant women (mainly due to the asylum-seeker permits that institutions disregard as legal documentation and grounds to deny public assistance) is pivotal to the unmaking of urban laws and making of street rules that allow the women to remain relatively autonomous from the state. The women here understand, use, and sometimes reinforce their invisibility to remain outside of the state structure or "uncaptured," especially because encounters with authorities are always unpredictable (entailing a bribe, incarceration, or violence). Being in legal limbo, the women are illegible in the city, and this "undoes the script of the all-seeing state" (37).

Chapter three homes in on the migrant women's aspirations and social expectations from family and communities. Migration is not only linked to material benefits but also to social obligations and, importantly, respectability or a rising up in the social hierarchy and becoming a "real woman" (60). Kihato makes the point that "[b]ecause of women's centrality in social networks, their decision to move is often linked to their roles in social networks, and their desire to be considered important actors in their community" (50). She explains that the failure to fulfill material obligations to the family when one returns home constitutes a loss of status, a form of "social death" to the woman and her family. Rather than returning home when some of them encounter hardships forging a livelihood (most are involved in petty trade selling various kinds of goods in the informal economy), the migrant women would choose to remain in Johannesburg. They weave their own success stories, portray a successful life in photographs sent home, and continue to remit the little money that they make. Straddling between real hardship and imagined success in the host city and not being able to return home, "they live dual lives" in physical limbo (51).

In chapter four, the author guides us into the "private" domain of the migrant women's lives, showing the ways in which everyday politics or the "public" intervenes and imposes on their personal or home lives. Their legal and physical limbo influences not only their views of home (with a small "h" being in Johannesburg and capital "H" the country of origin) but also how they organize domestic lives and handle domestic violence. Homes become sites for reproducing values and cultural practices that keep them connected to their countries of origin while communities come to occupy a larger role in settling domestic affairs to further minimize interactions with city authorities. Given their experiences of exclusion and dislocation in Johannesburg, Kihato notes, "[t]hese spaces, albeit fragile, become redemptive sites of the city, places of belonging, safety, and morality" (80). However, in some instances, obligations and fear of losing protection allow for the perpetuation of domestic violence on the migrant women. The author maintains that the insecurity some of these women encounter at home and in communities reflects the city's unpredictability and weaknesses in law enforcement.

The migrant women in Kihato's study come up against another form of violence in the city in chapter five. The xenophobic violence in 2008, in particular, narrowed the proximity between the center and periphery. Thorough in her analysis, the author presents the crisis from three standpoints: (1) the authorities who were conflicted by their

prejudices against foreign nationals and maintenance of trust among South Africans, (2) the camps or "temporary places of safety" (105) where those perceived as not belonging to South Africa momentarily experienced reprieve from street laws and the state's attempts at classification were undertaken, and (3) the displaced foreigners who continued to live insecure and uncertain lives even as they made claims to their rights and plans for relocation to third countries. Kihato indicates that these overlapped and interacted in conjunction with international law and actors to reproduce the center. Importantly, the 2008 crisis exposed how those ordinarily on the margins became insiders just as quickly as they returned to being outsiders. Regarded as a state of emergency, legal rights were extended to the displaced foreign nationals, and the displaced also made claims to rights that made them "insiders." The removal of rights that ensued captures how the state arbitrarily draws boundaries to include and exclude foreign nationals while petitions for geographical relocation reflect how the dislocated reinforced their "outsider" position. The "insider-outsider" identity illuminates what has always been part of everyday life for those living on the city's threshold, including the cross-border women.

Kihato's concluding chapter emphasizes that a focus on migrant women does not foreground them as victims or, even, heroines; it recognizes that they have agency in socioeconomic and political processes. "[Their] journeys to Johannesburg, notions of home and belonging, economic activities, self-representations, and everyday practices reconfigure urban space" (113), she writes. As told through the voices of and images produced by the women in this study, migrant women's daily practices of negotiating with or avoiding authorities as they move about the city as well as ways of protecting themselves and their families and communities from violence uncover a different set of urban relationship and rules that do not enter into conventional views of the city. Official discourse on urban life is fixated on policy regimes aimed at governing the city, rather than the social actors who move and interact with one another. This, Kihato insists, must be inverted to pay closer attention to how "urban dwellers' actions regulate the city" (124). Doing so opens the space for a gendered analysis of the city while a focus on migrant women enables the unofficial scripts of Johannesburg to surface. Lastly, the author reminds us, the idea that the state is absent from the in-between city should be rethought: the regulatory system that activates power also empowers authorities to act outside the law in their interactions with those on the margins. That is, the official and unofficial reconfigure authority and power, reinforcing the illegible and informal.

Migrant Women of Johannesburg indeed presents a novel way to see and think about the city and mobile populations in South Africa. The author's focus on migrant women from across the continent, who have been made invisible by and are invisible to the state, exposes the multiple sources of authority, competing values, and identities that are interwoven into urban spaces. Kihato's account of the liminal city and migrant women as always being in the state of becoming—waiting to transform—inspires questions for further consideration, such as what is the postapartheid South African state becoming (e.g., a liminal state) and could it ever be a finished project? Other questions that the study raises include the role of non-African migrant groups in the reproduction of the city and state. How does an in-between city look like for those migrants? Including non-African and non-European migrant women, who are also invisible, could perhaps deepen Kihato's already nuanced analysis of African migrant women's role in the liminal city.

While her focus on migrant women presents a convincing account of how their ambiguous position produces the official and unofficial city, the study could be strengthened if more consideration was given to how the city reproduces gender (notions of femininity and masculinity) within migrant communities whereby women are aspiring to become "real women." Lastly, a study that reveals both sides of the threshold on which migrant women stand (or are trapped) could benefit from a longer book that allows more of the women's voices to come through.

T. Tu Huynh
Jinan University

Cheryl Higashida. *Black Internationalist Feminism: Women Writers of the Black Left, 1945–1995* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2011), $27.00, 264 pp. ISBN: 978-0-252-07964-1 (paper).

Cheryl Higashida's *Black Internationalist Feminism* is a significant book that joins expanding scholarship on African-Americans and their international interests and activism. Although connected to work on the Black Political Left and radical activism more generally, Higashida's study uniquely employs a literary lens with a focus on African-American female authors from 1945 to 1995. The monograph's careful consideration of the work and legacy of Lorraine Hansberry, Alice Childress, Rosa Guy, Audre Lorde, and Maya Angelou richly contributes to literature on Civil Rights, Black Power, and Black feminism. Higashida's study demonstrates the need for a longer chronology to understand the Black Left's anticolonial internationalism. She shows that Black leftist groups not only survived the peak of the Cold War but also extended to the second half of the twentieth century. Another important intervention is the recognition that during these decades, women of the Black Left were clearly shaped by revolutionary nationalism and, in turn, reshaped it using queer of color and feminist critiques.

Higashida's study expands existing scholarship on Black women and the Communist Left including the works of Carole Boyce Davies, Erik S. McDuffie, and Dayo F. Gore. She argues that a failure to fully examine their literary works has rendered invisible political and theoretical implications concerning "the relationships between Left, civil rights, Black Power and second-wave Black feminist movements" (4). This silencing has also carried repercussions for the study of queer theory and African-American women's literature, as well as a narrative of American exceptionalism. Higashida's book begins to redress these issues and provides one of the first definitions of Black women's feminist internationalism, which "challenged heteronormative and masculinist articulations of nationalism while maintaining the importance, even centrality, of national liberation movements for achieving black women's social, political, and economic rights" (2). In its focus on five African-American women writers, this book helps us to understand that the literature that these women produced has too often been largely misinterpreted, narrowly defined, and falsely described as reactionary.

The first chapter provides a historical overview of the development of Black international feminism and takes its title from Claudia Jones's transformative 1945 article that pointed out the need to read the "national question" and the "woman question" in relation to one another. By demonstrating the "vital link" between women writers of later decades with Jones's writings as well as the analysis and activism of women of the Old Left, Higashida discovers the endurance of what she refers to as "nationalist internationalism." Central to this worldview was the belief that global socialism would be

achieved when oppressed populations including Blacks within the United States achieved self-determination. Women of the Black Left connected this liberation to the relieving of their own "special oppressed status." While transforming this prewar conceptualization through intersectionality, they also relied upon, benefited from, and dramatically shaped spaces that linked activists across generations including newspapers such as *Freedom and Freedomways*. While this first chapter does well in addressing the development of Black international feminism, it provides only a passing reference to the leftist political efforts of the 1930s and 1940s. The chapter also misses an opportunity to connect women's literary outpourings of the 1940s with broader Black political activism of the period. While Higashida writes that the activities of radical women "never persuaded large masses of Black women to become Communists," she notes that these women's perspectives found support among some mainstream activists (47).

This framing chapter provides the context for the next five chapters that focus on individual women and their literary works. We begin with Lorraine Hansberry and learn how her defense of nationalism led her to produce *Les Blancs* (1970), which she may have considered her most important dramatic work. Higashida then provides a close reading of two of Hansberry's earliest plays and her review of Simone de Beauvoir's *The Second Sex*, which better showed Hansberry's intent to write against narratives concerning tragic lesbians and to critique racialized imperialism and capitalism. The next chapters, which focus on Alice Childress and Rosa Guy, two relatively understudied Black women writers, are the most original aspects of this work. Higashida uncovers how Childress used the traveling minstrel show and the image of the ship that paralleled Marcus Garvey's Black Star Line to critique Garveyism, which endorsed traditional articulations of masculinity and femininity even as it promoted Black liberation. By examining Rosa Guy's defense and queering of nationalism, Higashida provides an in-depth analysis of *The Sun, the Sea, a Touch of the Wind* (1995). She argues that although Guy downplayed her radicalism in the 1960s, this later work reflected Guy's anticolonial internationalism. In *The Sun, the Sea, a Touch of the Wind,* Guy argued against beliefs that masculinist and revolutionary messianism were key to a nation's success and "progress." Higashida also examines Guy's call for others to rethink American exceptionalism and their identification with it.

Nevertheless, Higashida's discussion of Guy is limited in two major ways. While discussions of the other four writers focused on multiple works, this chapter almost exclusively examines *The Sun, the Sea, a Touch of the Wind.* It fails to offer a discussion of Guy's other writings including *Bird at My Window* (1966), which Higashida considered only briefly. As a result, it is difficult for readers to see the shifts in emphases that occurred in Guy's larger body of work and her activism. Additionally, it would have been worthwhile for Higashida to address the public reactions to *The Sun, the Sea, a Touch of the Wind*.

Similar to Rosa Guy, Audre Lorde's "hemispheric consciousness" was shaped by her familial ties outside of the United States. Lorde's political ideas were undoubtedly shaped by a number of historical developments of the period including the 1983 US invasion of Grenada (the birthplace of her parents), her first trip to the island in 1978, and the influences of women's centrality to the struggles for land rights in Australia and New Zealand. Whereas previous scholarship tends to separate Lorde's theorization of Black lesbian identity from her critique of US hegemony and obscures her examination of national identity and liberation, Higashida argues that "perhaps more than any other

writer, Lorde allows us to see how the postwar Left's gender and sexual radicalism shaped contemporary feminisms of color" (133). Deepening the analysis of Claudia Jones and others, Lorde's work theorized the importance of the leadership of Black women in nationalist and internationalist struggles. Significantly, Lorde fought to bring attention to the plight of Black women, children, and laborers.

In the final chapter, Higashida attempts to "meditate on the presence and the influence of this Left internationalist feminism within contemporary U.S. culture more broadly" by turning to Maya Angelou (157). She argues that although commercial success muted Angelou's Black feminist internationalism some aspects of it are still evident in her autobiographical writings. Therefore, Higashida finds some value in the fact that mainstream circulation of Angelou's writing (similar to Hansberry's *Raisin in the Sun*) challenges US culture by introducing readers to a defense of nationalism and postwar anticolonialism, albeit in a less overt and politicized manner. Despite Higashida's optimism, Black feminist internationalism in this chapter appears to have survived only in the realm of mainstream media. The fact that these messages can be easily dismissed, ignored, and co-opted reveal that some readers of Angelou's *Heart of a Woman*, for example, can be content with their concentration on the book's self-improvement focus. It would be interesting to see whether or not future works on Black women writers on the Left reach Higashida's conclusion concerning the contemporary condition of Black feminist internationalism. In taking up this work, scholars should not feel the need to study either literary works or political activism since considering them simultaneously provides a fuller picture. Future scholarship should also contend with Higashida's call to consider this radical tradition within and beyond the Communist Party. Higashida's book, which has rescued Black feminist internationalism, will continue to be an inspiration to everyone who takes up this challenge.

Brandy Thomas Wells
The Ohio State University

Erik S. McDuffie. *Sojourning for Freedom: Black Women, American Communism, and the Making of Black Left Feminism* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2011), $23.95, 328 pp. ISBN: 978-0-8223-5033-0 (paper).

In the1970s, Angela Davis was arguably the most well-known Communist in the United States. She was a target of government repression and a recognizable figure from Los Angeles to Havana. However, prior to Davis' rise to fame, Black radicals and Black Communist women of the Old Left nurtured her intellectual development. Erik McDuffie reveals the historical significance of these women in a well-researched and compelling narrative that traverses five decades of the Black Freedom struggle from the Russian Revolution in 1917 to the late 1950s. His study centers on a select group of Black Communist women who unequivocally opposed capitalism and imperialism. These women, according to McDuffie, situated working-class Black women at the axis of their analysis and activism. McDuffie refers to his subjects as "Black left feminists." Drawn from their lived experiences as radical Black women, this pioneering brand of feminist politics combined Black Nationalist and Communist perspectives on race, gender, and class.

Sojourning for Freedom: Black Women, American Communism, and the Making of Black Left Feminism makes three critical interventions that scholars and students of Black women's history, Black radicalism, and Black feminism will find valuable. First, McDuffie makes an important contribution to Black women's intellectual history by demonstrating how Black left feminists' travels to and from the Soviet Union, and the impact of global and local events, shaped their radical thinking. He offers a vivid distinction between their theoretical output and the ideological commitments of politically mainstream Black women activists, white Communist women, and Black male radicals. In doing so, McDuffie effectively argues that Black left feminists defiantly rejected the middle-class political agendas and cultural sensibilities of traditional Black protest groups and looked to—and often looked beyond—Communism as an essential factor for radical change and transnational political solidarity.

The Black left feminist agenda, which was a direct product of theory and historical struggles, centered on the "triple oppression" of Black women who stood at the axis of race, class, and sex oppression. McDuffie convincingly demonstrates that Black Communist women were the first to explicitly articulate the theoretical paradigm of "triple oppression" or what we have come to know as intersectionality. Louise Thompson Patterson's article, "Toward a Brighter Dawn," appeared in 1936 in *Woman Today*, over fifty years before Kimberle Crenshaw published her groundbreaking article, "Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence against Women of Color," in the *Stanford Law Review*. Indeed, the concept of intersectionality had been articulated in earlier Black feminist texts including the 1977 feminist manifesto of the Combahee

River Collective. However, what McDuffie highlights for his readers are the intellectual contours of Black left feminism of the 1930s and how it formulated a paradigm that was characteristic of Black feminism of the 1970s.

The decades between Thompson Patterson's publication, "Toward a Brighter Dawn," and the Combahee River Collective Statement are important years for Black left feminists. Brilliantly, McDuffie weaves together three generations of Black left feminists to show the direct intellectual, political, and personal links to twentieth-century Black feminists. For instance, Sallye Bell Davis was a member of the Southern Negro Youth Congress, and her children spent summers in New York with Louise Thompson Patterson's family, Esther Cooper Jackson's family, Herbert Aptheker's family, and major Black radicals of the period including Paul Robeson, W.E.B. Du Bois, and Shirley Graham Du Bois. Davis's daughter would later become the famed scholar and prison abolitionist, Angela Davis. The newspaper *Freedomways: A Quarterly Journal of the Negro Movement* is another example of the continuities between Black left feminism of the Old Left period and their successors in the Civil Rights and Black Power era. Esther Cooper Jackson, cofounder and managing editor of the journal, developed content that pushed Black women's voices to the forefront of the Black radical agenda. The publication featured work by seasoned and freshly minted Black women radicals including Shirley Graham Du Bois, Claudia Jones, Louise Thompson Patterson, Beah Richardson, Eslanda Robeson, Lorraine Hansberry, June Jordan, Audre Lorde, Barbara Smith, and Alice Walker. By highlighting these intellectual and personal connections between Black left feminists of the Old Left and Black feminists of the 1970s, *Sojourning for Freedom* offers a new genealogy of the latter, forcing us to rethink our assumptions about the roots of Black feminism of the 1970s. This second intervention challenges the theory of feminist waves and defies long-held beliefs that 1970s Black feminism emerged out of a frustration with White feminists, the larger women's movement, and "parent" organizations of the Civil Rights Movement including the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC).

Finally, *Sojourning for Freedom* introduces a variety of new figures to commonly known Black left radicals. Those familiar with Audley "Queen Mother" Moore, Claudia Jones, and Louise Thompson Patterson will be happy to learn of lesser-known women who worked right alongside them including Thyra Edwards, Bonita Williams, Williana Burroughs, Grace Campbell, and Charlene Mitchell. By assembling and connecting these women's stories to find similarities and differences, McDuffie interrupts the dominant paradigm of singularity. Instead, he argues that this cohort of women had varying relationships with the Communist Left and demonstrates that they arrived at Black Left Feminism in multiple ways. McDuffie expands the historiography of the Black radical tradition that has traditionally excluded Black women.

Sojourning for Freedom joins other pioneering studies on Black women within the Black radical tradition. Among these texts are Carole Boyce Davies's *Left of Karl Marx* and Dayo F. Gore's *Radicalism at the Crossroads.* While Boyce Davies asserts that Claudia Jones was a "radical Black female subject"—an identity that was antiracist, anticapitalist, antisexist, internationalist, and antiimperialist—McDuffie envisions Jones as a Black left feminist. McDuffie rightfully notes his intellectual debt to Davies. However, given the significant overlap between the two terms, one wonders how McDuffie envisions the

"radical Black female subject" as distinct from "Black left feminists." Are we to understand that all Black left feminists were also "radical Black female subjects"? Some readers may also find McDuffie's term slippery in its inclusion of women who were not official members of the Communist Party USA. This critique, however, is minor in relation to McDuffie's major interventions, which center on the Black women's radical politics.

One of the other strengths of McDuffie's book is the wide array of archival documents on which he draws to support his ideas. These include records from the Russian State Archive alongside over forty oral interviews. Readers will be pleased with his interdisciplinary approach—he integrates a range of secondary sources from various fields including History, Sociology, and Political Science. Ultimately, McDuffie takes his reader on a complex journey through the Communist Left, demonstrating how Black women in the United States crafted an innovative radical Black feminist politics during the early and mid-twentieth century. These women's political activism laid the groundwork for Black feminist movements of the 1970s. I highly recommended this book to anyone interested in Black feminism, radicalism, or Communism.

Jasmin A. Young
Rutgers University, New Brunswick

Melynda J. Price. *At the Cross: Race, Religion, and Citizenship in the Politics of the Death Penalty* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), $27.95, 220 pp. ISBN: 978-0-19-020554-6 (paper).

In this captivating study of race, religion, and the politics of the death penalty, Melynda J. Price explores the myriad ways that capital punishment constrains the citizenship of African-Americans and informs their political ideology. With the exception of scholars such as Jon Hurwitz and Mark Peffley, political scientists have paid scant attention to the relationship between race, crime, and citizenship. The few existing studies tend to focus on how incarceration and capital punishment affects Black voting. Price argues that scholars must move beyond this narrow framework and instead examine the other ways that the death penalty and incarceration affect Black political thought and practice.

Price begins by looking at two death penalty cases in Texas that came to a conclusion in the late 1990s, those of Karla Faye Tucker and Gary Graham. Both were on death row for murder, yet the public reactions to both were heavily informed by race, gender, and religion. While Tucker, a white woman, received widespread support for a commuted sentence because of her religious transformation, few outside the Black community paid attention to Graham's similar transformation and protestations of innocence. Although most attributed the widespread support for sparing Tucker's life to religion, Price argues that her "religious transformation was made palatable by her gender and racial identity" (34). Regardless of personal religious beliefs, African-American prisoners on death row cannot be redeemed in the eyes of the broader public.

Price notes that part of the widespread support within the Black community for Graham's exoneration, or at least a commuted sentence, was due to notions of linked fate among African-Americans. Drawing data from the Houston Area Survey, which has been conducted every year since 1982, Price shows that 52% of African-Americans are opposed to the death penalty and this opposition is correlated with feelings of discrimination. Blacks with a lower socioeconomic status often feel higher levels of discrimination and are more likely to oppose the death penalty. In addition, religious fundamentalists, a category that includes 56.5% of survey respondents, were also more likely to oppose the death penalty. Those who support the death penalty within the Black community are usually more highly educated, more financially well off, and report low feelings of discrimination. This latter group was more likely to identify as religiously liberal or secular.

A major contribution of this study is the way Price demonstrates that the politics of the death penalty have significant ramifications beyond Black voting. She does this in part through her examination of *Batson* hearings in chapter two. These hearing are attempts by the legal system to ensure that discrimination based on race does not occur in peremptory challenges to jurors. Although they were designed to prevent discrimination, the low

standard of evidence that justifies dismissal of potential jurors simply "allow[s] for the appearance of fairness while requiring little work on the part of courts and prosecutors to alter biased practices" (42). Jurors can be struck from capital cases because of their opposition to the death penalty, attitude, mannerisms, and even having friends and family in the legal system. With jury duty often being seen as an essential right of citizenship, the fact that Blacks are often excluded from this right demonstrates "the diffuse ways in which the dysfunctional relationship of the state to African Americans manifests itself" (54).

At the Cross convincingly demonstrates that the politics of the death penalty also heavily influence Black political thought. Building on the work of political theorists such as Michael Dawson, Price argues that the death penalty and its unequal application to African-Americans significantly contributes to the growing strain of disillusioned liberalism that Dawson examines in his seminal work *Black Visions*. Drawing from focus group data, Price notes that shootings and police brutality, along with the death penalty, have undermined Blacks' beliefs in core values of citizenship, including ideas about equality. Although many individuals articulated a religious opposition to the death penalty, they still did not believe that Karle Faye Tucker should have gotten clemency because of her religious conversion. African-Americans' views on the death penalty constitute an "inversion of equality" where they advocate more for parity in sentencing than actual equality.

Price's examination of religion is both a strength and limitation of the study. On the one hand, she convincingly demonstrates the importance of religious language in Black opposition to the death penalty. Many survey respondents and focus group participants said they opposed the death penalty because judgment belongs to God, not to man. At the same time, however, these individuals often noted that their church's position on the death penalty would not sway their view of it and that whites should not escape capital punishment because of their religion. They also expressed skepticism of any type of jailhouse conversion. This raises the question of just how important religion really was to their view of capital punishment? And if religion is not as central in ideas on the death penalty as Price or others have hypothesized, what other areas of Black political thought might have been less influenced by religious belief than previously believed?

A broader focus might have enabled Price to explore these latter two questions in more depth. She admirably weaves together a wide array of sources, including archival materials, court cases, focus groups, surveys, newspapers, speeches, and sermons. Yet the focus on data almost solely from the Houston metropolitan area limits the reach of her conclusions. While Houston is probably the best place to study Blacks' ideas of the death penalty, given the number of capital cases that originate there, examining just one city does not allow for the diversity of opinion within the Black community to be fully displayed, especially with regards to religion. Of the twenty-one participants in her focus groups, for example, all were Christian and thirteen were Baptist. Contrasting the data she gleans from the focus groups in Houston to data pulled from elsewhere that includes Blacks of other faiths or no faith at all would have made this study all the more stronger. These small issues aside, *At the Cross* is a well-written and important book that will be of interest to students and scholars of Black politics, history, and religion.

Christopher Cameron
University of North Carolina at Charlotte

Lakeyta M. Bonnette. *Pulse of the People: Political Rap Music and Black Politics* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015), $45.00, 219 pp. ISBN 978-0-8122-4684-1 (cloth).

Hip-hop music has entered fully into its fourth decade in both American and global culture. Billions of people have engaged in its rhythms and debates, transforming the analysis of lived experience in national and transnational contexts. Lakeyta Bonnette enters this conversation with an inspired work of political science titled *Pulse of the People: Political Rap Music and Black Politics*. Bonnette centers the analysis within the framework of youth politics and reaches out to the relevant, preceding political theories to explain the evolution of this music and its participant cultures. The most pressing methodological question she raises is, "How does political rap shape and inform public discourse in the late twentieth and early twenty-first century?"

The specific answer at the core of this work is that political rap is a reliable measure of thoughts and opinions among millions of people often marginalized by traditional surveys of attitudes and political beliefs. For Bonnette, it is a chorus of the historically voiceless, speaking to wider communities that exist and thrive despite their exclusion. The implicit affirmation that the people who constituted the Black poor and working class in the United States between 1970 and 2010 possessed an agency that found expression in beats, rhymes, graffiti, and break dancing is the foundation of this text. Bonnette covers the political and cultural contexts that shaped political rap before considering the deeper ideologies of nationalism and feminism that informed the public attitudes emerging from the music.

The reach of hip-hop music as a platform for ideological formation offers the basis for the early chapters. Arguing for its audience as diverse and inclusive, Bonnette explains the varieties of Black Nationalism that influenced early rappers and deejays. Here, Mark Anthony Neal's work becomes the central contributor to engage the long-standing debate in the African-American scholarly community about the standards for determining the political content of new artistic expression. Nas and Goodie Mob provide the specific lyrical content to illustrate the veins of Black Nationalist verses, but more recent work by Pharoahe Monch and Immortal Technique could have supported the points more forcefully. The strongest point in *Pulse of the People* is the discussion of political resistance as it manifested in rap music. Connecting artists as diverse as Grandmaster Flash and the Furious Five with Tupac Shakur and Young Jeezy, Bonnette scrutinizes lyrics closely to document the transformation of a political discourse across generations to counter the assertion that all rap music had become commercialized by the start of the twenty-first century.

How can one determine that rap music's ideologies actually had an impact on the diverse audiences, as Bonnette suggests? Here, she enlists Catherine Tabb-Powell and Melissa Harris-Lacewell to bring political science survey methodology into the analysis

of hip-hop in the African-American community. Though the sample sizes were limited, there were provocative findings that merit further investigation. Bonnette found that exposure to political hip-hop increased the audience's support for Black Nationalist ideology by a significant margin relative to her control groups. Exposure to rhythm and blues and nonpolitical rap music did not have this effect. This effect deserves additional study and more widespread analysis. Standardizing song selection and other elements of the methodology could develop numerous applications within the social sciences and various interdisciplinary areas of inquiry. In a related point, Bonnette documents how nonpolitical rap music had a discernable mitigating effect on audiences' support for Black feminism. The juxtaposition of these two results could help explain many of the tropes in mass media's discussion of rap music that conflate nationalism and misogyny.

In the fifth chapter, Bonnette provides a detailed engagement with several of the significant political movements that emerged from political rap music. The Hip Hop Summit Action Network (HSAN), National Hip Hop Political Convention, the Hip Hop Caucus, the Ella Baker Center, the Stop the Violence movement, and movements around the Jena 6, Troy Davis, and Trayvon Martin provide important insights about local and regional social movements that foreshadowed transformative international events like Black Lives Matter and Black on Campus. Even more valuable, *Pulse of the People* considers the role of hip-hop in the presidential campaigns of Barack Obama. However, it does not stop there. Bonnette goes further to consider the long-term implications of hip-hop encouraging its listeners to run for public office through organizations like Conscious Hip Hop Activism Necessary for Global Empowerment (CHHANGE). Other youth-protest organizations like the 1994 Rutgers University antiracism protesters and the coalition of Philadelphia activist organizations, the Ujima Collective, also contribute to a more accurate understanding of how civil rights activism evolved on campus and in neighborhoods in the wake of the disastrous policies under presidents Ronald Reagan, George H. W. Bush, and William J. Clinton between 1981 and 2001.

The study of hip-hop has gained a critical mass in the global academy since early works like Robin D. G. Kelley's *Race Rebels* and Tricia Rose's *Black Noise* first appeared. The precarious balance between the rigorous standards of disciplinary scholarship and the energetic passion of rap's lyrical expression remains evident in works like *Pulse of the People*. In many ways, Bonnette and the emerging generation of Hip Hop Studies scholars around the world are the vanguard of a movement that has existed like the Underground Railroad did in the middle of the nineteenth century. Where Rose and Kelley blazed trails, Neal, Jeffrey Ogbar, Tracy Sharpley-Whiting, Lester Spence, and Imani Perry have expanded networks, providing new opportunities for publication and promotion. These scholars all share the experience of hip-hop that Bonnette incorporates so powerfully into her writing. Yet, somehow, her voice is less shackled by the disciplinary conventions that those previous works labored under. This evolution speaks to the distinct moment in the early twenty-first century when works like *Pulse of the People* have the power to reinvent epistemological boundaries in ways only imagined by Frederick Douglass, Fannie Lou Hamer, and Marcus Garvey. The risks involved in breaking academic traditions in research are substantial, but the rewards are the creation of new universities actually worthy of the name.

Walter D. Greason
Monmouth University

A Note on Passing

Cedric J. Robinson (1940–2016)
Cedric J. Robinson: The Black Radical Tradition and the Quest for Universal Freedom

On Sunday June 5, 2016, we lost an intellectual titan and genius. Robinson was an innovative and creative thinker who took on the task of challenging American/Western regimes of knowledge at their core and foundation. In his five books and numerous articles he unmasks the mythology and folklore that passes as objective and unbiased truth. Cedric's scholarship challenges the liberal and Marxist narratives and theories of political change laying bare the racial character of capitalism. Robinson excavated a Black Radical Tradition that has been hidden in plain site: analyzing its political, cultural, and intellectual bases; interrogating the secular origins of socialism in Marxism; and exploring the Proletariat as a class distinctively responsible for leading the struggles against capitalism, imperialism and all other "-isms" from racism, classism to feminism. Robinson also demonstrates how the captains of the transnational corporations used films, theater, indeed, popular culture to socialize the Black and Third World populations and women into accepting new racial regimes through film and media. Further he shows how fragile these regimes are as *things do fall apart* revealing the extent that violence, chaos and disorder are critical dimensions of racial capitalism and its "terms of order." Robinson's scholarship builds on the work of his predecessors including W.E.B. Du Bois, C.L.R. James, Oliver C. Cox, Eric Williams, and Walter Rodney to name a few. The scope and depth of his scholarship is similar to that of Edward Said, Sylvia Wynter, and Michael Foucault. He drew attention to how Africans and people of African descent, that is, Global Africans, were critical actors in the ancient, medieval and modern world. He interrogates how the European demonization of Islam and Black people later morphed into the "creation and fear of the Negro" manifest today as Islamophobia through the war against terrorism and the fear of the black criminal. Robinson's criticism of this process of demonization is particularly relevant in the contemporary period of militarized policing, increased killings of unarmed Black males, females, and children by street level bureaucrats (the police) under a neoliberalism regime writ large. In Cedric's scholarship the Global African problematic was a critical part of the discourse on Ancient Greece, Medieval Europe, plantations in the Mediterranean, the Carolinas and the Caribbean islands.

Cedric was born and raised in Oakland, California in 1940. He was influenced by his grandfather Winston "Cap" Whiteside whom he consistently identified as one of the most important influences on his intellectual development. He grew up in a typical black

working class family where a largely extended family raised him. His grandparents moved to Oakland in the 1920s fleeing for their lives having made the escape from Alabama. Cedric's pursuit of academic excellence and social change through activism at the high school, undergraduate and graduate and post-graduate levels were no doubt, influenced by his grandparents and extended family. It became a signature feature of his academic career. As Robin D. G. Kelley has noted, Cedric's marriage to Elizabeth Robinson in 1967 and his participation in Black Study groups that engaged and interrogated Black identity, African decolonization, historical and contemporary racism, and read the works of Ralph Ellison, Du Bois, E. Franklin Frazier, and Melville Herskovits among others. This loose assembly morphed into the Afro-American Association, led by Donald Warden, a law a student at Boalt Hall. Indeed, Cedric was part of the original group, which subsequently attracted future Black Panthers Bobby Seale, and Huey P. Newton.

After a short stint in the military and a job with the California criminal justice system, Cedric continued his graduate education first at San Francisco State (around the time the Third World Liberation Front was fighting for an Ethnic Studies College) and later Stanford University pursuing graduate degrees in Political Science where he encountered a very cold and isolating environment. Cedric's dissertation challenged the theoretical and methodology tenets of American/Western Political Science including its key paradigmatic principals, Karl Popper and Thomas Kuhn. Robinson identified how the discipline of political science rested on foundational myths including the insistence on politicality producing stability, order and democracy, when in fact, disorder, conflict and turbulence are the terms of order. Robinson examined how the political science enterprise revolves around a mythic conception of individual/elite leadership. Through his case study on the Tonga and other peoples of the global South Robinson, demonstrated how collective leadership has been the norm across space and time. Robinson thus refuted the claims that the new states in Africa, Asia, and the Caribbean should emulate democratic capitalism and its phony notions about the origins of leadership and political order. SUNY Press published his dissertation: *The Terms of Order: Political Science and the Myth of Leadership* in 1980 and like *Black Marxism: the Making of the Black Radical Tradition* (1983), it was totally ignored. The University of North Carolina Press birthed new life into both issuing second editions, *Black Marxism* in 2000 and *Terms of Order* in 2016.

Robinson continued his pursuit of academic excellence and activism at the University of Michigan where he was recruited in 1972 after he and Elizabeth spent a year in England where Cedric completed his dissertation. The Stanford Political Science department had a hard time coming to terms with Cedric's erudite and elegant critique of conventional political science notions of order and authority but eventually signed off on this work. At this juncture, the University of Michigan was in turmoil as a result of the Black Action Movement (BAM) demands that the University substantially increase the number of Black/Minority faculty and students; this movement rocked the campus to its core. Cedric was hired jointly in the Center for African American Studies and the Department of Political Science. Elizabeth pursued her MA degree in Anthropology. Cedric joined forces with a group of radical faculty including Archie Singham, Mick Taussig in anthropology, Nancy Hartsock, Bill Ellis and Joel Samoff (African Studies specialists), Harold Cruse (History) among others. He also became part of the Black Matters Committee (BMC) in Political Science. BMC made similar demands on the Political Science Department: that it increase

the number of Black, Chicano and Chicana, and women graduate students. BMC played a critical role in recruiting the largest number of minority and women students in Political Science in the Big Ten Universities in the early 1970s. Cedric and Elizabeth Robinson provided guidance and support after several of the radical faculty—Bill Ellis and Archie Singham departed as the environment in the political science department chilled. Through workshops, courses in political theory including a course on Anarchism, Cedric Robinson provided this cohort of students with the interdisciplinary armor that enabled them to not only survive but also thrive in this competitive milieu. Cedric also was involved and had discourse with other political activists in the Michigan and Midwest area including C.L.R. James, James and Grace Boggs, Robert S. Williams, members and leaders of the Dodge Revolutionary Workers Movement, other local Garveyites and socialists in the surrounding communities. He later moved to SUNY-Binghamton in 1973 where he served as the Chair of the African American and African Studies Department. He also was involved with activism in the Empire state and worked with Terence Hopkins and Immanuel Wallerstein among others. He continued his mentoring of both graduate and undergraduate students. Elizabeth pursued her Ph.D. in Anthropology and worked as a graduate assistant in Sociology during the founding of the Braudel Center for the Study of Economies, Historical Systems, and Civilizations. The Robinsons also left their mark on the Braudel Center's intellectual development particularly with its focus on activist scholars and graduate students in its early years. Their daughter Nadja was born in Binghamton as they navigated the terrain between Global Africa and the world system.

In 1978 Cedric became the director of the Center for Black Studies Research and joined the Political Science Department (later serving as its head) at the University of California, Santa Barbara (UCSB). He, Elizabeth and Nadja spent a year in the English village of Radwinter, and this was the start of a life-long association with the Institute of Race Relations, writing for its journal—*Race & Class*. He conducted research at Cambridge University and published a slew of articles. He continued and extended his mentorship of undergraduate and graduate students, postdoctoral fellows, and young faculty. He was involved in social movements in Santa Barbara and the surrounding communities including Black and Chicano political movements in Lompoc, Oxnard, etc. He also continued to publish innovative texts and journal articles revolving around the quest by Global Africa for universal freedom beyond the clutches and guise of racial capitalism. In 2004, the NCOBPS annual conference in Chicago, Illinois included a special political theory panel on *Cedric Robinson's Black Marxism*. He was a founding member of NCOBPS and his mentorship as well as his scholarship exemplifies the goals of this organization. We can keep his legacy alive through extending his scholarship, by building on and extending epistemologies and ontologies of freedom.

Darryl C. Thomas

A Note on Passing

Savannah N. Carroll (1986–2016)

Dr. Savannah N. Carroll, born February 3, 1986, departed this life on April 7, 2016. Dr. Carroll was a devoted member of the National Conference of Black Political Scientists (NCOBPS), having been a member as a graduate student and professional. Dr. Carroll was a former Graduate Student Representative (2012–2014) to the NCOBPS Council, and she organized the inaugural Founders Symposium, which highlights critical, scholarly discussions and research in the discipline in honor of our organization's Founders. In May 2015, just weeks after successfully defending her Ph.D. dissertation on the Afro-Mexican presence in Mexico (*Creating the Ideal Mexican: 20th and 21st Century Racial and National Identity Discourses in Oaxaca*) from the Department of Afro-American Studies (History and Politics Track; Certificate in Latin American, Caribbean, and Latino Studies) at the University of Massachusetts, she was diagnosed with breast cancer, and she valiantly fought the disease for almost a year, before succumbing to her illness. Amid, chemotherapy, radiation, and several surgeries, she completed academic job and post-doctoral fellowship applications. From her hospital bed, she helped plan the 2016 Founders Day Symposium, and she served "on-call" to assist with handling organizational matters, as the 2016 NCOBPS Annual Meeting convened and as she was unable to attend, due to her medical condition. She lost her battle with cancer, just weeks before her Ph.D. graduation, and thus, she received her degree posthumously. Her research has been published in the *International Journal of Interdisciplinary Civic & Political Studies* and the *Journal of Pan African Studies*. Dr. Carroll's will to beat cancer, striving to enjoy life to its fullest, fierce desire to encourage others to reach for their highest limits, and persistence to give unselfishly to NCOBPS, all contribute to the budding scholar, who NCOBPS acknowledges she was and who it grieves in passing too soon. It is because of her spirit and tenacious drive to serve NCOBPS that President Todd C. Shaw has expressed the honor of dedicating the 2017 Founders Day Symposium to commemorate the service, dedication, and memory of Dr. Savannah N. Carroll.

Shayla Nunnally

A Note on Passing

Otis Franklin Madison (1943–2015)

Otis Franklin Madison passed on December 29, 2015, at the age of seventy-two. Otis was a husband, father, grandfather, intellectual, researcher, professor, and mentor. Otis was a fastidious researcher, a charismatic lecturer, and a wonderful mentor in the Department of Black Studies at the University of California, Santa Barbara (UCSB) since 1984. In recognition of his work, he was awarded Professor of the Year by UCSB Mortar Board in 1992.

He served in the US Air Force during the Vietnam War era and was stationed in Udorn, Thailand. On his return to the United States, he completed a bachelor's degree in Political Science at St. Mary's University in San Antonio. He began the doctoral program in Political Science at UCSB in 1975, serving as a teaching assistant in both Political Science and Black Studies. He also taught courses for many years in the Summer Transitional Enrichment Program. He was a research fellow in the Center for Black Studies and lecturer in the Department of Black Studies.

Some of Otis' most popular courses included the Civil Rights Movement; Scientific Racism; Blacks in the Media; Black Marxism; Obama—Political and Cultural Phenomenon; Blacks in the Military/The Black Soldier in the United States; Racism, Sports, and Politics. His topics in Politics included the following: A History of the Black Athlete in the US; Racism, Law, and the Constitution; Black Radicals and the Radical Tradition; and Analyses of Racism and Social Policy in the US.

UCSB Chancellor Henry T. Yang described Otis as the "cornerstone of our Department of Black Studies for nearly three decades, serving as a dedicated and influential lecturer. He was a powerful intellectual and phenomenal teacher whose career had a profound impact on countless students and colleagues."

One of his colleagues described him as "an intellectual force in Black Studies, a shepherd of minds and hearts. His faith in ideas and persuasion was so powerful. And thus his belief in our ability to change the world remained palpable and strong."

Otis had a profound effect on the lives of students, and his permanent contract as a lecturer at UCSB was a product of student organizing, protests, and petitioning in his support. When there were few Black Studies graduate programs in the United States, Otis trained several generations of future scholars in Black Studies through his work with graduate teaching assistants.

University of California, Los Angeles Professor Gaye Theresa Johnson, a former student and colleague of Otis, fondly recalled, "Otis loved to learn and he loved to know.

He loved to read new things and lived to honor the histories we aren't meant to find, and taught us all—his colleagues, his students, his friends—to be witnesses to the undeniable, unimaginable beauty and endurance of Black people, Black life, Black radicalism."

Otis' office reflected his love of research. From the floor to the ceiling were collections of books, papers, and media resources. Otis knew exactly where everything was and graciously shared his inventory with students and colleagues. In honor, and in deep appreciation of his research, the "Otis Madison Archive Project" is underway in collaboration with the Department of Black Studies and the campus library at UCSB.

Otis Franklin Madison is survived by his wife, Joanne Yansen Madison; his sons, Taiwo Odion Madison and Kehinde Omwokha Madison; and his daughter, SaidaaKai Madison of Santa Barbara, California.

He is also survived by his daughters, Shermain Lynette Norton (Ricky) of San Antonio, Texas, and Shirnell L. Madison of Aurora, Colorado; his grandsons, Justin Madison and Jeremo Madison; and many more family members, friends, colleagues, teaching assistants, and students.

Françoise B. Cromer
Yolanda Marquez
H.L.T. Quan

A Note on Passing

Jerry Gafio Watts (1953–2015)

Jerry G. Watts—myth, legend, and real. These are the words that come to mind when I think of my mentor and my (academic) friend. His personality filled a room, his intellect drew us in, and his compassion encouraged us to stay in the room at his feet learning from all he had to share. Jerry G. Watts was the epitome of Blackness in academic life. His sense of identity was present in how he walked the halls and in his scholarship. When I think of not bowing down to power, I imagine Jerry Watts.

Many moons ago, when I was a newly minted Ph.D. in political science I met Jerry G. Watts. Our paths crossed at Trinity College in Hartford Connecticut. I can still remember our first meeting. To me Jerry was like a giant. What made Jerry a giant in my eyes was the type of boldness he embodied. I was in awe of how he navigated academia with a type of authenticity mixed with an intellectual acumen that will never be matched.

Dr. Jerry G. Watts, a professor at CUNY Graduate Center, earned his B.A. from Harvard and PhD from Yale University. Dr. Watts authored a number of works, including: *Heroism and the Black Intellectual: Reflections on Ralph Ellison, Politics, and Afro-American Intellectual Life* and *Amiri Baraka: The Politics and Art of a Black Intellectual*, which continue to have substantial interdisciplinary impact.

Beyond his intellectual power, Dr. Watts is also known for his commitment to mentoring. His commitment to mentoring is reflected in "Open Letter to My Students and Anyone Else." This letter invites all who read it to engage in critical reflection on what it means to be a scholar. He writes,

"Simply put, the productive/creative scholar must immerse himself/herself in a body of literature and master that body of knowledge before he or she can go forth and creatively engage a discipline."

I continue to ponder these words and in fact have them printed and next to my computer. I (re)vist these words each time I sit to write as they have a way of not only grounding me in the academy but in keeping me honest about what I am doing and how.

Jerry had a way of engaging anyone and everyone. I had an opportunity to observe Jerry when I gave a talk at CUNY graduate school. I watched him in his interactions with various staff members, graduate students, and his peers. What was beautiful was that Jerry never changed how he interacted with these various individuals. The way he greeted them was the same, he greeted individuals as though he were genuinely delighted to be in their presence. Here was a man of great intellectual powers who never used it to belittle or condemn. Instead, he always challenged and encouraged all he mentored and

interacted with to not shy away from the difficult questions. He had a way of calling out nonsense while inspiring critical thinking. This is a dialectic that is not easily achievable. Somehow, Jerry was able to walk this dialectic and often with a laugh. In his presence I always felt that I could be my best possible self. To me Jerry G. Watts will always be myth, legend, and real.

In conclusion I offer you the words of Jerry G. Watts ". . . we have to set our own sense of intellectual ambition and then use that sense of ambition to inspire our work."

Julia Jordan-Zachery

A Note on Passing

Michael James de Ramus Mitchell (1944–2015)

Dr. Michael James de Ramus Mitchell passed on October 27, 2015 at the age of seventy-one. A stalwart and respected NCOBPS member as well as an editor of the *National Political Science Review*, Michael was an intellectual, scholar, pioneer, internationalist, teacher, mentor, son, father, grandfather, friend, and legend. Though she spoke no English, Vanderli Salatiel came from *Sao Paulo* to Phoenix, Arizona for services on November 5, 2015, to express through a translator, the grief, friendship, and affection of Afro-Brazilian scholars and activists at Michael's passing.

Michael received his bachelor's degree from Fordham University, his MA and PhD from Indiana University. His internationalism began with a stint as a summer intern in the State Department. That led to a junior year abroad in Santiago, Chile. After he graduated from Fordham, he and his wife, Ina, served as Peace Corps volunteers in Hualpencillo, Chile.

Michael conducted his PhD dissertation research in *Sao Paulo* during the height of the oppressive Brazilian military dictatorship. The apartment he and Ina shared served as a safe house and meeting place for the Afro-Brazilians secretly trying to revitalize the Black Movement in Brazil and who eventually became the leading cadres in the creation of *o movimento Negro Unificado*, The Unified Black Movement.

Dr. Mitchell's dissertation, *Racial Consciousness and Political Attitudes and Behavior in Sao Paulo Brazil*, became required reading for every serious student of Afro-Brazilian politics throughout the world. Along with Anani Dzidzienyo and J. Michael Turner, he was one of a handful of scholars who set the study of Afro-Brazilian politics on solid academic ground and legitimized it. Scholars in the United States who came under Michael's direct tutelage include Kim Butler, David Covin, Gladys Mitchell-Walthour, Tiffany Willoughby-Herard, Micol Siegel, LaTonya Williams, Mark Sawyer, Ollie Johnson, Heath Fogg-Davis, Gail Crook, and Melissa Nobles. In Brazil, the numbers defy enumeration. He taught at Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Princeton University, St. Peter's College, SUNY Albany and settled at Arizona State University, which he referred to fondly as, "in the desert."

Michael was the intellectual leader of the National Conference of Black Political Scientists' (NCOBPS) initiative—The Race and Democracy in the Americas Project. Indeed, he named it. That singular cross-national collaboration increased the number of credentialed Afro-Brazilian scholars of politics exponentially. One of them, Luiza Bairros, became the only Black minister in Dilma's first national cabinet.

Although best known for his work on Brazil, Michael was an accomplished student of Afro-Latino politics taken broadly, of Brazilian politics writ large, Pan African politics, and US politics, as his editorship of the *National Political Science Review* (NPSR) amply testifies. As the fourth editor of the NPSR, following the long and productive editorship of Georgia Persons, who institutionalized the journal, Michael cemented that institutionalization by insuring that the NPSR continued, intact, following the tenure of its legacy editor.

Michael's surviving immediate family consists of Ina, his wife of fifty years; son Martin; daughter Sahar and her husband, Stephen; and grand daughters Raven and Amara. They are joined in their grief by family, friends, and colleagues around the world, and by his NCOBPS family whom he served as both a pillar and a beacon.

David Covin

The *National Political Science Review* (NPSR)
Invitation to the Scholarly Community

The editors of the *National Political Science Review* (NPSR) invite submissions from the scholarly community for review and possible publication.

The NPSR is a refereed journal of the National Conference of Black Political Scientists. Its editions appear annually and comprise the highest quality scholarship related to the experiences of African-Americans in the American political community as well as in the wider reach of the African diaspora in the Western Hemisphere. It also focuses on the international links between African-Americans and the larger community of nations, particularly with Africa.

Among the more common areas of research, which the NPSR considers for publication, are those typically associated with political behavior and attitudes; the performance of political institutions; the efficacy of public policy, interest groups, and social movements; interethnic coalition building; and theoretical reflections that offer insights on the minority political experience. On the basis of recent interest, the NPSR also considers work on the role of culture in politics.

Manuscripts should be submitted in the following format. Submissions should follow the style conventions of the *American Political Science Review* (APSR). Two copies of the submissions should be conveyed electronically to the editors at the e-mail addresses listed below. One copy of the submission should include the author's or authors' information comprising the name that will appear in the published version along with the author's/authors' institutional affiliation and e-mail addresses. The other copy should delete the author's/authors' information from the title page. Please indicate the lead author and his/her email address in cases of multiple authors. Manuscripts should not carry footnotes at the bottom of the page but should be inserted as endnotes. They should not exceed thirty typewritten pages; should be double-spaced, inclusive of notes and references; and should be prepared and sent to the editors in the Microsoft Word format. Graphics should be done in grayscale rather than in color.

Manuscripts are reviewed on a rolling basis. However, submissions should be received no later than July 1 of the current year to be considered for publication in a forthcoming issue.

Further queries about the NPSR as well as submissions may be addressed (e-mail only) to the editors at:

Tiffany Willoughby-Herard
Managing Editor
Department of African American Studies
University of California, Irvine
E-mail: npsreditors@gmail.com.